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Magical realist fiction is marked by a striking abundance of animals.  Analysing magical 
realist novels from Australia and Canada, as well as exploring the influence of two 
seminal Latin American magical realist narratives, this thesis focuses on representations 
of animals and animality.  Examining human-animal relationships in the postcolonial 
context reveals that magical realism embodies and represents an idea of feral animality 
that critically engages with an inherently imperialist and Cartesian humanism, and that, 
moreover, accounts for magical realism‟s elusiveness within systems of genre 
categorisation and labelling.  It is this embodiment and presence of animal agency that 
animates magical realism and injects it with life and vibrancy.  The magical realist writers 
discussed in this dissertation make use of animal practices inextricably intertwined with 
imperialism, such as pastoral farming, natural historical collections, the circus, the rodeo, 
the Wild West show, and the zoo, as well as alternative animal practices inherently 
incompatible with European ideologies, such as the Aboriginal Dreaming, Native North 
American animist beliefs, and subsistence hunting, as different ways of positioning 
themselves in relation to the Cartesian human subject.  The circus is a particular influence 
on the form and style of many magical realist texts, whereby oxymoronically structured 
circensian spaces form the basis of the narratives‟ realities, and hierarchical imperial 
structures and hegemonic discourses that are portrayed as natural through Cartesian 
science and Linnaean taxonomies are revealed as deceptive illusions that perpetuate the 
self-interests of the powerful.
  
To Kerstin and Ingrid Anna 
Also, to Good Friends 
  
“In Pliny’s observations I discovered that man, 
far from being central in this life, lived in a 
parlous world beyond his knowledge, . . . a 
world in which man is lost & less but lost & less 
amidst the marvellous, the extraordinary, the 
gorgeously inexplicable wonder of a universe 
only limited by one’s own imagining of it.”  
  
— Richard Flanagan, Gould’s Book of Fish 
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Introduction 
Literary animals, in magical realism and elsewhere, are conventionally regarded as cyphers, 
symbols or props, whose importance lies in the meaning they give to others, the values they 
represent, or the role they play as part of the setting or landscape.  Through their 
transformation into figures of speech, nonhuman animals themselves, who form the basis of 
such symbolic representations, have been virtually erased from the consciousness of readers 
and literary critics alike.  Yet, as Erica Fudge writes, “[a] symbolic animal is only a symbol . . 
. unless it is related to the real,” and “it is in use—in the material relation with the animal—
that representations must be grounded” (“Left-Handed Blow” 7, original emphasis).  By 
“use” she means “practical use,” such as “meat-eating, sport, work, or any other form,” ways 
in which we engage with and treat animals (Fudge, “Left-Handed Blow” 7).  Examining such 
material uses of, and interactions with, animals may generate new and productive modes of 
reading, and shed light on some of the ways in which animal practices influence literary 
production and vice versa.  Starting from this premise, this thesis explores the role of 
animality in the context of postcolonial magical realist fiction from Latin America, Australia 
and Canada.  Taking local as well as globalised animal practices and human-animal 
relationships into account, I analyse the nature of a mode of writing characteristically marked 
by a striking abundance and prominence of animals.  As magical realism typically blurs the 
boundaries between human and nonhuman animals, the exploration of what “animals” and 
“animality” mean is a concern throughout this thesis.  This thesis is therefore situated at the 
intersection of postcolonial literary studies and animal studies, also known as human-animal 
studies. 
Critical attention has thus far overlooked the significance of nonhuman animals in 
magical realist fiction.  Surprisingly, critics have barely registered their presence.  There are 
some cursory observations, such as Sophie Masson„s identification of “fabulous beasts” as 
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one of the “devices of magical realism” used in Mudrooroo‟s Master of the Ghost Dreaming 
(qtd. in Shoemaker, Mudrooroo 80), but other than that, even critics who are clearly 
perceptive regarding the prominence of nonhuman animals in magical realism omit to 
comment on, let alone discuss in depth, the significance of animals “in and for themselves,” 
as John Simons puts it, rather than as symbols alone (6).  Maria Takolander‟s Catching 
Butterflies: Bringing Magical Realism to Ground, for instance, only mentions García 
Márquez‟ “butterfly plagues” in passing, alongside “flying virgins,” as one of the images that 
have become inseparably associated with magical realism (20).  She also counts “Colombian 
butterfly plagues” as one of several images that contribute to what she considers magical 
realism‟s “air of an exotic artifact and promise of authentic fantasy” (Takolander 13).  
However, despite the title of her book, these are her only comments on butterflies.  Similarly, 
Takolander lists several instances of human-animal metamorphoses as examples of “an 
„irrational‟ non-Western conception of reality.” yet she never registers the specific roles 
animality may play in these examples, or its importance as a marker of the mode (72, see also 
73-4).  Thus, animals are dismissed as representing merely one of so many ornamental signs 
of the exotic. 
Carolyn Pinet, in turn, in “Choosing Barrabás: Dog as Text and Text as Dog in Isabel 
Allende‟s La casa de los espíritus,” considers the dog Barrabás not as dog but as a “cypher,” 
representative of “the marginal” made “central,” in order to “reinstate the „trivial‟ 
(background) as foreground” (57).  She observes that Barrabás stands for suppressed Chilean 
history and the experience of “the dispossessed in Chile,” particularly Chilean women living 
in a patriarchal society and under a dictatorship (Pinet 62-3).  To Pinet, Barrabás symbolises 
the “voice” of these marginal groups, as well as “the power of the dialogic text” as a “place 
of many voices and many stories which are constantly being revised, restated, and restored” 
(63).  Pointing out the parallel between Barrabás‟ reappearance throughout the narrative and 
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the foregrounding of marginal elements is perceptive, but Pinet makes no connection to 
Barrabás “as dog” or “as animal.”  She does not consider the possibility that Barrabás may 
have his own doggy ways, interests (such as his penchant for stealing food from the kitchen 
table), and role to play that have nothing to do with immediate human agendas.  Moreover, 
she makes no suggestion as to how the marginal position of nonhuman animals and that of 
the subaltern groups she mentions may be linked. 
These are concerns I discuss throughout this thesis.  Reading beyond animal 
symbolism, or rather, back to actual animals, whose real existence provides the basis for 
imaginary beasts, and analysing the animal practices and human-animal relationships that 
give rise to postcolonial literary representations of animals (nonhuman or human), my aim is 
to gain a fuller understanding of the connections between inter-human relationships, 
ideologies and animal practices, and how these motivate, reinforce and perpetuate the process 
of colonisation.  In treating fictional animals not as decorative, trivial, or purely symbolic, but 
as characters and “irreplaceable living being[s],” as Derrida describes his cat (378-9), this 
approach reveals one of the essential characteristics of magical realism itself: the ferality of 
the mode.  Not only is magical realism‟s inherent ferality reflected in an animal agency 
displayed by individual animals within particular narratives, but it also determines its mode 
of narration, the dynamics of storytelling, as a whole.  Postcolonial magical realism embodies 
and represents an idea of feral animality that critically engages with an inherently imperialist 
and Cartesian humanism.  It is through transcendence of the Cartesian subject that the 
embodiment and presence of animal agency can be acknowledged in the first instance, which, 
in turn, animates magical realism and injects it with life and vibrancy. 
Moreover, the postcolonial magical realist writers discussed in this dissertation use 
animal practices inextricably intertwined with imperialism, such as pastoral farming, natural 
historical collections, the circus, the rodeo, the Wild West show, and the zoo, as well as 
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animal practices inherently incompatible with European ideologies, such as the Aboriginal 
Dreaming, Native North American animist beliefs, and subsistence hunting, as ways of 
engaging with, and positioning themselves in relation to the Cartesian human subject.  The 
circus especially provides a framework for reading animal representations in magical realist 
fiction.  Originally influenced by the works of Franz Kafka, magical realist narratives make 
extensive use of the circus as a thematic and structural concern.  Thus, they create an 
oxymoronically structured “circensian space,” which forms the basis of the narratives‟ 
realities.  In this way, the hierarchical imperial structures and hegemonic discourses that are 
portrayed as natural through Cartesian science, Linnaean taxonomies and realism itself are 
revealed as deceptive illusions that perpetuate the self-interests of the powerful. 
This resistance to Western categories and labelling systems becomes a metatextual 
concern, as magical realism‟s feral animality also accounts for its elusiveness in terms of 
genre distinctions.  This is revealed in profuse critical attempts—and this study is not entirely 
an exception—to define it by distinguishing between “magic,” “magical,” and “marvellous” 
realism, for example, by identifying it as a genre distinct from others such as postmodernism 
or surrealism, and by seeking more precise distinctions for related, similar or liminal modes, 
such as the “bordercases” Jeanne Delbaere-Garant identifies (250).1  Accordingly, this thesis 
discusses variations such as “maban realism” in Chapter Three; trickster narratives, or 
“magical realism?”, which incorporate aspects of magical realism, in Chapter Four; “mythic 
realism” and “Christian Science realism” in Chapter Five; and “faux magical realism” in 
Chapter Six.
2
  However, my use of these multiple sub-categories reflects my awareness that, 
despite numerous studies, literary critics have thus far not been able to fully capture the 
meaning of the label “magical realism”—and nor have I.  I therefore disagree with 
Takolander, for instance, who proposes to “offer . . . an understanding [of magical realist 
fiction] that is contextual and precise” (16). 
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It is my contention that no “precise” definition of magical realism, or of a “magical 
realist literary genre,” as Takolander calls it (15-16), is possible and that, ironically, this is 
precisely the point.  Rather, it is a mode of writing, a way of moving between, and utilising, 
different genres such as realism, fantasy, postmodernism, historical novel, romance, 
mythology and fable, for example, with, however, realism always as its starting and reference 
point.
3
  Rather than adhering to a fixed set of criteria, magical realist narratives are situated 
on a continuum.  The extent to which certain tropes, motifs, images and structural themes are 
employed appears to determine whether particular narratives are perceived “more” or “less” 
like magical realism.
4
  Thereby, the texts more universally recognised as obviously magical 
realist, such as Gabriel García Márquez‟ One Hundred Years of Solitude, foreground those 
animals who transgress boundaries, so-called pest animals, whilst those narratives that re-
domesticate animals and reinforce pastoral ideals, such as Jack Hodgins‟ The Invention of the 
World and Yann Martel‟s Life of Pi, are more contentious in regard to that label.  It makes 
sense to regard magical realism itself, in relation to other genres, as a kind of stray.  
Therefore, throughout the thesis, I speak of tendencies, rather than hard and fast rules. 
I do agree with Takolander, however, that the term cannot be used to apply to just any 
work of fiction which happens to display contradictory elements or supernatural phenomena 
alongside the everyday (cf. Takolander 15).  Fudge‟s assessment of Wind in the Willows as 
“magic realism” is one notable faux pas in this direction (Animal 71).  Just because a talking 
frog drives a car, and because cars exist and talking frogs do not, does not in itself mean the 
narrative is an example of magical realism.  Rather, Wind in the Willows is an instance of 
anthropomorphic representation, conventional to children‟s stories, fairy tales, allegories and 
fables, as Fudge herself observes.  She writes that “the tale told is ultimately about „us‟ 
[humans] and not „them‟ [animals]” (Fudge, Animal 71).  Steve Baker discusses such 
anthropomorphic representations in talking-animal stories in relation to Rupert Bear, for 
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example, who protests that he is “not that sort of bear,” that is, a real bear (128).  
Notwithstanding any supplementary role animality may play in such stories (see Steve Baker 
138-9), a notable difference between talking-animal stories, such as Wind in the Willows, and 
magical realism is the magical realist tendency to give animals a very material, “animal-like” 
rather than “human-like” presence.5  This magical realist animality is disruptive of 
conventional readings of animals within realism, which, Belsey writes, “is plausible not 
because it reflects the world, but because it is constructed out of what is (discursively) 
familiar” (47).  Belsey identifies “classic realism” as the predominant, popular mode (125), 
and points out: “Speaking animals, elves or Martians are no impediment to intelligibility and 
credibility if they conform to patterns of speech and behaviour consistent with a 
„recognizable‟ system‟” (51-2).  Nonetheless, due to the feral spirit of the mode, discussions 
about specific cases, which parameters can be applied to the label, and where to draw the 
line, are inevitably contentious and ongoing. 
The impulse to order and classify, the “meticulous examination of things,” is deeply 
ingrained in Western knowledge production since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
beginning with the ordering of nature and extending to other spheres of Western culture, 
according to Michel Foucault (Order 131).  Thus, the continuing critical debate surrounding 
the term “magical realism” and its applicability or otherwise to various works of fiction 
mirrors the kinds of disputes that arose from questions about the proper scientific 
categorisations of particular animal species, such as the early explorers‟ difficulties to class 
kangaroos and platypuses.  As a postcolonial, posthumanist mode of writing, magical realism 
is to the idea of “genre” what the platypus is to the Linnaean system: both are hybrid 
paradoxes which undermine attempts to subordinate them to particular master narratives.  
Accordingly, it is not the purpose of this thesis to give the ultimate checklist of criteria that 
will define magical realism once and for all and determine which narratives exactly are 
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magical realist or not.  Such an attempt is directly opposed to the spirit in which magical 
realism is produced, and the futility of that attempt is built into the mode, so to speak, which, 
after all, commonly makes fun of scientists, taxonomists, and list makers of all kinds.  These 
include the mad natural historian Mr Lempriere in Gould’s Book of Fish, the list-making 
Robinson Crusoe in Green Grass, Running Water (323-7), the crazy chicken breeder Miss 
Adamson (Illywhacker 280), Mr Brown, the agricultural technician in The House of the 
Spirits (134), or the type-setter Liebhaber, who has a very eccentric storage system for his 
letters (What the Crow Said 54-55).  The joke, I suggest, is as much on literary critics. 
In both its subversive critique of Western anthropocentrism, hierarchical orderings, 
material power structures and hegemonic discourse, and in its recognition of nonhuman 
subjectivity through indigenous belief systems and the carnivalesque, magical realism is 
essentially a posthumanist mode of writing.  Modern Western understanding of what it means 
to be human is strongly influenced by the Cartesian distinction between humans and animals 
on the basis of reason (see Badmington 3-4); a difference that implies human superiority and 
power over animals, who, in contrast to an active human subject, are rendered passive objects 
without substance.  As Derrida says, animals have become “a theorem, something seen and 
not seeing” within the Western philosophical tradition since the Enlightenment (383, 
emphasis omitted).  This tradition seeks a complete logical reduction of “the Animal” to a 
fixed set of definitions, a process that in its extreme reduces animals to Cartesian machines, 
whose every action can be observed and explained on a empirical basis and through stimulus 
response theories.  As Neil Badmington, however, points out, “Cartesian humanism” is 
always already undoing itself (4, see 9-10).  Indeed, its understanding of the human (or 
“Man”) on the basis of difference from “the Animal” is continually called into question by 
the fact that animals are, as John Berger puts it, “both like and unlike” us (“Animals as 
Metaphor” 504).  They are inherently feral, always wild to a degree, whether domesticated or 
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not, and thus irreducible to a fixed set of categories.  Any individual animal is, to use 
Derrida‟s description of his feline companion, “an existence that refuses to be 
conceptualized” (379).  In their “likeness” and “unlikeness” to us, and in their individuality, 
or “singularity,” as Derrida says (378), we are unable to fully capture their being and 
experience.  Their “wildness,” a concept already included in the idea of ferality, lies, I 
suggest, not in an idealised notion of untouched nature, but in a very tangible element of 
unpredictability (since they are not machines), as well as in characteristics and behaviours 
that run counter to human interests and are thus seen to be in need of control, containment, 
domestication or training, for example.  The characteristic proliferation of animals, evident in 
the magical realist fictions discussed here, is an expression of the inherent ferality of the 
mode, which animals always already represent.  I suggest that they embody an “irreducible 
element,” similar to the “„irreducible element‟ of magic” Wendy B. Faris regards as one of 
five essential characteristics of magical realism (Ordinary Enchantments 7).
6
 
Embodied ferality thus causes the phenomenon Faris describes, whereby “objects may 
take on lives of their own and become magical that way” (“Scheherazade‟s Children” 170).  
Dead metaphors are resurrected, and objects, such as Liebhaber‟s letters in Robert Kroetsch‟s 
What the Crow Said, figures of speech, and indeed occasionally whole narratives go feral, so 
to speak, as authorial control appears to be relinquished.  The story spills over and out to 
cross the boundary of the page and draw the reader into the narrative, as in Richard 
Flanagan‟s Gould’s Book of Fish, for example, which blurs distinctions between narrator, 
protagonist, reader and fish, or in Thomas King‟s Green Grass, Running Water, where the 
reader‟s unseen presence is built into the narrative, and Coyote‟s manipulation of the story 
leaves the reader in doubt as to whether a human narrator, Coyote, or perhaps a human 
Coyote is in control of the story-telling at any given point.  This embodied ferality also 
accounts for the profusion of animals in magical realism, since they always already signify 
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the inherent ferality and elusiveness of the mode.  Magical realist feral animals thus stand in 
opposition to the Cartesian “I (and only I) am.”  In the egalitarian spirit of the carnivalesque 
and in dialogic engagement with the Cartesian subject, they insist: “We are (too).”7  Through 
embodiment, the weight of realism is thus used to subvert its own essential subject-object 
relationship, since the presence of a transgressive, acting body cannot be denied by an 
empirically observing human subject.  Accordingly, the silenced “nonhuman” and feral 
subaltern speaks, as it were, through a disruptive and unsettling presence of the body, through 
the refusal to be invisible, and especially when “out of place.”  By addressing structures of 
oppression based on the subject-object relationship fundamentally important to European 
culture‟s treatment of the “nonhuman other,” magical realism gives nonhuman animals, 
alongside peoples animalised through racist discourse, a voice of sorts. 
Analysing a mode so inherently subversive of Cartesian and colonising subject-object 
relationships, and transgressive of the boundary between text and reader, requires a critical 
approach that reflects the capacity of postcolonial magical realist fiction to compel readers to 
question their position and situate themselves.  Donna J. Haraway‟s notion of “situated 
knowledges” is helpful here, especially in relation to aspects of the novels discussed in this 
thesis that are outside of my own cultural sphere and depict animal practices and beliefs I am 
unfamiliar with from my own experience and upbringing.  Haraway critiques the Myth of 
objective knowledge: the notion of a detached, disembodied and omniscient observer, 
whereby “[t]he eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity . . . to distance the 
knowing subject from everybody and everything in the interests of unfettered power” (188).8  
She counters the “god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere” with the argument that 
vision itself is necessarily embodied, rather than transcendent “of all limits and 
responsibility” (Haraway 189-90). 
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Haraway advocates partial, limited and locatable critical positioning in the sciences 
(188-196), a stance that is also necessary for literary analysis here, in order to avoid the 
danger of appearing to speak for and at cultures other than my own, let alone treating 
particularly indigenous narratives as “anthropological artifacts,” a particular pitfall 
Takolander cautions against (182).  I therefore write primarily as a “white,” European, 
Western reader of magical realism.
9
  This is an appropriate approach, I suggest, to texts that 
are themselves emphatically partial and locatable, and that encourage the dialogic 
engagement of many voices.  Particularly pertinent in relation to the representation of animals 
and human-animal relationships is also Haraway‟s declaration that “[s]ituated knowledges 
require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not a screen or a 
ground or a resource . . . “(198).  Adopting a position of “situated knowledge” entails, as 
Haraway points out, that I am accountable for my contribution and for my use and choice of 
sources: “In this way we might become answerable for what we learn how to see” (Haraway 
190). 
Chapter One, then, discusses the ways in which the circensian spirit of Kafka‟s works 
translates into the Latin American context by focussing on Gabriel García Márquez‟ One 
Hundred Years of Solitude and Isabel Allende‟s The House of the Spirits.  I explore the ways 
in which these seminal works set up the circus and feral animality as a thematic and structural 
model for subsequent magical realist writers in other national contexts.  The circus especially 
epitomises imperial conquest and, as a form of animal entertainment, it is particularly well 
suited to engage with the realist novel as a form of leisure commodity and representational 
practice that has traditionally upheld the integrity of the human, especially white European, 
subject.  The circus‟ demonstration of colonial power over indigenous peoples and of human 
mastery over animals directly mirrors the imperial subject-object relationship between the 
European “Master” and the nonhuman natural world. 
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Asserting a Latin American identity to counter European and neo-colonial influences, 
García Márquez and Allende decentre and transcend the Cartesian human subject by 
subversively and ironically embracing animality, blurring human-animal boundaries, 
presenting animals (human and nonhuman) as transgressive subjects who undermine the 
foundations of Western tenets, and by acknowledging the agency and experience of 
“nonhuman others.”  By positioning nonhuman animals as centrally important characters and 
agents, magical realism accords them a corporeality that they are often denied by 
conventional representations through their designation to the realm of the symbolic, 
functional and representational. 
Steve Baker points out, in relation to more conventional depictions of animals: “The 
notion that talking-animal narratives are not really about animals—that the worthwhile ones, 
at least, must surely be about something more important than mere animals—is quite 
consistent with the far wider cultural trivialization and marginalization of the animal” (138).  
This cultural marginalisation and Western, industrialised animal practices mutually reinforce 
each other in transforming animal bodies into concepts or commodities; that is, ideas and 
products seemingly altogether detached from the individual animals themselves.  Thus, 
cultural blindspots are created to a point where consumers are unaware that animals (actual or 
representational) are even involved in the product consumed, whether it be a marshmallow or 
a novel. 
Allende especially illuminates the parallels between nonhuman animal suffering and 
the exploitation of animalised humans, both on a physical, bodily level and in terms of the 
structures and mechanisms of oppressive power which frame exploitative practices.  Thus, 
The House of the Spirits illustrates the strong connection between colonisation and Western 
speciesism, addressed by Cary Wolfe, who argues: “[A]s long as this humanist and speciesist 
structure of subjectivization remains intact, . . . then the humanist discourse of species will 
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always be available for use by some humans against other humans as well” (8, original 
emphasis). 
Representations of animality fulfil similar functions in Gould’s Book of Fish and 
Peter Carey‟s Illywhacker, discussed in Chapter Two.  However, whilst García Márquez‟ and 
Allende‟s magical realism is characterised by a rejection of Linnaean taxonomy through an 
identification with pre-Linnaean bestiaries, the Australian context is clearly conceptualised in 
post-Linnaean terms.  Borrowing the circus model from Latin American magical realism, 
both Carey and Flanagan critique the Linnaean system, representative of British imperial 
worldviews and colonising practices, by illuminating its inherently carceral qualities.  In 
contrast to scientific classifications, they set up an identification with animality that creates a 
national identity in flux, which mocks and subverts the imposed material and conceptual 
structures of imperialism from within. 
Applying Foucault‟s analysis of the significant cultural impact of Linnaeus‟ 
taxonomies in The Order of Things, this chapter further develops the idea of the circus 
towards the concept of “circensian spaces.”  Fundamentally contradictory and polyphonic, 
the animal circus belongs to the group of spaces which Foucault calls “heterotopias,” other 
spaces, in which “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are 
simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.  Places of this kind are outside of all 
places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality” (“Of Other 
Spaces” 24).  Extending the term “circensian” from its original meaning, which refers 
exclusively to the circus of ancient Rome, I use the term “circensian spaces” to include also 
the modern circus tradition in all its aspects and variations: from its origins in the travelling 
menageries at country fairs and in the commercialized spectacles of natural history displays, 
to the colonial exotic animal performances in the big top and the contemporary animal acts 
that we are familiar with today.  This term can be applied to fictional as well as actual sites of 
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animal entertainment, whereby the circensian space is a conceptual construct, an imaginary 
reality produced by the staging and enactment of inherently contradictory discourses. 
Originally an imperial showcase, the circus enacts the oppressive structures and 
discourses at play in the process of colonisation, and yet at the same time, by means of the 
carnivalesque, it portrays the illusion of a subversive and egalitarian space where human-
animal boundaries are blurred, natural laws and human limitations can be transcended, and 
where magic is possible.
10
  Thus, setting, performance and language, which are 
simultaneously at odds with and reinforcing the material realities of the circus environment, 
create an inherently oxymoronic and dialogic heterotopia.  Magical realism reverses this 
relationship between imaginary and material reality.  The circensian space thus becomes the 
narrative‟s reality, whilst the material realities of colonisation and its aftermath are exposed 
as resulting from staged illusions, discourses and circumstances created by the powerful.  In 
this regard, Carey, who considers writing “an act of empathy” (qtd. in Koval 672), connects 
the exploitation and victimisation of animals with the mechanisms that marginalise and 
silence the (historical) experience of “other” groups of Australian society. 
The process of historical writing, the invisibility of “other” histories, and the 
inextricable connections between human and nonhuman animal exploitation are also major 
themes in both Mudrooroo‟s Master of the Ghost Dreaming and Sam Watson‟s The 
Kadaitcha Sung, discussed in Chapter Three.  The correlation between realism, empirical 
science, and colonisation, as structures founded on the Cartesian subject‟s central position in 
relation to the nonhuman world, is most explicitly addressed by Mudrooroo‟s character Fada, 
a priest, a scientist and an author/authority, in Master of the Ghost Dreaming.  The novel is 
based on Mudrooroo‟s theory of maban realism, a fusion of Aboriginal Dreaming with 
European realism, and a mode Mudrooroo explicitly associates with magical realism.  Maban 
realism represents what Mudrooroo calls “maban reality,” which he defines as being directly 
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opposed to “natural scientific reality.”11  The latter, he argues, produces “the dominant 
language,” and the resulting Master narratives—such as realism and linear history—create, in 
turn, the “dominant reality” and cement a European “ideological position of dominance” 
(Mudrooroo, Indigenous Literature 91, 100). 
This power and authority of the European, Cartesian human subject is threatened by 
the ferality inherent in maban realism, magical realism and its convergent mode, the North 
American trickster narrative.  Mudrooroo‟s perceptive comparison of maban realism with a 
living, unknowable beast is suggestive of this ferality that, like the “pest” animals of García 
Márquez and Allende, for example, disrupts European scientific and philosophical systems of 
order.
12
  Watson‟s novel exemplifies Mudrooroo‟s concept of maban realism as animality and 
humanity are blurred very tangibly on the level of flesh and the body.  Even the text itself is 
transformed into a body of text, so to speak.  Magical realism‟s characteristic focus on 
physical sensations, such as smell (epitomised in Patrick Süskind‟s Das Parfüm: Die 
Geschichte eines Mörders [Perfume]), taste (elevated in Laura Esquivel‟s Like Water for 
Chocolate and Joanne Harris‟ Chocolat) and touch (suggested, for instance, in the illusion of 
wet or bleeding book pages in Gould’s Book of Fish and Tomson Highway‟s Kiss of the Fur 
Queen respectively), which serve to dismantle the Cartesian focus on vision and the 
separation of reason and body, is thus taken to a new level of “embodiment” altogether.  
Through the embodied connection between humans and animals, Watson provides a very 
material link between the pastoral exploitation of animals and the exploitation of people 
animalised under a colonial ideology and within an economy based on livestock production 
and processing. 
In the North American context, John Sandlos points out Coyote‟s role in undermining 
European pastoral poetry, and argues that the trickster‟s approach constitutes a rejection of 
the terms by which pastoral/settler societies try to order and control “their” world.  He relates 
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this to the manner in which actual coyotes, considered pest animals, undermine pastoral 
farming (see Sandlos 107).  Chapter Four, with a focus on Thomas King‟s Green Grass, 
Running Water, and Tomson Highway‟s The Kiss of the Fur Queen, discusses the role of 
trickster animals such as Coyote, who subvert directly the material and ideological bases of 
settlement, that is, the idea that nonhuman nature (and all who are seen as part of it) is a 
resource to be domesticated and rendered useful by an ordering and civilising European 
subject.  This chapter will look at the role of feral trickster animals in undermining any kind 
of domestication by creating disorder within taxonomic divisions not only between humans 
and animals, but also between genres and narrative conventions.  Inevitably, these tricksters 
thus also raise the question whether these Native Canadian novels can be considered magical 
realism at all. 
The difficulty of applying magical realism as a label to particular works continues to 
be a concern in the remaining chapters.  Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ novels, discussed in 
Chapter Five, and Martel‟s Life of Pi, which is the subject of Chapter Six, diverge from the 
other works discussed here: whilst the project of postcolonial magical realism is generally the 
unmaking of mastery,
13
 the questioning of imperial power and the unsettling of settlement, 
these three Canadian authors assert their Canadian or, in Martel‟s case, supposedly global, 
multicultural identity by re-affirming pastoral practices, such as the perceived pragmatic need 
for nonhuman animals to be useful and controllable by humans.  Through this, they also re-
affirm settlement and the dominant position of the European human subject.  Kroetsch, 
Hodgins and Martel make use of magical realism as a mode widely recognised as a particular 
expression of local and postcolonial identities, and, in Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ case, of 
realities other than that perceived through the empirical eyes of a European human subject.  
Yet, in order use the mode to affirm—rather than unsettle—settlement, realism gone feral, so 
to speak, needs to be re-domesticated.  This does not, however, result in a simple reversal of 
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the subject-object relationship of realism, but in versions of, or deviations from, magical 
realism that acknowledge nonhuman agency in various forms and to various degrees, whilst 
asserting human ascendancy over nature regardless. 
Thus, Kroetsch‟s What the Crow Said explicitly deals with the question of narrative 
domestication, so to speak, and authorial control versus the ferality of the—nonhuman—
landscape (of which nonhuman animals are an inextricable part), and Kroetsch manages to 
situate his narrative in a liminal position between humanism and posthumanism by calling the 
permanence of the human subject, always threatened by an active landscape, into doubt.  
Hodgins‟ narratives The Invention of the World and The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne, both 
based on Christian Science tenets, recognise the omnipresent “nonhuman” agency of a 
Christian God, an approach entirely consistent with Descartes‟ concept of the rational human 
subject.  Correspondingly, Hodgins also maintains the Cartesian separation of humanity and 
animality.  Animals, moreover, along with the rest of nature, serve as mere abstractions to 
represent allegorical meanings and divine concepts.  Ultimately, both Kroetsch‟s and 
Hodgins‟ works constitute a reassertion of human control over nature and a legitimation of 
contemporary, if not historical, settlement.  This is achieved by framing nonhuman animals as 
necessarily useful within the context of the rodeo, for example, a re-enactment of the North 
American frontier myth and a domesticated form of the carnivalesque. 
Life of Pi, in turn, acknowledges the powerful forces of nature that Pi, the protagonist, 
however masters by farming the sea, as it were (Armstrong, What Animals Mean 178), with 
his “sea cow” solar stills (Life of Pi 187-8), and by capturing, dominating, controlling and 
intimidating nonhuman animals through zoo and circus practices.  Martel borrows the 
common magical realist circus motif and uses it in a clichéd and commodified fashion that is 
markedly different from the circensian model used elsewhere.  Life of Pi‟s depiction of circus 
acts and the closely related zoo entertainment reinforces and naturalises exoticist discourse.  
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In contrast, King and Highway, for instance, make use of the Wild West show, a practice 
derived from the circus, in order to address and undermine racial stereotypes that have 
rendered “the Indian” an exotic construct and commodity, and a metaphorical screen for the 
projection of Western fears and desires.  Thus, following Kafka‟s influence, all of the novels 
considered here, with the exception of Master of the Ghost Dreaming, utilise circensian 
animal entertainment, although The Kadaitcha Sung only contains the slightest trace of the 
rodeo, which is employed, in contrast to Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ use, as a critique of 
settlement.  This thesis explores the processes of “mastery in the unmaking”—a reversal of 
Life of Pi‟s protagonist‟s description of his lifeboat circus as “mastery in the making” (211)—
and the extent to which these narratives may indicate a shift beyond conventional notions of 
what it means to be human. 
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Chapter One 
Animal Acts: Visibility, Ferality and the Circus in One Hundred Years of 
Solitude and The House of the Spirits 
The first directly spoken words in Gabriel García Márquez‟ One Hundred Years of Solitude 
are as programmatic as they are prophetic in relation to representations of animals in magical 
realist fiction.  A travelling exhibitor of scientific and miraculous spectacles, Melquíades the 
“gypsy” announces: “Things have a life of their own . . . .  It‟s simply a matter of waking up 
their souls” (Solitude 7).  His proclamation not only anticipates the rousing of literary animals 
from a Cartesian object status in One Hundred Years of Solitude, but it also highlights a 
model of nonhuman subjectivity that bears upon magical realist fauna outside of Latin 
America, subsequent to the immense success of García Márquez‟ magical realist novel. 
Edward W. Said explains that magical realist “works and their authors and readers are 
specific to, and articulated in, local circumstances” (308).  Whilst magical realism is a global 
mode of writing, it is normally, and especially in the postcolonial context, locally specific.  
Accordingly, focussing on Isabel Allende‟s The House of the Spirits as well as One Hundred 
Years of Solitude, this chapter will take both global and local influences into account, discuss 
the impact of explorer narratives on the construction of Latin America as an “animal space,” 
(a concept borrowed from Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert [6-7]), and examine the ways in 
which these two novels resist or embrace this imposed animality in the formation of uniquely 
Latin American identities.  Following the influence of Franz Kafka, García Márquez and 
Allende represent an idea of feral animality that critically engages with an inherently 
imperialist and Cartesian humanism.  Their use of the circus, a globalised and traditionally 
colonial form of entertainment, provides a framework for subsequent magical realist writers 
to mock and subvert European-derived scientific, racist and exoticist discourse, and to 
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undermine hegemonic power structures.  Allende in particular highlights the marginalisation 
of animalised people and the interconnectedness of human and animal suffering.  Focussing 
on The House of the Spirits and One Hundred Years of Solitude, this chapter introduces key 
approaches to reading animals and animality in magical realist fiction. 
One Hundred Years of Solitude focuses on the lives of several generations of the 
Buendía family, who live in the remote town of Macondo, founded by José Arcadio Buendía 
and his wife Úrsula Iguarán.  The fate of the family and of the town is chronicled by 
Melquíades, whose travelling troupe provides the near-inaccessible town with curiosities and 
scientific discoveries from the outside world.  Macondo grows from a village to a prosperous 
town of commerce, marred, however, by wars, a massacre of striking banana company 
workers, an epidemic of memory loss, and floods of rain.  The town finally falls into decay, 
and the last descendant of the Buendía family is eaten by ants.  The House of the Spirits, in 
turn, traces the history of three generations of the Trueba family.  The focus is particularly on 
the women Clara, Blanca, and the narrator, Alba, and Esteban Trueba, the patriarch of the 
family and Alba‟s grandfather.  Allende fictionalises Chilean history up until the military 
coup in 1973 and the ensuing brutal dictatorship. 
 
Invisible Animals 
The “phenomenal popular success” of One Hundred Years of Solitude, published in 1967, has 
rendered García Márquez‟ novel one of the most influential texts for magical realist literature 
worldwide (Janes 9).  Geoff Hancock writes, “[m]agic realism flourished during the 
movement known as „The Boom‟ in the 1960s.  This period introduced many of the most 
prominent Latin American writers to the rest of the world, and culminated in Gabriel García 
Márquez‟ winning the Nobel Prize for his masterpiece One Hundred Years of Solitude” 
(“Magic or Realism” 45).  Allende acknowledges the influence of García Márquez on her 
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work and of One Hundred Years of Solitude on The House of the Spirits specifically (see 
Gazarian-Gautier 15).  Translations of both novels have been immensely successful outside 
of Latin America,
14
 and Regina Janes, referring to One Hundred Years of Solitude, points out 
that “the wider reading public consumed the novel as if it were Ursula‟s little candy animals” 
(13).
15
 
Her comparison of the appeal of García Márquez‟ novel with the voracious 
consumption of animal-shaped food is not only indicative of the significant role nonhuman 
animals play as a marker of the mode, but it also evokes the interconnection between the way 
literary animals are read and the way actual (mass-produced) animals are consumed in other 
ways.  Paradoxically, whilst nonhuman animals contribute significantly to the commercial 
appeal of magical realist fiction (an issue discussed in Chapter Six), they are also subject to 
the same cultural blind spots that render actual animals “invisible” in the West, as the critical 
response to them, or rather the lack of it, suggests.
16
  As Jennifer Wolch and Jody Emel write, 
“the thoroughly modern instrumental rationality that characterizes contemporary human-
animal dependency,” which is “artfully hidden behind factory-farm gates or research-lab 
doors, obscured by disembodiment and endless processing, and normalized by institutional 
routines and procedures, . . . has rendered animals morally and spatially invisible” (22).  
Adrian Franklin, who observes a split between charismatic animals and farmed animals in the 
wake of Fordism, writes that “[w]ith the city finally cleansed of all its pre-modern relations 
with animals, it became very nearly devoid of animals altogether, with the exception of pets 
and a subset of tolerated species” (Animals and Modern Cultures 38).  This division became 
more pronounced as “[t]he rationalization and concentration of the slaughtering, butchery and 
meat packing industries” removed the lives and suffering of animals from visibility and the 
human conscience (Animals and Modern Cultures 39). 
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Yet despite the concomitant increased interest in, and the greater commercial and 
media appeal of, charismatic (wild) animals or pets (see Franklin, Animals and Modern 
Cultures 39),
17
 even those supposedly privileged animals have not received much focussed 
attention from critics of magical realist fiction, although reviewers and critics frequently 
comment on One Hundred Years of Solitude‟s butterflies as one of the most striking images 
of the novel, to the point where they are considered, not without some justification, one of 
“the most overwrought clichés of magical realism” (Gruesz 75).18  Stephanie Jones observes 
a similar phenomenon in relation to Salman Rushdie‟s The Satanic Verses, and comments 
that Sala Suleri‟s, Pierre François‟ and Sadik Jalal Al-Azm‟s „short‟ readings of Rushdie‟s 
butterflies focus exclusively on symbolic meanings: “Such decisively dismissive readings 
seem at odds with the lush orderings the author devotes to the butterflies.  Abstracting the 
butterflies to a single static metaphor, these critical approaches ignore their very real, 
powdery, physical presence in the village and amongst the pilgrims, as well as their magical 
attachments and select detachments” (264).  She cautions, however, that, “within the 
lineaments of a tragic-comic narrative infused with a sense of sympathy and yearning, it is 
difficult to accept the butterflies‟ odd physical presence and behaviour as in itself their point” 
(Jones 264).  Referring to Faris‟ contention that magical realist images tend to be 
psychologically, socially, emotionally and politically motivated, Jones proposes that “[i]n the 
abundance of Rushdie‟s writing, the butterflies appear to bear meanings on all these planes” 
(264).
19
 
Fictional animals, in magical realism and elsewhere, certainly tend to convey multiple 
meanings, influenced just as much by cultural understanding of animals and literary 
techniques such as the employment of metaphor as by material human-animal relationships, 
and indeed the lives of animals themselves, whether they directly interrelate with humans or 
not.  A comment by Allende certainly supports a way of reading animals that pays attention 
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to their “very real,” “physical presence” and the human-animal relationships that influence 
their representation.  She says: “I have maybe four papers on Barrabás, the dog in The House 
of the Spirits . . . what the dog symbolizes . . . It was just a dog who lived in my house and his 
name was Barrabás, that‟s all!  But how can I explain to a student who has been working on a 
thesis on Barrabás for a year that he‟s just a dog?  I‟d feel awful!” (qtd. in Mujica 42, original 
ellipses).  Elsewhere, Allende explains that “[s]ome critics, however, say the dog symbolizes 
Pinochet, while others maintain that he represents Clara‟s innocence,” and that Barrabás‟ 
murder “in a pool of blood” is viewed “as symbolic of the sexual act” (qtd. in Gazarian-
Gautier 12).  She concedes that “there are things that writers are not aware of having put in 
their books, and it is the task of you people to discover them” (Gazarian-Gautier 12).  Yet 
here, too, her ultimate response to questions about “the meaning of the dog” is “that he 
symbolizes nothing” (Gazarian-Gautier 12). 
John Simons makes an attempt to draw some attention to “the ways in which animals 
appear in texts, are represented and figured, in and for themselves and not as displaced 
metaphors for the human” (6).  Steve Baker, in turn, also observes the obscurity of “„real‟ 
animals” in readings of cultural representations: “Culture does not allow unmediated access 
to animals themselves.  Our attitudes, our prejudices and indeed our sympathies are all 
filtered through or clogged up in this thick but transparent mesh (or mess) of history, culture, 
public opinion, received ideas.  Animals themselves, living animals, „real‟ animals: where are 
they in all this?”(10).  Ironically, this invisibility is strangely at odds with the sheer profusion 
of animals in magical realist fiction, who are more than ornamental parts of the scenery.  
Baker, citing Roland Barthes, provides an explanation for the apparent disappearance of 
animals from our conscious perception: 
Calling the workings of everyday culture “myth”, he writes: “Myth hides 
nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: 
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it is an inflexion”.  What it distorts and inflects is the historical and the 
cultural, so that they appear entirely natural.  But what is most useful here is 
the idea that nothing is actually hidden: it‟s just that the culture typically 
deflects our attention from these things, and makes them seem unworthy of 
analysis.  (Steve Baker 8) 
One of the reasons for this apparent unworthiness is a phenomenon Mary Midgley calls 
“relative dismissal.”  She explains the common belief that “animals, since they are conscious, 
are entitled to some consideration, but must come at the end of the queue, after all human 
needs have been met” (Midgley 13, original emphasis).   In consequence, animals are 
considered “a very low priority” and are thus dismissed as unimportant (Midgley 13).  
“Relative dismissal” is thus mirrored in conventional literary criticism.  As Philip Armstrong 
argues, 
The lack of culturally and politically-engaged readings of human-animal 
relationships in literature (prior to the last few years) may reflect the 
prejudice—as common in literary studies as it is elsewhere—that research into 
the meaning and function of the animal in the human world involves a kind of 
self-indulgent taste for the trivial.  (“Moby-Dick and Compassion” 20).20 
This perception of animals as trivial rests to a large extent in the object status assigned 
to them by Cartesian humanist epistemology and the resulting “human-animal divide,” as 
Glen Elder, Wolch and Emel term the conceptual and ideological separation of humans and 
animals.  They point out that “while humans and animals manifestly differ, the interspecific 
divide is not solely a behavioral or biologically determined distinction.  Rather, like many 
other categorizations (e.g., race, ethnicity), it is a place-specific, social construction, subject 
to change over time” (Elder, Wolch and Emel 192).  René Descartes was most prominent in 
establishing the idea of the human as subject and the animal as object, reasoning that animals 
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“have no reason at all” and are therefore “just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels 
and weights” (qtd. in Regan and Singer 62).  A multitude of philosophers, such as Saint 
Thomas Aquinas in the Christian tradition, or Immanuel Kant, have shared the view that 
animals are of instrumental value only (see Regan and Singer 56, 58-9, 122).  Yet, as Keith 
Thomas points out, it was Descartes who “created an absolute break between man and the 
rest of nature, thus clearing the way very satisfactorily for the uninhibited exercise of human 
rule.  The Cartesian view of animal souls generated a vast learned literature, and it is no 
exaggeration to describe it as a central preoccupation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
European intellectuals” (35).  He argues that “Descartes had only pushed the European 
emphasis on the gulf between man and beast to its logical conclusion.  A transcendent God, 
outside his creation, symbolized the separation between spirit and nature.  Man stood to 
animal as did heaven to earth, soul to body, culture to nature.  There was a total qualitative 
difference between man and brute” (35). 
Such views were not uncontested.  Thomas comments on the ambivalence of the 
“Judeo-Christian inheritance” and points out that “[s]ide by side with the emphasis on man‟s 
right to exploit the inferior species went a distinctive doctrine of human stewardship and 
responsibility for God‟s creatures” (24).  Accordingly, “there was a marked lack of 
agreement as to just where man‟s unique superiority lay” in the Western philosophical 
tradition, though ultimately, as Thomas explains, “what all such definitions have in common 
is that they assume a polarity between the categories „man‟ and „animal‟ and that they 
invariably regard the animal as inferior” (31).  In view of such general consensus, “the 
assumptions and ramifications which render the human strictly separable from the animal 
may appear at first sight entirely „reasonable,‟” as Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert put it.  
However, as they point out, “on closer inspection it transpires that they flow from a particular 
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set of discourses which began to gain currency in Europe from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century onwards” (15). 
The break between humans and nature and the subject-object relationship most 
influentially propounded by Descartes thus shaped the understanding of what it means to be 
human within what Neil Badmington calls “Cartesian humanism” (3-4), and were 
perpetuated, in practice, by empiricist scientific observation.  As Catherine Belsey‟s 
explanation of what she terms “the theory of expressive realism” shows, these assumptions 
also affected the practice of reading and writing literature.  The status of “one (especially 
gifted) individual,” whose perception of “the reality of experience” is reflected in literature, 
thus results from “a humanism based on an empiricist-idealist interpretation of the world,” 
whereby “[o]ur concepts and our knowledge are held to be the product of experience 
(empiricism), and this experience is preceded and interpreted by the mind, reason or thought, 
the property of a transcendent human nature whose essence is the attribute of each individual 
(idealism)” (Belsey 7, italics omitted).  These relationships are assumed to be based on 
“common sense,” as Belsey argues (7.).  Correspondingly, the position of the Cartesian 
humanist subject as a central observer separate from nature came to be considered as 
unbiased and universally valid from the Enlightenment onwards, when in fact it is specific to 
Western culture.
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  In practice, this means that nonhuman animals have “usually . . . been the 
relatively powerless and marginalised „other‟ partner in human-animal relations” (Philo and 
Wilbert 4). 
Magical realist fauna, however, challenges the cultural blind spots created by Myth, 
relative dismissal and the human-animal divide in a mode that is inherently anti-Cartesian.  
Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza comments in regard to García Márquez that “[h]e and Descartes 
would never have been friends (Rabelais yes, Descartes never). . . . He sees it [Cartesian 
thinking] as a mould in which there is only room for one side of reality” (94).  García 
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Márquez himself remarks: “I‟m much closer to Rabelais‟ craziness than to Descartes‟ 
discipline” (qtd. in Mendoza 78).  As a result of this anti-Cartesian impulse, animals resist 
object status, marginalisation, and the kind of obliterative consumption invoked by Janes.  
Thus, Stephen Slemon‟s observation in relation to Canadian magical realism, that 
“marginalized presences press in toward the center” (420), is pertinent to and characteristic of 
animals in One Hundred Years of Solitude and The House of the Spirits, who push their way 
into the reader‟s line of vision, so to speak, and undermine realism‟s “humanist assumption 
that [human] subjectivity, the individual mind or inner being, is the source of meaning and of 
action” (Belsey 3).  Accordingly, Janes acknowledges the important role of the ants in One 
Hundred Years of Solitude and makes some concessions to the “antness” of the ants (30, 
original emphasis).  She comments on the failure of “most readers and critics” to notice the 
significance of the scene in which the last Aureliano is devoured by ants and writes: “All the 
reader regards about the scene or remembers about that baby is his transformation into text, 
into the epigraph that finally permits the reading of the manuscripts of Melquíades . . . . Like 
Aureliano, we scarcely see the little body in our headlong pursuit of the pleasures of the text” 
(23-4).  If readers and critics barely notice the baby, one can only speculate on how much 
thought is given to the role the physical presence of insects may play (rather than a purely 
symbolic one).  Easily overlooked, the ants are more important than they seem, as insects—
real insects—have historically played a significant part in the conception of Latin America as 
an “animal space,” and have shaped the explorers‟ day-to-day experience of reality in the 
“New World.”  García Márquez‟ ants reflect this experience and ground the novel in 
historical as much as ecological realities. 
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Animal Space 
Indeed, animals featured prominently in the representation of South America ever since 
Europeans first began to imagine it.  Eric C. Brown, for example, examines the 
“crosspollination . . . of insect materiality with fictive models” in early modern explorer 
narratives of the New World (22-3).
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  According to Brown, these narratives traditionally use 
representations of insects to portray and define space.  He explains that “the construction of 
Old and New World differences along entomological fault lines was a recurrent device in the 
conquest and travel narratives of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (20).  Insects, Brown 
argues, provided “a template for the process of colonization itself,” as “bees, ants and other 
social insects have been the poetic models for ideal, organized communities, clockwork 
colonies of perfect governance and efficiency” since, he supposes, the time of Virgil‟s 
Georgics (21-2).  Thus, Brown observes, representations of insect colonies in utopian 
narratives, fabulous travel tales and early natural historical accounts created an image of the 
New World as a pastoral utopia for early modern explorers.  As he points out, “[t]he word 
„colony‟ itself derives from the Latin „colere,‟ meaning „to cultivate‟; hence a Roman 
„colonus‟ was as likely to be a farmer, bringing physical order to the land, as a settler 
reordering the population” (25).  However, this paradisical and benevolent view of the 
Americas came to be demythified “partially from [the] refusal of the natural world to cohere 
with fabulous expectations,” and disillusion set in as explorers were confronted by the reality 
of the unknown continent (25). 
Thus, Brown relates how Cortes, once triumphant conqueror of the Aztec empire and 
later on a “failed expedition south of the Yucatan,” is “so overpowered by nature that it alone 
proscribed his conquest and delimits discovery” (30).  Cortes laments “pass[ing] the night in 
a great downpour of rain and amid the greatest pest of mosquitoes imaginable” (qtd. in 
Brown 30).  Brown suggests that 
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[t]he imagined pliability of the New World often proved an overestimation of 
nature‟s passivity as the conquistadors hit upon repeated failures.  
Idealizations of the New World made independently of the land in question 
fell apart as a new natural reality surfaced, even as the displacement of ideal 
insect colonies by minatory insect infestations became the hallmark for many 
of these failures.  (30) 
Faced with an active nature as opponent, its refusal to conform to ideals shaped in Europe 
was integrated into what Beatriz Pastor Bodmer calls the “discourse of failure” (Brown 23).  
In this context, success and material rewards not only had to be earned through hardships and 
adventure, but the unexpected disorder of nature provided legitimation for the imposition of 
colonial order (see Brown 23-4).  Brown regards One Hundred Years of Solitude as a 
continuation of this discourse, as, he argues, “novelists like Garcia Marquez capped the 
discourse of failure by creating a magical reality where an unyielding nature is always 
perforating the walls of modernity” (Brown 32).  However, Macondo‟s “disordered” nature is 
not beckoning to be colonised and ordered.  It serves to locate the novel within the history of 
colonial narratives, at the same time as it constitutes a critique of colonising practices and 
imposed “order.” 
García Márquez certainly acknowledges the influence of explorer narratives, such as 
those of Christopher Columbus, Antonio Pigafetta and “the other chroniclers of the Indies” 
(qtd. in Mendoza 32), and observes that these contained “the seeds of our present-day novels” 
(“The Solitude of Latin America” 87).  He refers to Pigafetta‟s “strictly accurate account that 
nonetheless resembles a venture into fantasy,” in which he recorded 
that he had seen hogs with navels on their haunches, clawless birds whose 
hens laid eggs on the backs of their mates, and others still, resembling 
tongueless pelicans, with beaks like spoons.  He wrote of having seen a 
Schwalm  29 
misbegotten creature with the head and ears of a mule, a camel‟s body, the 
legs of a deer and the whinny of a horse.  (“The Solitude of Latin America” 
87) 
Pigafetta is only one of many to use such descriptions of apparently fantastic animals.  
Accordingly, Tzvetan Todorov points out that Columbus “is not alone” in believing in 
“Cyclopes and mermaids, in Amazons and men with tails, and his belief . . . therefore permits 
him to find them” (15). 
Thus, the European imagination transformed the New World into an “animal space.”  
Todorov comments that “Columbus‟s writings, and most particularly the journal of the first 
voyage, reveal a constant attention to all natural phenomena.  Fish and birds, plants and 
animals are the main characters of the adventures he recounts” (17-8, my emphasis).  These 
accounts provided the foundation of the historical construction of Latin America.  However, 
rather than the result of purported discovery, these reports were already predetermined, both 
by preconceived ideas about the New World, and the need to meet expectations at home.  
Accordingly, as Beatriz Pastor Bodmer argues, “rather than discovering, [Columbus] 
confirms and identifies,” and his “method of inquiry, informed by his need to identify the 
newly discovered lands with preexisting sources and models, was a mixture of invention, 
misrepresentation, and concealment” (10).  She points out that many of these “preexisting 
sources and models” were, in fact, medieval bestiaries and natural historical works, such as 
“the Historia Naturalis [by Pliny the Elder], an indispensable reference for anything 
connected with geography, botany, or zoology” (Pastor Bodmer 16).  Columbus used such 
“scholarly sources . . . to make his plans” and returned to them “constantly . . . to compare his 
subsequent experiences as a discoverer and colonizer” (Pastor Bodmer 16). 
The indigenous populations of the New World were also subject to those 
predetermined models, and the consequences were often fatal.  Todorov points out 
Schwalm  30 
Columbus‟ preoccupation with nature, and writes: “Columbus speaks about the men he sees 
only because they too, after all, constitute a part of the landscape.  His allusions to the 
inhabitants of the islands always occur amid his notations concerning nature, somewhere 
between birds and trees” (34).  This spatial placing in the narrative “somewhere between 
birds and trees” reflects the fact that the natives were commonly regarded as animals, or close 
to being animals.  Pastor Bodmer describes the transformation whereby “human beings in the 
New World will first be metamorphosed into beasts in Columbus‟s discourse, and, 
subsequently, into things” (42, original emphases).  This animalisation and objectification of 
the native population, moreover, was reinforced and motivated by commodification, as “the 
perception and characterization of people in America as dehumanized merchandise” is a 
logical consequence of “the perception and characterization of America as a warehouse of 
goods to be absorbed by the European market” (Pastor Bodmer 45-6). 
 
Animal Acts 
Yet far from displaying the “almost jaded resignation” that Brown sees in the final scene of 
One Hundred Years of Solitude (32), the influence of explorer narratives on García Márquez‟ 
and Allende‟s novels is reflected in their animal imagery and appropriated in empowering 
ways.  One Hundred Years of Solitude and The House of the Spirits follow the tradition of 
representing Latin America as an “animal space,” but at the same time they subvert the 
ideological assumptions that underpin this way of looking at the New World, and the 
imperialist power structures it legitimates, by transforming supposed things—nonhuman 
animals and animalised people—back into subjects.  Instead of simply redrawing the human-
animal boundary line, these authors question its basis, and make use of animal subjectivity in 
order to disrupt the systems and structures that underpin colonial discourse and make 
exploitation on the grounds of animalisation possible. 
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Thus, Barrabás, the dog who arrives “among [Clara‟s] uncle‟s things” and “was 
treated as part of the baggage,” transcends his initial status as object, and becomes a subject 
and distinctive character when he is found and named by Clara (House of the Spirits 30-1, my 
emphasis).
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  He is a significant actor and central figure, who connects the beginning and the 
end of Allende‟s circular narrative, and Clara, the narrator‟s grandmother and one of the main 
characters, records his arrival as an “important matter” (11).  Barrabás clearly possesses his 
own idiosyncrasies and personality traits, such as a liking for “ham and every known type of 
marmalade” (33).  He is “captivating,” “frolicsome,” and mischievously “steal[s] into the 
dining room and slink[s] around the table, removing with the greatest delicacy all his 
favourite dishes” (33.).  The intentionality, which leaves the guests to look on powerlessly as 
Barrabás makes off with their food, runs counter to Cartesian scientific ideas that the actions 
of animals are only reactions to stimulus responses, and it would be hard to argue that 
Barrabás‟ preference for marmalade is governed by survival instincts.24  Moreover, Barrabás 
is credited with “emotion,” such as surprise and disappointment (97).  This does not 
contradict but is rather presented as part of his dogness.  This is shown, for instance, by the 
fact that he cannot control his tail, which “grew to be as long as a golf club and developed a 
life all its own that led to lamps and china being swept from tabletops” (31-2), and by his 
“penchant for leaping at [Nana the housekeeper] whenever she went by with the breakfast 
tray” (39). 
Barrabás displays a distinctive animal agency, a concept described by Philo and 
Wilbert and taken up by Armstrong as a framework for critical readings of literary animal 
representations.  Armstrong suggests that “a reconceptualization of agency . . . might 
facilitate a mode of analysis that does not reduce the animal to a blank screen for the 
projection of human meaning, and might offer productive new ways of accounting for the 
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material influence of the non-human animal upon humans, and vice versa” (What Animals 
Mean 3).  As Philo and Wilbert themselves put it: 
If we concentrate solely on how animals are represented, the impression is that 
animals are merely passive surfaces on to which human groups inscribe 
imaginings and orderings of all kinds.  In our view, it is also vital to give 
credence to the practices that are folded into the making of representations, 
and—at the core of the matter—to ask how animals themselves may figure in 
these practices.  This question duly raises broader concerns about non-human 
agency, about the agency of animals, and the extent to which we can say that 
animals destabilise, transgress or even resist our human orderings, including 
spatial ones.  (5) 
Barrabás constantly destabilises, transgresses and resists attempts at human orderings within 
the text, spatially as well as conceptually.  Thus, from a human perspective, he is constantly 
out of place, “running everywhere” in the house, where Severo, Clara‟s father, does not want 
him in the first place, as well as outside the house, where he manages to cause “a riot” (House 
of the Spirits 31-2). 
However, he resists labels such as “pest” or “vermin” as much as the notion of “pet,” 
and the owner-property relationship this implies.  Clara and Barrabás‟ relationship is a 
companionship of an almost supernatural nature: 
Barrabas accompanied the little girl day and night . . . .  He was always 
hovering around her like a gigantic shadow as silent as the little girl herself. . . 
. He became so attached to his mistress that when she sleep-walked through 
the house the dog followed imitating her posture.  Whenever there was a full 
moon, they could be seen gliding down the corridors like two ghosts floating 
through the pale light.  (House of the Spirits 97) 
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Barrabás and Clara are kindred spirits, so to speak, who challenge the boundary between 
humans and animals.  Thus, Clara “adopt[s] him” and “becom[es] the creature‟s mother” 
(31), and at the same time as Barrabás is presented on what are conventionally human terms, 
Clara is animalised when she finds Barrabás “by instinct” (30).  Moreover, it is Clara who is 
described as “Nana‟s pet” (17). 
Barrabás‟ boundary blurring, moreover, transgresses scientific systems designed to 
define nature.  Mary Louise Pratt stresses the crucial role of Linnaean taxonomy in 
establishing not only human dominion over the natural world, but also European supremacy 
over colonised peoples.  She discusses the impact of “the construction of global-scale 
meaning through the descriptive apparatuses of natural history,” especially through Linnaeus‟ 
Systema Naturae; a project that became popular from the eighteenth century onwards (Pratt 
15).  The Linnaean system, she writes, “was perceived, even by his critics, as making order 
out of chaos” (Pratt 25), whereby “[t]he (lettered, male, European) eye that held the system 
could familiarize („naturalize‟) new sites/sights immediately upon contact, by incorporating 
them into the language of the system” (Pratt 31).  Naming and defining indigenous people, 
plants, and animals was a way of gaining mastery over distant places and their human and 
non-human inhabitants, while maintaining a spatial, social, and conceptual distance between 
the observing subject and the object of study at the same time.  As Pratt points out, “[t]he 
European observer himself,” a centrally positioned subject, “has no place in the description” 
(32).  Philo and Wilbert argue that “the result of such classifications, systems and tables is to 
fix animals in a series of abstract spaces, „animal spaces‟, which are cleaved apart from the 
messy time-space contexts, or concrete places, in which these animals actually live out their 
lives as beings in the world” (6-7). 
Indeed, as Armstrong points out, “the animal has tended to disrupt the smooth 
unfolding of Enlightenment ideology” (“Postcolonial Animal” 415), and Barrabás does just 
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that by his appearance and obscure origin.  Thus, he combines attributes of various real and 
imagined animals.  He is “black and silent as a panther” with “crocodile claws,” like a 
“kitten,” and first “the size of a sheep,” then “as big as a colt,” for instance, making it 
impossible to assign him to any particular breed of dog, even causing a desperate family “to 
question whether he . . . really was a dog” (House of the Spirits 32-3).  When Barrabás defies 
scientific classification, people resort to bestiaries, legend, folklore and hearsay in an attempt 
to place him, imagining him as a hybrid monstrosity: “Popular imagination and ignorance 
with respect to his past lent Barrabás the most mythological characteristics. . . . Some people 
believed him to be a cross between a dog and a mare, and expected him to sprout wings and 
horns and acquire the sulfuric breath of a dragon,” and rumours circulate “of how he turned 
into a wolf when there was a full moon” (33).  Those pre-conceived ideas have nothing to do 
with his actual character and existence.  As Allende writes, “despite his docility, Barrabás 
inspired terror” (32). 
When his species cannot be determined, and Barrabás‟ place cannot be fixed, as it 
were, the conclusion is drawn that Barrabás is definitely out of place, “exotic” and “wild”: 
“They suggested that he might be some exotic animal their uncle had caught in some remote 
corner of the world and that perhaps in his natural habitat he was wild” (32).  His existence—
to most people around him so bewildering, undefined and „out of place‟—is, it appears, too 
much of a challenge for society in the end, and he is murdered by an unknown killer with a 
“butcher‟s knife” (112).  Once dead, “transform[ing]” Barrabás “into a rug,” then, can be 
regarded as the final attempt to put him in his place and illustrates different ways in which 
humans classify, treat and feel about animals (119).  For Esteban Trueba, Clara‟s husband, it 
is, as the owner of a large farm and a hunter, normal practice to make use of a dead animal‟s 
skin.  Turning Barrabás into a rug reduces him to an object again.  In contrast, Clara regards 
this as a violation of her companion and friend. 
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However, even beyond death, Barrabás manages to subvert the attempt to transform 
him literally into a dead, “passive surface,” to use Philo and Wilbert‟s term, and undermines 
Esteban Trueba‟s final judgement that “this is where he always should have been” (House of 
the Spirits 479).  Of course, “where he should have been” is precisely where, for most of the 
time, he has not been, nor does he remain on the bedroom floor as a lifeless rug.  Within the 
narrative, Barrabás takes on a life of his own, refuses to stay out of the story after his death, 
and keeps appearing in unexpected places until he is, in fact, properly resurrected, as it were, 
when he connects end and beginning of the story (see 234, 260, 309, 337, 376, 491).  Thus, 
his life, and the narrative itself, begin again in a circular fashion.  Pinet makes a similar 
argument, yet offers a different perspective of Barrabás both as dog and as rug.  She 
considers his transformation into a rug as a form of restoration rather than an objectification 
and sees this, as well as his relocation from the basement to higher levels of the house, as a 
sign that he is “indestructible and immortal” (Pinet 62).  He functions, in her view, as a 
symbol for what she calls the “background noise” of history, the alternative stories that have 
been marginalised by the foregrounding of a „master narrative (Pinet 56).  Thus, she argues, 
Barrabás is “the cypher that survives as „noise‟ and, having been assigned for years to the 
background, he is restored to the foreground” (Pinet 62). 
However, his stray appearances within the narrative structure can also be viewed as 
another mark of Barrabás‟ dogness, and as much as he operates as a symbol for marginalised 
“others” more generally, it is also his dogness which is foregrounded.  Allende creates a 
character who strolls in and out of the narrative like an actual dog who might wander into the 
room, sniff around here and there, and then lollop back out into the garden.  Barrabás thus 
mirrors a tendency of animals described by Philo and Wilbert, who write: 
It is animals themselves who inject what might be termed their own agency 
into the scene, thereby transgressing, perhaps even resisting, the human 
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placements of them.  It might be said that in so doing the animals begin to 
forge their own “other spaces”, countering the proper places stipulated for 
them by humans, thus creating their own beastly places reflective of their own 
“beastly” ways, ends, joys and sufferings.  (14) 
Barrabás‟ reappearances and his material presence, like those of magical realist animals 
generally, illustrate the phenomenon Faris describes as one of the ways in which magical 
realism is distinctive from realism.  She writes: “[O]bjects may take on lives of their own and 
become magical that way. . . . This materiality extends to word-objects as metaphors, and 
they too take on a special sort of textual life, reappearing over and over again until the weight 
of their verbal reality more than equals that of their referential function” (“Scheherazade” 
170-1).  Through “the weight” of his “verbal reality,” Barrabás embodies a marginalised 
being who refuses to be invisible.  Ironically, realism is subverted through its own stylistic 
means, as this verbal reality is achieved through the “detailed and concrete variety” in which 
“the material world is present,” as Faris describes the common trait between magical realism 
and realism (170).  The details give him “weight,” that is, an embodied presence, but it is 
particularly Barrabás‟ animalness, his wildness or ferality, that animates and highlights his 
textual life and ensure his presence cannot be easily ignored. 
 
Stray Circus 
The term “ferality” is derived from the Latin fera, “wild beast,” and “feral,” which denotes 
wild and uncultivated, as well a state of having once been cultivated, domesticated or 
civilised, but now reverted to some degree of wildness.  In between both concepts of “feral” 
is a gap filled by the idea of a domesticated animal who fits seamlessly into human orderings, 
but, as Philo and Wilbert‟s description of animal agency suggests, even the most 
domesticated and cultivated creature retains the fera in essence.  From this point of view, 
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there is no gap between both definitions of “feral”; there is only a continuum of ferality, a 
feral spirit, so to speak, expressed to a greater or lesser extent, or perhaps even one that is 
either dormant or completely suppressed, but present nonetheless.  Armstrong uses “the 
notion of „ferity‟ (that is, the state or quality of being feral) to indicate those forms of 
wildness that represent a reaction against modernity‟s attempts at civilization, domestication, 
captivation or manipulation” (What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity 227n9), and it 
is indeed this version of ferality that magical realism uses, often as an unsettling or 
empowering concept, in order to subvert conventional realism and its associated ideologies.
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Magical realist ferality, as that displayed by Allende‟s and García Márquez‟ animals, 
derives at least in part from Franz Kafka‟s works.  Angel Flores tracks Kafka‟s influence on 
Latin American magical realism back to Jorge Luis Borges.  In his influential essay, “Magical 
Realism in Spanish American Fiction” (1954), Flores traces Kafka‟s influence on Borges: 
For the sake of convenience I shall use the year 1935 as the point of departure 
of this new phase of Latin American literature, of magical realism.  It was in 
1935 that Jorge Luis Borges‟ collection Historia universal de la infamia made 
its appearance in Buenos Aires, at least two years after he had completed a 
masterly translation into Spanish of Franz Kafka‟s shorter fiction.  Not that we 
intend to limit his extremely complex genius to one influence; he [is] the most 
literate writer in the whole of America, whose works reflect so many and so 
divergent personalities . . . , but Kafka‟s impact on him has been the most 
profound and revealing.  (113, parenthesis omitted) 
This notion has been emphatically rejected by Luis Leal, for example, yet both Allende and 
García Márquez, as well as Peter Carey and Richard Flanagan (as will be discussed in 
Chapter Two), acknowledge Kafka‟s influence.26   Kafka‟s Metamorphosis (Die 
Verwandlung) is singled out in particular by García Márquez, who says: “When I read 
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Metamorphosis, at seventeen, I realized I could be a writer” (qtd. in Mendoza 31).  At the 
heart of magical realist animals and, as will become progressively more apparent throughout 
this thesis, at the heart of the mode itself is thus the quintessential feral animality of 
characters like Gregor Samsa, the “ungeheures Ungeziefer” (Kafka, “Die Verwandlung” 1: 
69), part human, part pest animal, who is both monstrous and uncanny, scandalously 
inappropriate, and incomprehensible to grasp in its enormity, and who is part of a group of 
so-called pest animals (“Ungeziefer”) that is commonly understood as a coherent category but 
which is, at the same time, neither scientific nor specific.
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Moreover, Kafka‟s feral creatures and Latin American magical realist fauna are 
intricately connected through the circus, a genre that traditionally translates colonial 
narratives into performance through the use of animals.  Kafka‟s fascination for the circus 
pervaded his work, as Walter Bauer-Wabnegg demonstrates.  It is therefore no coincidence 
that in Kafka‟s fiction—as in the circus ring—“the unreal happens as part of reality” (Flores 
115), and animals are the main characters in narratives such as Metamorphosis, in which 
Gregor Samsa wakes up one morning to find he has turned into a monstrous beetle; or “Ein 
Bericht für eine Akademie” (“A Report to an Academy”), the account of Red Peter, an ape 
captured for Carl Hagenbeck‟s famous circus.  Accordingly, allusions to the circus in magic 
realist fiction are not coincidental, beginning with the narrative spaces in both One Hundred 
Years of Solitude and The House of the Spirits, for instance, which are each delineated by a 
circular narrative structure: their respective endings reconnect with the beginning, thus 
forming a circle and resembling the space defined by the circus arena, where animals are 
traditionally the central attraction.  Nonhuman animals such as Barrabás or the “moth-eaten 
parrot” of Clara‟s Uncle Marcos are at the center of spectacles in The House of the Spirits, for 
example (22-3).  They occupy starring roles, so to speak, within the circular narrative space, 
resembling the animals who characterize the performance space of the circus ring. 
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While the carnivalesque has been identified as an important feature of magical realist 
texts by critics such as Amaryll Chanady (see 136), David K. Danow, and Faris, who 
observes that “a carnivalesque spirit is common in this group of novels” (“Scheherazade‟s 
Children” 184), the influence of the circus in particular, as a specific form of the 
carnivalesque, has so far been neglected in relation to a mode of writing that tends to display 
a significant presence and abundance of non-human animality.  Mikhail M. Bakhtin, who has 
described the significant influence of the carnival tradition on literature, identifies the circus 
as one of “many ancient forms of carnival [that] have been preserved and continue to live and 
renew themselves” (107). 
In One Hundred Years of Solitude, explicit references include a circus parade 
observed by Colonel Aureliano Buendía (see 244, 248); the signing of a ceasefire in “a 
patched circus tent” (167); Amaranta Úrsula‟s husband who wears “acrobat‟s tights,” is led 
“with the leash around his neck” by his wife and rides “his circus bicycle” (350); and the 
gypsy fairs in Macondo with their animal attractions (see 20-1), “purveyors of amusement” 
such as “acrobats and jugglers” (34), “circus things” (36), and fabulous “new inventions” (7).  
The commercial success of Macondo turns the town into an economic circus, as “men and 
women were seen who had adopted everyday and normal customs and manners but who 
really looked like people out of a circus.  In a town that had chafed under the tricks of the 
gypsies there was no future for those ambulatory acrobats of commerce” (210). 
In The House of the Spirits, the narrator Alba paints a circus train, “a train full of 
animals,” on her bedroom wall during her childhood (310), while the family‟s house itself is 
referred to as “that immense covered wagon of a house . . . with its population of eccentrics” 
(307).  As Alba‟s grandfather Esteban Trueba comments on the military parades of the 
dictatorship that “[b]read, circuses, and something to worship is all they need,” she remarks 
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that “Marxism did not stand a chance in Latin America because it did not allow for the 
magical side of things” (435). 
Furthermore, as well as with animal characters, both novels are teeming with exotic 
hybrids, who challenge the human-animal divide.  One aspect the carnival shares with the 
circus is the blurring of human-animal boundaries, as it is quite common for people to dress 
up during the traditional pre-Lent revelries and thus embody animal figures.  The word 
“embody” is used advisedly here, as dressing up for carnival is not simply a matter of 
wearing funny clothes, but it is what Bakhtin calls the “carnivalistic life” (101).  This means, 
as he says, that “its participants live in it, they live according to its laws, as long as those laws 
are in force” (Bakhtin 100-1; original emphasis).  It can indeed be said that the experience of 
carnival is like living within a different reality altogether.
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  This reality is characterized by 
the combination of paradoxes. As Bakhtin describes it, 
[a]ll the things that were closed off, isolated, and separated from one another 
by the non-carnivalistic hierarchical attitude enter into carnivalistic contacts 
and combinations.  Carnival brings together, unites, weds and combines the 
sacred with the profane, the lofty with the lowly, the great with the 
insignificant, the wise with the stupid, etc.  (101) 
Likewise, in the circus, elephantine ballet dancers, clever horses, and dogs with hats and 
tutus, for example, blend together human and animal characteristics.  Humans, too, behave 
like animals, as contortionists manage to twist and tie themselves into knots like reptiles; 
trapeze artists fly through the air like birds, weightlifters demonstrate strength like elephants; 
and tightrope walkers confidently and gracefully walk on, hang from, and jump on ropes like 
spiders moving along thin threads or insects balancing precariously on the edges of leaves. 
Correspondingly, both One Hundred Years of Solitude and The House of the Spirits 
feature “elephantine” women, such as Esteban‟s mother (House of the Spirits 107), a 
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prostitute Alba‟s uncles Jaime and Nicolás visit (House of the Spirits 153), or Camila 
Sagastume, “a totemic female known all through the land by the good name of „The 
Elephant‟” (Solitude 237).  Other hybrids in One Hundred Years of Solitude include 
Aureliano Babilonia, who seems to be “not a human child” (271); “a bear dressed like a 
Dutch girl” in the circus parade, “keeping time to the music with a soup spoon and a pan” 
(248); “parrots painted all colours reciting Italian arias” (21); “a trained monkey who read 
minds” (21); “soft-skinned cetaceans that had the head an torso of a woman, causing the 
ruination of sailors with the charm of their extraordinary breasts” (15); Úrsula, whose name 
translates as “female bear”; a “snake-man” in a cage (35-7); and the pig-tailed last Aureliano, 
“the mythological animal that was to bring the line to an end” (15).  In The House of the 
Spirits, notable hybrids are Clara‟s daughter Blanca, the “armadillo” (124, 207), or the green-
haired Rosa, Clara‟s sister, who has “something of the fish to her (if she had had a scaly tail, 
she would have been a mermaid), but her two legs placed her squarely on the tenuous line 
between a human being and a creature of myth” (15). 
Emerging from these examples is the idea that the category “animal” is not separate at 
all from the idea of being human in the context of magical realism.  The term “animal” is 
deeply ambiguous and, like Allende‟s apparent mermaid, tends to suggest both the human 
and the non-human animal, as the hybrid characters of Allende and García Márquez are 
caught up between, or negotiate, conflicting systems of order.  Stoddart argues that “the 
circus promotes a public fantasy of itself as a space of exceptionalism, escape and danger in 
which the rules which seem to govern the world outside have no currency” (7).  The laws of 
physics and nature are seemingly suspended in the ring, a phenomenon also reflected in 
magical realism.  The defiance of the laws of gravity in the form of flying and levitation is a 
frequent motif in magical realist fiction, for instance, which is often combined with bird-
human hybridity (such as angels) or in allusion to birds.  Flying, after all and in whichever 
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form, represents humanity‟s unattainable desire to be like birds, as it were, and acquire this 
avian ability that can only be imitated relatively poorly, with the aid of machines and 
contraptions. 
Thus, Clara‟s Uncle Marcos builds an aeroplane described as “a bird of prehistoric 
dimensions, with the face of a furious eagle, wings that moved, and a propeller on its back,” 
which lifts off “[a]gainst all logic . . . and with a certain elegance, accompanied by the 
creaking of its skeleton and the roar of its motor” in a public spectacle that can appropriately 
be called a „circus‟ (House of the Spirits 23-5).  Such clumsy attempts (“elegance” is 
delimited here), reinforce the biological distance between humans and birds, while angels—
such as the protagonist of García Márquez‟ short story “The Very Old Man with Enormous 
Wings,” Allende‟s Rosa (see House of the Spirits 15, 35), Clara (93, 102, 122, 171, 188), 
babies who “might be born with wings” (123) and the two winged young women on the front 
cover of the Black Swan paperback edition of The House of the Spirits—blur it.29  In turn, 
Remedios the Beauty‟s graceful ascent to heaven with “flapping sheets,” thought to be a 
result of “her irrevocable fate of a queen bee” (Solitude 221), places her, like Rosa, on the 
tenuous line between humanity and animality. 
Uncle Marcos‟ flight, moreover, takes place in the context of exploration and 
scientific innovation.  His character illustrates the link between explorer narratives, natural 
history collections and animal entertainment, as he is also an explorer, who “had various 
travel journals in which he recorded his excursions and impressions, as well as a collection of 
maps and books of stories and fairy tales that he kept in the trunks he stored in the junk room 
at the far end of the third courtyard” (House of the Spirits 29).  Clara, who listens to her 
uncle‟s stories, “recalled Lope de Aguirre‟s search for El Dorado, or the unpronounceable 
names of the flora and fauna her extraordinary uncle had seen” (29).  Like early explorers and 
natural historians, he brings home “animals in jars of formaldehyde . . . and all sort of 
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unfamiliar animals . . . that had traveled from remote lands only to meet their death beneath 
Nana‟s irate broom in the farthest corners of the house.  Uncle Marcos‟s manners were those 
of a cannibal, as Severo put it” (21). 
As Uncle Marcos‟s strange collections, stories and circus-like public spectacles 
highlight, the circus as we know it today has emerged from what was initially a display of 
curiosities from newly „discovered‟ lands.  Later, it became an animated performance of 
colonial travel accounts and adventure stories.  As Todorov reports, Columbus was already 
interested in the collection of exotic species, in which he unproblematically included natives 
of the New World: “in his naturalist‟s enthusiasm, he always wanted to take specimens of all 
kinds back to Spain: trees, birds, animals, and Indians; the notion of asking their opinion is 
foreign to him” (48).  While, as William Johnson points out, “explorers began to return from 
distant lands with animal curiosities which were set on display in the fairs” from the Middle 
Ages onwards, the mass capture of wild animals only became possible with advancing 
colonisation.  Only then could the modern circus as we know it today begin to evolve 
(Johnson, ch.1 pt. 3). 
Expanding colonisation also increased the demand for such displays.  García 
Márquez‟s “A Very Old Man with Enormous Wings” illustrates the popularity of menagerie 
displays of “exotics,” be they people, animals, apparently supernatural beings or hybrids.  
Thus, when Pelayo and Elisenda walk out in the morning after an old man with wings has 
landed in their yard, they find “the whole neighborhood in front of the chicken coop having 
fun with the angel, without the slightest reverence, tossing him things to eat through the 
openings in the wire as if he weren‟t a supernatural creature but a circus animal” (García 
Márquez, “Very Old Man” 106).  The display becomes immensely popular and profitable, as 
people flock to see the old man: “. . . Pelayo and Elisenda were happy with fatigue, for in less 
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than a week they had crammed their rooms with money and the line of pilgrims waiting their 
turn to enter still reached beyond the horizon” (García Márquez, “Very Old Man” 108). 
The domination of animals in particular became a significant demonstration of 
superiority and power, not only over animals and nature, but also in an inter-human social 
context.  Both Pratt and James R. Ryan point out the popularity of explorer narratives during 
the nineteenth century and their importance in legitimating the colonial project to the 
population at home.  As Ryan states, an “interest in pursuing zoological „specimens‟ for 
private and national collections was fostered by both the dramatic upsurge in the popularity 
of natural history and the proliferation of popular literature and images of hunting in Britain, 
which frequently pictured the hunter as a manly adventurer and hero of Empire” (“Hunting 
with the Camera” 204).  Pratt points out that “journalism and narrative travel accounts . . . 
were essential mediators between the scientific network and a larger European public.  They 
were central agents in legitimating scientific authority and its global project alongside 
Europe‟s other ways of knowing the world, and being in it” (29). 
Franklin identifies several themes in “the colonial big game hunter stories,” which 
were “ostensibly for children and teenagers” (43).  These were “the naturalization and 
dominance of Europeans in places such as Africa and India; the aggressiveness and danger of 
wild animals; the heroism of the hunter” (Franklin 43).  This is illustrated by Uncle Marcos‟ 
photograph, which depicts him in a conventional pose “that showed him dressed as an 
explorer leaning on an old-fashioned double-barreled rifle with his right foot on the neck of a 
Malaysian tiger, the same triumphant position in which she had seen the Virgin standing 
between plaster clouds and pallid angels at the main altar, one foot on the vanquished devil” 
(House of the Spirits, 20-1).  Franklin describes the implications of such colonial imagery for 
the zoo, which not only shares its roots with the circus, but also has much in common with it 
in terms of the demonstration of particular human-animal relations.  He writes: 
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“Contemporary zoos housed these animals as dangerous captives (cages emphasized prison 
bars); like prisoners of war, they were put on public display for the entertainment of the 
victorious” (43). 
The circus thus mirrored and celebrated imperial power by providing conventional 
and recognisable imagery for its nineteenth century audiences.  Animal acts fulfilled a triple 
function in this regard: firstly, they symbolised political control of the colonies, secondly, 
they embodied human mastery over nature, and thirdly, they allegorised social and 
evolutionary superiority of white Europeans over indigenous colonised peoples.  “A Very 
Old Man With Enormous Wings” is a reminder that carnival sideshows and menageries, both 
representing earlier forms of the circus, were in fact the final destination not only for many 
New World animals but also for its people.
30
  By portraying the dominion over nature, exotic 
animals and the colonies not only as a natural relationship, but also as innocent fun, the circus 
legitimated colonial power structures and politics.  Moreover, circus acts took up and 
perpetuated the imagery of colonial travel narratives more vividly.  The “manly adventurers 
and heroes of Empire” depicted in travellers‟ tales came alive in the circus arena. 
Circus enterprises benefited enormously from the growing popularity of natural 
history, and with its capacity to combine completely contradictory elements within its shows, 
the circus ensured that, for example, the “diverse tastes of America‟s very first mass 
audience” would be catered for,” as Cook points out (qtd. by Whalen in Barnum XXXII).  
P.T. Barnum‟s famous exhibition of the Fejee Mermaid, a fake hybrid made from a fish and a 
monkey, for example, served on the one hand to satisfy the desire to see scientific evidence of 
the existence of marvellous, exotic, fairytale creatures.  On the other hand, it showed a 
resistance to known science at the time—not to mention subsequent evolutionary theory—as 
exhibits such as the Fejee Mermaid were not easily classifiable.  Harriet Ritvo observes a 
similar phenomenon in Britain.  She writes: “Exhibited mermaids ... concretely challenged 
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the established order of nature, which offered them no place” (Platypus 178).  Ritvo reports 
that “the intransigent classificatory problems posed by puzzling creatures also produced or 
mirrored taxonomic issues within their audience.  Not everybody felt compelled to eliminate 
the impossible.  Indeed many—including entrepreneurs, their eager audiences, and the 
opportunistic press—reveled in it, resisting efforts to deprive the world of its magic” 
(Platypus 175-6).
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Like magical realism, which is characterised by “the amalgamation of realism and 
fantasy” (Flores 112), the circus fuses illusion, “magic” and material reality.  The circus 
arena, notorious for spectacular and ambivalent displays of natural history, thus provides a 
suitable model to represent the hybrid creatures of magical realism.  Allende portrays this 
unclassifiableness in Rosa‟s embroidery, featuring “creatures that were half bird and half 
mammal, covered with iridescent feathers and endowed with horns and hooves, and so fat 
and with such stubby wings that they defied the laws of biology and aerodynamics” (House 
of the Spirits 15).  At the same time, these fantastical creatures appear against the everyday 
backdrop of a simple, mundane tablecloth.  In the same fashion, and unlike the carnival, 
which is, as Bakhtin says, “the world upside down” within its delimited timeframe (110), the 
circus is both the world and the world upside down; it is both the everyday and the 
extraordinary.  The circus not only acknowledges the laws of everyday life—the world 
outside the big top—but it also incorporates those rules, and presents them in concurrence 
with magical illusions and subversive, carnivalesque imagery.  As a result, the circus 
assimilates and combines completely contradictory discourses.  In this way, the apparently 
unbridgeable gap between humans and animals, perpetuated by Western scientific, 
philosophical and theological discourses, is blurred in the circus arena, at the same time as 
that gap is reinforced by the spatial separation between the visitors to the circus menagerie 
and the animals kept in trailers and cages, for example.  Likewise, circuses promote the idea 
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of equal human-animal partnerships, and present this image in an environmentalist context, 
for instance, while simultaneously reinforcing human dominance over animals.
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There is thus a dialogic relationship between multiple discourses in the circus, and the 
same phenomenon occurs in magical realism.  Slemon argues, with reference to Bakhtin, that 
the equal, non-hierarchical balance between “two separate narrative modes” is “the 
characteristic maneuver of magic realist fiction” (410).  He suggests, referring to Bakhtin and 
Foucault, that a “battle” for “power knowledge” takes place between “two opposing 
discursive systems” which makes it impossible to “naturaliz[e] the text to an established 
system of representation” (Slemon 410).  Correspondingly, in The House of the Spirits and 
One Hundred Years of Solitude, the established systems of representation, implicitly and 
especially Linnaean taxonomy, are both upheld and resisted by the circensian spirit pervading 
these novels. 
The Linnaean system of taxonomy in particular became, as Michel Foucault argues in 
The Order of Things, the universal blueprint for the way Europeans order the world around 
them; a foundational narrative of European epistemology.  Foucault describes the 
fundamental epistemological shift that these two kinds of animal spaces, the circus and the 
taxonomic order, signify and argues that botanical gardens and zoos, for example, were not 
the result of “a new curiosity about exotic plants and animals,” but that the space in which 
they were represented and perceived had changed (see Order 131).  He writes: 
To the Renaissance, the strangeness of animals was a spectacle: it was 
featured in fairs, in tournaments, in fictitious or real combats, in 
reconstitutions of legends in which the bestiary displayed its ageless fables. 
The natural history room and the garden, as created in the Classical period, 
replace the circular procession of the “show” with the arrangement of things in 
a “table.” (Foucault, Order 131) 
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The circus, however, which developed its current form in the nineteenth century, and 
originated from travelling menageries as well as natural history museums, retained the pre-
Linnaean circular spectacle and “the strangeness of animals,” at the same time as it 
incorporated the popular interest in natural history.
33
  Accordingly, as a fundamentally 
contradictory and polyphonic space, the circus belongs to the group of spaces which Foucault 
calls “heterotopias,” “counter-sites,” in which “all the other real sites that can be found within 
the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.  Places of this kind are 
outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality” (“Of 
Other Spaces” 24).  Foucault names these counter-sites “heterotopias” because, as he says, 
“these places are absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about” (“Of 
Other Spaces” 24). 
Corresponding to this idea is Faris‟ suggestion that “[p]art of [magic realism‟s] 
attraction for postmodern writers may be its willfully oxymoronic nature, its exposing of the 
unpresentable, its activation of differences” (“Scheherazade‟s Children” 185).  This idea of 
the unpresentable oxymoron is best illustrated by Borges‟ “Chinese Encyclopaedia,” a 
conundrum that inspired Foucault‟s The Order of Things: 
[A]nimals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) 
tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in 
the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very 
fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, 
(n) that from a long way off look like flies. (qtd. in Foucault, Order xv)  
In a conceptual twist which Foucault calls a “vanishing trick” (Order xvii), Borges creates 
categories that appear to be separate, but which are ultimately blurred and inconsistent with 
any rational system of order: the list contains itself within its entirety, as well as every animal 
outside of it.  Foucault points out that in Borges‟ list, “we shall never succeed in defining a 
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stable relation of contained to container between each of these categories and that which 
includes them all” (Order xvii).  Thus, the space created becomes “impossible to think” 
(Order xv).
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It is a heterotopia, brought into being within what Foucault calls the “non-place of 
language” (Order xvii).  Accordingly, its structure is determined less by the paradox, the 
“incongruous, the linking together of things that are inappropriate,” as Foucault puts it, but 
rather, as suggested by Faris above, by the oxymoron, best described, borrowing Foucault‟s 
words, as “a worse kind of disorder . . . the disorder in which fragments of a large number of 
possible orders glitter separately in the dimension, without law or geometry, of the 
heteroclite” (Order xvii, emphases omitted).  Foucault contrasts those heterotopias that order 
dead, controllable and passive objects, such as libraries or museums, with the heteroclitic 
space of the fairground, “these marvelous empty sites on the outskirts of cities that teem once 
or twice a year with stands, displays, heteroclite objects, wrestlers, snakewomen, fortune-
tellers, and so forth” (“Of Other Spaces” 26).  However, rather than being mutually exclusive, 
both heterotopias, those of extreme order and those of vibrant incongruity, can 
simultaneously be contained within the circensian space of the magical realist novel.
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Both the carnival square and the circus are heterotopias, and yet the circus is 
qualitatively different from the carnival.  Bakhtin stresses that “[c]arnival is a pageant 
without a stage and without a division into performers and spectators. In the carnival 
everyone is an active participant, everyone communes in the carnival act” (100-1).  The 
circus, in contrast, features a marked separation between active performers and a largely 
passive audience.  Moreover, the spectators are usually restricted to those who can afford to 
pay for the show.  In other words, unlike the carnival spectacle with its human animals, 
which is free and characterized by the active participation of everyone, the circus showcases 
animals for profit.  Indeed, the heterotopia of the fairground, such as the gypsy fairs in 
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Macondo, is another such commercialized animal space, where the display of animals and 
animal acts is common. 
I call such animal heterotopias “circensian spaces.”  Extending the term “circensian” 
from its original meaning, which refers exclusively to the circus of ancient Rome, I use the 
term “circensian spaces” to include also the modern circus tradition in all its aspects and 
variations: from its origins in the travelling menageries at country fairs and in the 
commercialized spectacles of natural history displays, to the colonial exotic animal 
performances in the big top and the contemporary animal acts that we are familiar with today.  
This term can be applied to conceptual as well as actual sites of animal entertainment.  In 
regard to magical realist fiction, the idea of „circensian spaces‟ can apply to various levels of 
the text.  They can occur within the narrative itself, where the performance, display and 
commercialization of animals is a thematic concern, or on the level of narrative structure, 
whereby the narrative space with its display of “performing,” or acting, animals is the 
spectacle and the reader is the spectator and consumer.  The concept could, furthermore, 
apply to a subset of the mode itself, with a group of “circensian” magical realist novels (such 
as those discussed in this dissertation) constituting a literary animal spectacle, so to speak, 
that is marketable to very diverse kinds of audiences. 
It is this same capacity of the circus to showcase incongruities, to allow paradoxes 
and ambiguities to exist, which makes it appealing and stimulating to its audiences.  With its 
colourful parades of hybrids, “freaks,” mocking clowns and exotic animals, the circus can be 
regarded as magical realism in action, as setting, performance and language, which are 
simultaneously at odds with and reinforcing the material realities of the circus environment, 
create an inherently oxymoronic and dialogic heterotopia.  However, magical realism 
reverses this relationship between imaginary and material reality.  The circensian space thus 
becomes the narrative‟s reality, whilst the material realities of colonisation and its aftermath 
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are exposed as resulting from staged illusions, colonial discourse, Myths and circumstances 
created by the powerful.  Magical realist, circensian animals thus constitute a further 
development in the cultural history of the circus.  With origins in pre-Enlightenment Europe 
and its bestiaries, they travelled, so to speak, to South America via explorer narratives, back 
to Europe via the circus, and back again to South America via Kafka‟s fiction.  In the process, 
they have been transformed from monsters at the margins of maps and beyond the limits of 
known reality to the protagonists of „their own “other spaces”‟ who break the boundaries of 
Cartesian dualities, a stretch of the imagination made possible by the dynamics of circensian 
spaces. 
 
Monstrous Vermin, Part I: Ants, Cockroaches and “Others” 
Through subjectivity, agency and ferality, by transgressing spatial and conceptual boundaries, 
and by creating “their own „other spaces,‟” García Márquez and Allende‟s animals resist 
employment as disembodied, utopian metaphors for European fantasies and serve to dislocate 
the human subject of Western epistemologies.  Indeed, Brown argues that “[t]he destabilizing 
of the New World [through nature‟s resistance] forced Europe at times to see itself as other 
even while struggling to make the New World in its image” (29).  By embracing the 
European explorers‟ idea of an animal space—albeit on their own terms—García Márquez 
and Allende use this kind of othering as a manoeuvre in keeping with Faris‟ comment on 
“patterns of reversal” in magical realism, which “implicitly figure a lack of human control 
over events: What you thought you controlled controls you” (“Scheherazade” 178).  This loss 
of control is expressed, for example, in the fact that feral animals, so-called pests and vermin 
such as rats, mice, moths, scorpions, leeches, spiders, ants, cockroaches, termites, stray cats 
and dogs, unwanted kittens, mosquitoes, lizards, lice and worms all feature abundantly in 
both One Hundred Years of Solitude and The House of the Spirits.  García Márquez in 
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particular makes the struggle against pests, such as the “age-old war between man and ant” 
(Solitude 377), or the unwinnable battle against cockroaches (Solitude 357), a central theme.  
Accordingly, as Janes suggests, “within the novel, the ants embody the natural forces that 
must be pushed back, struggled against, extirpated, if human order is to prevail” (26). 
Ants, after all, are not “a trivial antagonist,” as Janes shows: “30 percent of all living 
creatures in the tropics—and the most abundant and damaging predators—are ants or 
termites. . . . Servants of decomposition, nature‟s essential deconstructors, they are the 
dominant species” (26).  Janes views the ants as an embodiment of nature as such, and she 
describes the force with which the ants claim their territory and their place within the 
narrative as “the power of a nonhuman other” (27).  There is a “civilization versus nature” 
dichotomy, which, as Janes writes, is a traditional and “common theme” in Latin American 
literature (Janes 26-7).  She sees “[t]he conflict between man and nature as man tries to 
establish civilization over nature‟s dead body” as “central to the continuing struggles of the 
Buendías against ants and laxity” (Janes 129). 
Nonetheless, animals are by far the most prominent nonhuman others in magical 
realist fiction generally.  It is evident in One Hundred Years of Solitude that insects and other 
supposed pests control at least some spaces, some of the time, as Colonel Aureliano Buendía 
notices, who “would sit in the street door as long as the mosquitoes would allow him to” 
(Solitude 188, my emphasis).  Furthermore, attempts to drive them away from spaces they 
already occupy are ultimately futile, as Santa Sofía de la Piedad‟s efforts show: “She first 
tried to kill them with a broom, then with insecticides, and finally with lye, but the next day 
they were back in the same place, still passing by, tenacious and invincible” (Solitude 331).  
In the end, “she realize[s] that she [is] defeated” (Solitude 231).  The text suggests that 
humans will ultimately lose the battle  with animals, as “other species of future animals 
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would steal from the insects the paradise of misery that the insects were finally stealing from 
man” (Solitude 378). 
Accordingly, human order does not prevail, as animals subvert orderings of space 
according to “imaginative geographies,” a term evoked by Edward Said and employed by 
Philo and Wilbert, who write: 
[M]any human discourses contain within them a definite imaginative 
geography serving to position “them” (animals) relative to “us” (humans) in a 
fashion that links a conceptual “othering” (setting them apart from us in terms 
of character traits) to a geographical “othering” (fixing them in worldly places 
and spaces different from those that we humans tend to occupy).  (10-11) 
However, boundaries that appear to be fixed, immovable and defined by humans are fluid in 
practice, advancing and regressing, as humans and animals continually encroach on each 
others‟ territory.  Thus, the Buendías, “[s]urrounded by the voracity of nature,” try to mark 
„their‟ territory and erect barriers around it, “defend[ing] their world with demarcations of 
quicklime” (Solitude 377).  However, although Amaranta Úrsula manages to “[scatter] the 
red ants, who had already taken possession of the porch” (Solitude 347), for example, Santa 
Sofía de la Piedad, “[w]ith neither the time or the resources to halt the challenge of nature, . . 
. spen[ds] the day in the bedrooms driving out the lizards who would return at night.  One 
morning she saw that the red ants had left the undermined foundations, crossed the garden, 
climbed up the railing, where the begonias had taken on an earthen colour, and had 
penetrated into the heart of the house” (Solitude 331). 
Constantly under threat, therefore, is what Philo and Wilbert call the “strong human 
sense of the proper places which animals should occupy physically,” an idea related to “the 
conceptual placing of animals” (10).  Accordingly, the bedrooms and the garden are not 
proper places for red ants.  After all, pests, by their very definition, are animals ”out of 
Schwalm  54 
place.”  The ants‟ physical transgression here confirms, on the one hand, their conceptual 
placing as “pests”; on the other hand, however, they also attack “the heart of the house,” a 
metaphor that represents the epitome of human space and connotes ideas such as “home,” 
“belonging,” and “identity.”  They penetrate to the core of humanity itself and mock the idea 
that it is a human prerogative to order, control and define space, as they “undermin[e] the 
foundations of the house” (Solitude 308-9).  Indeed, García Márquez‟ ants undermine the 
foundations Western epistemologies, and infuse the central position of the Cartesian subject 
with nonhuman otherness, at the same time as this scene is an expression of the particular, 
material relationship between humans and animals called “pest control.” 
 
Monstrous Vermin, Part II: Controlling Pests 
In The House of the Spirits, ants continue to create “other spaces” and illuminate the clash 
between local knowledges and practices and those imported, or imposed.  Thus, old Pedro 
García, one of the peasants on Esteban Trueba‟s estate, deals with a particularly 
overwhelming ant plague effectively by acknowledging the ants, to borrow Simons‟ words, 
as “subjects of their own experience” (Simons 21).  He talks to a small number of individual 
ants and tells them: “I‟m going to show you the way out, ants, so you get out of here and take 
the rest of them with you” (House of the Spirits 134).  His success infuriates Mr. Brown, a 
US American “agricultural technician specializing in insecticides,” who has spent 
considerable time “identifying the species, its life-style, the location of its burrows, its habits, 
and even its most secret desires” by observing them through a microscope, and devising an 
elaborate, deadly poisonous and undoubtedly costly plan to eradicate the species (133).  His 
way of looking at animals and subsequent approach is natural scientific, contrasted with and 
ridiculed by the simplicity of Pedro García‟s actions: “The expert was furious.  „You have to 
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show me how to do that!‟ he shouted.  „By talking to them, mister.  Tell them to go, that they 
are a nuisance here.  They understand,‟ explained old Pedro García” (134-5). 
Allende thus sets up a split between the scientific, Western (or, in Mr Brown‟s case, 
specifically US American) expert‟s approach on the one hand, and the local knowledges and 
practices of the people Mr Brown calls “these poor savages” on the other (House of the 
Spirits 134).  Through Mr Brown‟s natural scientific method, Allende illustrates that, 
although “the systematizing of nature” (Pratt 29) was regarded as “not transformative” (Pratt 
33) and as establishing “non-exploitative relations to nature” (Pratt 29), “natural history as a 
way of thinking interrupted existing networks of historical and material relations among 
people, plants, and animals, where-ever it applied itself” (Pratt 32).  Imposition of Western 
thought on non-Western societies through colonising processes and systems disrupted 
existing relationships between people and nature, and inevitably affected cultural practices, 
social relations, economies, and politics within colonised societies.  As Pratt explains, 
“natural history extracted specimens not only from their organic or ecological relations with 
each other, but also from their places in other peoples‟ economies, histories, social and 
symbolic systems” (31). 
The ants‟ response to old Pedro García‟s “advice and recommendations, prayers and 
wisdom and enchanted formulas” (House of the Spirits 134) thus constitutes a resistance to 
what Philo and Wilbert call “[t]he domination of certain knowledges over others,” which, 
they write 
also points to related divisions which have been constructed between experts, 
elites and what we might term lay, amateur or even popular knowledges, all of 
which have consequences for which understandings of animals, and of what is 
an animal, become sanctioned as “proper”.  All sorts of boundary-work are 
involved in social struggles over which group has authority, and hence over 
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which form of knowing is taken as legitimate, and the participants in these 
struggles obviously all portray themselves—and seek to persuade others to 
portray them—as the relevant “experts” in the field.  (9) 
Important here is that neither García Márquez nor Allende launch a wholesale attack against 
the sciences as such.  Although Mr Brown is portrayed as “a madman” (House of the Spirits 
134), Allende does not suggest that Western science is always “mad” or “bad” in contrast 
with local, alternative knowledge systems.  Thus, she creates a reverse scenario in which 
there is one “realm” in which old Pedro García‟s “knowledge [is] so vast that the doctor from 
the nuns‟ hospital used to come and ask his advice” and another in which “all his knowledge 
[is] powerless” and effectively kills his daughter Pancha, fallen ill with “chicken fever,” who 
could have been saved by modern hospital care (166-7). 
Correspondingly, García Márquez comments that “few things in daily life are not 
scientific miracles” (“For a Country within Reach of the Children” 36).  In his outline of 
Colombia‟s cultural development from the “first Spaniards who came to the New World” 
onwards, he mentions the pre-colonial, “ancient systems of science and education” as much 
as the hopes pinned on Enlightenment ideals such as “the legal and ethical theories of 
Bentham, the education of Lancaster, the study of languages, the popularization of arts and 
sciences—in order to eradicate the vices of a Spain more Catholic than the Pope” (“For a 
Country within Reach of the Children” 33, 36).  However, he considers the failure of the 
“generation that won Independence,” that is, the “groups of young romantics inspired by the 
enlightenment of the French Revolution,” to “eradicate” the “deplorable legacy” of 
colonisation, because, as he says, “[e]ven they were not free of [colonialism‟s] evil influence” 
(“For a Country within Reach of the Children” 34). 
Accordingly, the issue García Márquez and Allende‟s magical realist novels address 
is not a critique of Western scientific methods or knowledge per se, offered and applied 
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where they can assist, but science‟s laying claim to a universal truth and turning it into 
colonising ideologies that are put into practice without consultation of local knowledges or 
regard for local conditions, and that implement and maintain the interests of the powerful.
36
  
Such a situation is outlined by Arturo Escobar‟s analysis of “development discourse,” the 
imposition of Western expert knowledge and practices in the form of Western development 
aid and strategies.  Escobar explains that one of the “basic premises of development . . . 
formulated in the 1940s and 1950s” is the “[f]undamental . . . belief in modernization as the 
only force capable of destroying archaic superstitions and relations.  Industrialization and 
urbanization were seen as the inevitable and necessarily progressive routes to modernization” 
(“Invention” 383).  Essential to achieving this goal is not only “capital investment” and 
“economic growth and development,” but also a “[d]issecting” of the Third World, 
whereby—like ants under Mr Brown‟s microscope—“[e]verything was subjected to the eye 
of the new experts” (Escobar, “Invention” 383).37 
As indigenous populations are categorised as both technologically and culturally 
backward, the values to be achieved through modernisation are thus “those embodied in the 
ideal of the cultivated European” (“Escobar, “Invention” 384).  However, Escobar argues that 
“[b]ehind the humanitarian concern and the positive outlook of the new strategy, new forms 
of power and control, more subtle and refined, were put in operation” (“Invention” 382).  
Development discourse establishes expert authority and determines “who can speak” 
(Escobar, “Invention” 383).  Moreover, as Escobar proposes, it is linked to a particular “type 
of rationality,” governed by a view of “people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical 
figures to be moved up and down in the charts of „progress‟” and an approach of 
“categoriz[ing] and further specify[ing]” new problems (“Invention” 384).  As Escobar‟s 
reference to dissection already suggests, this way of looking, mirrored by Mr Brown, is 
inherently Cartesian.  This view of the so-called Third World and its inhabitants is, 
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correspondingly, characterised by “the separation between reformers and those to be 
reformed by keeping alive the premise of the third world as different and inferior, as having a 
limited humanity in relation to the accomplished Europeans” (Escobar, “Invention” 386).  
Regarding the inhabitants of Third World countries—former colonies—in the context of a 
Cartesian subject-object division and taking a patronising approach thus leads to a situation 
whereby “[a]pproaches that could have had positive effects in terms of easing material 
constraints became . . . instruments of power and control” (Escobar, “Invention” 384). 
In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 1982, García Márquez addresses the disabling 
consequences of such a perspective.  He asks: “Why is the originality so readily granted us in 
literature so mistrustfully denied us in our difficult attempts at social change?  Why think that 
the social justice sought by progressive Europeans for their own countries cannot also be a 
goal for Latin America, with different methods for dissimilar conditions?” (“The Solitude of 
Latin America” 90).  He argues that “[t]he interpretation of our reality through patterns not 
our own serves only to make us ever more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary” 
(García Márquez, “The Solitude of Latin America” 89).  Such patterns include knowledge 
systems, both historical and contemporary, as much as political and economic structures or 
ideologies.  Political and economic systems, Garcia Marquez argues, cannot be imposed from 
outside successfully without adjusting to local conditions (see Mendoza 97-101).  He 
suggests that beyond capitalism and socialism “there are many alternatives—perhaps even as 
many alternatives as there are countries in our Americas, including the United States.  I am 
convinced that we have to find our own solutions” (qtd. in Mendoza 101). 
The key to finding these alternatives, he suggests, lies in looking at Latin American 
reality differently.  He describes “this outsized reality” as one marked by brutal dictatorships, 
such as Pinochet‟s regime, disappearances, and hunger, causing “twenty million Latin 
American children [to die] before the age of one—more than have been born in Europe since 
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1970” (García Márquez, “The Solitude of Latin America” 88-9)  Elizabeth A. Spiller raises 
the question of complicity in creating this reality through the way it is viewed by Europeans.  
She writes: “. . . for García Márquez, art—how Europeans imagined America—becomes 
responsible for political reality” (383).  Certainly, García Márquez suggests that the failure of 
“the rational talents” of Europe and the Western world lies in “measuring us with the 
yardstick that they use for themselves,” which leaves them “without a valid means to 
interpret us” (“The Solitude of Latin America” 89).  Thus, the perspective of “Europeans of 
good will—and sometimes those of bad, as well” has a decisive part to play in the creation of 
Latin American reality (“The Solitude of Latin America” 88). 
Whilst he does not address these issues overtly, García Márquez‟ references to 
Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala and El Salvador in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech imply 
that such realities, apart from being “the result of age-old inequities,” are also the 
consequence of concrete political and economic interference by the West (“The Solitude of 
Latin America” 90).  He speaks to an audience aware of the context of rising Third World 
debt to Western nations as well as a history of US American interventions in Latin American 
internal politics.
38
  As Faris points out, “North American hegemony in their hemisphere” is 
also a particular concern for “Latin American writers of magical realism” (“Scheherazade‟s 
Children” 179-80).  Allende‟s critique of “the barbarity of Pinochet‟s Chilean regime” (Faris, 
“Scheherazade 180) thus includes the support of “gringos sent by their intelligence service to 
map a strategy for bringing down the new government” (House of the Spirits 390).  The goals 
touted by the Pinochet regime, Allende observes, were to establish “savage capitalism” and 
“Western Christian values” (My Invented Country 158, 162), and she recounts how, in an 
unintelligible attempt at intellectualism, a senior member of the military junta described the 
foundation and aims of “a country like ours” as “Cartesian” (José Toribio Merino qtd. in 
Allende, My Invented Country 162-3).  US American and neocolonial influences on Latin 
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America are further illustrated by Allende‟s use of the US American pest control expert Mr 
Brown, or García Márquez‟ depiction of the banana company in Macondo, an allusion to the 
United Fruit Company, the same corporation “in whose interests the Unites States destroyed 
Guatemalan democracy in 1954” (Janes 79). 
Accordingly, local conditions in Latin America are inextricably linked not only to 
historical and contemporary representations of the continent and the resulting practices—
development and modernisation financed through international debt, or dictatorships aided by 
foreign agencies—but also to global acts as simple as buying bananas in a supermarket.  And 
yet, for people in industrialised Western nations, it is as easy to dissociate ourselves from 
those realities as it is to switch off the television or turn the pages of the newspaper.  This 
reality is thus completely outside the experience of most Westerners, and yet its interpretation 
through “invalid means,” as García Márquez and Allende illustrate, is a matter of life and 
death.  The ants‟ magical reaction to Pedro García‟s pest control method is therefore more 
than an “ironic literalism” designed to “encourage a symbolic or metaphorical reading of the 
fabulous” and “expose the delusory capacities of realism and deceptive constructions of 
reality,” as Takolander argues in relation to the characteristics of magical realism in general 
(215, 19).  Whilst an allegorical reading is possible, an inherently anti-Cartesian approach is 
necessary to expose the oppressive structures at work.  Magical realist narratives preclude the 
separation and disconnection of one realm of experience from another, as animals act as go-
betweens between “magical” and “real” spaces, blur such boundaries and establish validity of 
“other spaces” through their embodied presence.  In other words, the ants‟ and other animals‟ 
realities matter in a material sense, and not, or not only, as “ironic” constructs; as the 
following chapters of this thesis will further illustrate.  García Márquez asks for “those clear-
sighted Europeans who struggle . . . for a more just and humane homeland” to reconsider 
“their way of seeing us” (“The Solitude of Latin America,”89-90).  What is needed, he says, 
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are “concrete acts of legitimate support for all the peoples that assume the illusion of having a 
life of their own in the distribution of the world” (“The Solitude of Latin America” 90).  This, 
as García Márquez‟ and Allende‟s fictions show, involves more than simply redrawing the 
human-animal boundary line, in order to include more people deemed worthy of being in 
charge of their own lives.  It requires an openness towards other realities. 
As García Márquez explains, “I was able to write One Hundred Years of Solitude 
simply by looking at reality, our reality, without the limitations which rationalists and 
Stalinists through the ages have tried to impose on it to make it easier for them to understand” 
(qtd. in Mendoza 60).  Likewise, Allende is not ironic when she comments that “[i]t‟s strange 
that my work has been classified as magic realism because I see my novels as just being 
realistic literature” and suggests that “. . . if Kafka had been born in Mexico, he would have 
been a realistic writer.  So much depends on where you were born” (“Questions and 
Answers”).  Magical realist fiction, like Kafka‟s Metamorphosis, asks its readers to allow, at 
the very least, the possibility of other realities and other experiences of reality to exist, 
especially when these are so profoundly affected by the way we see them.
39
  Reading magical 
realism, such as The House of the Spirits or One Hundred Years of Solitude, requires readers 
to grant others the validity of their own experience, even if these experiences are as 
completely “other” or so seemingly insignificant as the lives of Ungeziefer, of ants, 
butterflies or birds, whose own other spaces lie “in the opposite direction from reality” 
(Solitude 128), that is, the opposite of a reality determined by positivist, Cartesian mindsets. 
 
Stray Culture 
Thus, the circensian spaces of Allende‟s and García Márquez‟ novels integrate multiple 
cultural perspectives through dialogic engagement against a background which Chanady 
describes as “the colonized subject‟s rebellion against imposed models, the resistance of the 
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newly independent Latin American countries to neocolonial domination and the European 
philosophical delegitimation of metaphysical and epistemological paradigms” (136).  Faris 
explains that magical realist texts “implicitly correspond textually in a new way to a critique 
of totalitarian discourses of all kinds” by being open to “more than one point of view, to 
realistic and magical ways of seeing” (“Scheherazade” 180, original italics).  In relation to 
One Hundred Years of Solitude, these magical ways originate in the cultural mix of 
Colombian society.  Apart from the strong Spanish influence, which, according to García 
Márquez, “is an undeniably important part of our cultural make-up,” it is the “contributions 
from many different races” in the Caribbean which, he explains, “taught me to look at reality 
in a different way, to accept the supernatural as part of our everyday life” (qtd. in Mendoza 
51-2).  He elaborates: “The history of the Caribbean is full of magic—a magic brought by 
black slaves from Africa but also by Swedish, Dutch and English pirates who thought nothing 
of setting up an Opera House in New Orleans or filling women‟s teeth with diamonds.  
Nowhere in the world do you find the racial mixture and the contrasts which you find in the 
Caribbean” (García Márquez qtd. in Mendoza 52). 
García Márquez‟ magical realism is therefore not simply a reaction to European 
constructions of the New World, but an active influence from a variety of cultures.  This is a 
confident assertion of cultural hybridity and identity, at the same time as it is a statement 
against European egocentrism, which, in the words of Todorov, is “the identification of our 
own values with values in general, of our I with the universe—in the conviction that the 
world is one” (42-3, original emphasis).  As García Márquez says, it was “the exuberant 
imagination of African slaves, mixed with that of the pre-Columbian natives and added to the 
Andalusian taste for fantasy and the Galician cult of the supernatural” which “had produced 
an ability to see reality in a certain magical way.  This is common to both the Caribbean and 
Brazil” (qtd. in Mendoza 51).  The diverse commingling of cultures is a positive, active force 
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rather than a reactive one.  This is reflected in García Márquez‟ Love in the Time of Cholera, 
where the female protagonist, Fermina Daza keeps a cosmopolitan house full of multicultural 
animals, so to speak, such as “Dalmatians,” “Abyssinian cats,” “Siamese,” “palace Persians,” 
an “Amazonian monkey,” “Guatemalan birds in cages,” “six perfumed crows” from the 
“smugglers‟ ships from Curaçao” and a “German mastiff” (22).  Her position “in the midst of 
so many abominable creatures” is described as that of “not only the most beautiful woman in 
the Caribbean but also the happiest” (García Márquez, Love 22).  The presence of 
“multicultural animals”—hybrid or otherwise, and human or nonhuman—is thus a positive 
marker of identity. 
Indeed, Allende describes Chilean society in terms of its dogs.  Dogs mark the social 
division between rich and poor in Santiago, where “the worker‟s districts” are inhabited by 
“mutts of indefinite color” who “wander among the garbage cans,” whilst the middle-class 
areas are characterised by mastiffs behind “impenetrable walls,” who are “let out only at 
night to guard the property” (My Invented Country 12).  However, she likens the “typical 
Chilean stray,” the result of an intermingling of “all existing breeds of dogs,” to the typical 
Chilean person (Allende, My Invented Country 16).  She intimately links animals and 
especially dogs, moreover, to the Chilean home: 
In our house, as in every Chilean home, there were animals.  Dogs are 
acquired in different ways: inherited, received as a gift, picked up after they‟ve 
been run over but not killed, or because they followed a child home from 
school, after which there‟s not a chance of throwing them out.  This has 
always been the case and I hope it never changes.  I don‟t know a single 
Chilean who ever bought a dog; the only people who do that are the fanatics 
from the Kennel Club, but no one takes them seriously. (Allende, My Invented 
Country 16) 
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Like Barrabás, such dogs show independence and are owned by no-one.  Her notion of the 
typical Chilean stray, who moves between demarcated spaces both geographically and in 
terms of the idea of pure breeds, undermines the oppressive social boundaries of a society 
Allende describes as marked by both latent and overt racism, and an “upper class” that is 
“relatively white, and the farther one descends the steep social ladder the more Indian the 
characteristics become” (My Invented Country 34).  She likens the Chilean practice of 
“situating,” the “process of automatic classification” in a society divided by “a thousand 
layers, each person in his place, each in her class, every person marked by birth,” to the 
behaviour of “dogs . . . when they sniff each other‟s hindquarters” (My Invented Country 46).  
This description constitutes carnivalesque ridicule of conventions that attempt to enforce 
social hierarchies and gloss over the realities of history and everyday existence, such as the 
genetic and cultural intermingling Allende depicts as typical of Chile regardless.  Indeed, 
Allende portrays Chile itself as a circensian space with rigid, oppressive rules and 
simultaneous subversive forces, such as the Chilean stray she evokes. 
Its grounding in Latin American history and culture has led to the fact that magical 
realism “has frequently been considered during the past three decades as the authentic literary 
expression of Latin America” (Chanady 126), a concept described as “lo real maravilloso 
Americano,” “the marvellous real,” “a uniquely American form of magical realism” (Zamora 
and Faris, “Introduction” 75).  Chanady explains that Carpentier presents “the authentic 
marvelous . . . as one of the main characteristics of the Latin American continent: the novelty 
of its „discovery‟ in 1492, the fictionalization of the New World by the Spaniards, the 
impressive dimensions of rain forests and rivers, the presence of heterogeneous racial 
groups” (137-8).  And yet, she points out, “Carpentier also used the concept of the marvelous 
real as a marker of difference in a Latin American discourse of identity rejecting European 
influence” (Chanady 137). 
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Faris comments on the dominance of European realism in Latin American fiction until 
the middle of the twentieth century and observes that the tradition “remains strong in modern 
and contemporary fiction” (“Scheherazade” 164-5).  She suggests that magical realism‟s 
success in Latin America lies in its deconstruction of “the imported code of realism „proper,‟” 
which “enabled a broader transculturation process to take place, a process within which 
postcolonial Latin American literature established its identity” (Faris, “Scheherazade” 165).  
Takolander analyses realism as a genre that puts forward, and is fundamentally determined 
by, a “positivist world view that privileges the „rational civilization‟ of the Western world,” a 
view which “is also essential to colonialism” (64).  She situates magical realism as 
succeeding the “Latin American literary production in the first half of the twentieth century” 
which emulated the positivist perspective of European realism (Takolander 64). 
This tradition, she explains, created a split between “the rationality and civility of the 
European” on the one hand, and a “Latin American reality” regarded “as „savage‟ and „wild‟” 
on the other, which is characterised by “the untamed landscape and its native or even mestizo 
(or mixed race) inhabitants,” who “consistently inspire apprehension or reprehension rather 
than enthusiasm or pride and are typically portrayed as elements that need to be changed or 
eradicated rather than embraced and eulogized” (Takolander 68, 65).  Thus, nature and its 
inhabitants represent a feral element in Latin American cultural history, so to speak.  García 
Márquez and Allende align themselves with this element and turn it around from a state of 
being in need of civilisation, modernisation and development to a positive resistance against 
these processes and their associated discourses, merging it with the convergent influence of 
Kafka‟s (human) animal protagonists.  In consequence, they employ animal agency and 
mestizo culture as an enabling force and assertion of subjectivity and identity.  Multicultural 
“magical”—or rather counter-realist and anti-Cartesian—ways of seeing are thus combined 
with multispecies, feral ways of being. 
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“No Man‟s Land”: Subalternity and Animality 
Zamora and Faris comment that “[m]agical realist texts are subversive: their in-betweenness, 
their all-at-onceness encourages resistance to monologic political and cultural structures, a 
feature that has made the mode particularly useful to writers in postcolonial cultures . . .” 
(“Introduction” 6).  A significant figure who epitomises “in-betweenness,” and who acts as 
an embodiment of the dialogic space of the circus and its colonial history, is the parrot.  Both 
Allende and García Márquez include parrots in their works.  In keeping with the circensian 
influence, the parrot who inhabits the household of Fermina Daza and her husband Dr Urbino 
in Love in the Time of Cholera is provided with “a trapeze for acrobatics” (23), signifying the 
role of pet parrots as private and exotic little circus acts, who are made to perform parlour 
tricks.  Through their ability of reproducing human speech, parrots blur the human-animal 
boundary line.
40
  As pets, they mirror the role of New World captives exhibited in the 
circuses of P.T. Barnum and Carl Hagenbeck, for example.  As Bruce Boehrer explains, they 
are traditionally closely associated with “inferior men,” a reference developed “out of the 
culture of early modern exploration” (173). 
This association arises from the early explorers‟ racist perception of colonised peoples 
as animals who are lacking human language, but who have the ability of learning the 
colonisers‟ mother tongue.  As Todorov suggests, others, as a “specific social group to which 
we do not belong” can be regarded as “outsiders whose language and customs I do not 
understand, so foreign that in extreme instances I am reluctant to admit they belong to the 
same species as my own” (3).  Explorer narratives such as Columbus‟ accounts, however, 
tended to deny the natives‟ “authority as speakers of their own language” completely and 
“their message [which Columbus is not able to interpret correctly] . . . is erased altogether 
once their verbal competence is made to appear doubtful” (Pastor Bodmer 36).  Pastor 
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Bodmer explains that “the step from questioning the natives‟ ability to speak their own 
language to questioning the natives‟ ability to speak at all is, for Columbus, amazingly short 
and easy.  He says in his first journal that he intends to take some Indians back with him to 
Spain „that they may learn to talk‟” (36). 
However, the intention of “teaching them to talk” did not stem from a desire to 
actually hear what they had to say.  Instead, from the beginning, “Columbus allowed himself 
to be convinced that what he heard and was told was precisely what he wanted to hear and be 
told” (Pastor Bodmer 34).  Thus, the comparison with parrots is never far away.  As Boehrer 
reports, this association has been used in 1536 by “Cardinal Garcia de Loaisa, president of 
the Spanish Council of the Indies and personal confessor to Charles V,” for example, who 
defended the enslavement of indigenous people with a statement saying that “the Indians 
were no more than parrots” (176).  Boehrer comments: “Loaisa‟s point is simple, perhaps 
even stupid, but nonetheless far-reaching; if there is no connection between speech and 
understanding in parrots, then they may be employed as models for the treatment of other 
articulate but subordinate creatures” (176-7).  Correspondingly, as Boehrer observers, the 
parrots‟ “growing popularity as pets” in eighteenth century Europe results in “their 
appropriation by writers to license various kinds of social and political subordination” (173). 
Thus, the portrayal of parrots is intimately linked with the idea of the subaltern.  For 
example, in The House of the Spirits, Uncle Marcos‟s parrot, “whose native language was an 
Amazonian dialect” (although his native language should be Parrotese, of course), retains a 
“foreign accent” when speaking Spanish (21-2), while the black tongue of Dr. Urbino‟s 
parrot in Love in the Time of Cholera may serve as a connection to the city‟s history as “the 
largest African slave market in the Americas” (23, 17-8).  Yet, both Dr Urbino‟s and Uncle 
Marcos‟ respective parrots ridicule imposed rules and expectations.  Uncle Marcos‟ parrot 
embarrasses the family through “its lusty glance, its fleas, and its harsh, tuneless hawking of 
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paper fortunes, sawdust balls, and powders for impotence,” and is “secretly poisoned” by 
Nana “with an overdose of cod-liver oil” as a result (House of the Spirits 23).  Dr Urbino‟s 
parrot, in turn, plays a very prominent and critical role.  Mocking her husband‟s authority 
over the household, Fermina Daza introduces the parrot against his order that “Nothing that 
does not speak will come into this house” (Love in the Time of Cholera 23).  The parrot‟s 
speech, “only the blasphemies of sailors,” is initially inappropriate (23), but soon he learns 
“to speak French like an academician” (20).  However, even then he “did not speak when 
asked to but only when it was least expected” (20).  The parrot embarrasses Dr Urbino in 
front of the president, refusing “for two desperate hours . . . to say a single syllable, ignoring 
the pleas and threats and public humiliation of Dr. Urbino” (21).  The reader suspects an 
intentionality on the part of the parrot, which proves ultimately fatal to Dr Urbino.  His 
attempt to catch the escaped bird is thwarted by the parrot‟s apparently calculated 
manoeuvres to avoid the doctor‟s walking stick, causing Dr Urbino to fall to his death (see 
41-2).  In this way, García Márquez and Allende restore subjectivity to a conventional 
symbol for the supposed inferiority of colonised peoples. 
Thus, García Márquez‟ and Allende‟s human-animal hybrids, in-between beings, 
resist the “hyperseparat[ion]” of “nature from culture,” which, Wolch suggests, 
encourages its colonization and domination.  The nature/culture dualism also 
incorporates nature into culture, denying it subjectivity and giving it solely 
instrumental value.  By homogenizing and disembodying nature, it becomes 
possible to ignore the consequences of human activity such as urbanization, 
industrial production, and agro-industrialization, on specific creatures and 
their terrains.  (37) 
Accordingly, alongside other colonial discourses, the human-animal divide gives the 
ideological basis for the colonisation of nature in general, and the appropriation of natural 
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resources from colonised societies in particular.  As Elder, Wolch and Emel write, “[t]he 
dominant uses of human-animal distinctions during the colonial epoch relied upon 
representations of similarity to animals to dehumanize and thus racialize particular groups” 
(193).  Correspondingly, whilst embracing animality as a positive concept, The House of the 
Spirits also reflects and emphasises the connection between the exploitation of people and 
their classification as animals. 
Esteban Trueba, for instance, describes his farm and property Tres Marías as having 
been “a wasteland” prior to his arrival; “it was a ruin filled with rocks and vultures.  A no-
man‟s-land” (House of the Spirits 83).41  This description completely omits the peasants who 
live there, whom Esteban Trueba frequently describes as, or compares to, animals (see 82-3).  
Esteban García, his son by a peasant woman he raped, feels that his father treats him as 
“simply one more in the pile of creatures who sang the national anthem in the schoolhouse” 
(221).  Spatially, the peasants‟ lives are intertwined with those of animals, reinforcing the 
perception of the peasants as animalised.  Accordingly, Esteban Trueba goes to visit his 
tenants “in their wretched huts,” where “in the shadows of one of them he came upon a box 
filled with newspaper, in which a newborn baby and a puppy lay in a shared sleep” (76).  
Lack of infrastructure and poverty also connect the peasants with the lives of animals.  Thus, 
the local midwife is “as good at delivering babies as she [is] at pulling calves from wall-eyed 
cows” (70) and, conversely, instead of seeing a doctor, the peasants are treated by the vet.  
Esteban Trueba thus reports: 
Sometimes I would walk to town and return with a veterinarian who would 
check the cows and hens and, while he was at it, anybody who was sick.  It‟s 
not true that I assumed that if the vet knew how to treat animals his training 
was good enough for people, as my granddaughter says when she wants to get 
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me mad.  The fact is, you couldn‟t get a doctor in a godforsaken place like 
that.  (69-70) 
Due to their animal-like status, the Tres Marías peasants are the recipients of Trueba‟s 
charity, linked with a kind of civilising mission.  In defence of his position, Esteban Trueba 
lists the improvements in “his” peasants‟ lives since he arrived: “My people have it fine now, 
what more do they need? . . . If they complain, it‟s out of sheer ingratitude.  They have brick 
houses, I blow their kids‟ noses and cure their parasites, give them vaccinations and teach 
them how to read.  Is there any other hacienda for miles around that has its own school? No!” 
(House of the Spirits 82).  However, he stresses what he perceives as their dependency on 
him and says: “I have to stay here, because if I were to leave for so much as a week, it would 
all collapse and these poor creatures would be starving to death again before you know it” 
(83).  Esteban Trueba ensures that ongoing charity is the mechanism that regulates his 
relationship with the workers on his land.  He declares: “. . . I don‟t see why the priest comes 
to talk to me about justice. . . . They don‟t know how to clean their asses and they want the 
right to vote!” (82).  Thus, in return for charity, he deprives his workers of their voice, 
exploits their labour, rapes the women, and denies them social justice on the grounds that 
they are not civilised enough, or in other words, like animals. 
By blurring the human-animal boundary, Allende illuminates the inextricable 
connections between animality and subalterity.  Elder Wolch and Emel explain the processes 
that constitute dehumanisation.  They write: 
Being treated like an animal means being treated in a degrading and 
dehumanizing way.  The specific treatments in mind here are not loving forms 
of human-animal interaction, but abusive violation (physical and/or 
emotional).  The key aspect of such violent treatment that makes it 
dehumanizing, however, is not just the violation, it is the fact that victims are 
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objectified and used like animals (who are commonly objectified and used).  
(194) 
Allende thus connects the fate of chickens with that of peasants and workers throughout the 
narrative.  The association is effective because the chickens‟ lives and deaths are represented 
not only in an allegorical fashion—most notably in Pedro García‟s “story of the hens who 
joined forces to confront a fox,” later turned into a song (House of the Spirits 167, 182, 205), 
but also in very material ways.  Significantly, Esteban García‟s role as brutal torturer under 
the dictatorship is anticipated by his childhood treatment of chickens, into whose eyes he 
drives nails.  This cruelty threatens even then to progress towards sticking nails into the eyes 
of his grandfather Pedro García, who has only just died that moment (see 220-1).  Esteban 
García‟s progression from tormenting nonhuman animals to torturing humans suggests that 
the mechanisms of oppression, the practices employed to demonstrate and maintain power, 
are the same or similar in essence regardless of whether the victims are human or 
nonhuman.
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Correspondingly, Allende also illustrates the absence of compassion in a cycle of 
oppression and violence directed against nonhuman animals—chickens, in this case—and 
those people who are dehumanised and represented as animals: Esteban García himself whilst 
growing up; his mother Pancha, whose rape by Esteban Trueba is described as “the same 
animal fate” as her mother and her grandmother before her (House of the Spirits 75); and 
Alba, Clara‟s granddaughter and Esteban García‟s rape and torture victim.  The chicken 
torture scene, especially in view of the associated graphic violence that follows (see 455-
471), suggests that compassion for nonhuman animals matters, because when it does not—as 
in Esteban García‟s case, the legitimisation of violence and cruelty is only a question of 
degree, circumstances and the definition of the victim.  García Márquez asserts that One 
Hundred Years of Solitude‟s “most outstanding quality—the author‟s immense compassion 
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for all his poor creatures” is one of the “crucial aspects” that “the critics . . . have overlooked” 
(Mendoza 77).  Compassion, the ability to “suffer with the other,” to “feel their pain,” is the 
opposite of Cartesian detachment from “the other” and its resulting disavowal of animal 
suffering. 
Accordingly, Allende declares that she is “always fighting against pain and suffering” 
(qtd. in Gazarian-Gautier 9).  Her strategy in this fight is to make pain and suffering visible.  
The chickens tormented by Esteban García, and unnoticed by Blanca who appears on the 
scene, are truly voiceless and thus mirror the absolute voicelessness of Alba, when her 
torturers throw her “into the doghouse,” an isolated dark cell, so that Esteban García can 
“forget that she existed” (House of the Spirits 469).  Allende manages to “tell a secret story, 
that of the silent voices who cannot speak,” and that of those who are otherwise rendered 
invisible (qtd. in Gazarian-Gautier 16).  Her intention in lending a voice by telling such 
stories is “to change the world, not just rewrite it” (Allende qtd. in Gazarian-Gautier 16).  She 
considers having a gift for writing as an obligation “to benefit those who don‟t have a voice.  
That‟s why when I speak I always refer to the political and social aspects.  How can one not 
talk about war, violence, poverty, and inequality when people who suffer from these 
afflictions don‟t have a voice to speak?” (Allende qtd. in Gazarian-Gautier 23).  By 
connecting the fate of chickens with the fate of oppressed people, Allende illuminates the 
suffering of both, intensifies their visibility through the association, and thus gives them a 
voice of sorts through this visible embodiment of suffering.  It takes compassion and 
empathy, the ability to not dismiss one as merely symbolic for the other, or as less worthy of 
consideration, to fully appreciate the depths of the experiences Allende describes, the 
structural connections between them; in this case, the fact that both kinds of violence 
implicitly legitimate each other. 
Schwalm  73 
Indeed, compassion, the acknowledgement of “the other‟s” suffering, is closely 
related to empathy and sympathy, abilities which both Carey and J.M. Coetzee regard as 
important to the art of writing.  Similar to Allende, Carey considers it a question of “a 
writer‟s responsibility to imagine what it is to be others.  It‟s an act of empathy, and it‟s not 
only what we do, it‟s a socially useful act to imagine oneself to be other than one is” (qtd. in 
Koval 672).  Coetzee, in turn, remarks that “[w]riters are reputed to possess this faculty 
[sympathy] particularly strongly.”  However, he comments on the difficulty of empathising 
with an animal, due to the differences in the “mode of consciousness of nonhuman species” 
from “human consciousness.”  He says: “There is a strong argument to be made that it is 
impossible for a human being to inhabit the consciousness of an animal, whereas through the 
faculty of sympathy (fellow-feeling) it is possible for one human being to know quite vividly 
what it is like to be someone else.”  He suggests that because of this difficulty, there is “a 
temptation” to anthropomorphise nonhuman animals; that is, “to project upon them feelings 
and thoughts that may belong only to our own human mind and heart.”  In addition, he 
observes the related “temptation to seek in animals what is easiest for human beings to 
sympathize or empathize with, and consequently to favor those animal species which for one 
reason or another seem to us to be „almost human‟ in their mental and emotional processes.  
So dogs (for example) are treated as „almost human‟ whereas reptiles are treated as entirely 
alien” (Coetzee qtd. in Engström, “Animals, Humans, Cruelty and Literature”). 
Thus, it is significant that amongst the multitude of animals who appear as subjects 
and agents in The House of the Spirits and in One Hundred Years of Solitude, there are also 
those least likely to be anthropomorphised or to inspire sympathy in readers, such as ants and 
cockroaches.  García Marquez and Allende highlight the fact that on the basis of being 
wholly other—pest animals—they are met with relentless violence, whether in the form of 
fire, pesticides, quicklime, cod-liver oil poisoning or, as in Barrabás‟ case, a “butcher‟s 
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cruelty” (House of the Spirits 33).  However, their counter-Cartesian acknowledgment of 
suffering and foregrounding of compassion shifts the realist focus from a positivist view 
towards the experience of the body, shared by human and nonhuman animals alike.
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Allende and García Márquez thus reflect the view of Enlightenment philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham, who observed a direct correlation between humans and animals on the grounds of 
sentience and thus argued that animals be spared torment on that basis: “the question is not, 
Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham qtd. in Regan and 
Singer 130, original emphasis).  Thus, outside of the constraints of “Cartesian thinking” 
which García Márquez finds “as uncomfortable as a tight waistcoat” (Mendoza 94), are 
empathy and compassion which provide one way of viewing reality differently.  Indeed, 
whilst circensian spaces put animals in the spotlight, it is the reader‟s ability to empathise, to 
recognise other existences, that ultimately renders magical realist animals and their own lives 
visible. 
 
Conclusion 
Approaching animals through animal geographies, the concepts of animal agency and 
ferality, and finally through shared suffering, or the shared ability to suffer, reveals that 
García Márquez‟ and Allende‟s representations of magical realist fauna are interconnected 
through the cultural, colonial and literary history of the circus.  They are, moreover, 
embedded in circensian spaces, which reflect multiple contradictory discourses that are 
combined with carnivalesque, anti-Cartesian and counter-realist strategies to an irresolvable 
oxymoron.  The tensions and in-between spaces thus created between these contradictory 
elements illuminate the extraordinary lives of fictional animals who might otherwise blend 
into the background and disappear at the margins of everyday (un-)consciousness.  However, 
in circensian spaces, as in the circus ring, everything happens in the center.  Likewise, 
Schwalm  75 
everyone—humans, animals and human-animal hybrids—occupies the central narrative space 
of magical realist fiction, including the readers themselves, who are drawn into the place of 
the other, or the carnivalesque heterotopia of the text, where there is no stable Cartesian “I,” 
but only others.  Indeed, in some places, as the next chapter will show, there are only fish. 
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Chapter Two 
True Australians: Animals and Identity in Gould’s Book of Fish and 
Illywhacker 
What happens when the Latin American magical realist menagerie travels to Australia?  
Stephen Slemon makes the case for “applying the concept of magic realism to texts written in 
English” (408), beyond Latin America, suggesting that it can indicate “continuities within 
literary cultures” and provide a point of comparison in analysing literatures from separate 
postcolonial contexts (409).  Focussing on two Australian novels written by authors of 
European settler heritage, Peter Carey‟s Illywhacker and Richard Flanagan‟s Gould’s Book of 
Fish, this chapter will explore these continuities as well as the incorporation of elements that 
create a distinctively local flavour.  I will argue that magical realism is a travelling mode of 
writing, so to speak, which, like the circus, retains its essential circensian quality—
characterised by “animal entertainment,” the carnivalesque and an oxymoronic heterotopia—
but which, at the same time, and precisely because of its heterotopic nature, adapts to the 
culture, history, traditions and natural conditions of the new locality.  Illywhacker and 
Gould’s Book of Fish continue with magical realism‟s anti-Cartesian project of destabilising 
the idea of a human-animal divide and transcending the Cartesian (human) subject through an 
empathic awareness or vision.  In the process, however, they also engage with the significant 
role representations of animals and material animal practices have played and continue to 
play in shaping Australian settler identity, and question the matrix of representational systems 
and foundational narratives that make up the nation. 
Accordingly, in both novels Australia is constructed as a circensian space, populated 
by human, nonhuman and hybrid animals who negotiate “their place” between, rather than 
within, the Linnaean ordering of nature, and its physical translation into the classifying 
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mechanisms of the penal system.  In Gould’s Book of Fish, the dominant and pervasive 
system that determines day to day life is shaped by natural history in general and Linnaean 
taxonomy in particular.  The main narrative is set on the Vandemonian penal colony of Sarah 
Island, where the forger William Buelow Gould is assigned the task of painting native fish for 
the island‟s surgeon, Mr Lempriere, an ambitious collector of natural historical specimens.  
Lempriere‟s aspirations include not only the discovery and naming of hitherto unclassified 
species of nonhuman animals, but also the devising of new and rigid categories for humans.  
Throughout the narrative, such classifications affect the lives and deaths of everyone, human 
and non-human, as they are caught up in the framework of classifications.  Illywhacker is 
equally concerned with “a consuming rage for order” (Huggan, Peter Carey 37), and whilst 
Carey‟s novel does not address Linnaean taxonomy directly, the system is, nevertheless, an 
important and equally pervasive point of reference for Herbert Badgery‟s narrative.  The 
conceptual and metaphorical imprisonment of animals, human and non-human, within 
categories delineated by language becomes manifest, and culminates in the actual 
imprisonment of human and non-human pets in “The Best Pet Shop in the World” created by 
the narrator‟s grandson, Hissao.  Amongst the assemblage of Australian icons in the pet shop 
is the narrator himself, imprisoned in a cage and exhibited as a curiosity.  Thus, 
paradoxically, human-animal boundaries begin to blur when order is at its most extreme, with 
“specimens” imprisoned in a physical carceral structure. 
This chapter discusses the ways in which the circensian spaces created in Gould’s 
Book of Fish and Illywhacker simultaneously contain and undermine such carceral systems of 
representation, and how animals offer resistance and a means of escape through the 
continuous collapsing of these systems‟ internal categories.  These Australian circensian 
spaces reflect Slemon‟s theory that whilst magical realism “suggests a binary opposition 
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between the representational code of realism and that, roughly, of fantasy,” its “two 
oppositional systems” are 
each working toward the creation of a different kind of fictional world from 
the other.  Since the ground rules of these two worlds are incompatible, neither 
one can fully come into being, and each remains suspended, locked in a 
continuous dialect with the „other‟, a situation which creates disjunction 
within each of the separate discursive systems, rending them with gaps, 
absences, and silences.  (Slemon 409) 
This, he argues, precludes the “possibility of interpretive closure” (Slemon 410).  I propose 
that this impossibility of achieving interpretive closure in Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of 
Fish is a mark of the heterotopia, arising from the influence and intensity of contradictory 
forces within these texts.  In the context of Australian nationhood, this heterotopic 
arrangement of narrative space, particularly in relation to categorisations of animals and thus 
in the form of circensian space, exposes foundational histories as selective stories that ignore, 
hide, or distort suffering, disempowerment and displacement resulting from colonisation.  
Thus, Carey and Flanagan address the complacent and expedient acceptance of Australian 
foundational Myths, at the same time as „hidden‟ histories create an uneasiness in the 
everyday life of Australians of European descent. 
The co-existence of contradictory narratives in the circensian spaces of Illywhacker 
and Gould’s Book of Fish complicates and destabilises ideas of belonging, home and 
settlement, and highlight the “gaps, absences, and silences” within Australia‟s dominant 
histories.  At the same time, animals provide a potential means of escape from oppressive 
colonial structures by calling definitions into questions, and, as in One Hundred Years of 
Solitude, „undermining the foundations‟ of those narratives that set out to define Australian 
reality.  Both Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish demonstrate that an understanding of 
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what it means to be Australian, for Australians of European origin, is intimately tied to an 
identification and engagement with animals, both indigenous and introduced. 
 
“Advance Australian Fair”: Histories and Circuses 
In Carey‟s Illywhacker, the human pets inhabiting The Best Pet Shop in the World are 
described as going “about their business, their sand paintings, their circumcision ceremonies, 
their strikes, settlements, discussions about national anthems, arguments about „Waltzing 
Matilda‟ and „Advance Australian Fair‟” (635).  Carey‟s pun, which proposes the idea of the 
Australian nation as a fair, rather than as “fair,” that is, beautiful, hints at several important 
themes in the novel: the fair is essentially a circensian space, at once a place of entertainment, 
with magic tricks, animal acts, acrobatics and other, carnivalesque, forms of amusement, a 
place of trade and exhibition in general and, traditionally, of the trade and exhibition of 
animals in particular.  A fair can be seen as a site where the mundane and the extraordinary 
meet.  Flanagan uses a similar image of the nation, in this case the microcosm of Sarah 
Island, as a “bazaar.”  William Buelow Gould, the narrator, tells the reader that “what started 
off as furtive trading along the southern stockade wall, administered but not controlled by the 
felons of a Saturday afternoon, grew into a market & the market into a bazaar & the bazaar 
into the idea of a nation” (Gould’s Book 175).44  This “bazaar” becomes the site of the 
Commandant‟s “exuberant & exotic” trading: 
a score of barrels of whale oils for the decadent scent of a single overripe 
guava, shipwrights‟ tools for iguana eggs, a whale boat for a large cargo of 
green bananas, much prized redcoat uniforms for silk turbans.  In spite of what 
the Portuguese traders told their Brazilian sailors under their breath as they 
emptied their ship holds of Moluccan feathers, . . . not all his trade was 
complete madness.  For the pine . . . he extracted the finest silk cloth from 
Schwalm  80 
India.  For a horde of sulphur-crested cockatoos he had painted to resemble 
baby macaws trained to recite melancholic verse in the manner of Pope & 
several songs of passion in the earthier argot of their convict trainer, he gained 
fourteen Brazilian caravels & seven cannons, the subsequent sale of which 
financed his palace & the new wharf.  (Gould’s Book 173-4) 
This passage conjures up imagery from the Arabian Nights and India, and strongly connects 
Sarah Island with South America.  It represents an ironic reference to the imagery and origin 
of the most prominent and successful magical realist works—such as those of Rushdie and 
the South American magical realists—in general, and the status of Flanagan‟s novel as an 
exotic product of sorts, and the reader as the consumer of that product, in particular.  The 
same kind of self-referential irony applies to the exotic pets in Illywhacker, and both 
Flanagan and Carey thus display, in their “deliberately exaggerated hawking of Oriental(ist) 
[and, more generally, exotic(ist)] wares,”45 the phenomenon Graham Huggan calls “the 
postcolonial exotic,” a repoliticisation of exoticism that is “redeployed both to unsettle 
metropolitan expectations of cultural otherness and to effect a grounded critique of 
differential relations of power” (Postcolonial Exotic ix-x). 
In regard to the Australian novels discussed here, an important function of the 
construction of the reader as consumer is the suggestion of complicity in the events that 
unfold..  Throughout both novels, readers are compelled to confront their role as consumers, 
and consider their position in regard to the representation of historical narratives and (animal) 
practices.  Moreover, Carey‟s and Flanagan‟s „fairs‟ address, in particular, the importance of 
animals and animal products in the practices and narratives that formed the Australian nation, 
a concern addressed later on in this chapter.  Most immediately striking, however, is Carey‟s 
and Flanagan‟s borrowing of the circus, and of circensian spaces as their narrative 
framework.  Thus, Sarah Island‟s bazaar, for example, is reminiscent of the gypsy fair and 
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“The Street of the Turks” in García Márquez‟s Macondo, where Arabs “swap knick-knacks 
for macaws” (Solitude 306), and both are related to Foucault‟s “fairground” heterotopia 
(described in Chapter One).  Accordingly it is necessary to explore more fully the 
connections between One Hundred Years of Solitude and Carey‟s and Flanagan‟s magical 
realist novels, along with the concept of the circensian space in relation to Australian history 
as represented in Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish. 
Both Carey and Flanagan acknowledge the influence of García Márquez on their 
work.  Flanagan refers to a number of authors when asked by Jamie Kornegay whom he 
credits “for inspiring [his] literary vision” (Kornegay).  Amongst them are several associated 
with magical realism, such as Cortazar, Borges, Gogol, and Grass, but also, notably, García 
Márquez (Kornegay), and he makes reference to One Hundred Years of Solitude in particular 
when discussing the importance of books (Flanagan, “Across a Newborn Baby‟s Eyes”).  
Carey, in turn, comments that Borges and García Márquez have been “important” to him, and 
says: “After I had been writing stories I read One Hundred Years of Solitude and it had for 
me a huge liberating effect” (qtd. in Willbanks 45).  In relation to magical realism more 
generally, Carey remarks: “I liked the term magic realism when I first heard it and I always 
thought that this was a lovely way to describe the sort of writing one finds in Illywhacker, 
even Bliss, but particularly Illywhacker,” and even though he says that he “became wary of 
being labeled a magic realist,” he maintains that he sees Illywhacker “in this sense” (qtd. in 
Willbanks 54-5). 
Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish certainly contain recognisable references to 
One Hundred Years of Solitude.  For example, Flanagan describes a scene wherein the bodies 
of massacred Aborigines are “long since picked clean by animals & birds & insects,” and the 
children‟s “[l]ittle skulls” are “toothless, translucent as parchment” (Gould’s Book 381).  This 
scene is very reminiscent of García Márquez‟ last Aureliano, whose body is eaten by ants.  
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Janes comments on this scene in One Hundred Years of Solitude: “In the dried skin of the 
baby, critics have noted the parchment‟s resemblance to human skin” (29).  Illywhacker, in 
turn, includes “a Spanish galleon in full sail across the top of the yellow Sydney sky” (600), a 
product of the imagination of Emma Badgery, wife of narrator Herbert Badgery‟s son 
Charles.  This image recalls the lost Spanish galleon found by José Arcadio Buendía and his 
fellow explorers as they search for the route to civilisation (see Solitude 17). 
Phil McCluskey has examined the “structural affinity” of Illywhacker to “a Latin 
American model of magic realism,” and considers “how this structure operates within a 
similar, yet importantly different, context” (90).  He proposes that, rather than by simply 
drawing on “obvious parallels” between Latin America and other nations on the basis of 
postcoloniality in order to justify the use of the term “magic realism” (McCluskey 90), a 
productive definition of the concept derives from a structural analysis based on the work of 
Amaryll Chanady, whereby the supernatural and the real are unproblematically juxtaposed, 
which is accepted both by the reader and the story‟s characters (McCluskey 89).  Bruce 
Woodcock, however, argues that, generally, Carey‟s fiction can be associated with a variety 
of modes, such as science fiction, fantasy (9), surrealism (11), and “post-modernism” (10).  
He suggests that Carey is “something of a hybrid” not only in his personal and professional 
life, but also in his writing, as “[h]is work refuses to establish a smooth narrative effect in the 
„classic‟ traditions of European narrative art,” as a result of which “he somehow escapes 
categorisation” (Woodcock 9).  Nonetheless, Woodcock associates Illywhacker in particular 
closely with magical realism, as he comments on “the epic texture of the novel” which he 
sees as “a One Hundred Years of Solitude of the outback, with small-town lives and incidents 
woven together into a panoramic account of national history” (58). 
However, most notably, Carey and Flanagan have adopted and adapted García 
Márquez‟ circensian framework, themes and images.  The circus theme in Gould’s Book of 
Schwalm  83 
Fish may not be immediately obvious, not least because fish are not normally associated with 
the circus.  Yet, Flanagan manages to create an aquatic circus, a mixture of the traditional 
travelling circus and menagerie, the natural history museum, and an aquarium, in his story 
about a convict artist, assigned to paint fish for taxonomic classification.  Flanagan draws on 
the circus‟ tradition as a showcase for colonial curiosities and conquests, presenting 
antipodean fish so strange in their appearance, and with such unusual, hybridized names—for 
example “Weedy Seadragon,” “Striped Cowfish,” “Porcupine Fish,” “Serpent Eel,” 
“Stargazer” or “Leatherjacket”—that it is hard to believe that these fish actually exist and are 
not products of the author‟s imagination.46  The Stargazer, significantly, is described as 
having a “tapering circus strongman body” (185).  Other attractions include Jorgensen‟s 
whistling dog Elsinore (see 166-7), and Gould‟s wet prison cave that is gruesomely decorated 
with the “elephantine form” of Jorgensen‟s “stinking balloon corpse” (336).  Flanagan fuses 
the circus‟ traditional role of showcasing novelties from the colonies with Australian reality 
by means of a motto on a painting.  Gould reports: 
Undoubtedly the high point of my short Hobart Town career was my 
dramatick canvas for the Iron Duke depicting the depravity of circus life after 
that good publican‟s woman ran off with the Great Valerio, a Sicilian high-
rope walker & seller of aphrodisiac powders. I did a terrifying mural of a soft 
naked woman being dragged into a Hell of flaming acrobats & tumblers by a 
rather nasty looking bald eagle, beneath which was inscribed the motto: Ex 
Australis semper aliquid novi (There is always something new out of 
Australia). (87) 
Flanagan alludes to the phrase “Ex Africa semper aliquid novi” here, most often, but 
somewhat mistakenly, attributed to Pliny the Elder.
47
  In this way, he parallels Australia‟s 
history as a colony with the fate of Africa: both places effectively became, in the process of 
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colonization, “warehouses” for European circuses and natural history museums, repositories 
for exotic animals to be exhibited for the entertainment of European audiences.
48
 The circus 
novelty Flanagan presents is, to use the words of one of his characters, “a whole new Exotic 
World of Fish!” (146). 
Illywhacker, in turn, features a number of performers who are, or could be, at home in 
a circus environment.  These include Herbert‟s lover Leah Goldstein, who used to perform as 
part of Mervyn Sullivan‟s “sideshow” (234), does “the Emu Dance, the Fan Dance, the Snake 
Dance, the Dance of the Seven Veils” (240), and spills notes “about the feeding requirements 
of various cockatoos” which look like “a circus arranged on her behalf” (500).  Phoebe, 
Herbert‟s wife, speaks “like a ventriloquist” and is described as “the magician” (90).  Charles 
performs with snakes even as a child, and later wears an outrageously colourful jacket suited 
to a circus clown or a ringmaster, “with bright blue and gold squares which had been 
refashioned from a man‟s dressing gown . . . and a big white Texan hat bought by mail order 
from Smith’s Weekly” (410), and Lenny and Rosa Kaletsky, Leah‟s mother- and father-in-
law, “were both show people, travelling the tent shows in the country towns” (259).  The 
guests at Rosa‟s birthday party, “Rosa‟s silly friends,” have “red mouths and huge hats. . . . 
There were dancers of every type, bit actors, second-rate cabaret performers, and short men 
with wide lapels who could tell jokes for three hours without repeating themselves,” and 
“they all walked along Bondi Beach and strolled along the sand in colourful defiance of 
reality” (273).  Wysbraum, a friend of Leah‟s father, looks like a clown with his beetroot-
stained mouth, as his messy eating habits, resembling those of a non-human animal, become 
a spectacle for the Goldstein family (see 245-7).  Mr Lo, illegal immigrant and pet shop 
inhabitant, is called a “human performing like a monkey in a cage” (530), whilst Nathan 
Schick, whose business schemes involve various forms of animal entertainment, is 
metaphorically described as “a juggler” (510).  Herbert‟s flying lessons with Jack are labelled 
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a “circus” (51), and Cocky Abbot—a wealthy farmer and potential investor in Herbert‟s 
schemes—accuses Herbert of creating a spectacle: “I didn‟t come here to see a circus with 
snakes” (141).  Charles sums up his peculiar family in a conversation with Leah and remarks: 
“If Time magazine were coming to interview you, . . . you wouldn‟t want them to see the 
circus on the top floor” (585). 
Huggan, in his discussion of Peter Carey‟s fiction, has remarked that they “parade a 
metamorphic world of exotic hybrids,” and has called Hissao‟s pet shop “this ludicrous 
human circus” (Carey 8, 31).  Woodcock describes Illywhacker thus: 
Carey‟s novel leads the reader in extravagant and fantastic circles as we follow 
the fortunes of the Badgeries. . . . In Illywhacker, despite his digressions, 
Herbert dominates the proceedings and is unquestionably the centre of his own 
story, so much so as to explode all the conventions of probability associated 
with traditional first-person narrative. . . . [T]he book is the narrator: its formal 
coherence derives from the centrality of Herbert, and from thematic shaping of 
the three books around the generational expansion of the Badgery family.  
(56). 
The image of Herbert, locked in a cage as a human exhibit at the center of these “fantastic 
circles” captures the paradoxical spirit of the circus: Herbert is the ringmaster of the “three-
book-circus,” as well as the captive, disempowered (human) animal on show.  In Gould’s 
Book of Fish, too, the narrator is animalised and central to the narrative, and he is both 
captive and in command of the story at the same time.  The circular narrative structures of the 
two novels simulate circus arenas enclosing stories that proliferate with representations of 
animals.  Accordingly, like a ringmaster Herbert advises his readers to “relax and enjoy the 
show” (Illywhacker 3). 
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Like García Márquez‟s novel, both Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish have a 
circular structure.  Illywhacker thus begins and ends in Herbert Badgery‟s cage, with people 
staring at him like visitors to a travelling menagerie.  Moreover, the narrator is contained 
within his own narrative, whilst the reader is one of the people looking at him, so to speak, 
captured within the narrative whilst positioned on the outside (of the book), and sharing 
Herbert‟s space in the cage, as it is from his position that the story is told.  The narrative 
structure becomes “impossible to think,” to employ Foucault‟s idea again (Order xv), a 
heterotopia in which Carey, like Borges, “does away with the site, the mute ground upon 
which it is possible for entities to be juxtaposed” (Foucault, Order xvii, emphasis omitted).  
Flanagan performs a similar vanishing trick—resembling the phenomenon of impossible 
structure Foucault ascribes to Borges‟ “Chinese Encyclopaedia”—in Gould’s Book of Fish, 
the structure of which can better be described as spiral.  The ending is not a straightforward 
circular return to the start, because, although the narrative returns to the seadragon in Mr 
Hung‟s aquarium from the beginning of the story (Gould’s Book 43), William Buelow Gould, 
Sid Hammet and the Weedy Seadragon are ultimately blurred into one, and even the reader 
is, arguably, drawn into the swirling eddy of “human fish,” or “fishy humans.”49  Part of this 
whirlpool of language is also the afterword, which blends several other important characters 
of the story into the figure of William Buelow Gould (n.p.).  Flanagan thus collapses the 
Cartesian “I,” separate from “others” as observing subject, and instead offers alternative ways 
of being, ways that entail being part of a multitude of others. 
The heterotopic quality of Gould’s Book of Fish is emphasised further by Flanagan‟s 
use of the idea of a book that vanishes, or consumes itself, as the characters read, and are 
trapped within, their own story, which is also an important theme in One Hundred Years of 
Solitude.  Thus, not only does „The Book of Fish‟ turn into “a large brackish puddle” (Gould’s 
Book 30) once Sid Hammet manages to finish the book that previously “never seemed to 
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really finish” (28), but, additionally, Gould bears a strong resemblance to Aureliano 
Babilonia, reading the manuscript that describes his own story, as he picks up one of the 
books taken from the Sarah Island Registry: 
Billy Gould could not escape the growing suspicion that he had become 
entrapped in a book, a character whose future as much as his past was already 
written, determined, foretold, as unalterable as it was intolerable.  What choice 
did he have but to destroy the book? . . . Trying desperately to avoid the 
conclusion that if this book of fish was a history of the settlement, it might 
also be its prophecy, I then realised that the book was not near ended, that it 
contained several more chapters, & with mounting terror I read on the 
succeeding page of how—I then realised that the book was not near ended, 
that it contained several more chapters, & with mounting terror I read on the 
succeeding page of how—  (373-4) 
Time collapses within itself, and is transformed from a linear chronology into a circular 
movement.  Foucault calls phenomena such as these “heterochronies,” the simultaneous 
existence of different kinds of time, different histories or different movements of time.  He 
points out that “[t]he heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort 
of absolute break with their traditional time” (Foucault, “Of Other Spaces” 26).  Such a 
collapsing of time, in conjunction with the collapse of the Cartesian subject into a 
multitude—or community—of others, again precludes readers from distancing themselves 
from historical events and actors represented in the narrative. 
Faris suggests that, in magical realist fiction, “history is the weight that tethers the 
balloon of magic” (“Scheherazade” 170).  However, James Bradley comments, in relation to 
Carey‟s fiction, that Carey represents “realms where history and truth constantly reveal 
themselves as fabrications and tales of dubious veracity; „curious and strange‟ like „the most 
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beautiful lies that constitute Australian history‟” (657).  Paradoxically, it is the circus that 
provides the “weight” in Illywhacker, as Carey uses historically accurate circus imagery to 
ground the imaginary narratives of history.  Accordingly, the figure of Goon Tse Ying, 
Herbert‟s adoptive father, explicitly refers to a kind of violent circus of sorts in Australian 
history: the riots at Lambing Flat, where miners of European descent attacked Chinese miners 
in 1861, sporting a flag bearing, in circus-style letters, the inscription “Roll up, Roll up.  No 
Chinese” (Curthoys 112 and plate 6.2).  Goon Tse Ying recounts this dark episode of 
Australian history: 
Lambing Flat is near Young in New South Wales.  It was a big rush.  I was 
there.  We were all there.  Roll up, roll up, that is what the English miners 
called to each other.  May you never hear it.  May you never die having heard 
the English come in their horses and carts.  They carried the English flag, an 
ugly thing.  They had a band.  They had pipes and drums and they came in 
their thousands.  They did not like the Chinese, little Englishman, because we 
were clever.  (Illywhacker 221) 
Carey exposes the discrepancies in different histories of the event.  Ann Curthoys calls the 
Lambing Flat riots the “most remembered today” (110).  She reports that the tents and 
possessions of the Chinese miners were burnt and destroyed, as they were “rounded up, 
struck with bludgeons and whips, pulled up against the saddles of horses their pigtails cut off. 
The procession then returned to Lambing Flat, now flying a Chinese silken sign appended to 
the corners of which were these cut-off pigtails” (Curthoys 113).  However, several websites 
have produced deviating accounts.  For example, Ralph Zuljan of OnWar.com writes: “The 
settlement of Lambing Flat (Young) in New South Wales saw the worst of the riots against 
the Chinese, many of whom were attacked, robbed, beaten, or killed by white miners who 
wished to force them from the goldfields in the area.”  The Walkabout Australian Travel 
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Guide website is more speculative about the consequences for the Chinese, describing the 
event thus: 
3000 Europeans, armed with pick-handles, bludgeons and whips, assembled 
and, sporting British, Irish and American flags, they marched to the Chinese 
encampments to the sound of a brass band.  Again, pigtails were cut off, 
property smashed and huge bonfires consumed Chinese clothing, tents and 
furniture.  At least one European man was killed and others were wounded.  It 
seems unclear how many, if any, Chinese died, though there seem to have 
been no reported fatalities.  (“Young”) 
In comparison, the Australian National Maritime Museum, an Australian government agency, 
merely says on their site that “the Chinese were humiliated and forced from the goldfields.  
Those who were affected by the riots petitioned the Government for damages, but were 
unsuccessful.”  This again contrasts with Herbert‟s version, who maintains that “the anti-
Chinese riots at Lambing Flat” were “where Goon Tse Ying‟s father and uncle were killed 
and where he learned to stand in such a manner as to be invisible” (Illywhacker 193). 
All of these variations, however, spring mainly from only four sources, as Curthoys 
points out (112).  Carey suggests that fact and fiction have become so intermingled in the 
recounting of the event, that it becomes impossible to tell later which is the truth.  Thus, 
Goon asserts: “„You will meet people who say that none of this happened.  They will say they 
gave John Chinaman a fright, but they are liars.  Roll up, roll up,‟ he bellowed, „roll up.  Kill 
John Chinaman‟” (Illywhacker 222).  This is further complicated by the fact that Goon later 
denies ever having been at Lambing Flat (see Illywhacker 387), leaving the reader to guess 
whether Herbert has made up the story about Goon‟s family‟s involvement, or whether Goon 
has reinvented his personal history in order to fit into Australian society and thus become 
“invisible” as a Chinese immigrant.  The conflicting narratives cancel each other out within 
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an unresolved, paradoxical heterotopia instead of providing a linear, definitive account of 
history. 
Carey shows that the circus is the site where fact and fiction mingle, and Goon Tse 
Ying provides the image of a ringmaster, as he re-enacts the terror of Lambing Flat in order 
to teach young Herbert how to make himself invisible, bearing an axe to inspire terror instead 
of the characteristic whip: “Goon Tse Ying, dressed in his formal three-piece suit, his watch 
chain flashing in the winter sun, came bounding towards me waving an axe handle.  „Roll 
up,‟ he screamed, „roll up.‟ . . . The axe handle belted me across the shoulders and sent me 
sprawling” (Illywhacker 225).  The circus plays, in this instance, one of the roles that 
Foucault assigns to heterotopias, which is “to create a space of illusion that exposes every 
real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory” (“Of 
Other Spaces” 27).  In regard to Lambing Flat, the inconsistencies in historical narratives, and 
omissions or distortions of dominant narratives, are exposed through the dialogic dynamics of 
the carnivalesque circensian space, which allows multiple voices to be heard equally. 
Flanagan‟s novel, too, is concerned with what he represents as the lies that have 
shaped the way the Australian nation is perceived.  Gould comments on the creation of “what 
this country will become” (Gould’s Book 442).  He says: “Ask me—after all, if you can‟t 
trust a liar & a forger, a whore & an informer, a convicted murderer & a thief, you‟ll never 
understand this country” (442).  Thus, Flanagan portrays a violent piece of Australian history 
as a kind of circus, in which fact and fiction are blurred and where science, particularly 
Linnaean taxonomy and phrenology, clashes with animal agency.  This idea is centered on 
the figure of Mr Lempriere, who sends the pickled heads of murdered Aborigines to Britain 
in the name of science.  The heads are to be classified for phrenological studies, yet Mr 
Lempriere, in the middle of the circle of barrels, wields a stick at these heads—whom he 
“believe[s] to be jeering him & his work” (254)—just like a ringmaster cracks a whip at wild 
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animals.  Mr Lempriere, his face always covered in “glistening white lead powder” (124), is 
the white-faced clown at the center of the arena, and he behaves as if the pickled heads were 
wild animals to be tamed.  The “cacophony of noise” and the appearance of Castlereagh—not 
the prime minister, but the pig Mr Lempriere has named after the politician—evoke the 
comedy of the scene, as does the fact that Lempriere is “striving to bring the squealing 
Castlereagh into the conversation” (262), creating an actual animal act.   However, the main 
animal act is Mr Lempriere himself, who represents a transgressive hybrid, a monstrous 
spectacle with a “grotesque unhuman visage” (124), whilst also representing, of course, the 
“porcupine fish” (156-8).  This scene exemplifies the site of resistance offered by magical 
realism, which here, within a circensian space, undermines the authority of scientific 
representation through carnivalesque subversion and through the agency of animals, or those 
who are classed as animals or even objects.  Mr Lempriere‟s mad ravings in the center of the 
circle of barrels suggest that he considers the circus to be an inherently subversive force that 
is oppositional and dangerous to the authoritative claims of science.  Thus, an exasperated Mr 
Lempriere exclaims: “I WILL HAVE SCIENCE, GOULD—NOT A RUDDY CIRCUS” 
(261). 
Richard Broome provides some historical background to Mr Lempriere‟s scientific 
practices, illustrating that, grotesque though this scene in the novel is, it is not purely an 
invention but was, in fact, reality: “At Toongabbie, west of Sydney, in [1797], Permulwoy 
led Aboriginal fighters against the soldiers and settlers until he was eventually shot down.  In 
ghastly fashion, his severed and pickled head was sent to Sir Joseph Banks in England” (33).  
The historical lie is created by the denial or distortion of such incidents or, as Lempriere 
demonstrates, in the explanations sought to justify such atrocities.  In Gould’s Book of Fish, 
these justifications, especially the idea that mechanisms of oppression are part of a natural 
order, are exposed as illusory histories, through the combination of those heterotopias 
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Foucault contrasts as opposites: the heterotopia of the fairground on the one hand and the 
heterotopia of extreme order on the other.  By representing extreme systems of order and 
classification within the context of a circensian space, Flanagan exposes the fact that the 
supposed authority, universal validity and objectivity of science—particularly in regard to 
Linnaean taxonomies and the human-animal divide—are parts of a discourse employed to 
justify unequal power relations and oppressive practices in Australia. 
Thus, the authority of Mr Lempriere‟s science relies on the fact that representatives of 
all species are controlled and defined through capture and killing, rendering previously active 
subjects into passive objects, both conceptually and literally.  Gould describes these passive, 
dead objects as “more bones than a knacker‟s vat—racks of marsupial skulls, rib cages, thigh 
bones & entire skeletons of various animals—as well as assortments of feathers, shells, dried 
flowers, rocks; framed collections of butterflies, moths & beetles; & trays of bird eggs” 
(Gould’s Book 137).  Surrounding himself with the “innumerable oddities” of his natural 
history collections puts Mr Lempriere into a position of command (137).  Furthermore, 
natural history‟s conceptualising of animals and the resulting animal practices are extended to 
humans and play, as Mr Lempriere suggests, a significant role in shaping European society in 
the colony.  He shows Gould “his most prized possession, the celebrated . . .  tenth edition of 
Linnaeus‟s Systema Naturae for animals,” and declares: 
“TIME IS RAPIDLY COMING—PROPERLY CLASSIFY NOT JUST 
ANIMALS—ALL LIVING THINGS—EN UN MOT?—PEOPLE—YES? 
NO? YES. . . . FIRST SUCCESSFULLY CLASSIFY ALL CONVICTS IN A 
CLASS FROM 1 TO 26—THEN ON SUCH BASIS MAKE SOCIETY 
ANEW.”  “Science?” asked I. “APPLIED,” confirmed he.  (138-9) 
On the surface it might seem paradoxical, then, that power here is based on the conceptual 
separation between humans and animals, when humans and animals are to be classed within 
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the same system.  However, as the categories “from 1 to 26” suggest, the system is inherently 
hierarchical, and the number of classes assigned to convicts asserts that convicts are innately 
biologically different from other members of society and suggests that they are as varied as 
different classes of animals.  Thus, authority and influence rest with those who have the 
power to define who is at the top of the “Linnaean ladder of creation” (144), and who is at the 
bottom of humanity, next to the “lower” animal species.  Mr Lempriere asserts that authority 
by stressing the importance of the Linnaean system, not only in stamping out “vulgar folk 
names for plants based on old witches‟ tales,” but, more generally and significantly, in 
separating humanity—that is, chiefly white Europeans—from nature: “No more thinking that 
the natural & human worlds are entwined, but a scientifick basis for separation of the two, & 
human advancement on the basis of that scientifick difference forever after” (138).  In the 
figure of Mr Lempriere, Flanagan reflects the establishment of power via the authority of 
scientific experts and its imposition on local societies and knowledges, as described by Pratt 
and Escobar, and as discussed in my previous chapter. 
It is on the basis of that separation of “nature” from “humanity” that natural historians 
claimed superior status of Europeans over non-Europeans.  Pratt points out that Linnaeus‟ 
classification of Homo sapiens was an “explicit attempt to „naturalize‟ the myth of European 
superiority” (32).  It is through this hierarchical ordering that Europeans thought themselves 
justified to treat indigenous people like scientific specimens, pickle their heads and send 
every body part imaginable back to European museums.  Accordingly, Flanagan presents the 
celebrated Sir Joseph Banks as the quintessential natural historian, who, as Gould tells us, 
“was well pleased with the half-dozen barrels of bobbing heads when they were finally 
presented to him, feeling, said he, that they could only greatly enhance our understanding of 
such misbegotten issue of the human race” (Gould’s Book 48). 
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Another “scientifick basis” of such outright racist thought and practice, Flanagan‟s 
narrative reveals, was provided by phrenology.
50
  As Mr Lempriere, talking to Gould and 
Castlereagh in his disjointed way, explains, the “STUDY OF SKULLS WILL REVEAL THE 
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES” between the “RACES OF MAN” (262).  To him, it is 
“STOUT COMMON SENSE” that Aboriginal people, “LIKE DOGS—FLEAS—ARE NOT 
DESCENDED FROM ADAM” (262-3).  They are thus classed as animals and apart from 
“STURDY ENGLISHMEN,” although, as Mr Lempriere points out, the supposed science of 
phrenology still needs to be invented: “BUT WITHOUT SCIENTIFICK CLASSIFICATION 
& CATEGORISATION WE DO NOT KNOW IT AS SCIENCE—YET” (263).  However, 
regardless of how many classifications and categorisations phrenologists have provided, the 
proof for their claims is, at that point and to this day, non-existent. 
Broome points out that phrenologists treated Aborigines “as being all the same, and 
on the basis of assumptions now seen as ludicrous, but which were believed by many to be 
scientific „truths‟ at the time” (94).51  This suggests that what is regarded as “scientific” and 
“true” depends very much on the society that constructs these terms.  As Gould points out, 
“swindling requires not delivering lies but confirming preconceptions” (Gould’s Book 25), 
and Europeans were receptive to scientific arguments that were politically and economically 
expedient.  Accordingly, Broome discusses the motives behind such “science.”  He writes: 
In the battle between Europeans and Aborigines for the land, a racist ideology 
provided support for the former and ground for further violence.  Many 
Europeans regarded the Aborigines as “savages”.  The eighteenth century 
notion of a Great Chain of Being which ranked all creatures in a hierarchy of 
ability and development gave some support for this idea.  The Aborigines 
were slotted in at the bottom of the human section.  An early “scientific” 
theory, phrenology, used arguments about head and brain size to “prove” 
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European superiority and thereby to justify the dispossession of the 
Aborigines.  (Broome 50-1) 
In Gould’s Book of Fish, this supposed proof is, of course, undermined by English natural 
historian Cosmo Wheeler‟s verdict on Lempriere‟s skull, which he believes to be Aboriginal: 
“Wheeler proves beyond doubt the Tasmanian negro is of an entirely separate species, one 
possibly even more barbarous than the new Hollander, approaching the mere animal” (339).  
Flanagan suggests that this is not merely a mistake, caused by the preconceptions of a 
defective and confused science, but a reality created by Gould through writing: “As the 
thirty-sixth skull of the Macquarie Harbour collection, it was according to Mr Lempriere‟s 
own method to be called MH-36.  I lifted my quill and threw sand across the page.  Beneath 
the speckling I watched as those four fluid letters dried into reality” (279).  As Pobjoy keenly 
observes, “definitions belong to the definer, not the defined” (376), and in this the definers 
have the power to determine the lives and deaths of others.  By turning the definitions back 
onto the definers, Gould takes back some of that power. 
At the same time, the comic scene of Mr Lempriere‟s “ruddy circus” also raises the 
question, both for contemporary Australian and international readers, of how seriously 
Australia‟s violent history is taken when Aboriginal heads have become nothing more than 
curiosities in a historical circus, a spectacle to be enjoyed.  Yet this scene not only thoroughly 
ridicules the scientist Mr Lempriere, it is also a comment on how practices such as pickling 
and exhibiting the body parts of colonised peoples are justified through the authority of 
science.  Flanagan remarks: 
I remember when I was a student at Oxford being routinely derided for 
coming from a country that was said to have no civilization, yet just round the 
corner in Oxford‟s celebrated Pitt Rivers Museum was the most 
comprehensive collection of stolen body parts assembled since antiquity, and 
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this barbarity was defended as knowledge and enlightenment.  This was 
frankly puzzling.  (qtd. in Kornegay). 
The illusion exposed through the circensian clash of extreme order and animal agency in 
Gould’s Book of Fish is that body parts exhibited in museums are somehow dead objects 
without human connection or personal histories.  The context in which they are displayed—as 
scientific objects of study and as exotic curiosities—fails to take account of the personal and 
collective suffering of those whose body parts are displayed and those for whom the 
individuals in question were important.  It also obscures the fact that these “objects” bear 
witness to crimes against humanity.
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  Gould points out the discrepancy between the way the 
victims‟ bodies, their deaths and their suffering, and those responsible for these deaths and 
suffering, are configured depending on the origin of the victim: “I don‟t know, for example, 
why I am now to hang for two murders I never committed, yet why nobody is guilty of the 
firesite skulls.  Nor do I know why murdering the Pudding [Mr Lempriere] or Jorgensen is 
deemed a crime, while murdering a people is at best a question & at worst a scientifick 
imperative” (Gould’s Book 396).  Systems of order, such as the penal system and scientific 
taxonomies, thus appear entirely arbitrary in their moral and logical application, except as 
tools to uphold the power of the colonisers. 
 
“MAN‟S MASTERY COMPLETE”: Carceral Systems and Hybrid Resistance 
Indeed, Mr Lempriere (also known as “the Surgeon”) and his fixation on the Linnaean 
system, are labelled “entirely mad” (Gould’s Book 145, see also 185).  A remark he makes, 
however, reveals the imperialist agenda behind such systems; the maintenance of power 
through control and domestication of nature and those classed as barely human or nonhuman.  
He explains that natural history is “NOT INTERPRETING NATURE FOR DECORATION,” 
but that it has a more important function: “MAN‟S DOMINION WILL BE ENTIRELY 
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KNOWN & KNOWABLE, & MAN‟S MASTERY COMPLETE—HIS FINAL EMPIRE 
NATURE” (148).  Yet, as in García Márquez‟ and Allende‟s novels, this attempt to control 
nature through Enlightenment science is undermined by feral animality. 
Accordingly, Castlereagh defies Mr Lempriere‟s belief in “the infinite perfectibility of 
pigs through breeding” (140).  This belief mirrors the shift Ritvo observes “between the early 
eighteenth and the late nineteenth century,” whereby “animals became significant primarily 
as the objects of human manipulation” (Animal Estate 2-3).  Ritvo proposes that nature 
“became less threatening” in this period through “new methods of acquiring and applying 
knowledge associated with the Enlightenment” that included “stockbreeding” and “veterinary 
science” (Animal Estate 3).  However, Mr Lempriere‟s attempt at gaining total control over 
nature by breeding the perfect pig is undermined by the “hog . . . of indeterminate breed” 
(141).  Thus, the foul-tempered Castlereagh quickly disperses Mr Lempriere‟s fantasy of 
“bucolic bliss” (253)—a mad delusion, in any case, in view of the “festering, stinking horror” 
of the pig pen (141)—and makes his entrance at the very moment the scientist lectures “the 
recalcitrant barrels” (262) about “how overjoyed they ought be at the prospect” of being “of 
some use to Civilisation” (261).  As the squealing pig appears to join the pickled heads in 
mocking the authority of science and its application in breeding systems and domestication, 
he lives up to the reputation of pigs in nineteenth century England, where they were seen as 
unruly and resistant to domestication; one of the “less compliant creatures” (Ritvo, Animal 
Estate 21).  Correspondingly, the pickled heads of Aborigines, animalised through scientific 
practice, are equally non-compliant in their refusal to be useful. 
However, their mockery of the Surgeon‟s totalitarian aspirations is limited, since his 
stated goal of gaining mastery over nature reveals not only the connection between science, 
imperialism and pastoral domestication—the “bucolic bliss” of complete control over land 
and people—but also the inherently carceral nature of his classification systems.  This causes 
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Gould to remark that “[i]t sounded suspiciously like an attempt by the Surgeon & Mr Cosmo 
Wheeler to recreate the natural world as a penal colony, with me, the gaoled, now to play the 
part of the turnkey” (Gould’s Book 148).  This power to define and thus determine the lives 
of others, based on the authority to write, tell, or paint the dominant story, is also reflected in 
Carey‟s Illywhacker.  As Herbert, commenting on the sign on Leah‟s cage in the pet shop 
points out: “The sign on her door says „Melbourne Jew‟.  She spends a lot of time explaining 
that she is not a Jew, that the sign is a lie, that the exhibition is based on lies; but visitors 
prefer to believe the printed information.  This information, after all, is written and signed by 
independent experts” (Illywhacker 636).  Both Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish suggest 
that those who “own” the story are in control of how reality is perceived and experienced, 
and that in Australia, perceived and experienced realities—perceived one way by some and 
experienced (physically, mentally, emotionally) differently by others—are inextricably linked 
to the concept and practice of caging animals. 
Foucault illustrates how scientific ordering of non-human animals, as manifested by 
animal display cages, for instance, and the penal system reinforce each other and naturalize 
the power relations they represent.  He compares the royal menagerie at Versailles with 
Bentham‟s Panopticon and writes: 
[O]ne finds in the programme of the Panopticon a similar concern with 
individualizing observation, with characterization and classification, with the 
analytical arrangement of space.  The Panopticon is a royal menagerie; the 
animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping and the 
king by the machinery of a furtive power. With this exception, the Panopticon 
also does the work of a naturalist.  (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 203)
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Both the Panopticon and the menagerie are examples of “heterotopias . . . of compensation,” 
about which Foucault, significantly, wonders whether “certain colonies have not functioned 
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somewhat in this manner” (“Of Other Spaces” 27).  Accordingly, Lempriere‟s obsessive 
ordering of specimens, of convicts, of Aboriginal heads and bones constitutes such a 
heterotopia of compensation, with which the mad surgeon, in Foucault‟s words, attempts to 
“create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as 
ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled” (“Of Other Spaces” 27).  Moreover, conceptual 
delineation is reinforced by physical incarceration in Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish, 
as natural history is a manifestly carceral narrative.  In fact, Mr Lempriere mirrors Foucault‟s 
comparison, and actively considers “how Bentham‟s principle of the panopticon—a model 
prison in which all men could be constantly watched—might profitably be extended to 
natural history” (Gould’s Book 150). 
Not surprisingly, then, Sarah Island‟s convicts are kept in “those infamous fish cells” 
(Gould’s Book 49), and shortly before Gould/The Weedy Seadragon‟s imprisonment in Mr 
Hung‟s aquarium (another “fish cell”), Gould comments: “I whose role was to assist with 
classification, have now become the classified” (441).  Thus, the aquarium, a glass prison, as 
it were, with boundaries that are near invisible (especially from the inside), is a symbol for 
the invisible boundaries of dominant language that define, delineate, and confine.  
Correspondingly, several critics agree that animal cages in Carey‟s fiction are intimately tied 
to Australia‟s past as penal colony, which continues to shape the stories and realities of the 
present.  Woodcock writes that “[t]he imagery of caging animals and birds is a powerful 
emblem of colonisation, particularly given Australia‟s penal past” (64, see also Woodcock 
67).  Cliff Lobe, in turn, discusses carceral architecture in Illywhacker and argues that 
Herbert Badgery constructs an “archi/textual edific[e],” that is, “a narrative of confinement 
and control that culminates in the dystopian Pet Shop” (23).  More generally, and referring to 
Mishra and Hodge, he points out the prominence of “the figure of the convict, patterns and 
images of imprisonment, and carceral spaces in Australian narrative” (Lobe 27). 
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Bradley remarks: “Carey sees culture as a sort of prison, like the birdcage in 
Illywhacker, a prison that the storyteller, whether novelist, ad man or historian, has a part in 
constructing.  A sense of confinement underpins the restlessness of his characters, their 
constant need for escape and change” (664).54  Thus, human and non-human animals are 
ordered into conceptual prisons of language, so to speak, a process that is paralleled by their 
actual incarceration in the display cages of the Best Pet Shop in the World.  Particularly 
striking in this context is the close identification with the cockatoo as a quintessential 
Australian.  The term “cocky” is used in many variations throughout Illywhacker, denoting, 
for example, both the feathered and the farming kind of cocky, the indigenous animal and the 
settler farmer, as well as pointing to one original meaning of the term, which refers to the 
prisoners of Cockatoo Island in Sydney Harbour, which Herbert and Hissao visit (Illywhacker 
577).  The 1871 painting, Sulphur-crested Cockatoo by Jacob John Halley (Olsen 76), 
illustrates the association between these parrots and the convicts.
55
  The pet cockatoo 
depicted is conspicuously chained to the perch, as a convict, too, might be chained, and in 
this context illustrates the connection between parrots and subaltern groups demonstrated by 
Boehrer and discussed in my previous chapter. 
However, Carey‟s settler “cockies” complicate the idea of oppressor and oppressed; 
they invoke, on the one hand, the victimhood of convicts under the cruel British penal 
system, and on the other, the usurpation of Aboriginal land by European settlers.  This 
unresolved moral position is decidedly unsettling, and Carey‟s (human) cockies, as well as 
other hybrid characters, negotiate the difficult question of home and belonging when the land 
at hand is not theirs and they no longer have a home to go back to.  Animality hereby plays 
an important role for strategies of settlement that include the dissociation from the colonial 
homeland, an identification with indigenous animals, and an understanding of nationhood 
based upon introduced and naturalised animal practices. 
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The notion of being British in particular is resisted by the human-animal characters in 
Illywhacker, who bring disorder into imposed carceral narratives and the colonizing role of 
natural history.  To do this, Carey‟s circensian space incongruously combines movement with 
the concept of Australia as a rigid taxonomic grid which separates, surveys, and controls 
different categories of animals.  Pratt explains: “Natural history maps out . . . the internal 
„contents‟ of those land and water masses whose spread made up the surface of the planet.  
These vast contents would be known . . . through verbal representations in turn summed up in 
nomenclatures, or through labeled grids into which entities would be placed” (30).  Thus, 
rather than allowing themselves to be placed in their appropriate category (Homo sapiens), 
and staying in their designated part of the labelled grid, the hybrid characters appear to move 
from square to square, belonging to different categories at any given time, and blending with 
a variety of animals. 
Accordingly, Herbert Badgery has a “dogfish soul” (342); Charles is “The Snake 
Boy” (402-3) with an “ape arm” (547), as well as being “bull-necked” (590); Phoebe‟s 
hybridity includes elements of being a cat (see 202) and a cow (see 160); Molly, too, is 
likened to a cat (see 23) and a dove (see 10, 47, 115); Leah is an emu (see 232-33), Nathan 
Schick has “a little goatee beard” (360), a licensee has “lizard-lidded eyes” (361); a fruit shop 
owner is “fox-faced” (488); the first names of Goog (who has butterfly ears) and Goose 
O‟Hagan link them to poultry (59), Patrick O‟Hare‟s name speaks for itself (61,66); and it is 
not a coincidence that the Rawleigh‟s Man‟s first name Horace sounds like “horse.”  The 
physical movement of the Badgerys‟ travelling animal show from town to town is thus 
mirrored by a conceptual movement of all hybridized characters through the taxonomic grid.  
Consequently, the grid is subverted from within through something resembling a game of 
hopscotch. 
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However, the hybrid‟s relation to place, defined rather as “not British” than “truly 
Australian,” is ultimately unstable.  Foucault points out that “[t]he fundamental codes of a 
culture—those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its 
techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices—establish for every man, from the very 
first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home” 
(Order xx).  Yet, instead of inhabiting an order within which they are “at home,” 
Illywhacker‟s hybrid characters are within a heteroclitic dimension, the site in which “things 
are „laid‟, „placed‟, „arranged‟ in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible 
to find a place of residence for them, to define a common locus beneath them all” (Foucault, 
Order xvii-iii).  Carey‟s hybrids thus embody the clash and irreconcilability of different 
systems of representation that Slemon identifies as characteristic of postcolonial magical 
realism.  Slemon proposes that, as a result of the irresolvable problem of reconciling the text 
with established and recognised systems of representation, such as hierarchical orderings, 
many postcolonial magical realist fictions characteristically demand “a kind of reading 
process in which the imagination becomes stimulated into summoning into being new and 
liberating „codes of recognition‟” (Slemon 421).  Both in Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of 
Fish, the idea of conceptual liberation from systems of thought and language correlates with 
the idea of physical liberation from carceral structures based on those thought systems, just as 
conceptual capture corresponds with physical capture.  Embracing animality, as an embodied 
merger with other animals, offers the promise of that liberation. 
Huggan, for instance, in his discussion of what he calls “monsters” in Carey‟s 
fictional works, presents an argument that complements Slemon‟s description of magical 
realism‟s liberating quality.  He proposes that “[t]he monstrous body . . . becomes the site of 
ideological conflict, the place where different systems of values collide and intersect,” 
whereby “the monster as hybrid” serves as “symbo[l] of possibility for a different future” 
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(Huggan, Carey 69).
56
  His comment illustrates that hybrids are quintessential inhabitants of 
magical realism‟s circensian spaces.  This is corroborated by Woodcock‟s description of 
Carey‟s hybrids as an expression of postcolonial experience in particular.  He finds Homi 
Bhabha‟s “view of post-colonialism,” which “rests on the transformational possibilities 
offered by the patchwork hybridity of the colonial experience,” especially useful (Woodcock 
12).  Woodcock explains that Bhaba replaces “the binary model of a dominant centre and 
resistant margins in the colonial legacy” with 
a process which sees the colonial experience as an interstitial, “in-between” 
experience, a matter of borderlands rather than fixed borderlines, “a place of 
hybridity, figuratively speaking, where the construction of a political object 
that is new, neither one nor the other, properly alienates our political 
expectations, and changes, as it must, the very form of our recognition of the 
moment of politics”.  For Bhabha, this allows for a more subtle sense of the 
latent possibilities for infiltration, subversion and transformation of the 
supposedly dominant culture.  (12, original italics) 
Hybridity, here, is metaphorically described in terms of spatial transgressions (“borderlands,” 
“place of hybridity,” “infiltration”).  In Carey‟s and Flanagan‟s respective novels, physical 
hybridity corresponds with the spatial movements characteristic of ferality: by crossing 
spatial and conceptual boundaries, feral animals resist “domestication,” a concept that 
denotes not only the attempt to gain control over nature here, but also the process of 
incorporating Australia as part of the British Empire, of making it part of the “homeland.”  In 
Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish, hybrids, like feral animals, are always out of place and 
on the move (which is precisely the quality—besides high reproductive rates—that makes so-
called pests so difficult to control). 
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Thus, the difficulty of accommodating themselves in the gaps between imported 
European narratives and Australian reality is expressed by Leah, who tells Hissao “that she, 
for her part, was sick to death of trying to decide what it meant to be Australian” (Illywhacker 
621).  The “in-between experience” of “being neither one nor the other,” of belonging neither 
to Australia nor Europe, is discussed by Herbert and Leah.  Leah tells him: 
“This is not your place and never can be. . . . You think you can put up some 
shanty and that makes it your place, but you can‟t, and it never will be. . . . 
The matter is obvious.  The land is stolen.  The whole country is stolen.  The 
whole nation is based on a lie which is that it was not already occupied when 
the British came here.  If it is anybody‟s place it is the blacks‟.  Does it look 
like your place?  Does it feel like your place?  Can‟t you see, even the trees 
have nothing to do with you.”  “This is my country,” I said quietly.  
(Illywhacker 320-1) 
However, shortly after this exchange, Herbert admits that “the landscape had, indeed, always 
seemed alien to me, that it made me, in many lights, melancholy and homesick for something 
else” (321).  For Leah, this means that Australia cannot be home, a place of permanent 
belonging.  She negotiates her presence in Australia by being “addicted to movement” and 
says: “I cannot stay still anywhere.  It is not a country where you can rest.  It is a black man‟s 
country: sharp stones, rocks, sticks, bull ants, flies.  We can only move around like tourists.  
The blackfeller can rest but we must keep moving” (337). 
In Gould’s Book of Fish, the key to subversion lies also in movement, yet more 
explicitly in the idea of “escape,” which, like the Badgerys‟ travels, is a process rather than 
the arrival at an absolute destination.  Gould remarks: “The Pudding‟s tastes, I was coming to 
realise, could never—no matter how hard I tried—be mine.  He was a cracked system lacking 
only a subject, Dr Bowdler-Sharpe in search of yet one more egg to measure.  He wanted to 
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be the ichthyologist, but I would rather have been the fish.  His dreams were of capture, mine 
of escape” (52).  Thus, Gould escapes definition, as well as the convict system, by 
transforming into a very strange, indigenous fish, who, in turn, is captured in an aquarium, 
which he again escapes by metamorphosing.  The process is one of constant re-definition and 
re-identification.  Similarly, after listening to Capois Death, a fellow convict, tell the stories 
of his mother, he “tried to imagine how it might be possible to fly as Capois Death‟s 
ancestors once had; to levitate then fly far from Van Diemen‟s Land‟s chains & cockchafers 
by eating fish eyes & smearing a bird‟s blood over my arms & leaping off a certain magic 
mountain, then diving into the sea & swimming as one with the fish until one was a fish” 
(94).  More than escaping through the ability to fly like a bird through the air and swim like a 
fish under water, the imagined “flight” here is an escape through animality; this is an escape 
from carceral narratives as much as an escape from the actual prisons of the Empire. 
Significantly, Gould temporarily manages to escape from the island with the help of 
Rolo Palmer, inventor of alternative natural histories, and the “somewhat tatty & partly 
mutilated 1628 Rotterdam edition of Philemon Holland‟s first English translation of Pliny the 
Elder‟s Natural History,” a book which describes “strange races” of people with animal 
characteristics and other nonhuman traits (344) and which “the Surgeon dismissed as 
superstitious claptrap written by an ignorant Roman” (151).  Thus, as in One Hundred Years 
of Solitude and The House of the Spirits, defiance of categories is offered through pre-
Enlightenment bestiaries as well as animal agency.  Gould comments that with his art and 
storytelling he is “shooting for freedom, nothing less, liberty,” and announces that therefore 
“I shall confine myself to no man‟s rule” (Gould’s Book 106).  He is “out of control” (106) 
and embraces the undefinability, the conceptual ferality of the fish he paints, in a statement 
which suggests that his art and his storytelling are inherently feral, an observation that also 
refers self-referentially to Flanagan‟s use of magical realism to produce “liberating codes of 
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recognition.”  Accordingly, Gould accuses “criticasters” of trying “to define me like the 
Surgeon does his sorry species, those cursed Linnaeans of the soul, trying to trap me in some 
new tribe of their own invention & definition.  But I am William Buelow Gould, party of one, 
undefinable, and my fish will free me & I shall be free with them” (GBF 108). 
This idea of escaping, or eluding, definition by embracing especially indigenous 
animality is grounded in the actual historical disruption of the Linnaean system by Australian 
animals such as the platypus and the kangaroo.  Australia, at the moment of its “discovery” 
by Europeans, was already divided up into a taxonomic grid before it was even explored any 
further.  As Pratt points out, Linnaean taxonomy was thought to be universally valid, and 
European explorers expected to find only what fitted already into their system.  Pratt explains 
that natural history provided ways of knowing unknown spaces, “through verbal 
representations [...] summed up in nomenclatures, or through labeled grids into which entities 
would be placed” (30).  Yet, as Harriet Ritvo writes, the very existence of some Australian 
animals proved to be so unexpected and subversive, “undermining the very categories that 
could not be stretched to accommodate them, as well as the principles on which those 
categories were based,” that a new category had to be conjured up to make room for the 
platypus, for example (Platypus 11).  Representative of the European reaction to Australia at 
the time, the impression of the “first trained zoologist to land in Australia,” François Péron, is 
described by Ann Moyal: “[O]nce there, observing and describing, he found in the furred 
aquatic platypus, the pouched kangaroo, the reversely-coloured black swan and the fleet but 
flightless emu, inversions and contrarieties of nature that challenged a rational explanation” 
(26). 
Flanagan contrasts this superimposed Linnaean grid with a landscape that resembles 
those described by Pliny and inhabited by “strange races.”  Thus, while Gould is on the run, 
Flanagan offers a vision of Tasmania as a “green immensity that went east for hundreds of 
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miles with only blacks & wild animals & wilder rivers & God-only-knew-what other 
monstrous races & creatures” (Gould’s Book 346).  In Illywhacker, it is a conversation 
between Herbert Badgery and Jack that illustrates the resistance to European preconceptions 
and categories especially by Australian animals: 
“The wheel,” Jack said, “seems an easy thing when you have it, but if you 
don‟t have it then how would you ever know you needed it?  Flying is an 
easier thing to imagine.  You can see a magpie doing it.  But tell me, 
Badgery[,] where is an animal, or bird, with wheels?”  “There is a snake,” I 
said, “that makes itself into a wheel and chases you.”  “Is that a fact now? In 
what country is that?”  “In this country.  A friend of mine was chased by one 
up at Jindabyne.”  “There is no doubt,” Jack said, “that if an animal would do 
it in any country, this is the country for it.” (50, original italics) 
Carey, moreover, makes an implicit and humorous reference to Barron Field, a nineteenth 
century English settler, lawyer,
57
 and colonial poet, in Sid Goldstein‟s telegram to Leah, who 
has joined a sideshow as an emu dancer: “TOO UPSET TOO UNWELL TO WRITE LIFE IS 
A BARREN FIELD. LOVE FATHER” (Illywhacker 297).58  Barron Field‟s poem “The 
Kangaroo” celebrates the “contradiction” of Australia‟s “chimera,” whom he considers to 
have the characteristics of a squirrel and a deer (Field ll.17, 26).  “British naturalists” at 
home, however, were, as Moyal writes, “inclined to indulge a lofty view of the Colonies—of 
monotremes, marsupials and men.  They perceived Australia as „a faunal backwater‟, a kind 
of „zoological penal colony‟, and [...] viewed Antipodean aberrations and inversions as a 
taunt to the hard-won truths of European science” (67).  In contrast, Carey and Flanagan 
adopt this portrayal of Australia and present a positive identification particularly with 
indigenous Australian animals.  Like Field‟s kangaroo, Australian hybrids and animals in 
Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish embody the “Spirit of Australia” (Field l.2).  
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Therefore, to elude capture within the walls of definition created by imperial power 
structures, to dissociate themselves from being British and, furthermore, in order to connect 
with Australia itself as home, one has to become a different kind of animal, Carey and 
Flanagan suggest. 
However, at the same time, Pliny‟s Natural History dies a symbolic death, as it is 
pierced by the sword of the island‟s clerk Jorgen Jorgensen in Flanagan‟s novel (Gould’s 
Book 333).  Jorgensen creates the island‟s “universe” and reality by keeping records in which 
“every detail . . . was augmented & qualified & tabulated” (320), and who “reinvent[s] all 
that barbarity & horror of our settlement as order & progress, material, moral & spiritual” 
(Gould’s Book 318).  Gould‟s narrative is thus ultimately carceral, as “human fish” keep 
ending up in aquariums and “fishy humans” in cells.  Likewise, Carey places emphasis on the 
carceral quality of Herbert Badgery‟s narrative, as all of the Australian nation is entrapped in 
The Best Pet Shop in the World.  Thus, the Australian magical realist circus, for all its 
mockery, remains, like the actual commercial travelling animal show, ultimately carceral, 
too.  In this, the Australian circensian space differs from the Latin American heterotopia in 
García Márquez‟s and Allende‟s novels, which is constructed as a kind of free-range circus, 
where extraordinary hybrids of all kinds, such as Allende‟s Rosa and Alba, parade 
themselves as part of everyday reality.  They are not confined to extraordinary spaces and 
spectacles, but they occupy all spaces and spheres of life in One Hundred Years of Solitude 
and The House of the Spirits.  This reality, however, engages with pre-Linnaean explorer 
narratives and medieval bestiaries as the defining epistemology, since Europeans 
“discovered” Latin America before the Linnaean taxonomy was ever devised, and natural 
histories included fabulous beasts at the time. 
Accordingly, though García Márquez and Allende write, like Carey and Flanagan, in 
historical terms from the context of, and about, a post-Linnaean era, their magical realism 
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flaunts and celebrates a pre-Linnaean reality, which is not imposed upon, captured, defined 
and catalogued by Linnaean taxonomy.  On the contrary, García Márquez demonstrates in 
Love in the Time of Cholera that it is Linnaean taxonomy which is contained, even 
marginalized, as Fermina Daza frames “color illustrations from Linnaeus‟s Natural History” 
and hangs them “on the drawing room walls” (23).  The Linnaean system is acknowledged, 
but not overpowering and all-pervasive.  Australian reality, in contrast, can be considered 
post-Linnaean: pre-defined, influenced and shaped by Linnaean natural history from the 
moment of European contact.  In consequence, Australia‟s inhabitants of European descent, 
who cannot situate themselves outside of the system but resist identifying with the carceral 
narratives of Great Britain, a place they no longer call “home,” seek to accommodate 
themselves in between its categories.  Thus, whereas Latin American magical realism 
subverts Linnaean taxonomy from the outside, by means of pre-Linnaean European 
epistemology, Australian magical realism destabilizes the system from within, as its 
characters keep moving, keep escaping and keep metamorphosing. 
 
Animal Products: Pastoral Myths and the Naturalisation of Settlement 
The result of these physical and conceptual movements is an unsettledness, an uneasy 
awareness of not actually owning the land on the one hand, and not fitting in with the 
“empirical orders” of Europe, to use Foucault‟s term, on the other.  In consequence, when 
finding a home within empirical—and imperial—order is not possible, Carey‟s and 
Flanagan‟s characters negotiate ideas of “nationhood” and “belonging” through an 
identification with, and transformation into, indigenous animals.  The rejection of European 
Enlightenment epistemology (especially in the form of the classification of animals) and the 
simultaneous alignment with indigenous Australian animals are thus part of the process of 
approaching one of the central questions posed by both novels, and addressed by Leah in 
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Illywhacker; that is, the question of what it means to be Australian.  Illywhacker in particular 
illustrates the construction of Australianness through stories and histories that naturalise the 
presence of settler society and represent it as practically indigenous through its relationship 
with nature. 
Herbert is the character who is most vocal about his identification as Australian, yet 
right from the beginning, his exposure as ”illywhacker” (a confidence man) indicates that his 
stories must be considered with scepticism.  Accordingly, Huggan observes that Herbert‟s 
make-shift buildings and the “temporary structure[s],” which are “built on land stolen from 
its original inhabitants,” are a comment on Australian nationhood: 
Like the Pet Emporium, like Australia itself, [Herbert‟s camp] is based on a lie 
of rightful ownership.  Australia—Aboriginal land—has been claimed and 
built on by white settlers.  But the Pet Emporium—“Australia‟s own”—is 
controlled, in turn, by foreign interests.  In each case, the edifice is false or it is 
built on unstable foundations.  It offers only the illusion of permanence, 
definition, protection.  In reality, the structure, like the idea(s) it represents, is 
inherently flawed and fragile.  (Carey 41) 
Ironically, it is precisely the idea of a “temporary structure” that provides Herbert with the 
means to negotiate the feeling of dislocation through his identification with bower-birds, an 
indigenous Australian species.  According to Huggan, Illywhacker “presents an allegory of 
Australian nation-building” (Carey 47).  Thus, Herbert creates a “home” through telling his 
story, an “archi/textual edifice,” to borrow Lobe‟s term, and, like bower-bird males who build 
“temporary structures” for nesting and adorn them with blue objects of every description, 
Herbert, too, embellishes his story with blue items of various kinds.  He frequently refers to 
bower-birds, such as “the famous regent bower-bird” in Charles‟ pet shop, “which is trained 
to dig sapphires” (Illywhacker 521), reminding the reader of the importance of the bird‟s 
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behaviour as a model for his storytelling.
59
  Herbert explicitly identifies himself with the bird 
when he builds a makeshift house for Phoebe (see Illywhacker 162), and he also tries to set 
up a temporary home in the McGrath‟s house by constructing a lie as a bower-bird builds his 
nest.  He says: “I was an Aviator.  That was my value to them.  I set to work to reinforce this 
value.  I propped it up and embellished it a little.  God damn, I danced around it like a bloody 
bower-bird putting on a display.  I added silver to it.  I put small blue stones around it” (27). 
The “small blue stones” he lays out for his reader throughout the narrative are, as a 
bower-bird‟s collection, varied and random, such as “a plate with a blue rim” (Illywhacker 
414), Leah‟s “pleasantly faded blue-checked shirt” (616), Emma‟s “baby‟s blue bunny rug” 
(499), the vein on Henry Underhill‟s forehead, which “take[s] on the appearance of a small 
blue worm” (461), “a bright blue lambswool cover” (566), Emma‟s “blue patent handbag” 
(601), a “big blue” bruise on Molly‟s “backside” looking “[l]ike a map of Tasmania” (72), 
“assembled pieces of blue paper” (435), “a vivid blue-white neon” light (604), “a blue book 
with unlined pages” (578), “a little blue dress” (579), “[b]lue curtains with puckered hems” 
(380), “bright blue creatures” who temporarily inhabit Herbert‟s ever-changing Vegemite 
bottle (435), “the blue shimmer of eucalyptus bush” (578) and “the cobalt blue sky above” 
(14), for example. 
Blue is the first colour mentioned in the story, and one of the two dominant colours in 
Herbert‟s narrative.  He stresses the importance and centrality of the colour blue by 
inextricably linking it to his sense of self at the beginning of his story: “It‟s a blessing my 
eyes are as good as they are and with all my other vanity gone this one remains: my eyes.  I 
speak not of their efficiency, but of their colour, which is the same colour, that clear sapphire 
blue, which illuminated my father‟s pale-skinned face” (4).  Herbert emphasises these eyes 
“which I so much admire in myself” (4), and near the end of his story he reminds us again 
that he is “Herbert Badgery, a blue-eyed illywhacker” (620).  Thus, feigning “blue-eyed” 
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innocence at the same time as he admits he is a swindler, Herbert audaciously creates his own 
indigeneity through verbal trickery: his eyes are, supposedly, evidence that he is Australian 
because they are amongst the blue objects of a bower-bird‟s structure, created by himself, 
who is shown to be Australian by the narrative he creates and the way in which he creates it. 
Accordingly, his argument that Australia is “his” country rests on tautology.  He is 
Australian because the object of the narrative (that is, Herbert‟s Australianness) and the way 
the narrative is told (by Herbert, in an Australian fashion, so to speak) reinforce each other.  
However, Herbert is “true blue” (320), as Leah sarcastically comments, towards an idea of 
Australianness which, however, is not “grounded” in any physical and cultural connection to 
the land and its people, but which is as fragile as the temporary structures of bower-birds.  He 
thus demonstrates how an idea of the nation and of its nationals is constructed through 
language, through stories and histories about being Australian, and by connecting with 
nonhuman animals as representatives of Australian nature and as natural inhabitants of the 
continent. 
Thus, whilst his Australianness is implied within the narrative structure, Herbert also 
announces it explicitly through an identification with an indigenous snake, his “pet” (20), 
whom he shows to some guests: “This . . . is a true Australian.‟ . . . „This snake,‟ I explained, 
„has been in gaol.  It is a mean bastard of an animal and it cannot be bought.‟  „What are you 
trying to say?‟ . . . „I‟m trying to say I‟m an Australian‟” (141).  Once again, Herbert speaks 
his Australianness into existence by connecting the snake‟s story with settler Australia‟s 
convict history and, by extension, with himself as its descendant.  Correspondingly, later on, 
he describes himself, in a positive light, as a snake: “By November 1934 I was a different 
man. . . . I was an old python with his opaque skin now shed, his blindness gone, once again 
splendid and supple, seeing the world in all its terrifying colours” (352).  Herbert‟s 
identification with an indigenous animal is an attempt to legitimate, or “ground,” his claim to 
Schwalm  113 
Australia as his home, an assertion emphasised by the fact that snakes live their lives 
physically and directly connected to the land. 
Moreover, this alignment with native animals is a rejection of the notion that he, 
himself, is a member of an introduced species.  Therefore, at the same time as he is 
“uncoiling [his] long bowed legs” like a snake (135), he positions himself as “a different 
animal to the Cocky Abbots” (132), the local farmers, who, in his opinion, are out of place 
and consequently not true Australians.  He says: “„The rabbit has no place in this country . . . 
. The things that will ruin this country are things like the rabbit.‟  The things that I had in 
mind were the Oswald-Smiths and the Cocky Abbots” (135), whom he considers “Imaginary 
Englishmen” (126).  Likewise, his son Charles creates The Best Pet Shop in the World “in 
accordance with his dream which was . . . an expression of the purest patriotism—pure 
Australiana—definitely no bunny rabbits or pussy cats no matter how tearfully his little boys 
begged him” (507).  Carey thus illustrates that the respective adoption or rejection of 
particular kinds of animality are fundamentally important for the self-image of Australian 
settler society. 
John Morton and Nicholas Smith illuminate this issue and point out that “[f]eral 
species . . . now carry an enormous burden in the symbolic economy of nationalism” (159).  
They discuss the representation of introduced pest animals as “un-Australian” (154), a 
cultural narrative that is one of “the many possible recipes for being „truly Australian‟” (155).  
Catharina Landström, correspondingly, describes the role biological control promotions play 
as a means to advance certain ideas of “what it means to be Australian” (211-12).  The 
construction of an “Australian rabbit story” in particular, in which rabbits, introduced by an 
Englishman and representing “an autonomous agent acting against humanity and against 
native Australian animals and plants,” is a way of distancing contemporary Australian settler 
society from English colonisation (Landström 205). 
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However, as Herbert‟s slight of the Cocky Abbots suggests, and as Nicholas Gill and 
Kay Anderson show, pastoral farming is itself a reinforcement of European colonisation, as 
well as classical-humanist ideals, by which land is transformed—and supposedly improved—
from a state of wilderness towards what is perceived as civilised patterns of use, that is, the 
production of commodities.  They argue that 
[t]he key process by which this is achieved is through ordering Central 
Australia‟s landscape by the labour of pastoralists and their stock, and through 
processes of remembering that entwine settlers, stock, land, soil, rainfall and 
plants to produce civilised landscapes.  Wild nature, and with it, the indigene, 
are displaced, or at least accommodated, as what is imagined to be the true 
potential, the good, of the land is realised through the labour of the settlers.  
(Gill and Anderson) 
Pastoral settlement is thus supposedly indigenised in contrast to introduced species.  Gill and 
Anderson show that “[p]astoralists reigned in wildness by naturalising their cattle within the 
landscape and giving them a status of belonging on a par with native fauna.”  Accordingly, 
the Northern Territory Cattlemen‟s Association think of themselves as “caretakers of the 
land” who “recognise [their] special responsibility” of “protecting and preserving” the land 
“for generations to come,” and, in their “Cattle Producers‟ Creed,” state ceremoniously: “We 
respect our rich heritage, and we embrace a way of life that is integral to Australia‟s unique 
spirit and cultural identity.”  The premises of this declaration—such as the presence of 
farmers for the good of the land, land occupation that is rooted historically within the land 
and legitimately continued into the future, the statement of the cattle farmers‟ presence as fact 
rather than as a potentially problematic political and social issue, and the proclamation of an 
intimate connection between farming and “unique” Australianness—are examples of the 
mythical, “depoliticized speech” described by Roland Barthes (155).60 
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Barthes defines Myth as a “type of speech,” whereby “everything can be a myth 
provided it is conveyed by a discourse” (117).  The unquestioned assumptions of the animal 
industry lobby groups featured here demonstrate the process of Myth making which Barthes 
explains as follows: 
In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the 
complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, . . . it 
organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, 
a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful 
clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.  (156) 
Carey illustrates this process at work in Herbert‟s announcement “I‟m an Australian,” which 
is meant, in the presence of the imprisoned snake, as a self-evident declaration of an 
Australianness that Herbert, however, struggles to explain.  His Australianness, which relies 
on imagery, storytelling, and a close association with nonhuman animals who themselves 
have no interest whatsoever in Australianness or otherwise, ultimately lacks substance in 
itself, at the same time as historical complexities are passed over.  This kind of speech is also 
reflected in Meat and Livestock Australia‟s description of pastoral settlement as settlers 
“learn[ing] to manage their new environment” (“A Brief History”).  The “new environment” 
is thus transformed into a homeland through farming, whilst there is an unquestioned 
assumption that this environment is also “theirs” to begin with.  The impression given is that 
the first generation of settlers took their place in an ecological niche that was already waiting 
for them.  Consequently, farming comes to be regarded and represented as a quintessentially 
Australian activity. 
Thus, the politically and historically loaded statements of Meat and Livestock 
Australia and the Northern Territory Cattlemen‟s Association appear not only self-evident, 
but also completely innocent.  As Barthes writes, “myth is experienced as innocent speech: 
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not because its intentions are hidden—if they were hidden, they could not be efficacious—but 
because they are naturalized” (142).  The intentions are clear: settler farmers, cattle producers 
in this case, lay claim to the land historically, now, and in the future, displacing any notion of 
Aboriginal ownership, as much as Aborigines were removed physically from the land and 
their communities.  The ideals and idealised versions of history propounded by the meat and 
dairy producers‟ lobby groups are examples of the conviction described by Gill and Anderson 
in relation to Central Australia: “For pastoralists, cattle belong to an authentic nature, they are 
part of an authentic Central Australian nature; that which was proto-pastoral and which is 
now fully pastoral.”  Farmed landscape and the animal practices that define it thus provide 
the mythic imagery that signifies the origins of nationhood, and farmers are regarded as the 
embodiment of the nation itself. 
Both Carey and Flanagan question the idea of a natural connection with the land and 
thus a quasi-indigenised settler population who legitimately occupy the land as if it were an 
ecological niche made for their arrival.  Consequently, as the settler Australians in 
Illywhacker have a troubled relationship with the land, they, too, attempt to occupy 
alternative spaces.  Woodcock writes that “[i]n Peter Carey‟s world, we are all creatures of 
the shadow lands.  His fictions explore the experiences lurking in the cracks of normality, and 
are inhabited by hybrid characters living in in-between spaces on the margins” (1).  Thus, the 
Australians in Illywhacker, as in Gould’s Book of Fish, are not only characterised by 
hybridity, the state of being in between human and nonhuman animals, but also by the “in-
between spaces on the margins” they inhabit.  In Illywhacker, this space is the air.  As 
Huggan argues: “One of Herbert Badgery‟s many attempts to claim a future for Australia is 
through the setting up of a „genuinely Australian‟ aircraft industry” (Carey 47), and, 
significantly, Herbert, who has already identified himself as a “bower-bird,” builds the home 
for himself and Phoebe out of “the spare wing sections that had come with the Morris 
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Farman” (Illywhacker 162).  At the same time, Herbert‟s comment on the land he built the 
house on, “I found my land, and took it . . .” (160), indicates the illegitimacy of this act.  
Through aviation, Carey provides a way of removing Herbert from land he has no right to 
claim.  It is therefore also fitting that Herbert finds himself metaphorically “in mid-air” (135). 
Aviation, moreover, is directly linked with animality.  In connection with Jack and 
Herbert‟s discussion about snakes who can turn themselves into wheels, Jack comments that 
Australia is not only the country for such strange animals, but that “[i]t is the country for the 
aeroplane as well,” as though aeroplanes were themselves a type of animal (Illywhacker 50).  
Correspondingly, pilots are represented as birds, as Herbert points out: “When the press 
wrote up a pilot he wasn‟t just a pilot; he was an „eagle soaring above our skies‟” (29-30), 
and aviation, claiming the air as a human space, becomes a heroic national endeavour.  As the 
narrator says: “They were eyries, the birthplaces of the great.  Australians, it seemed that 
night in Western Avenue, were born to rule the skies.  We drank a toast: „To our eagles‟” (30-
1). 
In Gould’s Book of Fish, similarly, Gould finds he cannot connect with the land, nor 
can he connect with the indigenous culture, even though Towtereh‟s daughter (derogatively 
called “Twopenny Sal”), offers him this bond when she paints him with red earth mixed with 
her own saliva during a funeral rite for Tracker Marks, an Aboriginal tracker: 
As she rubbed the ochre in she stared at me, as though I were some long lost 
friend, as if I were her man, her brother, her father, her sons, all the other 
people who had preceded Tracker Marks, for whom she had rubbed ochre on 
her face & charcoal on her body to mourn as one by one they had perished of 
colds & smallpox & the clap & musket shot, as if we shared something that 
transcended our bodies & our histories & our futures, & as if by marking me 
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so with red ochre I might somehow also know something about all this.  
(Gould’s Book 370) 
However, he finds that “with the daubings of death and life on my face & the secret mysteries 
of which they spoke, I only sensed that I knew none of it” (370).  Gould fails to connect with 
the woman, who, like all characters in the narrative, is revealed to be a fish, but who, unlike 
the other characters, is a fish of the land, so to speak, as “her hair had been remade with a 
thick pomade of red ochre & grease, fashioned into overlapping scales like those of a fish.  
The children were similarly naked and similarly decorated” (366).  Her appearance as a fish 
of red earth represents her connectedness with and belonging to the land, which contrasts 
with Gould‟s feelings of being out of place and incapable of understanding her story and her 
suffering.  Thus, unable to be a “fish of the earth” despite the woman‟s invitation, it is his 
metamorphosis into the Weedy Seadragon that allows him to find a place in Australia. 
Accordingly, throughout Gould‟s narrative, European culture is associated with water 
and the sea.  For example, Gould believes Sarah Island to be “not a colony of men at all, but a 
colony of fish masquerading as men” (Gould’s Book 281), and wonders whether “some effect 
of the southern light is making me see men as fish everywhere” (252).  Just as Carey‟s story 
mimics a bower-bird‟s nest and a pet shop, Flanagan thus creates an aquarium of sorts, a 
space where his hybrid fish are collected and assembled.  As Sid Hammet explains: “My 
desire was only ever to make a vessel—however crude—in which all Gould‟s fish might be 
returned to the sea” (34).  This “vessel” is described as “a charming kaleidoscope of changing 
views” (16), much like an aquarium full of colourful fish.  Correspondingly, Gould‟s book is 
characterised by “wetness” throughout the narrative, as it “teemed with words as the ocean 
did fish, and these schools of words formed a chronicle that explained the curious genesis of 
the pictures” (27).  Furthermore, Sid Hammet describes how, “[a]s I drew to its conclusion 
the pages first grew damp beneath my fingers, then wet, and finally, . . . I had the inexplicable 
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sense that I was now reading words written at the very bottom of the ocean” (29).  Not only is 
the book “wet,” but so is the landscape of the colony, which is characterised by constant rain 
(see 200-1, 280). 
Ultimately, Gould recognises that his place is neither England nor the Australian 
landscape, but the sea, the space between Europe and the Australian continent.  By 
suggesting the sea and the air may be appropriate “niches” for their characters, Carey and 
Flanagan submit a new version of settler-Australianness, which neither claims ownership of 
the land, nor does it pretend there are no historical injustices, or that colonisation is a natural 
process and an improvement on wild nature.  Indeed, the kind of animality into which the 
characters in both novels transform is far from domesticated.  Even where there is an 
association with farmed or “useful animals,”61 the blurring of human-animal boundaries 
precludes domestication; mastery over nature—or compliance of the animals in question—
may be physically enforced by carceral systems, but it is never achieved conceptually. 
On the contrary, the idea that settlers enhance and develop a domesticated nature is 
further subverted in Carey‟s novel by the figure of Les Chaffey, a farmer described as “a man 
with a dictionary on his shelf, a map of the world on his wall, a habit of poking at things with 
a fork or a screwdriver when they interested him” (Illywhacker 402) and who displays his 
“trophies from the rifle club” (438).  Surrounded by icons of the British Empire, Les Chaffey 
embodies the connection between science, farming and imperial expansion.  The humanist 
ideals underlying these practices are resisted by Australian nature itself, as “[t]he earth had 
been ploughed and seeded twice but the expensive seed had never germinated and the 
paddocks, the subject of mortgages and other substantial documents, were drifting like bad 
dreams in the wind” (400).  Carey ironises and complicates the supposed dichotomy between 
introduced “pest” species and Australian farmers, as Les Chaffey is as European as it gets, 
and his efforts are thwarted by a combined resistance of Australian nature and introduced 
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mice, who “ate all the books. . . . They ate all his plough drawings too” (442).  Les Chaffey‟s 
situation is clearly at odds with the idea that farmers represent “pure Australiana.” 
Illywhacker is thus a reaction to the popular link between rural society and the animal 
practices on which it is predominantly founded and the idea of the nation itself.  As Meat and 
Livestock Australia, an industry lobby group, puts it, “[m]eat and livestock production is an 
industry that has developed hand in hand with Australia‟s growth as a nation and it will 
continue to play an important role in the 21st Century” (“Paddock to Plate”).62  Notably, the 
emphasis here is on the nation itself and as a whole, rather than on the nation‟s economy.  
Carey engages with the significance of animal industries for the perception and development 
of nationhood by depicting animal products as omnipresent, pervasive and essentially 
Australian.  Accordingly, he describes Ballarat as “made from wool” (96), whilst “wool-
bound Geelong” (84) is characterised, in addition, by the presence of pigs who “sum up 
everything Phoebe hates about Geelong” (5).  Phoebe, moreover, is associated with dairy 
products, as Herbert describes her “creamy skin” (20, 30), her “creamy shape” (40), her 
“milky neck” (41), and as he draws attention to her eating “a dish of vanilla ice-cream” (123).  
Cream and milk are linked with the colour yellow, as Molly “heat[s] up some milk” for 
Charles (345), which is “yellow with cream” and which “wrinkles its yellow face” (348-9). 
Yellow is the other dominant colour throughout the narrative, which is mirrored, for 
example, in Phoebe‟s “bright yellow flying suit” (162) and the tannery‟s “yellow dusk” 
(348), a reference that precedes not only Charles‟ yellow-creamed milk, but also Molly‟s 
“cream dress” (349) and the “cream-rose” in “her gold-dyed hair” (350).  Indeed, dairy 
products and gold are closely connected, not only by being two shades of the same colour, 
but also, implicitly, through Leah Goldstein, who is also associated with yellow (see 393 and 
415) and whose family name literally means “golden stone.”  Using yellow to signify dairy 
products thus links the industry with the prosperity of gold mining, and Carey thus indicates 
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the profitability and importance of dairy farming for the Australian economy.  Moreover, the 
pervasive presence of dairy products throughout the narrative, referred to either literally, 
metaphorically or through the colour yellow, suggests the importance of dairy farming and 
milk products as markers of settler Australian space and identity. 
However, whilst the connection between animal industries in general and the idea of 
the Australian nation is very significant, meat production and consumption remains the 
ultimate signifier for Australianness.  It will not do, for example, to consume eggs and milk 
products as part of a vegetarian diet, as a current Meat and Livestock Australia campaign 
makes abundantly clear.  The Australia Day and, most recently, “Australia Week” 
commercials featuring local celebrity Sam Kekovich are designed to promote the 
consumption of lambs as an inherently Australian activity.  In part, this is achieved by 
presenting it as an unquestioned given that eating lambs epitomises Australianness.  
However, to complement this premise, the refusal to eat lambs is portrayed, conversely, as 
“un-Australian.”63  Thus, whilst the commercials are meant to be humorous, their polemical 
tone reveals and reinforces the deep-seated stereotypes and prejudice against anyone who 
does not conform to predominant animal practices.  Vegetarians are constructed—only half-
jokingly—as “placard-waving, police-bashing, weed-worshippers” who may be “too un-
Australian to chomp a few chops with the rest of us” (Kekovich qtd. in Meat and Livestock 
Australia, “Australia Week 2008”).  The series of commercials suggest that vegetarians are 
somehow “foreign” and may need to be shown “the way to the airport” (Kekovich qtd. in 
Meat and Livestock Australia, “Australia Day 2005 Commercial”).  Kekovich and Meat and 
Livestock Australia, to borrow William Buelow Gould‟s definition of swindling, are 
“confirming preconceptions” as they construct their version of what being Australian 
means.
64
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Many Australians appear to identify with the commercials.  Meat and Livestock 
Australia states: “Since his first tongue-in-cheek address to the nation in 2005 Sam 
Kekovich‟s Australia Day campaigns have continued to strike a chord with Australians.  The 
week leading up to Australia Day continues to be the biggest trading period for lamb each 
year . . .” (“Sam Kekovich - Eat Lamb and Fix the Economy”).  Herbert Badgery‟s 
announcement to readers that he will not sign “your protest letter about the battery hens” can 
be seen in this context (Illywhacker 275).  In view of Kekovich‟s call “If you still call 
Australia „home,‟ stack the fridge full of lamb!”(“Australia Week 08”), it makes sense that 
Herbert is averse to criticising any Australian animal industry.  From such a perspective, 
signing such a petition is tantamount to fouling his own nest, so to speak, and would put 
Herbert, who is proudly Australian, on a par with “un-Australian,” “hairy-legged . . . lentil 
eaters” (Meat and Livestock Australia, “Australia Day 2007 Commercial”).  Notably, neither 
Leah, who feels rather disconnected from the idea of Australianness, nor Hissao, who is 
inexplicably Japanese, eat anything from the “famous five-bob barbecues” of a Sydney beer 
garden “redolent with burning meat and alive with the small blue flashes of burning chop fat” 
(Illywhacker 620-1), a space defined even by its smell as essentially Australian. 
In contrast to Leah and Hissao, Goon Tse Ying uses meat as a means to become 
Australian, as he is described as “a man driven by a desire to prove himself civilized to the 
English he despised. . . . He joined Chinese-Australian associations and had grandchildren 
with names like Heather and Walter.  He ate chops and sausages, roast beef on Sundays, and 
the only invisibility he would acknowledge was that which comes from dressing like 
everyone else” (Illywhacker 216).  Annette Davidson, Phoebe‟s lover, who values all things 
European, identifies meat-eating as an Australian characteristic, too: “Annette, as usual, was 
disgusted by the Australian habit of consuming large quantities of lamb, great slabs of dead 
dark meat smothered in near-black gravy.  She scorned her knife and picked moodily at her 
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shepherd‟s pie with fork alone” (152).  Accordingly, other characters consume large 
quantities of meat and dairy products.  Molly McGrath eats “a breakfast of steak, chops, 
bacon, fried bread and eggs” (155), and Leah cooks Charles “a big breakfast with grilled 
sausages, steak, kidney, onions, eggs, chops, buttered toast, cups of tea” (414).  Herbert 
describes this as a “monstrous meal,” and adds that “[s]he probably cooked him fried bread 
and liver as well” (414, 417).  Furthermore, butchers are literally an everyday presence as 
Emma “begged a calendar from the butcher‟s” (475),65 and “all around [Leah] people worry 
about sausages” (322).  Carey thus reflects not only the importance of meat for the national 
economy,
66
 but his novel illustrates that Australian settler society constructs much of its 
national identity from the use and consumption of animals.  To be Australian is to eat meat 
and vice versa.  Indeed, the nation itself, in this version of Australianness, is a product of 
animal industries. 
Meat thus “unites” the nation, a narrative perpetuated by Kekovich, who, in a parody 
of Martin Luther King, claims that it is his “dream that lamb could unite Australians of all 
colours and creeds” (qtd. in Meat and Livestock Australia, “Australia Day 2007 
Commercial”).  Similarly, Landström argues that “[i]n all of their different roles in biological 
control stories animals serve to articulate Australian nature as a primary cultural value in a 
way that produces the nation as unified” (212).  Presenting a “unified” nation on the basis of 
Western animal practices, however, glosses over cultural differences and social inequalities, 
and delegates not only historical injustices, but also their effects on contemporary populations 
firmly to the past, an attitude expressed by Sid Hammet in Gould’s Book of Fish: “Once upon 
a time terrible things happened, but it was long ago in a far-off place that everyone knows is 
not here or now or us” (5). 
As Landström points out, “human practices are backgrounded and conflicts made to 
disappear in the struggle against a foreign nature that threatens to corrupt Australia” (211-12).  
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She refers, in particular, to the effect of agriculture on the environment, whereby 
environmental problems are blamed on “unnatural nature,” that is, introduced pest species, 
whilst farming, in conjunction with biological control research, is seen as promoting 
solutions (Landström 207).  As Landström writes, “agriculture is not depicted to be in any 
way responsible for the degradation of native environments.  Agriculture and nature are both 
represented as victims of historical mistakes and powerful pest organisms” (207).  Gill and 
Anderson comment, too, on the “relative silence in pastoral discourses” about the fact that 
cattle and sheep have the same or a similar impact on native environments that feral rabbits 
have.
67
  Illywhacker, however, highlights environmental degradation caused by animal 
industries connected to pastoral farming.  Thus, there are descriptions of the “the rank foul 
smell that came drifting from the abattoirs” (164), “the yellow dusk and the white smoke 
from the tannery” (348), the pollution of the Maribyrnong, which “is, in places, a pretty river, 
but as it snakes down through Flemington and pushes through the flats to the bay it is 
neglected and dirty, enriched by the effluent from the Footscray abattoirs” (160).  From these 
abattoirs emanates the “stink of rendering sheep boiling into tallow” (165), and Phoebe‟s 
family, looking for picnic spots, avoid any river “with the constant risk of dead heifers just a 
mile upstream” (11).  Such imagery contrasts with the Northern Territory Cattlemen‟s 
Association representation of contemporary animal farming as producing food “the way 
nature intended” and thus as an integral part of Australian nature. 
However, the naturalising of agriculture and the unifying of an Australian nation, 
positioned alongside indigenous nonhuman animals and in conflict with “alien invaders,”68 
also obscures the connection between animal farming and Aboriginal dispossession, and 
implicitly legitimates settlement and its history.  Indeed, the Meat and Livestock Australia 
commercials featuring Sam Kekovich illustrate this further.  Despite Kekovich‟s “dream,” 
settler Australians are not only by far the dominant group featured in the commercials and 
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posters of the campaign, but there is also a notable absence of any reference to Aboriginal 
culture or populations.
69
  Aborigines, it appears, are not part of what Kekovich‟s or Meat and 
Livestock Australia deem to be the epitome of Australianness. 
Carey draws attention to the marginalisation and silencing of stories that contradict or 
compromise the image of a unified nation built upon naturalised, innocent and heroic 
settlement.  Huggan comments that “[i]n Illywhacker, Australian nationhood is built on false 
foundations; it is an imaginary construct based on the lie of peaceful occupation.  The 
allegory of Australia‟s development into an „independent‟ nation is similarly founded on lies, 
strategic theft, and crooked salesmanship” (Carey 47).  Such distortions are not only founded 
on what is said, but also on what is not said.  Meat and Livestock Australia, for example, 
make reference to the achievements of the meat industry in Australia since 1788, hailing “the 
spirit of the nation‟s early pioneers” (“Paddock to Plate”), and employ euphemisms to 
describe a process of colonisation that resulted in death, suffering and dispossession of 
Aboriginal populations.  They write: “Further exploration found more land suitable for 
raising stock . . .” (Meat and Livestock Australia, “A Brief History”).  The two simple words 
“further exploration” cloak the fact that pastoral settlement entailed, for example, theft of 
land and violent clashes with and displacement and exploitation of Aboriginal populations.
70
  
Carey contrasts this representation of history with the “Footscray abattoirs” in Herbert‟s 
neighbourhood (Illywhacker 160) and the nearby tannery (see 348), both industries that 
processes animals and which are built on land that, as Phoebe announces bluntly, is “stolen” 
(320). 
The juxtaposition between official or dominant versions of history and the felt 
experiences of history by those usually left out of or marginalised by those accounts is an 
effect of circensian dynamics that exposes the “gaps, absences, and silences,” to use 
Slemon‟s phrase again, in the former and increases visibility or perception of the latter, as 
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both versions have equal weight in the narrative.  Kafka yet again provides a model for this in 
his narrative “Auf der Galerie,” a short piece that contrasts the misery of an ailing circus 
equestrian on a “swaying” horse and terrorised by the ringmaster and his whip with the 
illusion of a beautiful lady and a caring ringmaster (60, my translation).
71
  On the surface, the 
first, gloomy version is represented as false, but it is suggested that if it were true, audience 
members might intervene to stop the sorry spectacle.  Even though this is dismissed, and the 
second, glamorous account presented as true, the priority given to the first version, the 
recurring insistence that the second version is true, and the fact that the horse is shivering 
undermine and ironise the credibility of that claim. 
The suggestion is that the second version is the one spectators want or care to see and 
therefore accept as reality.  They do not intervene and are, moreover, moved to tears at the 
end of the show as if in a “ponderous dream”; they cry “without knowing,” an ambiguous 
statement that undercuts their unquestioned acceptance of the glitzy show they are presented 
with (Kafka, “Auf der Galerie” 61-2, my translation).72  Karl Brinkmann reports, in relation 
to “Auf der Galerie,” that “[t]he opposition of real misery and superficial glamour in the 
circus” was “a subject of avid interest” among expressionist writers (47, my translation).73  
Correspondingly, Woodcock argues that Illywhacker “reveal[s] a hidden history beneath the 
surface „show‟” (71).  This approach is indeed reflected not only in Illywhacker, but also in 
Gould’s Book of Fish.  I propose that in both novels the perception of “real misery,” obscured 
by prevalent, more convenient, desirable or marketable accounts, is facilitated by empathy, 
another anti-Cartesian strategy employed by Carey and Flanagan to dismantle the 
foundational tenets of colonial settlement. 
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Animal Writing: Empathy and the Unsettlement of the Nation 
Flanagan comments on the political and social climate in the past decade up until the very 
recent and momentous “Apology to Australia‟s Indigenous Peoples” issued by Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd on 13 February 2008.  Before then, 
[i]n 1995 the Paul Keating Labor government commissioned an inquiry into 
the forcible removal of Aboriginal children.  But by the time the report was 
tabled in 1997, John Howard‟s Liberal party—widely seen in its early days to 
have had truck with a racist far right—was in government, and empathy for 
the dispossessed was in short supply.”  (Flanagan, “An Invitation”) 
It is in this wider context, which Flanagan describes as being characterised by “jingoistic 
nationalism,” former Prime Minister John Howard‟s refusal “to condone what he referred to 
as „a black armband version‟ of history,” and Howard‟s promotion of “a revisionist school of 
history that claimed the suffering of Aboriginal Australia had been grossly overstated” (“An 
Invitation”), that Gould’s Book of Fish was written. 
Gould’s Book of Fish is a response to this lack of compassion, and highlights the need 
for empathy, especially in the processes and practices involved in the representation of others 
through art or science.  Illywhacker, too, is concerned with empathy as a means to address 
historical and contemporary injustices which mar the foundation of the Australian nation, and 
focuses on seemingly inconspicuous practices and animal products in order to show that not 
only the nation‟s history, but also the fabric of everyday life is pervaded by hidden, 
unacknowledged or deliberately ignored cruelty.  The suffering of others, Carey‟s novel 
suggests, is decidedly understated in a wider social context.  Both authors create an empathic 
awareness in order to dismantle the narratives that conveniently cloud aspects of Australia‟s 
history such as those Prime Minister Rudd has called “uncomfortable things to be brought out 
into the light,” “not pleasant” and “profoundly disturbing” (2).  Empathy, the ability to 
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imagine the position, feelings, thoughts and experience of another, and to accept the other as 
same or similar, is the means by which injustices and pain caused to others can be recognised 
and acknowledged; a capacity that, Flanagan‟s comment suggests, was lacking in a nation for 
which the denial of historical practices and responsibility for contemporary social ills has 
been expedient for so long.
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This may raise the question of why empathy towards nonhuman animals should 
matter in the context of human dispossession and exploitation.  In The Dreaded Comparison: 
Human and Animal Slavery, Marjorie Spiegel makes a compelling case for the parallels 
between racism and speciesism and proposes that “as divergent as the cruelties and the 
supporting systems of oppression may be, there are commonalities between them.  They 
share the same basic essence, they are built around the same basic relationship—that between 
oppressor and oppressed” (28).  She points out that speciesism often forms the basis for 
oppression of human beings and argues that “any oppression helps to support other forms of 
domination” (Spiegel 30).  Both Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish illuminate the fact 
that structures and mechanisms of oppression are the same or similar, regardless of whether 
the victim is human or nonhuman, indigenous or non-indigenous.  In Gould’s Book of Fish, 
this is made transparent especially by the pickled heads of Aborigines and the connection 
between natural history, phrenology, and the convict system, whilst Carey illustrates the link 
particularly strongly in a scene that shows Leah being sexually abused by Mervyn Sullivan, 
who coerces her into having sex in exchange for a job as a dancer in an emu costume (see 
Illywhacker 290-93).  Leah, in addition to being a woman and a Jew, represents several 
instances of subalternity, as her emu costume also signifies indigeneity and animality.  The 
latter is reinforced by the fact that Leah finds herself “spread out across a desk and making 
tiny bird-sounds” during the abuse (Illywhacker 293).  Leah embodies all of these 
marginalised groups, which are exploited by the same oppressor. 
Schwalm  129 
Moreover, the scene is set by Sullivan, “a bully and a bastard” (Illywhacker 293), 
sitting “hunched over a metal wastepaper basket, his left hand on his chest, carefully keeping 
his silk tie from harm whilst he ate a meat pie, the watery contents of which dripped messily 
and landed noisily amongst the crumpled papers in the bin” (290).  Leah is directed to “sit in 
the chair next to the waste-paper basket” (291), which contains the drippings from the meat 
pie.  The gesture signifies not only that Leah is treated as a disposable object, but the waste 
basket is also the final destination of the animal rendered into the meat pie.  Sullivan 
“consumes” both Leah and the animal, illustrating the connection between sexual violence 
and the butchering and consumption of animals as described by Carol Adams.  She writes: 
“„Meat‟ becomes a term to express women‟s oppression, used equally by patriarchy and 
feminists, who say that women are „pieces of meat‟” (Adams 59). 
Adams argues that through this comparison nonhuman animals are rendered “absent 
referents,” their victimhood delegated to the metaphorical realm (57).  She defines the absent 
referent as “that which separates the meat eater from the animal and the animal from the end 
product.  The function of the absent referent is to keep our „meat‟ separated from any idea 
that she or he was once an animal . . . , to keep something from being seen as having been 
someone” (Adams 14, original italics.)  Adams suggests that language obscures the lives and 
deaths of animals by renaming their “fragmented body parts” before they reach the kitchen 
(59).  Thus, “cows become roast beef, steak, hamburger; pigs become pork, bacon, sausage” 
(Adams 59).  She further argues that making use of the “imagery of butchering” to describe 
violence against women, without, however, taking the “literal oppression of animals” into 
account, is to “uphold the patriarchal structure of absent referents, appropriating the 
experience of animals to interpret our own violation” (Adams 57).  In short, “meat” becomes 
a metaphor, a “something,” rather than being perceived as the remains of an animal, a 
“someone.” 
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However, Sullivan consumes the pie as literally as he abuses Leah‟s body; the absent 
referent is not so absent in this scene.  Carey places the focus of the scene in Mervyn 
Sullivan‟s office as much on the meat pie as he does on Leah, as Sullivan “had, always, 
tremendous concentration on anything he took a mind to tackle, and the meat pie did not 
allow anything else” (Illywhacker 291).  In this way, the reader‟s “tremendous concentration” 
is also directed towards the meat pie and the significance of the seemingly incidental detail is 
highlighted, signifying that Sullivan‟s consumption of meat is not as innocent as it may 
appear.  There is, moreover, the suggestion that the reader is complicit in the various forms of 
abuse, as Carey draws attention to the fact that Sullivan‟s sexual exploitation of Leah is a 
show, and the readers are his audience: “Mervyn Sullivan had been a tap-dancer.  He was 
brilliant, alone in a spotlight, which itself suggested there might be an audience for the event . 
. .” (293).  This scene in particular, and the narrative in general, illustrates the everyday 
entanglement of ordinary people within various patterns of exploitation and subjugation of 
those configured as “others.”  Carey indicates that the consumption of animals, an expression, 
supposedly, of Australianness, is closely linked with other forms of oppression.  Illywhacker 
shows that the denial of the historical violent and oppressive practices upon which the nation, 
the nation‟s self-image and the nation‟s economy have been built translate into an everyday 
callousness as part of the animal practices supposedly quintessentially Australian.  Thus, 
callousness is either quietly accepted or barely perceived, or indeed celebrated as an 
Australian attitude as, for instance, in the Meat and Livestock Australia commercials 
featuring Sam Kekovich. 
In response, Gould’s Book of Fish is very explicit in its application of empathy and 
the resulting description of animal victimhood.  Accordingly, Gould relates how, in the 
process of painting fish for classification, “I wanted to tell a story of love as I slowly killed 
those fish, & it didn‟t seem right that I was slowly killing fish in order to tell such a story, & I 
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found myself beginning to talk to the dying fish as their movements grew sluggardly, as their 
brains slowly ceased working from lack of oxygen” (429).  He makes it clear that in order to 
create the legacies of colonial natural historians in the form of paintings and catalogues of 
animals, which give the impression of nature-loving scientists and artists, the animals 
depicted were actually killed.  By way of comparison, Gould relates that he and Jean-Babeuf 
Audubon, a character modelled on the nineteenth-century ornithologist, natural historian, 
wildlife artist and hunter John James Audubon, would “shoot birds & bring them back,” after 
which he would “watch as Audubon wired their bloodied corpses up to form dramatick 
shapes of ascent & descent, stretching wings this way & that, & then sketched & painted 
these bedraggled tormented forms as beautiful birds” (70).  Flanagan highlights the ways in 
which animal histories are distorted and forged through verbal and visual representation.  
Thus, Gould admits that the animals, lifelike in the paintings, were in fact already dead: 
The pictures did not end up the most truthful.  The orange-bellied parrot, a 
small, rather sweet & colourful bird in the flesh, bulked larger on paper than in 
life.  It was unavoidable: half the poor creature‟s head had been blown apart 
by the captain‟s shot & much of its body was matted in dried blood.  I drew on 
experience to fill the hole the captain had made, & the bird took on a regal 
splendour . . . . (97) 
Moreover, such images also do not show the fact that the animals are cooked and eaten after 
Gould has finished with them (see Gould’s Book 96). 
Both Carey and Flanagan acknowledge that Australian histories, whether they pertain 
to nationhood or the related matter of its relationships with animals, are inherently deceptive.  
Gould comments: “Everything that‟s wrong about this country begins in my story: they‟ve all 
been making the place up, . . . because anything is easier than remembering” (Gould’s Book 
of Fish 443).  Histories are invented and distorted because they serve particular interests, such 
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as commercial and political interests, as well as the self-interests of individual consumers, as 
a remark by Herbert Badgery illustrates: 
I took the lies and held them gratefully.  I wrapped them round me and felt the 
soft comfort a child feels inside a woollen rug.  And this, of course, is what 
anyone means when they say a lie is creditable; they do not mean that it is a 
perfect piece of engineering, but that it is comfortable. . . . In all these cases, of 
course, there is a part of us that knows the thing is not true, and we hold it 
closer to ourselves because of it, refusing to hold it out at arm‟s length or 
examine it against the light (Illywhacker 191). 
Empathic awareness is precisely the process of “holding out” every day items, circumstances, 
and representations of others, historical or otherwise, and “examining them against the light,” 
whilst imagining the experience of those others and how they may be affected.  Illywhacker 
and Gould’s Book of Fish encourage, in a climate of denial, to do what Rudd has finally 
asked non-Aboriginal Australians to do in relation to the Stolen Generation:  “I ask those 
non-Indigenous Australians listening today who may not fully understand why what we are 
doing is so important to imagine for a moment that this had happened to you. I say to 
honourable members here present: imagine if this had happened to us” (Rudd 3).  Flanagan 
and Carey implicitly ask their readers to make reading—whether it is reading fiction or the 
interactions of daily life—an act of empathy: a strategy, I propose, that is also usefully 
employed as a tool for literary criticism, as it illuminates cultural blind spots and the 
workings of “mythical speech.” 
Barthes argues that “[m]ythical speech is made of a material which has already been 
worked on so as to make it suitable for communication: it is because all the materials of myth 
(whether pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason 
about them while discounting their substance” (119, original italics).  In this context, Carey 
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draws attention to the fact that all of his animals are “paper animals,” created through writing 
and storytelling.  References to newspapers, for example, which “pass across the sky like 
migrating birds” (Illywhacker 504) or which flap their “pages in the wind, fluttering like a 
captive dove or fortune-telling chook” (332), or to a “a cockatoo whose tail feathers 
conveniently echo the color of the telegram in Leah‟s hand, a pretty coincidence not noted by 
the idle clergyman who stops to stare” (322) are self-referential comments that question the 
substance of such verbal creations.  In the “idle clergyman‟s” case, moreover, Carey 
comments on the ability of observers to recognise that substance or rather, the apparent 
absence of it. 
Accordingly, one of the questions posed by the connection between animals, writing 
and paper(s) throughout Illywhacker is the question of what real animals have to do with such 
representations.
75
  Carey draws attention to the fact that language about animals and using 
animal imagery may have little to do with the actual animals themselves.  Jack illustrates this 
by finding it difficult to reconcile expressions such as “kangaroos in [the] top paddock” or 
“galah” as synonyms for stupidity with the animals in question (Illywhacker 48).  He finds 
that such expressions have “no sympathy in them” and are “not fair or sensible,” because “the 
galah is not a stupid bird” (48).  He implies, moreover, that this lack of sympathy may be an 
Australian trait: “„I don‟t think,‟ Jack said, „that we have taken the same trouble with our 
expressions that the English have‟” (48).  Elsewhere, he remarks: “I don‟t know anything 
about analogies, . . . but by Jove I know about animals” (143). 
The connection or otherwise between symbolism and nonhuman animals as referent is 
also addressed by a sceptical Herbert, who visits a psychiatrist: “I told him something (but by 
no means all) about the snakes.  By God, you should have heard him.  Snakes and aeroplanes, 
he says, are not snakes and aeroplanes at all, but symbols.  Well, it‟s entertaining anyway and 
I would not have missed it for worlds” (156).  This is both a hint that not all animals in the 
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narrative are necessarily symbols, and a self-referential recognition that, whether 
representations of animals have a symbolic use or not, their function within a novel such as 
Illywhacker is, in the first instance at least, to entertain.  Carey further indicates that 
representations of animals are often motivated by commercial concerns.  This kind of 
discourse is illustrated by advice Les Chaffey gives to Charles about how to explain his idea 
for a pet shop to the banks.  He says: 
You are doing the right thing, Chas, to have a pet shop.  By that I mean—you 
are handling a product that already exists.  . . . So what you need, when you 
approach them, is something they can understand without thinking.  You 
won‟t have to make them imagine a pet shop, because they‟ll have already 
seen one.  You won‟t have to give them drawings of cockatoos or prove to 
them that a cockatoo can actually fly and talk and that, if it could, people 
would want to pay money for the privilege of owning one.  The cockatoo 
already exists.  (452).  
The Myth here is that cockatoos “already exist” as a “product”: they are meant to be pets “by 
nature.” 
However, Barthes comments that the “substance [of Myth] is not unimportant” (119).  
The “substance” here consists of real animals who live their lives regardless of how we 
define them, or how we position ourselves in relation to them, but who are affected by the 
way we treat them as a result of our definitions.  This is further illustrated by the Best Pet 
Shop in the World, which is referred to as “poetry,” with a cashier sitting “in the middle of 
the floor” whilst being “deep in a book” (Illywhacker 507).  Carey shows that commercial 
concerns are central to this “archi/textual edifice,” which represents the foundational 
narratives upon which the nation is built, and that the interests which motivate mythical 
speech are generally detached from or the complete opposite of the interests of the animals 
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portrayed in such narratives.  Leah points this out when she confronts Hissao and demands 
“that he admit the companies he worked for . . . would almost certainly have values that were 
against the interests not only of fish and birds, but also of marsupials and mammals, human 
beings included” (620). 
Mythical speech thus transforms animals into replaceable and disposable 
commodities, as in Nathan Schick‟s scheme to sell talking cockatoos, whereby “once the 
cockatoo had been in the newsreels and in the papers it would be worth a lot of money. . . . 
What he knew was that one cockatoo looked exactly like another, and that he could produce 
fifty MacArthur‟s cockatoos, or even a hundred, and sell each one as the original.  It was a 
good scheme, as smooth and flawless as an egg” (Illywhacker 511).  Writing, in Illywhacker, 
facilitates these capitalist transactions, whereby animals themselves become a kind of 
tradable currency.
76
  Mythical speech, moreover, is designed to hide and protect the interests 
that drive it, as Carey‟s connection between animals and newspapers shows.  The fact that 
Leah‟s and Rosa‟s prawns, who, it is made clear, end up crushed and dismembered, are 
wrapped in newspaper symbolises the fact that language packages, obscures and legitimates 
the substance of Myth; that is, those aspects of consumption people might find disturbing if 
they stopped to think about it, as Rosa does (see 266).  This is also illustrated in the encounter 
between Sullivan and Leah, when Sullivan is depicted as “complet[ing] his meat pie and 
carefully wip[ing] his fingers with the newspaper cuttings” (291).  It is the newspapers, so 
this symbolic act indicates, that absolve Sullivan of any wrongdoing. 
Illywhacker, however, reintroduces this substance, the lives and interests of real 
animals, whose bodies are processed into actual or conceptual animal products—that is, meat 
and novels, for example—and rendered marginal in our awareness or discounted through 
relative dismissal.  Carey addresses this obscurity and dismantles mythical speech by 
highlighting seemingly inconspicuous animal products.  By repeatedly drawing attention to 
Schwalm  136 
such items and indicating a connection with animal suffering, Carey‟s narrative raises an 
empathic awareness that leaves readers, at the very least, with the feeling that something 
about the ordinary consumption of animal products is amiss.  Accordingly, the inhabitants of 
the Best Pet Shop in the World, the representatives of the Australian nation, “discussed the 
quality of the harbour prawns, got drunk, crunched the prawns‟ heads, imagining themselves 
free and happy,” a behaviour that Leah considers “disgusting” (Illywhacker 615).  Similarly, 
“the whale-fat flavour” of Emma‟s lipstick appears to spoil the taste of a commodity 
associated with luxury and beauty (597), and Sullivan‟s silk tie reappears, as Leah, about to 
be sexually abused, comes “level with his splendid tie.  It was a big tie, and tied into a 
luxurious fat knot” (293). 
Leah is literally and metaphorically on the same level as the animal product; her fate 
is thus implicitly connected with that of the silk worms who die in the making of the material.  
Spiegel cautions that the comparison between “the suffering of animals” and that of “any 
other oppressed group” is “offensive only to the speciesist,” since “[t]o deny our similarities 
to animals is to deny and undermine our own power.  It is to continue actively struggling to 
prove to our masters, past or present, that we are similar to those who have abused us, rather 
than to our fellow victims, those whom our masters have also victimized” (30, italics 
omitted).  However, Leah wears silk herself in the form of a dress later on.  Given that silk 
has rarely been in the limelight for cruelty to animals, the gesture illustrates perhaps not so 
much the pervasiveness of speciesism and dismissal of the suffering of animals even by those 
who are equally or similarly victimised, but the rather dim awareness of consumers that 
animals are even involved in the process. 
Consequently, Carey spotlights the victimhood of the animals involved.  Thus, when 
Wysbraum points out the value and quality of silk to Leah, he inadvertently also refers to the 
animals who die because of it: “Silk,‟ he said, as if it was somehow her fault.  „Very nice.‟  
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„Silk, from silkworms,‟ he said, almost angrily, nodding his big head and making funny 
blinking signals with his eyes” (Illywhacker 369).  Although Carey does not overtly state the 
fact that silk worms are boiled alive in order to obtain the silk thread from their cocoons, 
Wysbraum‟s “signalling” behaviour—even though supposedly motivated by unrelated 
matters—leaves readers with the uncanny feeling that somehow there is something wrong 
with silk. 
Details such as these ground the novel in realism.  Carey explains, “I suppose I do 
have a passion that if I am going to have something extraordinary happen, I want it to be real.  
I want the reader to believe that the chairs in the room are solid.  If a ghost comes into the 
room, then you believe it because everything else is so real” (qtd. in Willbanks 57).  
However, not only do realistic details make the extraordinary real, but here they unsettle 
illusory histories and Myths; in this case, they highlight the absence or repression of animal 
histories in the awareness of consumers.  In this regard, the chairs in Jack McGrath‟s house 
are significant.  As Herbert says, “[t]he other remarkable thing about the house was chairs. . . 
. They were all chairs to him [Herbert], some old, some new, some tatty, some gilt, some 
comfortable, some overstuffed, some bursting with horsehair which would prickle the back of 
your legs and make you itch” (Illywhacker 28-9).  Later on, these chairs are occupied by “an 
odd collection of characters . . . from the racetrack,” who are “[s]harp-looking punters and 
toffee-nosed horse owners all . . . as different from each other as the chairs they sat on” (42).  
Yet, as the reader already knows, at least some of these chairs will make those horse owners 
and punters very uncomfortable, a prickly reminder for those responsible that chairs are 
where horses, no longer fit for racing and no longer celebrated for their wins, may end up, a 
known but usually ignored and unspoken detail. 
In this manner, Carey does not allow the reader to pass over and dismiss any animal 
victim out of hand.  Instead, he reminds us that there is an issue to be addressed, as in the 
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case of a “ewe caught in O‟Hagan‟s muddy dam a quarter of a mile away” from Phoebe, who 
overhears her becoming “silent” (16).  We, the readers, put the silent ewe out of our minds 
just as Phoebe does; this sheep is only a minor detail.  However, several pages later, “[t]he 
ewe resume[s] its bleating” to remind us of her suffering (20).  The question that arises is 
why, it appears, none of the characters have enough sympathy for the ewe to rescue her from 
her predicament, yet the answer has already been given earlier: sheep, it is made clear, are a 
part of the landscape because they are meant to “make a quid” (14).  As such, they are as 
replaceable as the human and nonhuman inmates of the Best Pet Shop in the World, for 
example (see 635).  Thus, Carey alerts readers that others, in this particular case sheep, pay 
the price for Australia‟s prosperity created by pastoral settlement and wool. 
Carey plays with the fact that what is usually absent are not so much the animals 
themselves, but the inclination of consumers to think about such details.  In other words, 
neither the animal body nor the knowledge of that animal body is actually absent; people 
know to a greater or lesser degree that animals are involved (with the exception of children 
who have not yet been told).  What is absent is an empathic awareness, the ability to 
acknowledge the lives and life experiences of nonhuman animals, and discern them and their 
suffering within the animal product, so to speak.  Empathic awareness opens up questions 
beyond the interests of consumption and does not easily allow relative dismissal.  It prompts 
consumers—and readers—to look behind the given and question the history of a particular 
product, whether it is the history of a race horse no longer fit for the track, or that of a battery 
hen living inside a cage with a floor space no larger than an A4 piece of paper.  It is indeed to 
recognise the “someone” rather than the “something” behind the product. 
Huggan observes a certain “ethical imperative” within Carey‟s work, revealed “in the 
fictions‟ constant moral promptings,” which include “their narrators‟ persistent hectoring of 
the morally complacent reader; and, not least, their exposition of unimaginable acts of 
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cruelty, of behaviour so beyond the pale that it seems to merit the label monstrous” (Carey 
77).  Many of Carey‟s “promptings” regarding animal suffering in Illywhacker are subtle, yet 
persistent.  However, in addition, he presents a rather graphic “scene of execution,” whereby 
“a headless Rhode Island Red spurted its last spasms of bright red blood beneath the picnic 
sky and then fell, drunkenly, and lay twitching in the dust” (Illywhacker   283).  Responsible 
for the scene is Teddy, a “nice bloke,” who passes a bowl of eggs, “[n]ice fresh cackleberries 
for your mum and dad,” to Izzie and then “dunk[s] the headless chook into the cauldron and 
the rank smell of its steaming feathers fill[s] Leah‟s nostrils” (283).  Leah, who had been 
looking forward to meeting Izzie Kaletsky‟s “famous chooks” (282), reacts to the slaughter 
with “confusion” (283), and her contemplation of evicting Teddy illustrates John Berger‟s 
argument that “a dead animal in the cities is first thought of as an object of disgust” (“Animal 
World” 1042). 
Her confusion and disgust over the slaughter arises from the supposed 
inappropriateness of the Kaletskys‟ suburban back garden as the “site of harm,” as Elder, 
Wolch and Emel call it (197).  As Armstrong writes, “the development of an urban-centered 
commodity capitalism has demanded that images of animal suffering be removed from public 
visibility” (“Farming Images” 107).  Moreover, Teddy‟s method of slaughter represents a 
pre-industrial relationship between peasants and animals, described by Berger as a 
“familiarity with animals,” which he suggests is more grounded and authentic than 
contemporary industrialised animal processing (“Animal World” 1042; see also “Animals as 
Metaphor” 504).  Teddy‟s friendly gesture amidst the gory scene invokes and mirrors the 
kind of nostalgic rural charm represented by Phoebe‟s parents Jack and Molly, who are 
portrayed positively as “friendly and neighbourly” people who “offe[r] hatfuls of hens‟ eggs 
across the fence,” and who “[do] not understand Geelong society” (10). 
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However, in contrast to the figure of a rural peasant or someone like Jack, who, as a 
former bullock driver, is iconically tied to the Australian pastoral landscape, the goriness of 
the scene surrounding Teddy undermines “the romantic idyll of agrarian and pastoralist 
communion with nature” (Armstrong, “Farming Images” 117), which, Armstrong writes, is a 
common advertising strategy for animal products ( “Farming Images” 117-18).  The reader is 
“lured . . . into moral condemnation,” to use Huggan‟s expression (Carey 77), although the 
“picnic sky,” which may invoke the common picnic fare of boiled eggs and chicken 
sandwiches, suggests the irony of the situation: most Western readers will themselves be 
consumers of chickens and eggs; moral condemnation of slaughter is thus at odds with the 
ordinary, everyday behaviour of most Westerners.  After all, animals are victims regardless of 
the “site of harm.”  Moreover, while the backyard scenario may be shocking for Leah and 
readers alike, it would be somewhat less traumatic for the chickens than any industrialised 
method that keeps them out of sight.  At least until death, they can take “possession [of the 
Kaletskys‟ property] like a conquering army. . . . The chooks scratched and pecked at the 
remains of the front lawn” (Illywhacker 282).  In other words, they are able to display natural 
behaviour and their deaths under Teddy‟s axe are relatively sudden, unlike the experience of 
battery hens and so-called “broiler chickens” (see Armstrong, “Farming Images” 121-26). 
In order to create an empathic vision or awareness, Carey employs a strategy 
described by Armstrong in "Farming Images" as one used by animal advocates: “Most 
importantly, they must attempt the return to visibility of that most easily obscured and 
unpalatable of knowledges—that of history” (124), whereby “they seek to bring into view the 
industrial, genetic and biological histories by which a particular breed of living creature has 
been constructed for human consumption and profit.  They do so with the aim of restoring to 
visibility not only actual animals, but also history itself,” such as the “life history of the 
individual animal, prior to its conversion into packets of chilled meat” (125).  Accordingly, 
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Carey makes some animal histories visible, including that of animals within the legal and 
illegal pet trade.  At the same time, he also highlights the absence of many other histories and 
leaves it up to the reader to fill the gaps. 
The recognition of animal suffering in Illywhacker, as well as Gould’s Book of Fish, 
is thus not only important in raising awareness, by extension, of human suffering.  Spiegel 
warns against prioritising victims, which, she writes, does “tragically little to upset the very 
foundations of cruelty” (30).  Magical realism addresses these “very foundations of cruelty,” 
as it decentres the dominant position of “masters,” to borrow Spiegel‟s words (30), and 
balances this out with those who are marginalised.  The absent referent is thus presented once 
again in magical realism through polyphony and the carnivalesque dissolution of Cartesian 
hierarchies characteristic of the mode. 
Moreover, this destabilising of species hierarchies converges with Darwinian theory, 
which, as Spiegel points out, stresses kinship of different species—including Homo 
sapiens—through common ancestors.  Accordingly, Darwin suggested that “we may all be 
netted together” (qtd. in Spiegel 20).  Spiegel notes that Darwin‟s evolutionary theory has 
been, and still is, popularly seen as a ranking of a “„worst-to-best‟ ascension list,” which, she 
writes, is a “chronic misinterpretation and misapplication of Darwin‟s evolutionary theory, 
falsely concluding that humans are evolution‟s „finished product‟” (20).  Magical realism 
undermines such popular and anthropocentric misconceptions, dismantles hierarchical 
orderings and power structures and, instead, reflects the idea of a web of complex 
relationships and interactions between human and nonhuman animals—ecologically, 
genetically and socially.  Therefore, and within the circensian dynamics that counter the 
prioritising of one species over another, magical realism also precludes a purely symbolic 
reading of animal suffering for the pain of human beings who are “treated like animals.”  
Such a representation would dismiss the substance of the animals‟ experience in the narrative 
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and accept the basic premise that it is defendable to treat animals “like animals” (cf. Spiegel 
25; Tiffin, “Unjust Relations” 32-33).  The pain of animals, human or nonhuman, matters in 
magical realist fiction such as Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish. 
These novels hereby follow a literary tradition described by Armstrong.  He identifies 
sympathy in connection with late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century literary 
production as a quality that challenges “modernity‟s valorization of dispassionate 
rationalism,” whereby “the recognition of animal suffering, like instances of animal agency 
or ferity, provided a means to disrupt the instrumentalist paradigm that united Cartesian 
philosophy, new scientific practice, capitalist economics, and colonial dominion over 
populations and terrains” (What Animals Mean 38).  Empathy, closely associated with 
sympathy or compassion, is indeed an anti-Cartesian strategy in Gould’s Book of Fish and 
Illywhacker, and it fulfils precisely the functions outlined by Armstrong.  It disrupts Myths of 
naturalised, and therefore, by implication, supposedly harmless or innocent settlement, which 
are followed and replaced by contemporary Myths of equally naturalised and harmless, or 
innocent, consumption.  Animals are victims in a chain of exploitative practices.  From 
settlement and pastoral farming to animal industries such as the battery egg production 
explicitly emphasised by Herbert, cruelty has systematically and habitually been hidden away 
in the interests of the powerful.  Animal victims are the end product, so to speak, of a history 
marked by oppressive human-animal and subject-object relationships that are perpetuated in 
the patterns of everyday life.  Empathy in Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish counteracts 
and exposes the callousness inherent in both. 
Correspondingly, the “Australian” lack of sympathy towards animals is contrasted 
with the figure of Phoebe‟s father Jack, a former bullock driver, who represents a nostalgic 
version of an authentic, genuine Australian.  His past profession is another example of the 
integration of cattle and the people who work directly with, and use, these animals into a 
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national Myth of down-to-Earth, pragmatic people in tune with, and part of, the environment.  
Accordingly, Jack is presented as an archetypal Australian, suited especially well to the dry 
and dusty landscape, as he “was built like a bullock driver, was the son of a bullock driver, 
and there was still . . . plenty of bullock driver left in his walk . . . , a man made to endure the 
dusty day and the solitary night, a man whose natural style would be reserved, who would be 
shy with men and women alike” (Illywhacker 49).  Carey evokes an image of genuine, 
unpretentious Australians who, like Jack on his bullock drives, drink “champagne from metal 
pannikins and call it „Gentlemen‟s grog‟” (Illywhacker 12), and who are therefore by their 
very nature part of a genuinely Australian landscape. 
Jack is presented as a natural bullock driver with a “bullock driver‟s body” 
(Illywhacker 83).  He can be seen as having claimed the land as his own step by step, by 
“cover[ing] twenty thousand dusty miles beside his bullock teams,” and by sleeping in touch 
with the land, so to speak, on the ground and under the stars (12).  This image of genuine 
Australianness is consolidated through Jack‟s relationship with “each individual” bullock, 
whom he knows “like you might know a man or woman, each one with their strengths, their 
weaknesses, their little quirks” (24).  Jack‟s close relationship with the bullocks, as well as 
the practice of bullock driving in general, evokes a past in which supposedly authentic 
Australians were directly connected with “real,” “raw” nature.  Jack is thus tied closely into a 
Myth which obscures the fact that the bullocks were as foreign to the land as the people who 
supposedly share a bond with them.  This, and his appearance as a sympathetic character, 
provides a point of identification for settler Australian society. 
However, Carey makes is clear that Jack is an exception, at least as far as his 
treatment of animals is concerned.  His “talent” for bullock driving lies in “a sympathy with 
the beasts that got them moving when other drivers whipped and swore and tangled 
themselves in hot confusion,” and he “soon became famous for two unlikely qualities: he 
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used none of the profanities for which bullock drivers were renowned, and he was a 
teetotaller” (Illywhacker 84).  He stands out for his ability to “handle animals with great 
feeling and sensitivity” (13), telling Herbert: “If there is one thing I know about . . . it‟s 
animals” (143).  Jack is a proponent of kindness, who explains to Herbert that “[t]here isn‟t a 
creature alive who won‟t respond to kindness” (143).  Accordingly, he cares not only about 
bullocks or other mammals, but kicks a stranded jellyfish “back into the water” (51), and he 
liberates the snake Herbert kept in a Hessian bag (see 143).
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Seemingly in contrast to Jack is Herbert, the self-professed embodiment of an 
Australian.  He disillusions Jack, who tells him: 
“You don‟t know anything about animals . . . . You‟re not a kind man, 
Badgery, and it hurts me to say it.” . . . He sat with his heavy smudged tumbler 
before him and looked at this stranger he had invited into his house and 
wondered how any man alive could not believe in kindness.  “It‟s a great 
disappointment,” he said.  I always believed he was referring to the aeroplane.  
(Illywhacker 143) 
Indeed, when Herbert asserts at the end of the narrative that “I am, at last, the creature I have 
so long wished to become—a kind man” (637), the statement is deeply suspect.  Herbert is an 
“opportunist” (153); his kindness is a means to an end, such as his “kindness” in prison, 
which he only took up, “originally, to stop myself being bullied by my fellow prisoners” 
(479).  Moreover, his kindness is relative and directly in relation to relative dismissal.  In 
order to stop Molly from “go[ing] mad with grief,” as he says, he loans his car to Molly‟s 
doctor, a bad driver, and judges later: “I felt myself, not incorrectly, a kind man. . . . It had 
been worth climbing gates, breaking windows and running over both dog and cockerel.  I 
would have run my wheels over cats and goldfish to achieve this end . . .” (153).  Herbert‟s 
relative kindness, like relative dismissal, is thus either motivated by self-interest or, as in 
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relation to Molly, by the interests of another human being at any cost to animals.  He thus 
represents a different model of Australianness to Jack, whose kindness appears to include all 
creatures. 
However, Carey offers no simplistic formula of kindness to animals equalling 
kindness to humans or vice versa, as Jack is a racist, whilst Herbert is not (see Illywhacker 
50-51).  Both characters complement each other; each lacks the other‟s positive qualities, and 
each perpetuates a different version of oppressive discrimination.  Thus, Carey shows that 
kindness is a behaviour which involves choices, whereby kindness in one sphere of life is not 
an absolute which redeems all decisions, beliefs and behaviours in others, nor is kindness in 
one instance necessarily negated or devalued by the lack of it in another.  At the same time, 
though, Carey demonstrates that being kind is not a question of having to choose between 
kindness to animals and kindness to humans, for example.  Rosa Kaletsky illustrates that 
empathic awareness, looking with empathy, reveals the areas where kindness may be lacking 
and offers, in this way, the possibility of extending acts of kindness further. 
Thus, at least momentarily, she bridges the gap of kindness revealed by the 
juxtaposition between Jack and Herbert.  Having just agreed with Leah that kindness “is 
important,” and acted upon that sentiment by giving money to a young beggar with 
“downcast” eyes and “cardboard tied to the bottom of his shoes,” she rethinks her 
relationship to the prawns she and Leah have just eaten: “„I am suddenly struck,‟ Rosa said, 
her smile quite collapsed, „by how evil we are.‟  She looked down at the empty prawn shells, 
the broken heads, the long thin feelers and something—perhaps it was only the flies crawling 
on them—made her shudder” (269).  The juxtaposition of the beggar and the prawns suggests 
that Rosa, a communist, realises at this moment that both the young man and the prawns are 
victims of the same capitalist system, where both people and animals are disposable and 
replaceable.  Rosa feels empathy towards humans and nonhuman animals alike, because, at 
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this instance at least, she feels it unconditionally, that is, without regard for Cartesian 
humanist species boundaries.  Therefore, regardless of its complications, kindness towards 
others, human or nonhuman, is ultimately “the point,” which runs counter to common 
practices and beliefs, in Illywhacker.  As Jack says: “If kindness is not the point, what point is 
there?” (143) 
Gould’s Book of Fish, in turn, is concerned with a concept closely related to kindness, 
sympathy and empathy: love.  Flanagan comments that “[a]ll of my books have been about 
love” (“Flanagan Novel Condemns Modern Australia”).  Accordingly, Gould looks with 
sympathy at a “poor leatherjacket” he killed to paint and asks himself about the 
desensitisation of a society that treats fish as commodified objects (Gould’s Book 226).  He 
wonders 
whether, as each fish died, the world was reduced in the amount of love that 
you might know for such a creature.  Whether there was that much less 
wonder & beauty left to go around as each fish was hauled up in the net.  And 
if we kept on taking & plundering & killing, if the world kept on becoming 
ever more impoverished of love & wonder & beauty in consequence, what, in 
the end, would be left?  (226-27) 
Flanagan highlights the value of extending emotions to include nonhuman animals, even 
those as generally unloved and regarded as devoid of feelings as fish.
78
  A fish, Gould 
recognises, has not only “its own truth,” but also his or her own joy (227).  Empathy—more 
than sympathy or compassion which tend to focus on the pain of others—is also the capacity 
to recognise a joie de vivre in others, including animals, a sentiment entirely consistent with 
the carnivalesque spirit of the mode.  Magical realism, like carnival, is a celebration of life in 
all its caprice and disorder, after all. 
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Accordingly, like sympathy for nonhuman animals, Gould‟s love for fish is an 
inherently counter-Cartesian force that undermines scientific rationality and ordering, human-
animal boundaries, colonial power structures and oppressive practices and consumer 
capitalism.  Gould calls Mr Lempriere‟s scientific method of “smash[ing] the mystery of the 
world up into enough fragments & ship[ping] them all back to Mr Wheeler to catalogue,” so 
that “all would be knowable . . . solvable & improvable, all matters of good & evil explicable 
& remediable on some Linnaean ladder of creation,” a “gargantuan act of vandalism” (144).  
In this way, Flanagan criticises dispassionate scientific methods directly and, moreover, 
connects its lack of love and emotion with a capitalist exploitation of nature.  Thus, Gould 
imagines “a world of the future as a barren sameness in which everyone had gorged so much 
fish that no more remained, & where Science knew absolutely every species & phylum & 
genus, but no-one knew love because it had disappeared along with the fish” (227).  Gould‟s 
all-encompassing love is the expression of an environmentalist sentiment here, which runs 
counter to the consumer capitalist exploitation of nature, such as the overfishing of oceans, 
and the consumerist patterns that perpetuate such practices.  Love and empathy are indeed 
subversive forces which erode the power of industries that exploit the environment, another 
important context for the publication of Gould’s Book of Fish. 
In this regard, Flanagan has been a vocal opponent of Tasmania‟s logging industry for 
a number of years.
79
  In “Out of Control: The Tragedy of Tasmania‟s Forests,” Flanagan 
describes a climate of corrupt company practices; the intertwinement of the dominant 
corporation in the Tasmanian woodchipping business, Gunns Ltd., with local politicians; and 
its influence on the major political parties and senior politicians on a national level, including 
then “prime minister John Howard, and the Opposition leader, Kevin Rudd,” who, Flanagan 
writes, endorse this industry nationally.  Flanagan recounts a particularly callous “senior ALP 
politician,” whose aggressive and crude behaviour, shown not least by swearing of the worst 
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kind in the presence of Flanagan‟s twelve-year-old daughter, is telling in regard to displaying 
a decided lack of empathy.  In this insensitive climate, any kind of opposition to logging is 
configured by those in power as practically un-Tasmanian, it appears, despite the fact that 
“[t]he great majority of Tasmanians appear to be overwhelmingly opposed to old-growth 
logging.”  However, as Flanagan points out, logging continues, although “only by the 
constant crushing of opposing points of view, and the attempted silencing and smearing of 
those who put them.” 
Flanagan highlights the effects of logging on humans and animals alike, which 
include “slaughter” that “sees not only possums, wallabies and kangaroos die slowly, in 
agony, but other species—including wombats, bettongs and potoroos—killed in large 
numbers, despite being officially protected species”; the poisoning of wells in the local 
community; and the endangering of the giant freshwater crayfish, a species that characterises 
one of the chapters in Gould’s Book of Fish (“Out of Control”; see Gould’s Book 367-94).  
To name these effects openly and publicly is to counter power and corruption with empathy 
for all species in a climate of fear that “stifles dissent, avoids truth” (Flanagan, “Out of 
Control”).  Showing such empathy thus becomes an act of courage, as well as an activist 
strategy, similar to that used by animal advocates and described by Armstrong.  Accordingly, 
employing an empathic way of looking is to make the history of “a ream of copying paper” 
visible (Flanagan, “Out of Control”), and to lay open the power structures and corrupt 
practices that facilitate the slow deaths of animals and the destruction of ancient trees. 
Gould’s Book of Fish counters this context of environmental destruction by offering a 
vision that recognises humanity as but one species amongst many.  As Gould remarks, “the 
truth is that there is something irretrievably fishy about us all” (Gould’s Book 432).  In turn, 
Illywhacker‟s species diversity, the crossing and blurring of human-animal boundaries, and 
references to environmental degradation, suggest similar environmentalist sentiments, and it, 
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too, presents Homo sapiens as one of many animal species “netted together.”  This 
connection between the species forms the basis of Carey‟s and Flanagan‟s respective novels, 
designed to undermine the nation‟s foundational narratives based on animal economies.  
Therefore, in order to offer a different version of Australianness, both authors submit a 
different kind of “animal product.” 
Accordingly, whilst Illywhacker is produced by a human animal storyteller who is 
caged as a menagerie exhibit and who, by adorning his narrative with blue items, mirrors “the 
famous regent bower-bird” imprisoned in the Best Pet Shop in the World (Illywhacker 521), 
Gould‟s “Book of Fish” is identified as an animal product on a material level, as Sid Hammet 
finds it in a “galvanised-iron meat safe” (Gould’s Book 12).  Besides oxymoronically being 
the “meat“ of its own story, it contains references to two other such animal products: on the 
one hand, there are the books in Sarah Island‟s Registry “covered in dark Morocco leather,” 
“vellum-bound,” or “clad in abortive, that dainty vellum made from cow foetuses” (Gould’s 
Book 313); details which connect human and nonhuman animal victimhood, and the 
unacknowledged histories of those victims, under the colonial regime.  On the other hand, 
there is the journal of Matt Brady, an escaped convict, which Gould finds while at large from 
the penal colony himself.  Its union of animal products and writing is the manifestation of a 
merger between settler culture and indigenous culture, and between settlers and Australian 
nature. 
Gould thus discovers the journal in a hut described as an animal space, “a giant sea-
eagle‟s nest,” with “[s]kins of wallaby & possum & quoll hung on the walls at unusual 
angles, as if they might momentarily take back their original form as animals & leap down” 
(Gould’s Book 391).  The skins represent a non-European form of writing, as they are painted 
with “charcoal & red ochre,” and show “tigers & devils & kangaroos,” “hunting parties, . . . 
men & women dancing, . . . the moon in its various guises” (391).  The journal itself is made 
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of animal parts, as Gould describes it as “roughly bound with gut sinew, which I recognised 
as having been stretched & softened in the blackfella manner of chewing.  Its cover—wallaby 
hide, like the rest of the book—was stained red with ochre like that which, I realised, 
touching my cheek, still remained on my face from where the black woman had rubbed it on” 
(387).  Unlike Gould‟s watercolours, which emphasise Gould‟s association with the sea, 
kangaroo blood, sinew, wallaby hide and red ochre connect the journal, a European form of 
writing, to the land, and, significantly, Gould (who is also painted with red ochre) finds the 
journal after “swaying falling dreaming embracing the earth” (385). 
Gould, rolling up inside the animal skins, perceives the hut as a protective, womblike 
environment, which is defined by what he first experiences as the “stinking human & animal 
odours” (382).  These become, however, “comforting, halfway between meat cooling & 
coming home” (383).  Although he feels he has “no way of understanding” the stories painted 
on the animal skins wrapped around him as he falls asleep (392), he begins his own 
dreaming: “being drawn out of my nostrils by those dancing animals & then sent hurtling out 
of the hut, I finally felt my soul taking flight” (392).  In this way, Gould experiences a kind of 
homecoming through the discovery that “implicit in a single seahorse was the universe, that 
everyone had the capacity to be someone, something, somebody else, that Numminer were 
Palawa & Palawa Numminer” (393).80  He thus acknowledges the interrelatedness of all 
species, as well as “Twopenny Sal‟s” belief that all human beings are related.  As she 
explains: “Long time before . . . you were us” (378). 
This does not suggest, however, that Gould himself is practically Aboriginal and thus 
a a legitimate occupant of the land.  Instead, like the freshwater crayfish, Gould is “prepared 
to abandon the shell of who & what I was, & metamorphose into something else” (392).  This 
metamorphosis reveals that the connection to the land, as well as that between the two 
cultures, cannot be made on the basis of a common humanity, which would leave European 
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paradigms of self and otherness intact, but on the basis of “something else,” that is, a shared 
animality.  Moreover, in order to approach Matt Brady‟s dream of “building a white man, 
black woman home, the whole something other than either in the merge,” and of “growing 
old together” in the wider sense of a cultural union that may, finally, make Australia home for 
a displaced European like Gould (390) , he needs to acknowledge his own otherness, a 
process made possible by alternative ways of configuring animals.  In a comment that applies 
to magical realism as much as the bestiaries of Pliny, Sid Hammet, reading Pliny‟s Natural 
History, discovers 
in its pages something more than a mythical bestiary of manticores & 
basilisks.  In Pliny‟s observations I discovered that man, far from being central 
in this life, lived in a parlous world beyond his knowledge, . . . a world in 
which man is lost & less but lost & less amidst the marvellous, the 
extraordinary, the gorgeously inexplicable wonder of a universe only limited 
by one‟s own imagining of it.  (151) 
Through the transcendence of the Cartesian subject, “lost” among a community of 
interrelated others, the magical realist narratives of Flanagan and Carey thus open up their 
readers‟ imaginations to encompass other ways of being a nation and a species; “the point,” 
they suggest, is not to dominate and destroy, but to live, to love, and to be kind. 
 
Conclusion 
Both Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish reflect Alice Walker‟s description of the 
“heightened consciousness” that recognises “the pain felt by humans who are abused and the 
pain felt by non-human animals who are abused . . . as the same pain” (14).  By presenting 
readers with details normally overlooked, ignored, or dismissed, Carey and Flanagan shift 
realism‟s focus on rationally observable phenomena to the material, sensate experience of the 
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body, or rather, the experience of a multitude of other bodies, which is accessible to readers 
through an empathic imagination and the recognition of their own human animality and 
otherness.  Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish thus make the suffering bodies at the core 
of foundational practices visible and in this way, reveal obscured, ignored or distorted 
histories and hidden interests, interrelated structures of power and oppression, and the 
everyday complicity of consumers.  By presenting their novels as “animal products” and thus 
situating them firmly within the tradition of national Myths, Carey and Flanagan effectively 
write two quintessentially Australian narratives, whilst unsettling, at the same time, those 
very foundational Myths they relate to, as well as the animal practices that shape the self-
image of settler Australian culture.  Carey and Flanagan thus offer the descendants of 
colonial settlers other, more compassionate ways of being human and of being Australian that 
may, they suggest, productively address the rifts of the past. 
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Chapter Three 
Animal Country: 
Maban Realism in Master of the Ghost Dreaming and The Kadaitcha Sung 
Australian novelist and literary critic Mudrooroo describes a mode of writing related and 
similar to magical realism or sometimes even synonymous with it, which he calls “maban 
reality” (see Indigenous Literature 96, 101).81  This, he writes, is characterised by its contrast 
with what he calls “natural scientific reality” and depicts, instead, “an Australian reality 
which comes from the land and from one of the oldest, continuous cultures in the world” 
(Mudrooroo, Indigenous Literature 91, 105, sic).  Maban reality, or maban realism 
(Mudrooroo uses the terms interchangeably to mean two somewhat different things, as I will 
make clear below), shares basic characteristics with postcolonial magical realism, yet its 
grounding in an embodied relationship with the land, characterised by human-animal 
relationships determined by the Dreaming and traditional subsistence animal practices, 
renders it distinctive and unique to Australia.
82
  The first section of this chapter discusses the 
connection between maban realism, animality and the land, and considers how Mudrooroo‟s 
theory of maban realism and his fiction can be read after revelations about his non-Aboriginal 
genetic background have raised questions about the authenticity of his work. 
Focussing on Mudrooroo‟s Master of the Ghost Dreaming and Sam Watson‟s The 
Kadaitcha Sung: A Seductive Tale of Sorcery, Eroticism and Corruption, the following 
sections of this chapter investigate the significance of human-animal relationships and animal 
practices for the construction of maban realism.  Mudrooroo‟s novel features animals most 
strikingly in the form of Dreaming companions, with whom the inmates of a small island 
mission connect in an attempt at cultural survival in the context of European invasion, as well 
as to achieve spiritual healing for themselves and the so-called ghosts, the white invaders.
83
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The mission is overseen by Fada, an English missionary and amateur anthropologist, his wife 
Mada, homesick and addicted to laudanum, and their inept son Sonny.  The compound 
houses a displaced mob from the mainland, which is lead by Jangamuttuk, the “mapan,” or 
“shaman” (Ghost Dreaming 87). The mob includes Ludjee, Jangamuttuk‟s wife and a kitchen 
help in the missionary‟s house, as well as Wadawaka, an African convict born on a slave 
ship.  Wadawaka is an initiated member of the mob and his Leopard Dreaming therefore 
materialises in Jangamuttuk‟s ceremonies, alongside Jangamuttuk‟s Dreaming companion 
Goanna and Ludjee‟s Dreaming companion Manta Ray.  In Ghost Dreaming and through his 
theory of maban realism, Mudrooroo sets up the discrepancy between indigenous and settler 
animal practices, both spiritual and material, as the defining division between these two 
cultural contexts (see Indigenous Literature 89), and thematises its effect on the spiritual 
health of the mission‟s inhabitants and the island‟s environment. 
This clash of animal practices is developed further in Kadaitcha.  The story is set in 
contemporary Brisbane, and its protagonist, Tommy Gubba, is a Kadaitcha man, a powerful 
“sorcerer” and demi-god (Kadaitcha 47, see also 32), whose task it is to restore the heart of 
the Rainbow Serpent, Biamee, and with it the balance between good and evil to the land.  
Accompanied by Purnung, the Dingo Dreaming, he must hunt down Booka Roth, another 
Kadaitcha, who is confined to Brisbane as punishment for stealing Biamee‟s heart, trying to 
usurp the supreme deity‟s position and leading the “migloo,” the white invaders, in their 
destruction of the land, “Biamee‟s garden” (33-34).  Booka inhabits the body of the white 
captain of the vicious Native Mounted Police (NMP) and has considerable influence amongst 
Brisbane‟s political, legal and social establishment.  In order to prevent his own destruction, 
he tries to hunt Tommy down in turn.  The narrative plays out in a space that is colonised by 
the cattle empire of European settlement, yet defined, at the same time, by the Law of the 
Dreaming.
84
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In both novels, moreover, the incorporation of Aboriginal human-animal relationships 
and animal practices serves to dismantle what Mudrooroo calls the “Master text” (Us Mob 
8).
85
  With this overarching term, Mudrooroo denotes any kind of imperialist narrative or 
writing—such as historiography, anthropological discourse or the realist text—that constructs 
an other from a Eurocentric perspective characterised by the relationship between an all-
knowing, all-seeing subject and a passive object
86
.  This chapter explores how the Cartesian 
humanism inherent in the Master text is undermined by the inextricable connection between 
maban realist representations of animals and the idea of “country,” a term that indicates the 
intertwinement of animal practices, the land and spirituality, as well as the oneness of people 
and animals within an all-encompassing universe governed by the Law.
87
  I discuss how this 
relationship to country and the related indigenous animal practices shape the narrative 
especially in Kadaitcha, and what role they play for recuperating and renewing Aboriginal 
storytelling within the Western genre of the novel. 
Furthermore, Mudrooroo declares that “[b]oth Sam Watson and I agree that 
Indigenous texts should intervene politically and socially in the dominant ideology and that 
texts should not only be political but also enjoyable and entertaining” (Indigenous Literature 
96).  Watson‟s and Mudrooroo‟s representations of animals, such as Dreaming companions, 
and animal practices such as hunting, fishing and meat consumption, signify the intersection 
of leisure and survival, and of politics and entertainment, as different ways of looking at their 
meaning come into play.  The final section of this chapter investigates how Kadaitcha in 
particular implicates the reader in structures of oppression in ways that make an innocent and 
leisurely perusal of the novel (in a deckchair by the barbecue for example) impossible. 
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Strange Beast: Maban Realism as the Expression of a Multicultural Country 
Mudrooroo suggests that Australia has its own, home-grown version of magical realism.  He 
writes that this maban reality, as he calls it, “is sometimes labelled „magic realism‟” 
(Mudrooroo, Indigenous Literature 101).  In fact, Mudrooroo provides not one but two terms 
to describe indigenous Australian “magic realism”: “maban realism” and “maban reality.”  
Whilst the boundaries between maban realism and magical realism may be fluid, 
Mudrooroo‟s concept of maban reality is a specifically Australian phenomenon that denotes 
both a mode of writing and “the living within a maban reality based on the Dreaming” 
(Indigenous Literature 101-2).  According to Mudrooroo, this experience of everyday life has 
been disrupted, displaced, weakened or destroyed in the course of colonisation, which 
banished the “shaman or maban” and replaced “the magic implicit in the world” by a natural 
scientific reality, a dominant, European worldview “formed from eighteenth, nineteenth and 
early twentieth century scientific thought” (Indigenous Literature 90). 
However, such life experiences that are not explained by European science still play 
an important role, not least for Watson, who says he is following his “dreaming path that was 
mapped out . . . at the point of creation, and has been prepared for me by every single 
generation since then” (Davies and Watson 190).  He describes, moreover, the experience of 
“the fourth dimension of aboriginal people—the hidden spiritual dimension we take for 
granted” (qtd. in Dean).88  Watson gives as an example ways of communicating between 
Aboriginal people that are outside Western scientific conceptualisations.  He says: “You can 
have two people who need to meet.  They may be separated by a continent and regardless of 
what events take place, they will come together.  It‟s happened to me on numerous occasions.  
We accept this. . . . Our old people are with us every moment of the day and we accept it” 
(qtd. in Dean, original ellipsis). 
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Correspondingly, Mudrooroo suggests that maban realism is “about describing a 
world which is as existent and as real as that constructed by European thought” (Indigenous 
Literature 98).  He proposes that, by representing maban reality in literature and returning to 
the “great mythic narratives” and “mythic structures” that are the “literary heritage” of 
indigenous Australians, at least some indigenous traditions can be maintained and developed 
in contemporary fiction ( Indigenous Literature 96).  Indeed, Watson comments that “Murri 
people, until quite recently, have never really stopped passing down all the knowledge and 
wisdom that one generation needs to impart to the next one. . . . So, I think what I create in 
my books is just an echo of things stored within my own psyche . . .” (qtd. in Davies and 
Watson 190).  This approach has moved Mudrooroo to remark that Watson‟s novel is “to date 
perhaps . . . the best example of how maban reality can be used to create an original work” 
(Indigenous Literature 97). 
Maban realism thus denotes a mode of writing that incorporates the conflict between 
conventional realism and representations of the mythic structures of the Dreaming.  These 
two systems of representation hold an equal (though not harmonious) balance, equivalent to 
the balance between different systems of representation, such as the “magic” and the “real,” 
in magical realism.  In fact, Mudrooroo explicitly states that his explanation of maban realism 
is derived from “some of the work done on Latin-American magic realism” (Indigenous 
Literature 96).  Clare Archer-Lean, commenting specifically on Mudrooroo‟s and Thomas 
King‟s fiction, suggests that “the way in which transformation of discourse occurs is not 
simply through competition or opposing motif, the interaction is more complex, more 
incorporative” (245, original italics).89  Correspondingly, Mudrooroo echoes Slemon‟s 
analysis of magical realism in his description of the maban realist text: “[T]he reader or 
viewer might see that there is a contestation between two realities—maban and natural—with 
the contest not usually being resolved, or a drifting over from maban reality into a natural 
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scientific reality, which appears to be the only reality that many in the audience can accept” 
(Indigenous Literature 94). 
It should be noted here that Mudrooroo uses the term “maban reality” interchangeably 
for the pervasive and all-encompassing influence of the Dreaming on everyday Aboriginal 
experience, as well as a representation of this influence in literature.  This chapter is 
concerned with the literary representations of maban reality.  To avoid confusion, I will 
employ the term “maban reality” for the system of Aboriginal thought, spirituality and 
experience that is opposed to European scientific thinking, and “maban realism” for the mode 
of writing as a whole henceforth, although Mudrooroo uses this latter term (once only) as an 
equally flexible and fluid definition (see Indigenous Literature 103). 
Mudrooroo suggests that the effect of maban realism is to confront readers with 
“strange beasts of quotations,” created through the textual infusion of maban reality into the 
natural scientific reality of Western literary genres.  He argues that these beasts “do not 
belong to those who read books like this and who often have no entrance into any reality 
pertaining to another people‟s reality.”90  Alluding to natural history, one of the defining 
animal practices of imperial expansion, Mudrooroo links natural scientific discourse, 
conventional realism and Western animal practices as different manifestations of the Master 
text, the dominant speech and “world-shaping” view constructed by the colonisers 
(Indigenous Literature 90). 
He thus contrasts the strange textual beasts of maban realism with “scientific 
discourse,” which, he asserts, 
is static rather than dynamic and allows intrusions from within the scientific 
field, but not from without.  If it does so, there are transmogrifications of the 
beast into startling shapes of such repelling attractiveness that there are cries 
for an ethnic cleansing that will remove once and for all such non-scientific 
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intrusions.  The beast must become tamed, static and able to be petted, 
examined and made known.  It cannot be strange, it must be scientifically 
acceptable, and indeed all that that strangeness deserves is a bullet between the 
eyes, or rather a scientific research grant to imprison it within the folds of 
properly constituted discourse and theories.  (Mudrooroo, Indigenous 
Literature 90) 
As in Flanagan‟s and Carey‟s magical realist fiction, scientific discourse is represented here 
as an attempt to capture the (animal or animalised) other both physically and conceptually.  
Mudrooroo‟s evoking of an elusive animality in relation to rigid, natural historical 
categorisations, however, suggests that the mode itself is resistant to definite conceptual 
capture within Western genre classifications.  As Mudrooroo remarks, “Surrealism and 
Magic Realism” are the best means “to escape the awfulness of the realist text” (qtd. in 
Little).  In this context, his description of maban realism in terms of animality and natural 
history implies, more specifically, that maban realism is in itself a “strange beast”; that is, an 
animal—or feral—mode of writing which undermines the Cartesian humanist structures 
imposed by colonial settlement. 
This ferality is not only reflective of a resistance to imposed systems of order and 
power, but it is also intimately tied to the Aboriginal concept of “country,” a dynamic 
relationship to the land as a changing, living entity that is expressed through being on the 
land, caring for it and engaging with it through various cultural and everyday practices, 
including their relationships with, and uses of, animals.
91
  Accordingly, Mudrooroo describes 
the link between maban reality and the land as an essential feature of maban realism: “Maban 
reality might be characterised by a firm grounding in the reality of the earth or country, 
together with an acceptance of the supernatural as part of everyday reality” ( Indigenous 
Literature 97).  It is through this relationship to country that everyday practices are 
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essentially spiritual.  In Kadaitcha, Watson portrays this everyday numinous dimension in 
Tommy‟s hunt for a wallaby, for instance, when Tommy, according to the Law, “offer[s] the 
silent prayer to Biamee.  It was the duty of any hunter who took a life that belonged to the 
deity” (249). 
Adrian Franklin, moreover, argues that country is “[t]he key to understanding 
Aboriginal views of animals” and explains that “it is through their relations to the natural 
world around them and their co-dwelling in that world that specific elements take on 
meaning.  The natural world does not exist as a separable world, beyond and different from 
the human world” (Animal Nation 167, italics omitted).  The idea of country can neither be 
fully captured by Western knowledge or language, nor are the practices related to it 
compatible with Western concepts and uses of nature, land, or landscape.  As Deborah Bird 
Rose points out, “country has its own life, its own imperatives, of which humans are only one 
aspect.  It is not up to humans to take supreme control, or to define the ultimate values of 
country.  Aboriginal relationships to land link people to ecosystems „rather than giving them 
dominion over‟ them” (Nourishing Terrains 10-11). 
This life and agency of the land itself is reflected in Ghost Dreaming, as the “island” 
becomes an embodied, living and personified “Island.”  In contrast to Fada, who, observing 
the landscape from a high vantage-point, sees only “the island,” which, nonetheless, 
resembles an animal of sorts with a “central spine” he perceives as menacing (55), the 
Aboriginal characters engage with “Island,” who feels “his skin [being] tickled by the claws 
of animals” (128) and who is aware of “the presence of humankind on and under his skin” 
(147).  Jangamuttuk, additionally, perceives the geography of the island in terms of the body 
of a snake, which changes colour as it winds from the beach through the forest “and 
continued on as a red serpent with a bloated head which was the wide clearing in which the 
mission had been erected.  There stood . . . a chapel in which Fada entertained them with 
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incomprehensible sermons which hurt his head when he tried to reason them out” (24).  “His 
head” might be Jangamuttuk‟s, the snake‟s, or even Fada‟s here.  All three are thus intimately 
(and humorously) linked.
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The Aboriginal relationship with country as an ever-changing, complex and living 
entity thus resists Western thought and eludes the scientific observation of a Cartesian 
subject.
93
  As Franklin argues: “Unlike the scientist, they [Aboriginal people] do not deal in 
absolute categories, classifications, boundaries pure and impure but in the messiness of life 
itself, in the complex way real life confounds the possibility of such a neat and ordered 
world” (Animal Nation 167).  He refers here also to the incorporative and pragmatic 
relationship of Aboriginal people with introduced species, who are not only tolerated on the 
land but seen as integral to country on the basis of merit, so to speak: “Aboriginal people 
work with a concept of the landscape as it is, as they „find it‟ and as they work with it” 
(Animal Nation 174, original italics).  In contrast to settler Australian ideas about which 
species do or do not belong in the Australian landscape, Franklin explains that Aboriginal 
Australians “are not concerned with what a proper Australia should be, with its identity, 
natural or social, relative to other nations.  This can only be the concern of those in the grip of 
nationalism” (Animal Nation 174, italics omitted).  In contrast to idealised, nationalistic or 
conservationist paradigms, he observes that the Aboriginal “model is more pragmatic.  It is 
based on what does work, not what should be.  It is based on the way things have worked out 
over time . . .” (Franklin, Animal Nation 174-75, original italics). 
This incorporation of others, of strange beasts, so to speak, can also be seen as 
resulting from the Aboriginal concept of country as “synonymous with life,” which “needs no 
justification,” as Rose writes, and which entails “that other living things also want to live, and 
have the right to live their own lives.  It follows that other species, as well as humans, have 
the right to the conditions which enable their lives to continue through time . . .” (Nourishing 
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Terrains 10).  Thus, even an introduced species as reviled in Australian settler culture as the 
feral cat can be integrated into everyday human-animal interactions (both as food and as 
companion animals), as well as into the Aboriginal spiritual framework in the form of the 
Pussycat Dreaming (see Franklin, Animal Nation 168-78).  Mudrooroo reflects this 
incorporativeness by integrating both Wadawaka‟s African Leopard Dreaming and Mada‟s 
European Ghost Dreaming, a “weird bird [Ludjee] had never imagined before” with “[g]reat 
white wings,” into the spiritual realm accessed by Jangamuttuk (Ghost Dreaming 61). 
In this way, he also translates the incorporation of foreign species into an integration 
of foreign cultures in Ghost Dreaming.  However, this, too, is connected to a relationship 
with country, in what Rose describes as the Aboriginal tolerance towards their neighbours, 
where “each country is surrounded by other countries” (Nourishing Terrains 9).  Whilst, as 
she writes, “differences are known, respected and culturally elaborated in many ways,” those 
boundaries are “rarely absolute” (Nourishing Terrains 9) and meant to be crossed: 
“Aboriginal boundaries . . . while they promote and rely on difference, mark difference 
primarily in order to overcome it.  Boundaries are permeable, flexible, rarely monolithic” 
(Rose, Nourishing Terrains 45).  Comments by Watson confirm this interaction with 
neighbours and newcomers, who “should be entitled to camp” in an area where they “feel 
comfortable and secure,” so as long as they ask “the local mob and they give their 
permission.  That‟s always got to be done” (Davies and Watson 205). 
Mudrooroo‟s integration of other cultures—and their respective Dreaming species—
into the island‟s mob and the spiritual realm, moreover, makes use of the Dreaming as a 
“global” concept (Davies and Watson 195).  Likewise, Watson‟s inclusion of “Homeric 
legends,” “aspects of Christian legends” and “American Indian ways of making connection 
with the land and the spirit of the land” in Kadaitcha is “absolutely deliberate,” as Watson 
advocates an earth-based multiculturalism:  “I think there‟s enormous parallels between our 
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different spiritual paths. . . . [W]e need to understand that all of us are descended from earth-
based cultures.  There‟s a universality about spiritual journeys and dream paths” (Davies and 
Watson 195).
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  In Kadaitcha, this is portrayed in Tommy‟s mixed heritage and his white 
mother, whom Watson calls “the eternal mother of the indigenous people” (Davies and 
Watson 200).  As Ningi, the Kukaburra totem explains, Fleur‟s “blood reaches back to 
sorcerers from the northern lands.  They worshipped stones, great standing stones, and their 
powers are equal to those of the Kadaitcha” (Kadaitcha 228). 
Watson refers to the incorporation of these different elements as a case of cultural 
borrowing that is not unusual amongst “Murri tribal cultures” (Davies and Watson 201), a 
process reflected in the cultural hybridity of maban realism.  Thus, at the same time as maban 
reality clashes with Western concepts, and as maban realism represents a feral, disruptive 
project, this mode of writing makes use of and develops the very Western genres it critiques.  
Mudrooroo not only deems the “cultural, historical and social context” of Aboriginal affairs 
to be essential for the consideration of “Aboriginal writers and their literature,” but he also, 
conversely, maintains that “contemporary Aboriginal communities are the end result of 200 
years of white history, and this past must never be forgotten” (Narogin 3).  He portrays this 
kind of cultural borrowing in the opening scene of Ghost Dreaming, where Jangamuttuk, the 
island‟s maban, conducts a ceremony that involves participants painted as though they were 
wearing European clothing: “He was not after a realist copy, after all he had no intention of 
aping the European, but sought for an adaptation of these alien cultural forms appropriate to 
his own cultural matrix” (Ghost Dreaming 3). 
Correspondingly, and reflecting the cultural pragmatism of country, Watson argues 
that “you can‟t reverse the colonial process, so they‟re here and you‟ve got to learn to live 
with them, number one and number two, there‟s a lot of things you can learn from Migloo” 
(Davies and Watson 201).  The elusiveness of maban realism as a textual beast and its 
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composition as a cultural hybrid featuring both Aboriginal cultural forms and the Western 
genre of the novel thus reflect the idea of country in relation to Aboriginal human-animal 
relationships and in terms of cultural boundary crossing, borrowing and tolerance.  As a 
result, Mudrooroo‟s novel, with its contradictions arising from the simultaneous use and 
critique of Western modes of expression, an oxymoron also characteristic of magical realism, 
had been well received along with his other works both within and outside of Aboriginal 
communities at the time of publication. 
However, it is not Mudrooroo‟s use of Western, but of Aboriginal culture that has 
raised the question of authenticity: following the 1996 article “Identity Crisis” by Victoria 
Laurie, published in the widely read Australian Magazine, it was revealed that Mudrooroo‟s 
ancestry is not, as he had claimed, Aboriginal, but African-American, English and Irish (see 
M. Clark, Likely Story 34, 41-45).  Mudrooroo had formerly been celebrated as the first 
Aboriginal author of a novel (see M. Clark, Likely Story 27), but the question whether 
Mudrooroo could indeed claim an Aboriginal cultural matrix as his own, and whether he was 
not, rather, appropriating Aboriginal culture and integrating it into a Western cultural matrix, 
has been hotly debated ever since.  Indeed, Maureen Clark, whose Mudrooroo: A Likely Story 
provides a thorough account of the controversy surrounding Mudrooroo‟s identity, the 
associated ethical and political questions, and the various reactions and positions from 
Australia‟s Aboriginal and academic communities, writes that “Johnson‟s claim to Aboriginal 
genealogy is unfounded.  His assertion of tribal belonging has been refuted” (Likely Story 
64).
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Nyoongar elder Rosemary van den Berg points out that the Nyoongar people, with 
whom he had alleged to be related, have rejected his claim.
96
  Speaking in the context of 
settler Australians posing as Aboriginal people in order to gain access to particular markets 
for their products, such as the author Leon Cameron and painter Elizabeth Durack, she calls 
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Mudrooroo, here addressed as Colin Johnson, “an imposter of the worst kind” who “used an 
Aboriginal identity for his own ends” (“Intellectual Property Rights”).97  She emphatically 
rejects the assumption of an Aboriginal identity by association and suggests, moreover, that 
“the literati, academia and the publishers, besides those ignorant Aborigines, seem to uphold 
his right to maintain his false identity” (“Intellectual Property Rights”). 
On the other end of the spectrum of opinions in the wider Aboriginal community are 
author Ruby Langford Ginibi and activist Gary Foley, who reject a definition of Aboriginality 
on racial grounds.  Langford Ginibi, accordingly, argues that “[a]ll blood runs red, and we 
come in many colours,” denying the right of white Australians to define who is Aboriginal 
and who is not, and at the same time expressing her dismay at the Nyoongar people‟s 
decision to distance themselves from Mudrooroo (227).  She argues that he should be 
included in the wider Aboriginal community on the basis of merit, “because how he writes 
and what he‟s writin about is for our people” (227, sic, original italics), and on the basis of 
life experiences and a shared spirituality: “He couldn‟t write that sort of stuff if he didn‟t 
have an Aboriginal spirit.  It‟s there.  And he‟s lived the life of a Blackfellow in Australia 
from the day he was born, he‟s been in jail, too.  He‟s shared a life, and experience, and a 
spirituality, the whole lot” (226-7).  Foley, citing Barry Morris, argues likewise that 
“relationships are not perceived in terms of a biological model but are defined primarily in 
terms of cultural notions of interconnectedness,” and asserts that he regards Mudrooroo as an 
Aborigine on the grounds of having “lived the life of an Aboriginal person” and “displayed 
Aboriginal values.”  Both Foley and Langford Ginibi thus reflect the incorporative dynamics 
of country, as Mudrooroo, in their view, has earned his place. 
Arguing in a compatible fashion, Mudrooroo himself makes a case against a genetic 
determination of Aboriginality and writes, “[t]he question of blood is what else but a clinging 
onto Victorian classifications of race” (“Tell Them You‟re Indian” 262).  He claims an 
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existential Aboriginality and postmodern identity, arguing that it is questionable “whether 
„culture‟ as a formal entity did survive in heavily settled areas and what is often put forward 
as Aboriginal culture of a particular area is but a pastiche collected from various books 
written by Europeans” ( “Tell Them You‟re Indian” 265).  Mudrooroo thus prefers to “res[t] 
his authenticity on doing rather than being” as what he calls a “crossblood” and asserts that 
“[w]hatever my identity is, it rests on my history of over fifty years and that is that” (“Tell 
Them You‟re Indian” 263-64). 
Intriguingly, Mudrooroo‟s use of the Leopard Dreaming in Master of the Ghost 
Dreaming to provide a spiritual legitimation for Wadawaka‟s belonging, seems to anticipate 
the way Langford Ginibi would later argue for Mudrooroo‟s own “Aboriginal spirit.”  
Wadawaka‟s Leopard Dreaming is consistent with Mudrooroo‟s assertion that an 
appropriation of the Dreaming as “the heritage of all Australians . . . is not impossible,” as 
“Indigenous motifs and myths can provide the well-springs of a vibrant Australian culture 
resting on the land and the sense of national identity which can only come from our land” 
(Indigenous Literature 2).  Moreover, Mudrooroo‟s inclusion of the African Wadawaka, who 
is initiated into the island mob “under our Law” (Ghost Dreaming 83), is, Maureen Clark 
maintains, consistent with his “embedding” of autobiographical elements in his fiction; 
through Wadawaka, Mudrooroo is “textualising himself” (Likely Story 188).98  She argues 
that “it is not unreasonable to suggest that the parallels to be drawn between the author and 
his character suggest the possibility he may have always been aware of his African-American 
antecedents” (M. Clark, Likely Story 189).  Clark proposes that Wadawaka‟s choice of a 
Leopard as Dreaming animal may be an indication of “his unwillingness or inability to 
renounce the African side of his identity . . . ,” implying that this may be pertinent to 
Mudrooroo himself (M. Clark, Likely Story 187). 
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Choosing a big cat in particular connects the Leopard Dreaming—and Wadawaka—to 
the “wildcat” of Mudrooroo‟s Wild Cat trilogy and especially to “his most autobiographical 
novel, Wild Cat Falling,” as Maureen Clark observes (Likely Story 187).  She suggests that 
Mudrooroo aligns himself with “the sign „cat‟” through the main character of Wild Cat 
Falling, “strongly mark[ing] the character‟s sense of self, metaphorically constructing him in 
a way that denotes the plurality of his hybrid persona.  He is the quintessential „native‟ cat—
the European import gone feral” (M. Clark, Likely Story 96).  Whilst Clark regards the cat 
motif recurring in Mudrooroo‟s work as a “sign” or “signifier” for various other meanings, I 
propose that, insofar as the characters associated with cats have, or may have, 
autobiographical connotations, Mudrooroo sets himself up as disruptive, feral, human animal, 
consistent with an elusive identity that runs counter to European binaries and which 
undermines the construction of colonised others as nonhuman animals.  He, too, is a strange 
beast, so to speak, and with maban realism he has arguably constructed a hybrid mode that 
reflects and accommodates his own feral, shifting identity as a “mongrel,” a term he prefers 
for himself (Mudrooroo, “The Global Nomad”).99 
Furthermore, Mudrooroo‟s integration of the African big cat and, by association, the 
African Wadawaka into Dreaming and country mirrors Franklin‟s equation of the Aboriginal 
inclusion of introduced feral species with a legitimate belonging of settler Australians.  
Commenting on settler aversion to and control of feral species versus Aboriginal acceptance, 
Franklin argues that “we might finally concede that the ferals are as Australian as we are, that 
we all, after a while, belong to country” (Animal Nation 192, original italics).  Yet, the 
problem with Franklin‟s assumption is that the settlement of humans and the introduction of 
nonhuman animals are different kettles of fish, as it were.  As Watson has pointed out, and as 
Rose documents, it is absolutely essential to “always ask” before moving onto somebody 
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else‟s land, a courtesy European settlers have consistently failed to observe, to say the very 
least (see Rose, Nourishing Terrains 44-47). 
In comparison, Mudrooroo‟s equating species introduction with cultural integration, if 
it indeed suggests autobiographical connections, is similarly problematic.  His setting up 
camp, so to speak, as an Aborigine has been of an existentialist and political rather than a 
land-grabbing nature, but he has crossed boundaries nonetheless, as the Nyoongar reaction 
clearly shows.  Mudrooroo‟s claim to an existential Aboriginality is, as Clark puts it, 
“individualistic,” removed from any kind of relationship with, or the “value standards” of, the 
community he identifies with (M. Clark, Likely Story 57).  At the same time, 
[a]ny claim to authenticity that Johnson may make, whether in his writing or 
in his being, cannot be defended against a background of the collapse of the 
political, social and cultural issues that he has always claimed matter most to 
him in his life.  In the postmodern world, the notion of self-identification is an 
ideal that exercises a powerful attraction, but it is a concept that does not 
recognise any boundaries—anything pre-given that individuals must respect in 
the process.  (M.Clark, Likely Story 57) 
In other words, once aware of his African origins, Mudrooroo did not give the Aboriginal 
community to which he claimed to belong the opportunity to include him.  Foley‟s and 
Langford Ginibi‟s reaction shows that at least some parts of the wider Aboriginal community 
would have accepted him as one of their own, genetic credentials or not.  However, Foley 
himself, commenting on Archie Weller, stresses “the importance of convincing others of the 
group with which you seek to identify to accept your identification.”  This raises the question 
as to why Mudrooroo did not ask to be accepted once he knew that his claims to 
Aboriginality were unfounded, and at what point and in what form he could have made such 
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a request to belong.  Mudrooroo‟s dilemma, it appears, ultimately stems from the failure to 
observe the courtesy of asking permission when crossing boundaries, rather than his DNA. 
As a result of this debate, Annalisa Oboe reports that “academics, journalists and 
writers in Australia and around the world have felt it appropriate” to position themselves “in 
favour of or contrary to [Mudrooroo‟s] Aboriginality” (x).  However, given the history of 
white, racist definitions of Aboriginality and degrees of Aboriginality and whiteness, as well 
as the divided opinions amongst Aborigines themselves, I agree with Adam Shoemaker‟s 
assessment: “[W]hat I am not doing is asserting that Mudrooroo is, or is not, an Aboriginal 
person.  I cannot make that determination and it is not my place to do so” (“Curse” 7).  As a 
German, European migrant and “new New Zealander” living in Aotearoa New Zealand, part 
of a white, international, and Western readership, I am an outsider to this debate.  It is well 
and truly not my place to pass that kind of judgement, nor is it necessary for this analysis. 
However, the question raised by critics such as Maureen Clark and Shoemaker is how 
Mudrooroo‟s work can be read now.100  Certainly, Mudrooroo‟s work cannot simply be 
dismissed as suggested by Robert Eggington, for example;
101
 it is worthy of consideration not 
least due to its significant influence on the Australian literary scene.
102
  Langford Ginibi, for 
instance, enthusiastically attests to Mudrooroo‟s foundational and lasting impact on the 
present generation of Aboriginal writers (226).  Watson has expressed a similar sentiment, 
regarding Mudrooroo as positioned alongside Australia‟s most influential Aboriginal writers: 
Mudrooroo, Oodgeroo, Kevin Gilbert and others opened up whole new 
horizons for black expression and black communication.  They were our 
literary champions of the sixties, seventies and eighties, and they made it 
much easier for younger writers like myself to get published.  Those people 
defined the boundaries of new black literature and the black writers of the 
nineties owe them a great debt.  (“I Say This” 595)103 
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Certainly in regard to maban realism, Mudrooroo has succeeded in constructing a mode of 
expression with which contemporary Aboriginal authors are able to identify, and which they 
have adapted and developed further.  This is not only the case for Watson‟s novel, but also 
for Alexis Wright‟s Plains of Promise (1997), for example.104 
As for the question of authenticity, I propose that in relation to maban realism this is 
not an issue in the first place, as there was never a claim that the mode in itself is authentic.  
Authenticity carries connotations of purity—racial, ethnic, historically accurate, or 
otherwise—that simply do not apply to an explicitly hybrid and deconstructive or “mongrel” 
mode such as maban realism.
105
  Moreover, in relation to Ghost Dreaming specifically, there 
is no claim that the novel is anything other than fiction.  Mudrooroo himself has stressed in 
regard to maban realism that “[a]n important point is that there is not an attempt to 
rehabilitate traditional culture as such which, after all, might be an impossible project, but it 
is the using of our traditional storytelling content and structures in an effort to gain a wider 
readership” (Indigenous Literature 97).106  It is the “using,” the fictional adaptation, not an 
accurate or authentic reproduction, that is of interest in my reading of both Ghost Dreaming 
and Kadaitcha.  Indeed, Watson, in turn, maintains that his novel is entirely fictional in this 
regard.  He comments: “Kadaitcha Sung never ever traded, never ever used real business, or 
real special ceremony. . . . Because I wouldn‟t use that as a trade good.  I wouldn‟t use that as 
a convenient currency to advance my own interest” (Davies and Watson 191).  Thus, the 
concept of authenticity applies to Kadaitcha as little as it applies to Ghost Dreaming.
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At the same time, maban realism, like magical realism, can convey other truths, such 
as subversive histories, experiences other than those conceivable within a Western 
worldview, or reflections on structures of (neo-)colonial power and oppression.
108
  
Mudrooroo suggests that, “unlike many high cultural or message constructs, maban reality 
can not only pass on a message, but also find a popular audience who will read the work 
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because it is, at least on the surface, enjoyable” (Indigenous Literature 97).  Thus, his novel 
Ghost Dreaming is not, for instance, designed to exploit Aboriginal culture in an exoticising 
fashion for trivial entertainment, but it is, on the contrary, a political and feral narrative that, 
amongst other strategies, uses animality to undermine the language of oppression. 
My reading of both Ghost Dreaming and Kadaitcha is a response to Mudrooroo‟s 
argument that 
Aboriginal literature begins as a cry from the heart directed at the whiteman.  
It is a cry for justice and an asking to be understood.  In some ways it is 
different from other national literatures which are directed towards a national 
readership and only after that to other nations.  Black writers . . . have a White 
Australian readership firmly in mind when they write and it is their aim to get 
across to as many people as possible the Aboriginal predicament in Australia.  
(Narogin 1)
109
 
In this context, an understanding of representations of animals within an indigenous 
Australian framework is inevitably limited for non-Aboriginal readers unfamiliar with 
Aboriginal culture.  For instance, as Stephen Muecke writes in relation to translations of 
traditional texts, “[i]f one is familiar with the landforms, as well as the local flora and fauna, 
these texts would be much more accessible” (53-4), a circumstance that also applies, for 
example, to the maban realist landscape of Watson‟s Brisbane.  A thorough knowledge and 
experience of Aboriginal spirituality, moreover, would undoubtedly provide a different kind 
of access to Mudrooroo‟s and Watson‟s representations of animals.110  However, this chapter 
does not aim to examine what these fictional animals might mean in and for Aboriginal 
culture, or for an Aboriginal readership, but rather, it looks at how they function within the 
postcolonial, magical or maban realist narratives as far as they are aimed at a white, Western, 
European, or European-descended settler Australian readership.
111
  Accordingly, the 
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following section explores ways in which the contrast between Aboriginal animal practices 
and settler pastoralism is employed to dismantle the subject-object relationships inherent in 
European ways of looking and the Master text. 
 
Farming Country: Pastoralism and the Master Text 
Mudrooroo‟s and Watson‟s respective narratives each represent oxymoronic spaces that are 
characterised by the overlap of different ways of seeing, with each corresponding to different 
kinds of animal practices.  Whilst Aboriginal animal practices are determined by a spiritual 
unity of all creatures living with the land, settler pastoralists view the land and its animals as 
usable commodities.
112
  These different ways of seeing find their expression in different ways 
of telling stories: maban realism as an essentially embodied mode on the one hand, and 
realism‟s focus on vision—the singular vision of the Master—on the other hand. 
Mudrooroo describes the Master text‟s inherent mechanisms and power structures as a 
“hierarchical structure of order, of power, in which the Master constructs his own text, one in 
which he positions . . . himself as subject and others as objects.  His is the all-powerful gaze 
and consciousness” (Us Mob 8).  Maban realism disrupts this power structure by countering 
the Master‟s single, authoritative version of reality with multiple alternative realities through 
the infusion of maban reality (see Mudrooroo, Indigenous Literature 90-91, 96, 100).  This 
other reality is accessed through Aboriginal human-animal relationships and ways of dealing 
with the land, as Watson points out.  He explains that it is “the human beings‟ relationships 
with the natural things of the world” that reconnects them with “the spirit, the gods of the 
natural universe, through their treatment of lands and animals and the natural environment.  
It‟s only by being responsible guardians of the natural world that we can then reconnect with 
those who create us” (Davies and Watson 194). 
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Critics of Ghost Dreaming and Kadaitcha have discussed the subversive qualities of 
maban realism in terms of the “blending of the real and the fantastic; the intermixture of the 
natural and the supernatural—the hallmarks of magic realism,” to use Shoemaker‟s 
expression (Mudrooroo 75), as well as the creation of alternative, Aboriginal “mental” 
universes (see Shoemaker, Mudrooroo 67-68).
113
  Kate Hall, moreover, provides a thorough 
discussion of the dialogic dynamics of Australian magical realist fiction.  She offers a 
succinct description of how the cultural hybridity of magical realism—rather than simply the 
opposition or combination of the magic and the real—functions in relation to dominant 
discourse, such as the realist text, and writes: 
[T]hese hybrid texts unsettle the monologic discourses of white Australian 
historiography and narratives of nation.  With its characteristically 
deconstructive approach to notions of empirical reality, singular versions of 
history, and “truth”, magical realism is an ideal mode for narratives of 
revision—writing that interrogates normative ideologies and assumptions, and 
illuminates that which is repressed or elided by authoritative discursive 
formations of nation and identity in Australia.  (Hall 111) 
Neither Hall nor other critics of maban realism, however, have recognised its characteristic 
contrast between introduced and indigenous animal practices as a marker of an essential 
cultural difference between settler and indigenous culture in Australia.  So far, the clash of 
indigenous human-animal relationships with settler pastoralism—an animal practice and a 
“narrative of nation,” after all—has not been identified as a crucial aspect in constructing a 
hybrid narrative space and the oxymoronic interplay between different points of view in 
Mudrooroo‟s and Watson‟s respective novels. 
Indeed, Mudrooroo begins his theory of maban realism by characterising the 
colonisers in essence as people “who had other animals to hunt and plants to gather from a 
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place other than Australia” (Indigenous Literature 89).114  The conflict between European 
and indigenous Australian animal practices and conceptualisations has shaped and continues 
to shape the history and inter-relations of Aboriginal Australians and Australians of European 
origin.  Accordingly, indigenous representations of animals and animal practices play a 
significant part in tying Mudrooroo‟s and Watson‟s respective narratives to a spiritual 
connection with the land and are therefore instrumental in challenging the singular reality of 
the Master text.  Representations of animals expose the cultural frameworks that structure 
different perceptions and points of view and open up the dialogue between them. 
Both Watson and Mudrooroo initiate their white readers into their fictional, maban 
realist universes and the associated animal practices, allowing them to consider the narrative 
from an alternative perspective.  Accordingly, in Ghost Dreaming, aspects of the Law and the 
presence of Dreaming companions are, as the narrator clearly states, “secrets known only to 
the initiated” (60).  Yet these secrets are revealed to the reader regardless of cultural 
background, who, significantly, also follows Jangamuttuk‟s novices through their initiation 
ceremony.  The readers are like the novices who “were all eyes and ears when it came to 
knowledge” (60).  In Kadaitcha, in turn, the reader “participates” in Tommy‟s initiation 
ceremony, as Mudrooroo puts it (Indigenous Literature 99), as well as in Tommy‟s secret 
talks with Dreaming Companions and his conversation with a dog called Nugget (Kadaitcha 
264-5). 
Correspondingly, Davies remarks that Kadaitcha is “a profoundly revolutionary novel 
in its possible effects on the reader.  It opens up for white readers the possibility of seeing 
differently . . .” (Davies and Watson 191).  Her comment on the experience of reading in 
general is particularly pertinent to maban or magical realism, where there is not only an 
encounter with a different life, place or time, but with a different worldview altogether.  
Davies writes: “For the duration of the reading [readers] live the imaginary possibility of 
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being otherwise, of being in ways they might not have imagined possible until they 
experienced that way of being in the novel.  This is not simply an intellectual/rational act, but 
something that is lived bodily in the act of reading” (Davies and Watson 191).  In regard to 
Kadaitcha in particular, she argues that the narrative represents a way of viewing the land 
that is akin to that of Aranda hunters, whose performance of stories through dance and song 
emphasise “incorporation and folding,” whereby “the movement of the dancer‟s body 
incorporate the folding and unfolding of the landscape that is moved through, and merge the 
body, the land, the hunter, and the hunted” (Davies and Watson 202, italics omitted).  This 
way of narrating the story, she proposes, enables readers to move beyond the singular vision 
of conventional Western writing. 
In contrast, Mudrooroo‟s character Fada is set up to be without access to 
Jangamuttuk‟s world, a concept that, significantly, is both spiritual and geographical.  Thus, 
Fada finds that the highest peak, the site of Jangamuttuk‟s camp, is “[a] cultural refuge off 
limits to the uninitiated and uninvited” (M. Clark, Likely Story 199).  His conquest of the 
mountain top is thwarted by nature, as the density of the vegetation hinders his progress and 
the site itself is protected by leeches, who, covering his whole body, instil “terror” in Fada 
(Ghost Dreaming 55).  The reader gets a sense of an active nature participating in the 
spiritual protection of Jangamuttuk‟s camp, since neither Jangamuttuk nor his novices have 
problems accessing the site.  Fada finds that “[t]he incident had put all ideas of climbing the 
mountain out of his mind forever” (56).  In this way, Fada‟s attempt to be at the “top” of the 
island‟s hierarchy, as it were, are frustrated from the beginning by the land itself. 
Thus, the idea of different points of view is presented not only in its metaphorical, but 
also in quite a literal, spatial sense in Ghost Dreaming, as Mudrooroo reverses and 
destabilises the relationship between seeing, active subject and “the Other, the object which is 
defined and described by the all-seeing gaze of the Master” (Mudrooroo, Us Mob 8).  In order 
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to survive physically, culturally and spiritually, the island‟s mob needs to subvert Fada‟s 
authority over, and authorship of, their lives.  Even Sonny, the missionary‟s son, is 
“overconscious” of his father‟s overpowering gaze (Ghost Dreaming 74).  “Damn him and 
his eyes” is his comment (74). However, whilst Fada surveys the landscape all around him 
from an eye-of-God perspective (55-6), Jangamuttuk, who establishes himself on the island‟s 
highest peak, is described as “the wily one” who “had picked the perfect camp site to keep 
the whole area under observation” (59).  As Ludjee points out, “He [Fada] always watchin‟ 
us . . . . But we watchin‟ him too” (25). 
In this way, the perception of the “all-seeing eye” of Fada is exposed as narrow and 
limited (12).  Mudrooroo reveals that the central, Cartesian subject is not the centre of 
attention after all, and that his vision for and of the island colony (both literally and 
metaphorically) cannot be anything but highly subjective.  Likewise, Fada‟s authority is 
further eroded by “the small capering form of a monkey,” whom the members of “his flock” 
find much more interesting than Fada‟s speech, but whom Fada, trying to get their attention, 
fails to notice entirely (133).  Animals, like the monkey and the leeches, thus work alongside 
other spiritual forces to ridicule Fada as both authority and author of the Master text.  The 
wind, for example, which is “same as cousin” to Jangamuttuk (143), blows away the 
inventory of the island‟s supplies, which Jangamuttuk mockingly calls “[s]trong paper” in 
allusion to Fada‟s petition, a vision to having the island‟s population moved to the mainland 
(see 67).  What can be seen as a weather-related incident is thus imbued with spiritual 
meanings and connections, and Aboriginal spirituality emerges as a strongly subversive and 
counteractive force to official texts. 
Moreover, the significance of writing as a European expression of power is 
continually undermined by Jangamuttuk‟s deliberate mispronunciation of Fada‟s self-
bestowed title of “commandant” as “com-mand-ment” (Ghost Dreaming 64-5, 131), for 
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example, which signifies, as Shoemaker observes, “one way of denoting the Aborigines‟ 
rebellion against imposed authority and the transmission of that authority, both in the person 
of Fada and on paper” (Mudrooroo 73).  Indeed, Fada represents the Master text himself, a 
disembodied verbal construct, as Mada comments: “That‟s all he was: words.  And that‟s all 
he had, never anything else” (Ghost Dreaming 9).  Shoemaker argues that “[t]he larger issue 
alluded to here is not one of linguistics in isolation.  It is a question of the English language 
as an agency of domination, and of writing that language as a form of silencing Aboriginal 
voices” (Mudrooroo 73).  Mudrooroo foregrounds, here and elsewhere, the use of biblical 
language in particular as a means of domination and control, which, viewed from a different 
point of view, however, reveals its lack of substance, as it were. 
This is exemplified by the use of biblical animal imagery, as Fada casts himself as the 
central, god-like subject in command of everyone else‟s attention.  Within a framework of 
biblical language, he visualises “a fresco of himself surrounded by his adoring sheep” (Ghost 
Dreaming 115).  Like a shepherd of actual sheep, Fada, as “the shepherd at the head of his 
newly saved flock” (130), is in charge of the physical control and incarceration of his “mob 
of sheep” on the island (115).115  His role is to get the mission‟s Aborigines to accept and 
internalize the European view of them as their own.  Thus, the concept of “pastor,” a 
“shepherd of souls,” takes on an especially sinister meaning, as Fada attempts to capture and 
confine the Aborigines‟ minds and souls within the boundaries of European and biblical 
discourses. 
In contrast, Jangamuttuk, “the hero” of the novel, as Shoemaker argues, is “concerned 
with converting the European interlopers to the Aboriginal way of seeing.  It is a paradox that 
he must first get inside the Europeans‟ heads—the „ghost dreaming‟ of the title—in order to 
fend off their invasion.  The battle becomes a spiritual one, literally for the souls of the 
Aboriginal Tasmanians” (Mudrooroo 68).  As part of that “battle,” Mudrooroo invites the 
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reader to view biblical animal imagery in a different light, as he literalises and presents it in 
the flesh, so to speak.  He parodies the allegory of the Good Shepherd (John 10:11-29) by 
paralleling the self-styled “Good Shepherd” Fada with the image of his son, who takes 
possession of a neighbouring island populated by sheep (see Ghost Dreaming 148). 
Sonny‟s pathetic and displaced reign over a “kingdom” of actual sheep, where the 
only spirituality is provided by alcoholic spirits, is an indictment on colonial rule and the 
powerlessness of a spirituality that is detached from its land of origin.  Mudrooroo‟s interplay 
between (dead) metaphors and their (living) referents uncovers the pastoral farming practices 
on which European spiritual concepts and language are based.  Thus, “pastoralism” has both 
a spiritual and an agricultural meaning in Ghost Dreaming.  The double meaning of the term 
reveals a spirituality wholly divorced from the animals who populate its language, whereas 
Aboriginal animal practices in Kadaitcha and Ghost Dreaming are presented as intimately 
intertwined with spiritual beliefs and customs.  At the same time, “pastoralism” proves to 
have a corrosive effect on the cultural, spiritual and physical survival of indigenous 
Australians. 
Tony Dingle describes the clash of Aboriginal hunting and gathering with European 
pastoralism thus: 
Aboriginal society was so strange to the first European observers that they 
found it incomprehensible.  For centuries Europeans had relied upon 
agriculture to feed them, yet Aborigines did not plant crops or tend herds of 
cattle or live in towns and cities; they did not even possess houses worthy of 
the name.  Apparently always on the move, Aborigines appeared to most 
Europeans to be a lower form of life, usually on the brink of starvation and 
little advanced from the animal kingdom.  (4) 
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Dingle adds, though, that “[w]e now know that hunters and gatherers were knowledgeable 
and sophisticated managers of resources who were able to live off the land with a minimum 
of effort.  They possessed ample time to enjoy a full and satisfying spiritual, ceremonial and 
social life once their food needs had been satisfied” (4).  David Unaipon explains that due to 
hunting skills and detailed knowledge of prey and its environment acquired from childhood 
onwards, “you can never come across or hear of an Aboriginal dying of thirst or starvation.  
He is well informed about where and how to procure water and food.  These are the two 
principles that constitute the means of existence for an Aboriginal” (17). 
However, as both Kadaitcha and Ghost Dreaming illustrate, these means of existence 
dwindled rapidly during the course of European colonisation, as the ecological impact of the 
settlers‟ pastoral economy took its toll.  Watson comments: “The land and the environment 
was in a pristine condition when the white man came here and after two hundred and seven 
years of white settlement is an absolute wasteland” (qtd. in Dean).  Elsewhere, he says: “Very 
few parts of Australia are untouched by white settlement, and wherever the whites have come 
onto the land they have butchered and destroyed it and that leaves me with a great sadness” 
(“I Say This” 591-2).  Accordingly, in Kadaitcha, the narrator recounts that “[t]he migloo 
displayed an astonishing sense of industry and the entire land was conquered and bound to 
their needs and desires” (35).  In Ghost Dreaming, the natural balance has been disturbed by 
the displacement of Aborigines onto the mission and the resulting overfishing and 
overhunting.  As Jangamuttuk points out, “[l]and all forest and empty „cepting for leeches.  
No kangaroo, no wallaby, no possum on this place—all gone” (132), whilst Ludjee mourns 
the loss of shellfish.
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  As Jangamuttuk, Ludjee and their people leave the island, 
Jangamuttuk declares: “We „bout ready go and find that new world.  This one finished.  All 
finished” (143). 
Schwalm  180 
A comment by Fada suggests that he blames the island‟s lack of native wildlife on the 
Aborigines‟ hunting practices.  He proposes that Sonny could take them hunting to the nearby 
island of sheep, but, he says, “you must look after the sheep on the other island.  If you take 
care of them, then, maybe you hunt „em sometimes just like you did kangaroo.  But kill only 
what you need for food, otherwise soon no sheep” (133).  The implication is that if the 
Aborigines learned to “take care” of the sheep, that is, engage in pastoral sheep farming, their 
food supply would be much securer.  The idea that nature may be out of balance and that 
Aboriginal survival techniques may now be inadequate on the island because of European 
intervention does not occur to Fada.  Ironically, at the same time, Fada‟s son contemplates 
kangaroo hunting for profit on one of the other islands: “Kangaroo skins brought a good 
price” (132).  This scene exemplifies a settler attitude towards the land, who, as Broome 
argues, “saw it economically, as a commodity to be taken, exploited, bought and sold,” which 
led to “dramatic clash[es]” with “the Aboriginal people who saw the land religiously, as an 
intimate part of themselves and all life” (40). 
Mudrooroo writes: 
One of the main features of Indigenous spirituality is to keep the earth and the 
environment in good repair, to look after it, and this obligation has been 
passed down as Law from the Dreamtime.  The Dreamtime is always present 
within us.  We are there at the beginning of creation and it is our very selves 
which continue the processes of creation and preservation.  (Us Mob 52) 
Accordingly, Eva Rask Knudsen finds that “the divine creation of the environment and the 
secure binding of man and nature through a complex system of social and religious Law” sets 
the tone both in the prologue to Kadaitcha and the opening of Ghost Dreaming (275).  
Correspondingly, Kadaitcha addresses the destruction of the environment in spiritualised 
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terms: “The fair-skinned races gathered beneath Booka‟s standard and the horde laid waste to 
Biamee‟s garden” (33).  Dingle explains: 
In Aboriginal Australia people and land were united in ways that are difficult 
for outsiders to grasp.  Access to land was vital for the maintenance of both 
body and soul.  Food and water were necessary for physical survival but land 
was far more than an economic resource.  People were tied spiritually to a 
particular locality; this was their „country‟, „home‟ or „dreaming place‟, a 
tangible link with the ancestors who had lived and died there and with the 
Dreaming beings who originally created the territory.  Through such links 
people derived a sense of belonging, of identity and of oneness with the living 
world.  (9) 
In Kadaitcha, this is described as “the natural order” to be kept by all: “Men and women were 
created and fostered, who would live upon the land.  They were shown that they must 
worship the gods and keep the laws, were taught to revere all life and respect the natural 
order of all things” (32).  Jarroo, “a sub-chief of a fierce southern tribe” (95) observes the 
absence of these values in the settlers: “They don‟t belong to this land. . . . They pull down 
the trees and change the courses of our rivers.  This land will be devastated even within our 
own generation” (132). 
Broome points out that “[t]he Aborigines also lost access to their sacred places when 
pastoralists drove them away to ensure that cattle would not be disturbed.  Aboriginal anger 
arose at this disruption to their traditional life” (42).  He outlines the historical progression of 
pastoralism, and the consequences of the British government‟s decision to drop the duty on 
Australian wool in 1822.  Broome recounts the “rapid expansion of flocks and the inflow of 
over 200,000 British immigrants to Australia between 1832 and 1850,” which resulted in “a 
fantastic land grab which was never again to be equalled” (41).  “The Aborigines,” he writes, 
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“were quickly outnumbered in their own land,” as “about 4000 Europeans with their 20 
million sheep occupied over 400 million hectares of Aboriginal land stretching from southern 
Queensland to South Australia by 1860” (41).  William J. Lines describes the process thus: 
Private property triumphed over this landscape, not only because of the 
Aborigines‟ military defeat, but also because the business of sheep raising 
changed the very nature of the country.  It subverted the environment, 
destroyed the material basis of an aboriginal culture inextricably bound to 
topography, flora and fauna, and delivered the land into the hands of the 
pastoral pioneer.  The squatters and their flocks drove away the game, and the 
sheep ate the plants and killed the roots upon which the Aborigines lived.  (82) 
Lines goes on to say that, ”[b]y 1890, two years after Australia‟s centennial, over 100 million 
sheep and nearly eight million cattle grazed over much of the continent” (124).  Pastoral 
practices thus destroyed Australian bush, resulting in “a landscape and environment created 
largely in the interests of flocks of sheep and herds of cattle.  Later generations accepted, 
even celebrated, this diminished and impoverished scene as typical Australian landscape” 
(Lines 124). 
 
Dreaming Country: Human-Animal Companions, Anthropomorphism, and 
Hunting Stories 
In Ghost Dreaming, the result of the exploitation of country through animal practices 
disconnected from the land is spiritual impoverishment.  Thus, although Mada has a 
connection to the Dreaming via the Ghost Dreaming, the bird spirit, she is afflicted with a 
“spiritual malaise” at the same time (Shoemaker, Mudrooroo 69).  Shoemaker interprets her 
condition as a suggestion that “it is Black Australians who can liberate non-Aborigines from 
the frozen prison of their souls in the „land of the ghosts‟ if the path to the „sky-land‟ can be 
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opened.  In so doing, the novel gives primary control over the spiritual destiny of the world to 
Aboriginal people” (Mudrooroo 69).  By creating the Ghost Dreaming, Mudrooroo opens up 
an entrance into maban reality.  Whilst he argues that “[s]cientific reality had dispossessed 
the Indigenous people not only of their lands but also of their reality” (Indigenous Literature 
92), Mudrooroo also suggests that Europeans and European settlers have, in turn, limited 
their own reality through natural science.  As Shoemaker writes, 
[i]t is obvious that when colonial powers subjugated Aboriginal peoples the 
invaders invariably attacked their indigenous language, religion and culture.  
One of the insights Mudrooroo communicates in Ghost Dreaming is that 
language, religion and culture of the colonisers suffered at the same time, by 
virtue of the fact that they were locked into a place and a function which was 
soul-destroying.  (Mudrooroo 70) 
Watson, in turn, portrays the spiritual detachment of settler Australians in terms of a 
replacement of the Dreaming with commodity consumption, as Jack Finlay, a young lawyer 
representing Aborigines in prison, drives a green Jaguar.
117
  Finlay is an ambivalent, white 
“Jacky Jacky” figure, so to speak, situated between being an admirable hands-on volunteer 
and being part of the novel‟s privileged and corrupt white legal establishment.  His driving in 
the car is a comical juxtaposition to Tommy riding Purnung, the Dingo Dreaming, as the car 
is portrayed as an animal: “Finlay drove the green Jaguar through the deserted streets with an 
almost arrogant ease. . . . „This brute still runs well.‟  Tommy spoke to snap himself back to a 
modicum of readiness.  The purr of the engine had lulled him into a trance-like state” 
(Kadaitcha 83).  The Jaguar thus almost seems to exercise a spiritual power, which, however, 
amounts to nothing but a dull feeling in the head.  As an expensive status symbol, it denotes 
Finlay‟s privileged upbringing: “„I picked it up the day after I graduated.  My old man had 
made me that promise in my first year.‟  Finlay smiled, pleased with the memories.  „He 
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didn‟t bat an eyelid.  Just pulled the old chequebook out and started writing‟” (83-4).  The 
juxtaposition of Finlay riding an expensive Jaguar, a dream car one might say, and Tommy 
riding the Dingo Dreaming illuminates the difference between spiritually and materialistically 
motivated animal practices, as it were.  The ridicule lies in the fact that whilst the Jaguar may 
be an impressive car, it is not connected to country and Dreaming in any way and has no 
value in that regard.  Finlay‟s proud Jaguar ride thus falls short rather pathetically in 
comparison to Tommy‟s ride on his Dreaming Companion. 
In contrast, both in Ghost Dreaming and Kadaitcha, the spiritually connected 
characters derive strength and reassurance from their Dreaming companions, and the strong 
bond and kinship between Dreamings and humans is shown in their sharing of experiences 
and feelings.  For instance, Wadawaka‟s Dreaming companion Leopard is “[s]uffering as 
much as Wadawaka” (Ghost Dreaming 100), as is the Red Kangaroo Dreaming of Bulley 
Macow, a tribal Aborigine in prison for the revenge killing of a rapist policeman in 
Kadaitcha.  Tommy asks the imprisoned Macow: “„How does that big red fullah feel about 
being locked up in this stinking little hole?‟  „No good.  I feel him inside me, he need that 
open country.  He no good in a cage like this place, he need wide open place‟” (Kadaitcha 
71).  In addition, Tommy‟s Dreaming, Tapu “the snake of the Biri Gubba people,” is the 
source of his “cunning and stealth” (37) and his green eyes (28).  Watson comments about the 
relationship between Tommy and the various Dreaming spirits that “what I was trying to 
convey was the closeness of the Aboriginal warrior to all facets of the natural environment” 
(Davies and Watson 209), such as the water, represented by Dituwonga, an “ancient groper” 
(Kadaitcha 296), and the air, inhabited by Ningi, the Kukaburra Dreaming. 
In Ghost Dreaming and Kadaitcha, this closeness is not only represented by the 
human characters‟ relationships with Dreaming companions, but also the undermining of 
Cartesian human-animal boundaries, a blurring of physicality and spirituality, and the 
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omnipresence of Dreaming spirits within humans, animals and land.  Kakkib li‟Dthia 
Warrawee‟a explains the Aboriginal relationship to animals thus: 
The sundry macropods are not just a fine animal that looks cool on a coat of 
arms, they are a part of this land.  Dtjowdtjba, the Eastern Grey Kangaroo, 
Macropus giganteus, is not my brother or sister: Djtowdtjba and I are one.  
Hurt Dtjowdtjba—and you hurt me.  I, just because I‟m human, am not 
superior to Dtjowdtjba; neither is Dtjowdtjba superior to me: we are simply 
one.  Sure, I will eat Dtjowdtjba if I am hungry—but only after asking 
Dtjowdtjba if I may.  Sometimes we die, and we provide food for the grasses 
that feed Dtjowdtjba.  This is life.  Dtjowdtjba and I are a part of the universe: 
a part of the web of life.  Vital and important to that web as the other.  (97) 
Accordingly, in Kadaitcha, Dreaming companions and also apparently ordinary animals have 
both human and animal traits, and they are also both spiritual and material creatures.  A 
wallaby hunted by Tommy, for example, displays intelligence, agency, and a sense of 
purpose and planning.  The animal, aware of potential danger from humans, uses a 
remarkable skill to assess the situation: “Small flies buzzed around the roney‟s head, attracted 
by the strong, gamey smell, and from time to time the wallaby plucked one out of the air and 
held it to his nostrils.  But the flies did not carry the scent of man” (248).  To a Western, 
urban reader, this seems like an extraordinary and unexpected ability, yet it is presented in a 
matter-of-fact way.  Tommy only manages to outmanoeuvre the animal‟s intelligence by 
employing equally extraordinary, though no magical, skills.  Unaipon comments on the 
difficulty of hunting kangaroo, because of the animals‟ considerable cognitive abilities: 
“Hunting the kangaroo requires a great deal of skill and patience because there is something 
that is almost [like] human reasoning in some animal life” (65, parenthesis in original).  
Humans and kangaroos are close and share common traits, according to Unaipon.  He writes: 
Schwalm  186 
“Kangaroos are like human beings, they choose to live in one locality and frequent one 
particular feeding ground regularly” (65). 
In Kadaitcha, characteristics that in a realist text would be considered exclusively 
human are also an inextricable part of Dreaming companions such as Ningi the Kukaburra 
spirit, Purnung the Dingo spirit, and Dituwonga the Groper spirit.  Thus, they are frequently 
described as “wise,” and use human language.  In Ningi‟s and Dituwonga‟s case, the 
language is verbal, whilst Purnung uses some human body language, such as “a nod of 
approval” (23) or shaking his head (6).  Ningi “lift[s] an eyebrow” (226), yet even though 
kookaburras look a bit as though they have eyebrows, they do not raise those in disapproval.  
Neither do fish shake their heads “sadly” (298), as Dituwonga does, or “whisper” (296).  
Spirit companions, frequently called “elders,” are also described as “uncle” (6), “teacher” 
(128), and “mentor” (24), whilst Tommy is their “son” (25) and “student” (225).  At the same 
time, these animal spirits are interchangeably labelled “it” or “he.”  This shift in the English 
language between the animal “it” and the human “he” indicates either a blurring or an 
absence of human-animal boundaries. 
This boundary blurring is particularly striking in the ubiquitous and numinous 
presence of Purnung the Dingo Dreaming, dingoes and dogs in Kadaitcha, as the spirit of the 
Dingo pervades the land and its inhabitants, whether they are human or animal, good or evil.  
Dogs, dingoes, and Purnung himself are evoked at significant moments in the narrative.  
Thus, the comet, which marks the time of transformation and the battle between good and 
evil, is “really the great one‟s watchdog,” as “even the youngest child in the tribe knew” (68).  
A dingo marks the moment Jelda‟s and Tommy‟s child is conceived, as “[f]rom far off, a 
dingo bellowed a challenge, and the gods laughed once again upon the promised land” (203), 
and the dawn of the day Booka is finally trapped is greeted by dogs: “A few dogs were 
beginning to emerge into the cool air, shaking themselves and scratching at fleas” (294).  The 
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Dingo Spirit is a reassuring presence throughout the narrative, providing companionship and 
encouragement to Tommy, and guaranteeing the safety of the protagonists.  In view of this, 
the dogs‟ matutinal barking on the day of the final battle gives a reassuringly ordinary quality 
to the day and defines the space of the mission as safe, as people get on with their everyday 
business (295).  As a hunting spirit, Dingo is both ominous and frightening, though no less 
omnipresent.  Thus, whilst Tommy, himself doglike in some aspects, and Purnung hunt 
Booka and his policemen, they, in turn, are also “dogs,” both hunters and hunted, throughout 
the narrative.
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  Moreover, Jonjurrie declares to Tommy that “the migloo will pay for what 
they have done, and we shall also punish their dogs” (99). 
Rose‟s account of the Yarralin concepts of the Dingo Dreaming explains the all-
pervading presence of Dingo, and his spiritual and bodily connection with humans. 
In Dreaming, only the dingo (wild dog, Canis familiaris dingo) walked then as 
he does now.  He was shaped like a dog, he behaved like a dog, and dingo and 
human were one.  It was the dingo who gave us our characteristic shape with 
respect to head and genitals, and our upright stance.  Ancestors and 
contemporaries, dingos are thought still to be very close to humans: they are 
what we would be if we were not what we are.  (Dingo 47) 
Accordingly, people from very different backgrounds are all associated with dog qualities or 
imagery in Kadaitcha, reflecting the connection with Dingo as ancestor both metaphorically 
and physically.
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  The connection to Dingo pervades all aspects of life, sacred or profane, 
and regardless of a person‟s cultural background.  Human life is inherently animal in all its 
aspects, whilst human beginnings are reflected in the Dreamings‟ human traits. 
Nonetheless, the Dreaming companions retain some distinctively animal behaviour, 
sometimes to comic effect, as they almost appear as eccentric humans through the 
combination of human and animal behaviour.  Thus, in response to Tommy‟s question 
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whether he will be all right on his own, “Purnung lifted his leg with studied contempt and 
urinated on the rock at his feet to indicate that he would hold his post to the end of eternity.  
He growled and shook his head” (6).  Ningi “squawk[s],” “ruffl[es] his feathers and dust[s] 
the fine grains from himself” after falling off his “perch” (249-50).  His kookaburra laughter 
is at the intersection of humanity and animality, reflecting the actual call of kookaburras, the 
common, anthropomorphised understanding of it as laughter, and the laughter of the 
humanised character Ningi. 
Moreover, Purnung, at the same time as being a spirit, also takes on the very practical 
function of being a camp dog, whether that means guarding Tommy and his camp (see 292), 
or being the supreme deity Biamee‟s “watchdog” (68).  The relationship between humans and 
Dreaming companions, furthermore, offers mutual benefits, comparable to the bond between 
people and their animal companions.  Tommy, for example, reassures Purnung in the same 
way he would reassure an ordinary dog (see 5, 120), and Purnung, in turn, “whine[s] softly, 
reassuringly” (6).120  In Ghost Dreaming, too, Ludjee and her Dreaming companion Manta 
Ray “had missed each other” (60). 
In addition, instances such as Purnung relieving himself and Ningi “rubb[ing] his 
beak into the mists beneath, to ease an itch” (Kadaitcha 129) serve to foreground the 
Dreaming companions‟ physicality.  Franklin points out, in regard to totemism, “that animals 
are experienced sensually and intimately by those who live close to them and not just 
symbolically” (Animal Nation 112).  Neither Dreaming companions in particular, nor animals 
in general, can be reduced to a purely symbolic, abstract function in either Mudrooroo‟s or 
Watson‟s respective novels.  As Mudrooroo points out in regard to Kadaitcha, “the Spirit 
Dingo . . . is as much material as Tommy Gubba” (Indigenous Literature 99).  Furthermore, 
whilst a dog like Nugget can and does have an allegorical function as the spirit of survival in 
the face of invaders, for instance, his physicality, too, is strongly emphasised: he is a 
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“monstrous dog with a misshapen head,” an “ugly brute” with a “shaggy coat,” “stumpy tail,” 
“pink stomach” and “scar tissue that ran across its pink belly” (Kadaitcha 264).  Maban 
realist animals therefore demand a reading in terms of their material, bodily presence in the 
narrative at least as much as any other functions they may have, as they, like humans too, are 
“vital and important” and “part of the universe.” 
However, the prevalence of animals in particular, especially in combination with 
blurred human-animal boundaries or anthropomorphism, human-animal communications, and 
transformations considered “magical” from a Western perspective, contributes to the 
trivialisation of traditional Aboriginal narratives, as animals are (still) conventionally 
associated with children‟s stories in Western literary traditions.  It is those traditions, 
exemplified by Rudyard Kipling‟s stories, which, as Muecke suggests, served as a template 
that translators of Aboriginal narratives have historically drawn on.  Muecke explains that 
when traditional Aboriginal texts have been transcribed into English, they were paraphrased 
and “the social and ethical importance of the original stories and songs was stripped away in 
favour of some basic human or anthropomorphic content” (53).  Jackie Huggins comments on 
“children‟s literature based on creation stories” and writes: “Much of what has been written 
about Aboriginals by non-Aboriginals has been patronising, misconstrued, preconceived and 
abused.  We‟ve had so much destructive material written about us that we must hold together 
the very fabric of the stories which created us” (qtd. in Heiss 197-98).  Van Toorn discusses 
such trivialisations and marginalisations of Aboriginal oral narrative, and points out that, 
“[d]isqualified as history, Aboriginal encodings of the past are often categorized as myths, 
legends, or fairytales—markers of the primitive and the child-like” (123).  She identifies the 
frameworks provided by academic disciplines as part of the problem, as well as the prevailing 
primitivist discourse which delegates Aboriginal culture to the past, and writes: “According 
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to the prevailing demarcations between academic disciplines, „primitive‟ or „prehistoric‟ 
societies are the province of anthropology and archaeology, rather than history” (123). 
Thus, anthropomorphism is often seen as a sign of supposedly primitive and childlike 
qualities of totemic cultures.  Anthropomorphism, “the ascribing of human characteristics—
thought, feeling, consciousness and motivation—to non-human things” (Masson and 
McCarthy 43), is, according to James Serpell, “the normal and immediate response of the 
vast majority of people to animals,” including people in the West, and probably “a universal 
human proclivity” (Company of Animals 172).121  However, in relation to the Master text, 
anthropomorphism was a disconcerting influence for a “post-Enlightenment Europe” used to 
“nice clean lines separating animals from humanity,” and “a disturbing hybrid state of affairs, 
where the boundary between humanity and animality was apparently dissolved and fluid,” as 
Franklin points out (Animal Nation 50).  Seen as “a form of scientific blasphemy” (Masson 
and McCarthy 12) and a “dirty word” in the context of “scientific objectivity” (Serpell, 
Company of Animals 167), anthropomorphism is directly in opposition to the natural 
scientific reality that maban realism undermines. 
Essentially, anthropomorphism is “a sin against hierarchy” (Masson and McCarthy 
44), which questions the foundations of Cartesian humanism, as well as its patriarchal, 
Eurocentric assumptions.  Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy report that it is 
“regarded as a species confusion, an unprofessional merging, a forgetting of the line between 
who one is and what one is observing, between subject and object, womanish” (45).  The 
prominence of anthropomorphism within other knowledge systems, such as the Aboriginal 
Dreaming and attitude to country, triggers the derision described by Chris Philo and Chris 
Wilbert, which is directed at “lay and „indigenous‟ knowledges (or ethnosciences)” by 
“dominant Western scientific cultures and the „rational institutions which adopt their logics as 
a guide and model” (8-9).  In other words, it disturbs those areas of human-animal 
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relationships, such as natural science, vivisection, or animal industries, that rely on the use of 
animals as objects (see Masson and McCarthy 43, 47).  The trivialisation of 
anthropomorphism as belonging to the realm of “inferior” and “emotional” women (Masson 
and McCarthy 45)—or, indeed, children—functions as a means to maintain the hierarchical 
position of the Cartesian (male, European) observer. 
The post-Enlightenment attitude towards anthropomorphism thus affects the reception 
and translation of Aboriginal stories.  Muecke writes in regard to the transcription of 
Aboriginal texts into English that “one traditional narrative device of (magical) 
transformation was retained for „just so‟-type stories,” and finds that while the “use of 
Aboriginal children‟s stories in translation may be appropriate” for such a purpose, the 
reduction of other major texts in this way is “much more serious” (53).  In terms of 
contemporary fiction, there is certainly a possibility that the perception of maban reality as 
trivial or as an entertaining anthropological curiosity may extend beyond transcriptions of 
traditional oral narratives and into readings of maban realist, or magic realist, texts.  Wendy 
Faris describes how readers, in her view, perceive magic realist fiction and writes: 
The narrative appears to the late-twentieth century adult readers to which it is 
addressed as fresh, childlike, even primitive.  Wonders are recounted largely 
without comment, in a matter-of-fact way, accepted—presumably—as a child 
would accept them, without undue questioning or reflection; they thus achieve 
a kind of defamiliarization that appears to be natural or artless.  
(“Scheherazade” 177) 
Hall objects to the terms “fresh, childlike, even primitive” and responds to Faris‟ 
statement: “In speculating about „non-Western‟ cultural systems . . . critics of magical realism 
have framed the genre within an orientalist hermeneutics comprised of cultural essentialism 
and binary oppositional critique” (119).  Yet, given the deep-seated traditions of primitivist 
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discourse in Western society, Western readers may well perceive counter-realist narratives in 
the way Faris describes.  This, however, is not a limitation of the text, but it would be a mark 
of how much the readers‟ (and critics‟) perception is framed by their own cultural universe, 
so to speak, how much readers are preconditioned to look at other cultures in certain ways, 
and just how much readers are willing to step outside of frameworks determined by 
hierarchical binaries in their reading.  Indeed, as Suzanne Baker, with reference to Amaryll 
Chanady points out, magic realist texts themselves actually resist an “exoticised” reading 
through their “interweaving of realism and fantasy” (“Magic Realism” 57). 
Griffiths, in addition, draws attention to the intermixture of traditional narrative and 
“those forms which also resist the closure of „realism‟ within contemporary popular culture,” 
such as video and computer games (“Representing Difference” 477), and highlights the fact 
that such blending of genres prevents the relegation of contemporary Aboriginal fiction into 
categories that historically have been considered, as Muecke puts it, “an appropriate destiny” 
for traditional tales (53).  Indeed, though imagery associated with kitschy (yet entertaining) 
Star Wars creatures could not contrast more starkly with Aboriginal Dreamings, mixing 
traditional and postmodern imagery serves its purpose in resisting exoticised readings.  
Accordingly, referring to the transformation of Bulley Macow‟s glowing flesh into a “pile of 
ash” and then into a black goanna (Kadaitcha 239.), Griffiths argues: “If such descriptions 
are open to criticism as too popular and lurid, they nevertheless act as an effective counter to 
those older forms of representation which restrict Aboriginal icons to a folksy, ethnic 
discourse that effectively disempowers them within contemporary life” (“Representing 
Difference” 478).122  At the same time, the lurid veneer and popular culture references do 
pose the risk of readers‟ reception of the novel as a work of graphic pulp fiction and 
underestimating its depth and complexity.  As Griffiths argues, the strategy of including 
popular culture references is designed to attract a mass market and young audiences (see 
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“Representing Difference” 476).  Nonetheless, given the pornographic aspects of Kadaitcha, 
whereby oppressive and violent sexual commodification are portrayed in explicit detail, the 
x-rated nature of the novel certainly precludes it from being read as a “folksy” tale for 
children.  Mudrooroo employs a similar, though less graphic, strategy, as the complexity and 
subject matter of Ghost Dreaming renders it a narrative attractive to adults and less suited to 
young children.
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Nevertheless, both Ghost Dreaming and Kadaitcha still function in much the same 
way as traditional Aboriginal storytelling, as van den Berg‟s illuminating comments of the 
purpose of traditional Aboriginal oral narrative shows: “Traditionally Aboriginal story telling 
had many functions, and it still does.  It reinforced the Aboriginal people‟s ideological beliefs 
in the Dreamtime—their Creation and other cultural stories of the Rainbow Serpent and their 
environment. . . . All these stories referred to the Aborigines‟ environment or the practices of 
their everyday life” (“Aboriginal Storytelling”).  Significantly, spiritual, allegorical and 
practical components are intertwined and equally important, as van den Berg illustrates: 
In a sense these stories were parables that children learned from, much like the 
Bible stories in Christian culture.  Aboriginal story telling gave information of 
where the best game and water sources were to be found; where people could 
venture and where they weren‟t permitted to go, such places as sacred sites 
and where men‟s and women‟s businesses were conducted that was off-limits 
to the uninitiated.  (“Aboriginal Storytelling”) 
She further stresses the importance of storytelling for cultural, spiritual and physical survival, 
both historically and in the present day, and explains: 
Aboriginal storytelling is as old as the cultures themselves.  Based on the 
Nyoongar practices of storytelling, it is not presumptuous to say that 
Aborigines all over mainland Australia and Tasmania kept their respective 
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cultures alive by passing on their beliefs, and their social and spiritual, cultural 
and economic practices to the younger generations. Storytelling is an integral 
part of Aboriginal oral cultures.  Not only were stories entertaining, but they 
enabled a learning process whereby the matter of survival became the basis of 
their telling. Children had to listen and learn; not to do so meant certain death. 
(“Aboriginal Storytelling”) 
Animals are portrayed as an integral part of social, spiritual, cultural and economic practices 
in both Ghost Dreaming and Kadaitcha, and thus animal practices lie at the heart of both 
novels, although in Kadaitcha more markedly and explicitly so.  Moreover, different 
conceptualisations of and practices involving animals are one area where cultural conflict 
becomes most apparent.  Mudrooroo‟s and Watson‟s maban realist animals are both spiritual 
and material beings, as important to the narrative as human characters, providing strength, 
reassurance and continuity in a changed and changing world.  Accordingly, alongside and in 
contrast to European animal practices, both Mudrooroo and Watson inscribe and reinstate 
Aboriginal animal practices into the traditionally Western genre.  Pastoralism, which focuses 
on the usefulness of animals in terms of profit, products and labour, is thus contrasted both 
with a view of animals as spiritual and powerful entities and, in Kadaitcha, with the hunt, 
which forms the basis for the physical and spiritual survival of Aboriginal culture, as well as 
the narrative itself. 
Hunting skills are described by Unaipon‟s Legendary Tales of the Australian 
Aborigines (60-8).  However, his account, written in the 1920s, is not so much a “legendary 
tale” or anecdote, and more than instructions on how to hunt different types of animals.  
Instead, the narrative itself is a hunt, rather than simply a story about hunting.  As Unaipon 
writes “Now we shall begin our hunting expedition” (60), he imparts an immediacy that sets 
this animal practice firmly within the present and renders it very much alive, rather than 
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relating it as a distant event, or a long lost tradition designated to the past.  The reader is 
enticed to participate (“our hunting expedition”), that is, to be present, at the very least, as an 
observer, with an emphasis on the “bodily” experience of reading.  Notwithstanding the 
1990s setting of Kadaitcha in and around urban Brisbane, Watson equally takes his readers 
on a hunting expedition alongside the protagonist Tommy Gubba and his Dreaming 
companion, the dingo spirit Purnung.  As Purnung and Tommy, riding on the Dingo‟s back, 
are introduced, they are surrounded by the omnipresence of other hunters: “The hunters and 
the bird, fish and animal totems hunted silently. . . . [D]eath stalked on hushed feet.  The 
hunted fled in terror to find the secret places while far above, in the vaster oceans of the air, 
the most feared hunter of all was abroad” (5).  As Watson writes, Purnung “and Tommy had 
hunted many times and the killing had been good” (6).124  Likewise, “greenish clouds [roll] 
forward to hunt” (40) as Tommy‟s “prey” (226), Booka Roth, makes his first appearance in 
the setting of present-day urban Brisbane.  Thus, the hunt is established as an all-pervading 
practice early on and throughout the novel. 
The reader follows Tommy in his ambition to hunt, entrap and kill Booka.  This quest 
drives the sequence of events and urges the reader to keep turning the pages.  Other major 
and minor characters are also associated with the hunt.  For example, the “death spirit” 
Jonjurrie is an ancient hunter (9);
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 Worimi, a tribal woman abducted, raped and abused by 
Booka‟s white policemen, is “[l]ike all her people . . . a hunter” (7); the mental powers of 
Ningi, the kookaburra totem, are likened to essential hunting skills: “Ningi could read his 
mind as easily as a child could follow the tracks of an adult kangaroo” (225). 
By inscribing the hunt into the narrative and infusing it into the plot and its characters, 
Watson employs the literary representation of the hunt as a strategy for cultural survival in a 
world where hunting and hunting skills have been eliminated from the everyday lives of 
urban Aboriginal populations.
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  Broome reports that “[a]ll Aboriginal communities were 
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semi-nomadic hunters and gatherers which meant that each tribe foraged for food across its 
own defined territory. . . . It was not an aimless search but one directed by an intimate 
knowledge of the land and the seasons” (15).  Yet Watson‟s strategy of reinscription is a 
reminder that, as Mudrooroo puts it, “even today, scratch many an Indigenous person and 
beneath his or her contemporary skin, or the persona he or she shows to the white world, you 
will still find the old hunter or gatherer” (Indigenous Literature 39).  Watson himself has 
commented that Kadaitcha is a form of redress, as “the recording of white history, white 
economists and white administrators have tried to separate the so-called true Aboriginal 
person, the so-called full-blooded tribal person, who is essentially a hunter-gatherer, from the 
urban blacks who were agitating for such bullshit things as land rights . . .” (“I Say This” 
590).  He points out, 
not only to white Australia but also for my own brothers and sisters, that even 
though we live in a land of concrete and bitumen, and even though we speak 
in the language of the conqueror, wear the clothes of the conqueror, deal in the 
currency of the conqueror and essentially earn a living within the camp of the 
conqueror, we are still very much a tribalized, fully cultural people and we 
still have, even through that boundary of concrete and bitumen, we still have a 
very strong link to the land.  (“I Say This” 590) 
Maban realism thus facilitates the perception of different kinds of cultural spaces and systems 
which exist within the same place and time in an oxymoronic fashion.  Davies likens this to 
the way Aranda hunters perceive the land, as “. . . The Kadaitcha Sung takes us to many 
places and enables us to see from the multiple folds in the political landscape,” which 
contrasts with the “Western model,” in which “the author should take us to a clear and 
singular position from which to view the land” (Davies and Watson 204).  Indeed, hunting 
itself is at the intersection of different cultural universes, which hold equal balance in magic 
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realist fashion, and different perceptions of what hunting means and how and why it is 
practised illuminate the spiritual and cultural abyss between Aboriginal and white Australian 
society. 
A conversation about fishing (the hunt for fish, as it were) between Tommy and judge 
Justice Jones, a wealthy, respected, and well-connected member of the white establishment, 
illustrates the two completely different perspectives at play.  Tommy, a go-between who 
operates in and understands both cultural universes, is able to participate in the conversation 
from both angles.  Through Tommy‟s eyes, Jones appears ignorant to the reader, since the 
literal and spiritual meaning of Tommy‟s affirmative response to the judge‟s question “You a 
salt-water man, are you?” eludes Jones completely (Kadaitcha 77).  Tommy, after all, is able 
to breathe and speak under water (295-7), which makes Jones‟ assertion “I am a trout man 
myself” (76) look patently ridiculous.  In contrast to Tommy, who catches fish for 
subsistence,
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 Jones considers fishing a trivial matter, “relaxation,” and a “hobby or 
distraction” (76).  He is clearly not interested in catching fish as food, but he does it “for the 
sport” (77).  Jones‟ view of fishing evidently relates to the tradition described by Thomas R. 
Dunlap as that of “[m]any Australians and New Zealanders . . . willing or eager to play the 
sporty English squire,” following a “model of gentlemanly recreation” (65).  Tommy is 
“amused by the rambling dialogue” about fishing (Kadaitcha 76), at the same time as he sees 
right through the supposedly gentlemanly act. 
More than a cultural and spiritual issue, however, these contrasting hunting practices 
have had very serious material and political consequences, as hunting for sport and 
taxonomic specimen decimated Australian wildlife in the course of colonisation.  Kakkib 
li‟Dthia Warrawee‟a comments: “A couple of hundred years ago some fellas rowed ashore on 
this continent and preceded [sic] to shoot everything that moved or flew, and chop down or 
dig up everything that didn‟t; how the Aboriginal people standing and watching this event 
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survived that day is a miracle” (95).  On contemporary Australia, he remarks: “Two hundred 
years later and these whitefellas a[re] just as greedy and destructive” (95).  Indeed, 
Aboriginal subsistence hunting and European recreational hunting continue to clash.  Jon C. 
Altman, Hilary Jane Bek and Linda Mae Roach document that tourism, for example, “can 
have both direct and indirect negative impacts on Aboriginal subsistence activities.  Direct 
impacts occur at locations like Kakadu National Park where Aboriginal people who are 
harvesting resources for a livelihood are in direct competition with recreational fishers” (14).  
Furthermore, writing five years after the publication of Kadaitcha, Altman, Bek and Roach 
reported that, since Federation, changes in legislation regarding hunting and fishing rights 
had resulted in “a considerable reduction in the rights of Aboriginal people to hunt and fish 
for food” (5). 
The clash between different animal practices is not only indicative of a cultural 
conflict, the contrast between the necessity of survival and the luxury of leisure, but it is 
ultimately a source of injustices, murders, deprivation and other violent episodes in 
Australia‟s colonial history, as Kadaitcha illustrates.  Accordingly, Jones‟ status as a cattle 
station owner implicates him in the processes that rendered Aborigines landless in their own 
land and destitute in the cities;
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 which decimated their numbers and facilitated the large-
scale exploitation of their labour and bodies. 
 
Slaughtering Country: The Cattle Empire 
As the ironically-named Justice Jones offers Tommy a position as an overseer on his cattle 
station, it is clear that his business rests on the exploitation of Aboriginal labour, and the theft 
of vast tracts of their lands.  Jones‟ stated purpose for his “rather large cattle holding out near 
Cunnamulla” is that he “intend[s] to make a lot of money out of it.  The station is huge, 
hundreds and hundreds of square miles and some good improved pastures, too” (Kadaitcha 
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76).  He needs Tommy because, as he says, “we can‟t get any work out of our coons and we 
need someone like you to get through to them” (76).  Tommy, knowing that he cannot “afford 
to alienate the white man” (78), who, after all, is responsible for “just sentenc[ing] a[n 
Aboriginal] man to death” (75),129 evades giving an answer to the powerful judge‟s offer, but 
reveals to his friend Jack Finlay that he has no intention of “making a career out of being a 
white man‟s Jacky-Jacky” (78). 
Watson, an Aboriginal and political activist and community worker, involved with the 
Brisbane Aboriginal Legal Service and the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody (RCIADIC) in the 1990s, shows an acute awareness that historical processes 
continue to have an impact on the lives of today‟s Aboriginal communities, and that the 
mechanisms of oppression continue to take their toll.
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  By portraying the corrupt judge as a 
capitalist cattle baron intend on making as much profit from as much land as possible, 
Watson‟s maban realist polychronotopia effectively conflates past, present and future, and 
connects past conflicts on remote cattle stations with a present-day urban white 
establishment.
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  The author brings historical atrocities and injustices forward to today‟s 
Brisbane, to highlight the ongoing concerns resulting from the wrongs committed in the wake 
of pastoral expansion.
132
 
The historical background to Jones‟ pastoral business can, for instance, be found in 
Rose‟s Dingo Makes Us Human, a study of the Yarralin people in the Victoria River valley, 
which outlines the decimation of the indigenous population.  She argues that “the process of 
establishing cattle stations was the one which had the most profound impact on Aboriginal 
people” in the Victoria River District (Dingo 9).133  According to Rose, their first encounter 
with Europeans occurred in 1883, when Victoria River Downs in the Northern Territory was 
established as “the largest cattle station in the world,” with “four or five thousand Aboriginal 
people living in the area” (Dingo 1).  But, she writes, “[f]ifty-five years later only 187 
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remained” (Dingo 1).  Rose describes the cattle industry‟s role in “forcibly wresting control 
of the land” from the indigenous population.  She explains: “The essence of the cattle station 
economies was that as Aboriginal labour was virtually free, labour-intensive production was 
profitable.  Unwilling to cut into profits by investing in capital intensive production, station 
owners maintained a strong interest in keeping the cost of Aboriginal labour as low as 
possible” (Dingo 17). 
In fact, the cattle industry was reliant on what was effectively slave labour, as state 
governments withheld their wages.  Rosalind Kidd‟s report Hard Labour, Stolen Wages gives 
an extensive account of the practice marked by abuse, fraud and neglect, which continued 
until as recently as 1972.  Bob Weatherall from the indigenous rights group Fairastates: 
“Aborigines were forced into the rural industry.  We were the ones who built the state of 
Queensland—as slaves.  Everyone else in Australia has been able to acquire enormous 
comfort and wealth through this labour” (“In Pictures: Victims and Campaigners”).  
Concurrently, Broome writes, “Aborigines were absolutely essential to the pastoral economy 
because of their skills and their acceptance of low wages . . . .  The cattle industry . . . . was 
profitable only because the Aborigines had little choice but to work at below subsistence 
wages” (130-1).134  Rose relates the personal experience of Hobbles Danayarri, who tells of 
“lack of wages, minimal health care, appalling living conditions, violence, back-breaking 
work for men and women, and insufficient and unhealthy food” on the cattle stations (Dingo 
18).
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In addition, Rose describes the disturbing practices in place to gain control of the 
land: “Most of the managers and workers came to the Northern Territory from Queensland 
where they had apparently developed strategies through which the country could efficiently 
be made safe for their purposes.  It seems that the initial tactic was to kill; after this period of 
ruthless extermination, the second tactic was to incorporate the survivors into the station 
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work force” (Dingo 9).  Conflict arose when “[s]carcity of food,” caused by the displacement 
of native wildlife with sheep and cattle, “encouraged Aborigines to look to European stock as 
an alternative” (Dingle 57).  Dingle explains that, in consequence, 
[s]quatters threatened to shoot them if they killed sheep, fenced off water 
supplies that had already been damaged by sheep and encouraged them to 
move away. . . . Pastoralism and hunting and gathering proved to be 
incompatible forms of land use although it should be noted that Aborigines 
generally did not object to the presence of Europeans on their land and 
attempted in various ways to incorporate them into their kinship networks.  It 
was only when Europeans insisted on their exclusive use of the land and failed 
to fulfil what Aborigines considered to be their reciprocal obligations that 
there was violent retaliation.  (57) 
In Kadaitcha, the fictional Native Mounted Police (NMP) “opened the country up” for the 
pastoral economy by murdering Aborigines (11).  The historical NMP was “an Aboriginal 
fighting force to be used against the Aboriginal resistance” and marked, according to 
Broome, “the absolute rock bottom of government Aboriginal policy.  Not only was violence 
against the Aborigines being institutionalised, but several hundred Aborigines were being 
encouraged to hound and kill other Aborigines in the service of colonial expansion” (48-9).  
Again, Watson conflates past and present, as the NMP was disestablished in Queensland in 
the 1890s (see Broome 49), and his fictional NMP is interchangeable with the regular urban 
police service (see Griffiths, “Representing Difference” 474).136  Chambers, one of the white 
officers, talks of the connection between pastoral settlement and the genocide of Aborigines 
in Tasmania: “All the cockies and the government fullahs were screaming for shooters early 
in the piece.  They had a bloody stack of new settlers and immigrants stuck in the towns, too 
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toey to get out on the land „cause of the coons.  But we soon set them straight” (Kadaitcha 
14).
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Rose describes the alliance between police and cattle stations: “In the early years of 
settlement, cattle men and police were engaged in the serious business of conquering the 
country by decimating its people” (Dingo 9).  In Kadaitcha, the Jesuit priest Father Senior at 
the Cribb Island Native Compound sums up the attitude that made such violence towards the 
Aboriginal population possible.  He comments: “These poor devils have only come out of the 
trees a few generations back . . .” (89).  Such racist animalisations of Aborigines were 
reported by a Reverend W. Yate, for instance, who “[i]n 1835 . . . told a government inquiry 
that: „I have heard again and again people say that they [the Aborigines] were nothing better 
than dogs, and that it was no more harm to shoot them than it would be too shoot a dog‟” 
(Broome 34). 
However, it is the comparison with farmed animals that is particularly often drawn on, 
either explicitly or implicitly, in relation to the treatment of Aborigines.  The prologue to 
Kadaitcha signals the fundamental shift in animal practices, as well as the application of 
those practices to the Aboriginal people, as the “fair-skinned ones laid waste to the garden 
and the chosen people” and “the tribes were decimated, they lost their lands and they were 
herded into compounds like animals” (3).  The idea that Aborigines were treated “like 
animals” is invoked by Broome, who uses the term “slaughter” for a “massacre of Aboriginal 
women, children and the aged” (46).  Rose describes the “revulsion and disbelief” expressed 
by Aborigines, “that Europeans preferred to shoot rather than to converse, and that they held 
the lives of human beings to be of less value than those of cattle” (Dingo 2).  Lines argues 
that in Queensland “[h]uman slaughter . . . liberated the country for sheep.  In 1859 
Queensland grazed 3 500 000 sheep; 21 700 000 depastured there in 1893.  At least 200 000 
Aborigines lived in Queensland in 1840; no more than 15 000 remained alive by the turn of 
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the century” (109).  By qualifying the term “slaughter,” Lines highlights that in a cynical 
reversal, people have been killed “like animals,” so that animals can live (at least 
temporarily). 
The term “slaughter” derives from the Old Norse and Icelandic word slátr, meaning 
“butcher-meat.”  It is also related to the Norwegian dialect word slaater, meaning “cattle for 
killing.”  Thus, the first definition of “slaughter” is “[t]he killing of cattle, sheep or other 
animals for food.”  Only the second meaning is given as “[t]he killing or slaying of a person; 
murder, homicide, esp. of a brutal kind.”  The association with the killing of animals when 
using the term “slaughter” for the killing of people is thus a very close one.  Generally, using 
“slaughter” in connection with people takes on much more brutal, violent, and emotive 
connotations than the idea of slaughtering animals, which is, certainly in Western societies, 
by and large regarded as a fact of life, a necessity, and, in more sanitised terms, a routine 
practice that does not require much contemplation.  However, in connection with the racist 
animalisation of Aborigines, the link and crossover signified by the related terms “slaughter” 
and “butchering” is especially significant. 
Carol Adams comments on the processes that render nonhuman animals “absent 
referents” and discusses the linguistic mechanisms inherent in such comparisons with 
animals.  She argues: “The animals have become absent referents, whose fate is transmuted 
into a metaphor for someone else‟s existence or fate.  Metaphorically, the absent referent can 
be anything whose original meaning is undercut as it is absorbed into a different hierarchy of 
meaning; in this case the original meaning of animals‟ fates is absorbed into a human-centred 
hierarchy” (53).  Whilst Adams speaks, in this instance, of the comparison between the 
slaughter of animals—their transformation into meat products—with sexual violence against 
women, in more general terms her concept of the absent referent is particularly pertinent in 
relation to Kadaitcha.  She writes: “While animals are the absent objects, their fate is 
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continually summoned through the metaphor of butchering” (69). Accordingly, the dead 
metaphors of “butchering” and “slaughtering” are not only commonly invoked, but also, to 
varying degrees, re-associated with their referent, the killing of animals, in the context of 
Australian colonisation.  Yet, as Adams points out, the absent referent is ultimately “both 
there and not there.  It is there through inference, but its meaningfulness reflects only upon 
what it refers to because the originating, literal, experience that contributes the meaning is not 
there.  We fail to accord this absent referent its own existence” (53).  Indeed, rather than 
simply illuminating the connection, Watson makes a particular point, paradoxically, of 
shedding light on this fact that the absent referents, the victims and processes of industrialised 
butchering and slaughtering, remain in the dark. 
Accordingly, the close link between Aboriginal characters and cattle in Kadaitcha is 
strikingly illustrated by the naming of “Poddy” and “Bulley Macow.”  Poddy, a little boy 
from the mission, represents the youngest generation, dispossessed and ignorant of their 
native language and culture: 
Tommy felt immensely saddened by the boy.  The tribes had always measured 
their wealth in the health and abundance of the next generation, who were the 
guardians and warriors of tomorrow.  Yet children like Poddy had never 
walked upon their own land and they spoke English too fluently.  Their own 
language was beginning to fade and they knew nothing of their own 
Dreaming.  (261) 
The fact that Poddy, who likes “them cowboy mob” from Western movies (260), is himself a 
“cow/boy” illuminates the sheer scale of his confusion and loss of identity, and the pervasive 
influence of the cattle barons‟ reign.  Perceptively and ironically, Poddy describes the 
cowboys as “real deadly,” as they “belt the piss out of them Indian buggers” (260).  Watson 
draws parallels between indigenous experiences of colonisation as Tommy points out to 
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Poddy that he is “backing the wrong mob there.  Those same Indians now, well they our 
country men and we the same blood as that mob.  Them cowboy fullahs the same breed as the 
night riders up north.  They bad news mate.  You want to back those red fullahs up, boy” 
(260). 
Poddy‟s name, moreover, signifies his place in the postcolonial order of power, as it 
conjures up the imagery of the rodeo, the re-enactment of North American frontier 
conquest,
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 yet with a distinctly Australian flavour: “poddy,” after all, is the Australian term 
for a small calf used in “poddy riding” by young rodeo cowboys.  This denotes a position of 
complete powerlessness, as the rodeo employs coercive measures to control animals, such as 
sticks and electric cattle prods; the animals are also at risk of bullying and abuse by cowboys 
and handlers.
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Whilst the rodeo, a form of postcolonial entertainment evolved within and from the 
cattle industry, is thus an allegory for present-day postcolonial power-structures, Watson does 
not depict the hierarchies in place simply as a battle between black and white.  Accordingly, a 
sympathetic white barkeeper and “mate” of Tommy is called “Bronco” (279).  By definition, 
bucking broncos are rodeo horses who “naturally” want to get rid of the weight of the 
cowboy of their backs (R. Clark, “How Do They Make Bareback Horses Buck?”).140  The 
allegorical connection with a class of white people oppressed by the structures of empire is 
signalled by the fact that Bronco‟s pub known as “the Queen‟s Hole” is a popular meeting 
place for “anti-royalists” (Kadaitcha 278). 
Significantly, Bronco is not associated with cattle, denoting his essential difference in 
status and circumstances.  Cattle imagery remains associated with Aboriginality, as the 
pained cry of cattle rings throughout the narrative.  Thus, “a roar of thunder bellow[s]” when 
Booka hears the news of the new Kadaitcha (Kadaitcha 68), and as Tommy dives into the sea 
to prepare for the final battle, “his flesh bellow[s] out for relief” (295).  Furthermore, 
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Tommy‟s aunt Darpil (298), children gruesomely killed by the NMP in a massacre (15), 
Boonger (195, 210), Booka (304) and the Bunyatt (309) all “bellow” as well.  The cattle 
imagery reflects the reality that Aborigines “. . . were taken here and there; sometimes we 
went voluntarily; other times we were like cattle rounded up, slaughtered and bought and 
sold” (Mudrooroo, Us Mob vi). 
Indeed, indigenous communities were also seen as pests on the land.  Tatz reports on 
the situation in nineteenth-century Queensland: “White settlers killed some 10,000 blacks in 
Queensland between 1824 and 1908.  Considered „wild animals‟, „vermin‟, „scarcely human‟, 
„hideous to humanity‟, „loathsome‟, and a „nuisance‟, they were fair game for white 
„sportsmen.‟”  He cites Arthur Hamilton Gordon, British High Commissioner, in 1883, who 
“wrote privately to his friend William Gladstone[,] Prime Minister of England”: 
The habit of regarding the natives as vermin, to be cleared off the face of the 
earth, has given the average Queenslander a tone of brutality and cruelty in 
dealing with „blacks‟ which it is very difficult to anyone who does not know 
it, as I do, to realise.  I have heard men of culture and refinement, of the 
greatest humanity and kindness to their fellow whites . . . talk, not only of the 
wholesale butchery (for the iniquity of that may sometimes be disguised from 
themselves) but of the individual murder of natives, exactly as they would talk 
of a day‟s sport, or having to kill some troublesome animal.  (qtd. in Tatz, 
original italics) 
Dingle, who focuses on the expansion of the wool industry, describes the attitude that saw 
Aborigines as parasites: “The justification for the European occupation of the land (used then 
and since) was that pastoralists and farmers could make the soil productive in a way that the 
Aborigines—who survived merely by harvesting nature‟s bounty and were therefore claimed 
to be essentially parasitic—were unable to do” (59).  Using the absence of a pastoral 
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economy as the criterion to judge that Aborigines are animals strengthened the terra nullius 
doctrine, the idea that “the growing inflow of immigrants, the development of farming, the 
search for a staple export and the eventual emergence of the wool industry . . . . filled a 
vacuum” (Dingle 59).  The fact that the land was inhabited by human beings was an 
inconvenient contradiction of the terra nullius doctrine and therefore generally of no 
consequence in the pursuit of profit.
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At the same time as police and pastoralists decimated Aboriginal communities, Rose 
writes, “[t]hey were equally engaged in assuring that word of their actions not be made 
public, for by the 1880s there had developed behind the frontier, in the southern colonies, a 
society of settled citizens who protested against the gross ill-treatment of blacks” (Dingo 9).  
Accordingly, one of Booka‟s white officers complains about public opinion turning against 
the NMP: “I mean them city bastards like their cheap beef; but they don‟t fuckin‟ know what 
chances the cow-cockies take. . . . This could be a real white man‟s country if only those big 
mouths would just give us a go.  Have a look at how friggin‟ quiet Tasmania is now you and 
Roth and all the rest shot out the niggers” (Kadaitcha 13).  Put in the spotlight by obtrusively 
vulgar language here is the link between the mass production of meat, the decimation, 
exploitation and dispossession of Aborigines, and the implicit complicity of those removed 
from the slaughter, the city dwellers, who, albeit opposed to the decimation of Aborigines, 
enjoy the benefits of the process (“cheap beef”).  Watson draws direct parallels between the 
production, commodification and consumption of meat and the historical processes that have 
objectified and dehumanised Aborigines, obscured the origins and details of their 
exploitation, and thus disconnected those implicated from any notion of responsibility.  Rose 
points out that “European sources are not completely silent; particularly in the early years it 
was accepted that killing was essential.  To quote Ernestine Hill, a journalist who interviewed 
many of the early settlers: „The business of establishing a cattle empire depended upon 
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killing. . . .‟” (Dingo 10).  The “cattle empire,” after all, was not only an empire over cows, 
but also the reign over people treated like cattle. 
 
“A Couple of Choice Courses”: The Meat of the Story 
As the act of butchering blurs the boundary between humans and animals in Kadaitcha, the 
conceptual distinction between human “flesh” and animal “meat” is also dissolved.142  In 
Watson‟s novel, meat literally and metaphorically forms the connective tissue, so to speak, 
between “conceptual othering,”143 commodification and physical persecution.  Meat is 
employed both as a metaphor as well as a material, embodied entity.  The reader is constantly 
reminded that the human body ultimately consists of meat.  Thus, Ningi warns Booka: “If 
you do not sharpen your skills you will be nothing but rotting meat, left in the dust for the 
dingo and the black goanna” (219); the NMP burns “the rotting remains” of  Aboriginal 
people whom they have „butchered‟ (43); the cemetery, where all meat is rather bloodless, is 
cast in an “almost anaemic light” (161); and Tommy implicitly points to the common link 
between humans and animals, when he tells Ningi that death “is the way of all flesh” (225). 
However, the connection between human and animal flesh is made particularly 
explicit when the “naked body of Tea-Pot,” an Aboriginal tracker who betrayed his people to 
Booka, is left “hanging from a meat hook” in Booka‟s headquarters: “The top of the hook 
was jammed into the ceiling and Tea-pot had been lifted onto it, so it pierced his lower jaw” 
(244).  Furthermore, the ironically named Bulley Macow literally slaughters a white 
policeman who had raped and murdered his sister: “Trained as a knife hand at a meatworks, 
Bulley Macow was good with a blade and the white man died a slow and very painful death” 
(57).  Ironically, or aptly, Tommy and Finlay hope (in vain) for “a verdict of manslaughter” 
for Bulley (73).  Thus, the ultimate revenge in Kadaitcha is to literally make meat of those 
who butcher others. 
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Furthermore, “meat” is an intensely sexualised metaphor in Kadaitcha.  Adams points 
out that “„[m]eat becomes a term to express women‟s oppression, used equally by patriarchy 
and feminists, who say that women are „pieces of meat‟” (59).  Correspondingly, alongside 
the various references to butchering, the representation of women as “pieces of meat” in the 
narrative is particularly striking and disturbing.  Whilst the idea of “pieces of meat” in a 
sexualised context is not restricted to women, this particular comparison is most prevalent, 
and the various ways of consuming meat, whether literally or in more metaphorical senses, 
are closely connected in Kadaitcha.
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  Accordingly, the first instance of “meat” used as a 
sexualised metaphor is when Booka and Sambo encounter what appears to be a prostitute, a 
“heavily painted white woman”: “Her dress was soaked and her body offered itself 
obscenely. . . . Roth waved the woman off.  She stepped back and jabbed an upright finger at 
them.  „Yeah! Fuck you too sweetie,‟ Sambo chuckled.  „I‟m going to chew your pink meat 
later.‟”  (Kadaitcha 44)  Immediately, the idea of “meat” is connected not only with sexual 
commodification,
145
 but it is also explicitly tied to a metaphor connected to eating.  Likewise, 
prostitution in Coontown takes place in an environment “run by shifting alliances of lower 
white criminals and black street gangs.  Its pubs and bars stayed open all hours, providing a 
stream of cashed-up human fodder for the diseased brothels” (45). 
Throughout the narrative, it becomes increasingly clear that sexualised meat 
metaphors, such as “prime meat” (116), “young black meat” (91), “human fodder,” and “pink 
meat” are more than simply figures of speech, but that their meanings are very sinister and 
literal.  For example, immediately after the encounter with the prostitute, Booka and Sambo 
hunt the town for meat.  In the immediate context, and also because at this point it is not clear 
who the “servant” is, the reader still automatically assumes that Booka and Sambo are 
speaking in sexual metaphors: “„What sort of meat we need tonight, boss?‟ [Sambo] asked. 
„A youngish, clean sort of woman.  Our servant is developing strange appetites, but we‟ll see 
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what we can come up with‟” (46).  However, a short while later, Booka obscurely remarks 
that he is going to be able to offer his “friend a couple of choice courses” (53).  It transpires 
that Booka and Sambo are, in fact, feeding corpses to the Bunyatt, the monster guarding the 
heart of Biameet.  Booka comments that Chambers and Hinds, the police officers killed by 
Jonjurrie and Worimi, “made a tasty enough meal” (68) 
Throughout the novel, the re-introduced referents and the sexual metaphors derived 
from them remain intimately connected, as “Booka Roth and his migloo mates” treat the bars 
of Coontown like the meat counter of a butchershop, where they make their “blatant 
selection” for “young black meat” to supply their parties (283).  At these parties, it emerges, 
Booka entertains influential men, such as politicians and judges, and the “young black meat” 
denotes their choice of victims of grave sexual abuse:  “The Roth mansion was again hosting 
an evening of enjoyment for some of Queensland‟s most powerful men . . . . Booka, who well 
knew of the twisted tastes of his betters, had provided them with three fine young gins” (205).  
In particular, the cattle baron Justice Jones, evidently one of Booka‟s regular guests, 
embodies the fusion of metaphorical and literal butchering, and the consumption of meat.
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Booka‟s initial comment that his “servant is developing strange appetites” is therefore 
ambiguous, possibly referring to Justice Jones as much as the Bunyatt, as, most disturbingly, 
the judge rapes and murders Booka‟s prey first, before their corpses are fed to the monster.  
In this way, “[t]he naked and bloodied body of Florence,” who died while Jones was raping 
her, “lay in the corner like a discarded bag of rubbish, ready to be served to the Bunyatt, to 
appease its awful appetite” (237).  The process through which Booka and Justice Jones turn 
Florence into a piece of meat, or “an empty envelope of flesh” (222), is described by Adams, 
who argues: 
Consumption is the fulfillment of oppression, the annihilation of will, of 
separate identity.  So too with language: a subject first is viewed, or 
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objectified, through metaphor.  Through fragmentation the object is severed 
from its ontological meaning.  Finally, consumed, it exists only through what 
it represents.  The consumption of the referent reiterates its annihilation as a 
subject of importance itself.  (58) 
Accordingly, Florence is nameless to Jones, for whom she is not a human being but a “gin,” 
interchangeable, replaceable and disposable: “„Are there any more gins available?‟ Jones 
asked as he completed his dressing.  He asked the question as casually as another man would 
ask for a second beer” (Kadaitcha 223). 
The cattle baron‟s abuse of Florence reflects the sexual exploitation of Aboriginal 
women on cattle stations (see Broome 101), which was grounded in a perception of them as 
no different from farmed animals, commodified, readily accessible for use (against their 
will), units rather than humans, as “[s]ome cattle owners boasted that they could breed all 
their future labour from Aboriginal women” (Broome 138).  Yet, because of his graphic 
portrayal of sex and sexual abuse, Watson has been charged with depicting women in an 
exploitative fashion (see Griffiths, “Representing Difference” 481; Lever 110), and criticised 
for deliberately attempting to “draw in a popular readership seeking the prurient” (Griffiths, 
“Representing Difference” 481; see also Gelder and Jacobs 111).147  However, such 
statements suggest that critics have not looked beyond the lurid veneer.   Indeed, Watson has 
made an emphatic statement attesting to “the strength of the black woman” as the “most 
enduring asset of aboriginal people since white settlement” (qtd. in Dean).  This, he says, 
“has been our strongest spear and our greatest shield in the black community.  It has been the 
strength, vision and courage of black women that have carried us through.  This fact[,] 
unfortunately, has not been recognised fully by black men.  I think it will take a black man to 
write of it” (qtd. in Dean).  Kadaitcha‟s female characters are instrumental in trapping Booka 
and hunting him down, and are thus—arguably and to a degree at least—re-empowered.148 
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Instead, such explicit scenes fulfil another, more subtle function, as Watson—
deliberately, I propose—puts the (white) reader into the position of voyeur and, accordingly, 
“meat” consumer.149  In this context, the subtitle of the novel, A Seductive Tale of Sorcery, 
Eroticism and Corruption, is a very candid description of how the narrative functions in 
relation to the reader, who is (potentially) seduced and corrupted by the seemingly gratuitous 
scenes and thus implicated as Mitläufer,
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 unless they read the novel beyond entertainment 
and consider their own position.  And this position, conversely, entails potentially being 
“made meat of” themselves, as human-animal boundaries are blurred beyond the narrative 
and the reader, too, is animalised. 
In a general sense, the animalisation of the reader is a reflection of the Dreaming, 
whereby humans and animals are “simply one,” as the omnipresence of Purnung, the Dingo 
Dreaming, spills over and out of the narrative to encompass and include the reader.  Thus, not 
only are fictional characters imbued with dog qualities, but as the reader is following the plot, 
that is, participating in Tommy‟s and Purnung‟s hunt for Booka and his “dogs,” the reader is 
dogging—chasing—Tommy‟s adversaries, as much as being dogged, along with Tommy, by 
them in return.  Moreover,  Tommy finally demands “a terrible retribution from the new 
settlers” (310), which means that, ironically, white readers are dogged at the same time by the 
Kadaitcha man and his curse, as Tommy seeks to bring white settlers to justice.  He arranges 
that “[f]or every one hundred migloo, there had to be one that would know depthless tragedy 
and sorrow” (310), and declares: “And I say this to you migloo: you will be doomed to the 
end of time to wear the blood of my people” (311). 
Watson explains the role of the Kadaitcha man: 
I wanted to base the book on a foundation of black strength and black power, 
and the most powerful figure within traditional Australian society was the 
tribal Kadaitcha.  The Kadaitcha man is the tribal executioner, tribal sheriff, 
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tribal bounty hunter, who would take up your cause for you and pay back, visit 
revenge upon your enemies.  So it had to be a Kadaitcha man. (“I Say This” 
590) 
As a result of joining Tommy‟s and Purnung‟s hunt, readers are confronted with the looming 
threat of being tracked down and becoming “dog meat,” so to speak, themselves—though 
less in the novel‟s ominous and physical sense, but in terms of having to answer for their 
position.  Ultimately, the ubiquity of the great hunter, the Dingo Dreaming, confounds the 
reader‟s ability to distinguish who is a hunting “dog” or hunting with “dogs,” and who is 
hunting “dogs” or hunted by “dogs,” who is dogging and who is dogged.  Purnung thus 
represents the “trickster character,” who, as Mudrooroo writes, “keep[s] the boundaries fluid” 
(Indigenous Literature 207). 
Hall considers “[m]agical realism . . . the hybrid literary mode par excellence,” which 
“by actively and intentionally dismantling borders and boundaries, . . . demonstrates the 
arbitrary nature of their construction, and illuminates inequalities in the power structures that 
constitute the desire for borders and boundaries” (116).  Watson‟s representations of animals 
and conflicting animal practices, his blurring of human-animal boundaries, the essential and 
spiritual notion that humans and animals are “one” all serve to illuminate historic and 
contemporary inequalities and unveil the power structures and processes that perpetuate and 
produce them.  In this context, the barbecue scene at Stephen‟s house is crucial, as Watson 
employs body language and silence to elucidate cultural differences and conflicts, as well as 
the arbitrariness, even absurdity, of borders and boundaries instituted by Western science and 
cultural tastes, in a setting often considered a quintessentially Australian affair. 
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“That Last Chop”: The Story of Meat 
Boonger‟s clubbing and cooking of a possum at Stephen‟s barbecue (Kadaitcha 209-13) 
brings the white guests‟ repressed prejudices, culturally ingrained attitudes and double 
standards to the surface and spotlights cultural blindspots, areas which remain hidden not so 
much because they are in fact invisible, but rather because society at large chooses to ignore 
them.  The ensuing argument revolves around the idea of what kind of meat consumption is 
acceptable and supposedly civilised, and what kind is not.  The row divides the idea of meat 
into two distinctive categories.  As Boonger tries to explain that the possum is in fact “my 
tucker,” “my meat” (210), for which he hunts on a regular basis, one of the women amongst 
Stephen‟s guests speaks up indignantly: “If you wanted to eat you could have shared our 
food” (211).  In this case, “our food” consists of a large meat tray Stephen had won 
previously in a darts competition.  Since both the barbecue meat on the tray and the possum 
meat are animal flesh, and both are edible, the question arises as to what may be the reason 
for the “the shocked faces” and “the wall of revulsion” (210) shown by Stephen‟s white 
guests. 
Their comments suggest that the possum cannot be eaten because it is both “cute” 
(209) and endangered.  And yet, the cuteness of the possum cannot be the real reason for his 
or her assumed inedibility, because animals generally described as “cute,” such as lambs, 
rabbits or young calves, are consumed in their thousands every day by mainstream Western 
society.  Furthermore, the woman‟s accusation that Boonger is a “brute” (211) because he has 
killed a member of an endangered species is not convincing, either.  She charges: “Don‟t you 
realize how rare those little creatures are becoming?  It‟s vandals like you who will kill them 
into extinction . . .” (211).  However, it is not Aboriginal hunting practices that have caused 
possums to be endangered.  As Lines points out, “Aborigines had successfully managed the 
Australian environment for tens of thousands of years” (82).  On the other hand, modern 
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pastoral and industrialised farming practices play a large part in the destruction of native 
habitat, yet Stephen‟s guests make no connection between their own barbecue meat and 
environmental degradation.
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So as neither the environmental argument nor the cuteness of the possum provide an 
adequate explanation for the white woman‟s and the other guests‟ anger, there is evidently 
another factor at play that renders Boonger a savage brute in their eyes: It is significant, for 
example, that the white woman sets up the “your food—our food” binary in racial, or rather, 
racist, terms.  As Boonger‟s concept of what he calls “my tucker” intrinsically embraces not 
the idea of ownership but the idea of generous sharing as he offers some of his possum meat 
to the other guests, the white woman‟s offer of food in turn constitutes not only a rejection of 
Boonger‟s possum meat, but also an element of charity of the patronising kind. 
What Stephen‟s white guests miss completely is the possum‟s spiritual connection 
with the Dreaming; a fact Watson illuminates through Jelda‟s kinship with the Black Possum 
(71, 301, 310).  Boonger practises his own connection to country and Dreaming through his 
hunt, whilst modern industrialised animal practices, represented by the barbecue meat tray, 
are essentially disconnected from it.  Indeed, Watson uses suggestive slaughterhouse imagery 
to discuss the disconnection of Aborigines from the Dreaming through the processes of 
colonisation.  He comments on “that boundary, the barriers that have been built up, the 
barriers in the mind, placed there by the sheer horror of the daily existence of the racism, of 
having to work within this enormous abattoir that the Migloos created on our land” (Davies 
and Watson 211).  The possum and Boonger‟s hunt bring the novel‟s competing systems of 
representation and ways of looking to a point; the seemingly incidental barbecue scene is thus 
central to Watson‟s maban realist universe, where different animal, spiritual and cultural 
practices, as well as different histories and politics, intersect in the body of a single dead 
animal. 
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In Kadaitcha, the controversy over who can eat what and where opens up 
fundamental questions about belonging, identity, power structures and “race” relations in 
contemporary Australian society, as the cattle empire continues to shape the inter-relations of 
Aboriginal Australians and Australians of European origin.  Thus, as the heated debate 
unfolds, Tommy, who had spoken up to support Boonger, is told by the woman‟s husband: 
“You just keep your place!  You had no right to talk to my wife like that.  She‟s sent a clothes 
parcel to your people every Christmas.  You should learn to hold your tongue” (211).  
Tommy responds with a question: “Just what is my place?  Do tell me, boy!” (211).  The 
exchange, set against the backdrop of the smouldering possum and the barbecue meat tray, is 
an expression and continuation of the colonial view that the question of whose place 
Australia is ties intimately to the idea of whose animal practices are supposedly civilised and 
productive.  Watson thus presents the idea of pastoralism as the ultimate mark of 
landownership, and of hunting and gathering as an invalid claim over land, as culturally 
ingrained and contemporary.  Boonger‟s choice of meat becomes an excuse for the white 
woman to reveal her inherent, yet hitherto latent, racism, when she not only calls him a 
“brute,” but likens all Aboriginal Australians to animals.  Thus she proceeds to complain 
about what she perceives as Aboriginal ingratitude and says, “„I‟ve done so many things for 
you people and that is all we get.  Insults!  I really thought that you people deserved our 
support, but you just don‟t.  You just keep on biting the hand that feeds you” (212). 
Glen Elder, Jennifer Wolch and Jody Emel describe the process at work here and 
write, 
Specific human-animal interactions that are legitimized and rationalized over 
time, become accepted as civilized behavior.  Those who do not stay within 
this repertoire, however, fall over the human-animal boundary into the 
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netherworld of savagery.  If practices are viewed as too far over the line, they 
can even be likened to cannibalism.  (195) 
They describe the human-animal boundary as “a shifting, metaphorical line, built up on the 
basis of human-animal interaction patterns, ideas about hierarchies of living things, and the 
symbolic roles played by specific animals in society” (184).  The assumed inedibility of 
possums rests thus in part on their special, revered status in white Australian society, as 
“[c]ertain sorts of animals (such as apes, companion animals, or other revered species) 
become positioned on the human side of this metaphorical line, rendering some practices 
unacceptable” (Elder, Wolch and Emel 184).  Correspondingly, whilst Boonger and Tommy 
are regarded as “animals,” the possum, described by Stephen as “one of my guests” (211), is 
humanised.  Eating possum, or, especially, this particular possum, is thus tantamount to 
cannibalism. 
However, Elder, Wolch and Emel also stress the importance of place, “the site of 
harm” as they call it.  They write that this is “perhaps the most crucial aspect of context in 
determining the legitimacy of an animal practice: Was an animal killed in a slaughterhouse, 
or in the backyard barbecue pit?” (197).  Elder, Wolch and Emel argue that “[a]lthough in 
traditional societies, killing animals is a quotidian experience, keeping violence toward 
animals out of sight is required to legitimize animal suffering on the vast scale required to 
accomodate [sic] modern mass market demand for food, medicine, and clothing” (197).  
Boonger hits a raw nerve when he kills the possum in view of everybody.  As Watson writes, 
“The whites shook their heads dumbly.  Theirs was a cloistered world, removed from the 
harshness of everyday life.  They had never before been so . . . so confronted by such direct 
violence” (Kadaitcha 210, original ellipsis).  Accordingly, Watson‟s barbecue scene 
illuminates the phenomenon that acts of brutality are only considered so-called animal 
behaviour when they are visible.  Unseen brutality, however, is part and parcel of everyday 
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practices in Western animal economies.  As Elder, Wolch and Emel write, “. . . harmful 
practices are normalized to reduce the guilt or ambivalence associated with inflicting animal 
pain or death and justify such actions as defensible” (184). 
I propose, therefore, that in Kadaitcha, more than anything, it is not the killing that 
upsets Stephen‟s white guests, but the visibility of it.  Significantly, Stephen‟s house, where 
the barbecue takes place, is the gatekeeper‟s cottage of a cemetery, a fact that “unsettled 
many of his visitors, but he scoffed at them.  The smell of so many dead was the truest 
perfume in the universe, he told them” (170).  Accordingly, the reader needs to keep in mind 
that the smell of death defines and pervades the setting of the barbecue.  Therefore, when the 
woman, walking away from the scene of the argument, comments, “That dreadful stink is 
making me quite ill” (212), this appears to refer in the first instance to the smell of the 
smouldering possum, in the second instance it may be perceived as a racial slur against 
Tommy and Boonger, but ultimately it also points to the smell from the cemetery, the 
unsettling reminder of death, which the woman finds intolerable. 
The red blood dripping from the possum‟s carcass, the singeing hair and the 
tightening limbs of the animal in the fire (210) confront Stephen‟s guests directly with the 
material realities of death.  Additionally, a detailed description of a wallaby hunt starkly 
contrasts with the “cloistered world” of Stephen‟s white guests.  From the wallaby grazing in 
the bush, via Tommy‟s stalking, his prayer before the kill, his spearing of the wallaby, his 
preparation and dismembering of the carcass, the careful disposal of minimal, biodegradable 
waste, to the description of the final product, his aunt Darpil‟s “superb wallaby stew” (263), 
Watson presents, so to speak, the history of a bush meat dish.  Significantly, after skinning 
and disembowelling the animal, Tommy hangs the carcass up in a tree at the mission, visible 
to everyone, whilst the barbecue meat at Stephen‟s party is quietly juxtaposed, its precise 
origins unknown, its history untold.  The high visibility and graphic descriptions of the 
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possum‟s and wallaby‟s deaths thus emphasise, by contrast, the invisibility of the lives and 
deaths of the individual animals processed into barbecue meat.  In this manner, Watson 
amplifies the silence surrounding the story of meat. 
However, Watson‟s use of meat in Kadaitcha is as much metaphorical as it is literal.  
A significant moment in the novel, when Tommy and his mother “embrace as mother and son 
for the first time,” is interrupted: “Below them, a train zoomed past, carrying its load of tired, 
cold white meat” (176).  This moment of reconciliation between black and white is thus 
disrupted by the ghostly presence of either literally refrigerated meat, or, metaphorically, 
cold-hearted white passengers.  The disruption is a chilling reminder that before black and 
white can reconcile, there is unfinished business to attend to.  Correspondingly, as Stephen, a 
stereotypical parody of a white colonial Englishman, chooses the meat tray as his “trophy” 
over whisky, this symbolic act signifies the inextricable connection between the colonisation 
of Australia and the production of meat: Australia itself, once producer of abundant meat for 
British dinner tables and now the world‟s largest meat exporter,152 is the Englishman‟s 
“prize” (186). 
By using meat, butchering, and slaughtering as allegories and dead metaphors, and by 
making meat and butchering very literal and tangible concerns throughout the narrative, 
Watson renders the absent referent not so absent; he re-embodies these supposedly dead 
metaphors by shifting the emphasis back to the metaphor‟s referent, so that figure of speech 
and figure of flesh (so to speak) hold equal balance.  In this way, Watson textualises 
previously non-verbal, Aboriginal modes of communication, on which he comments: “Of 
course, we excel at using body language and silence as a means of communication and 
thought.  Though how one gets into print through silence . . . Silence is of course a very 
powerful tool” (qtd. in Dean,” original ellipsis).  Watson‟s metaphorical use of meat 
reinstates the language of the body, or body language, as it were, alongside silence as a tool 
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of communication, to the text.  By shifting human-animal boundaries, Watson emphasises the 
very real connection between Australian animal industries and the exploitation and 
decimation of Aborigines.  Thus, the story of meat is in fact the meat of the story, as Watson 
draws direct parallels between the production, commodification and consumption of meat and 
the historical processes that have objectified and dehumanised Aborigines, obscured the 
origins and details of their exploitation, and thus disconnected those implicated, to whatever 
degree, from any notion of responsibility. 
In this context, Watson makes use of a distinction set up by Mudrooroo in Ghost 
Dreaming, whereby supposedly wholesome bush meat, such as “the sweetest” and “most 
tender” roasted possum (Ghost Dreaming 28), is contrasted with indigestible colonial fare, 
such as salt pork and mutton, which even Fada and Mada find “abominable” (48-9).  In an 
allegory of colonial experience, Mudrooroo describes Fada‟s and Mada‟s unappetising 
evening meal, consisting of “a row of very lean mutton chops and some withered potatoes 
[which] lay congealing in a lumpy gravy,” as “a period of social disharmony and tough meat” 
(96), a circumstance of which Sonny, representative of the first settler generation born in 
Australia, seems blissfully oblivious.  Fada‟s and Mada‟s son, “blessed with youth, a cast-
iron stomach and a palate which had never known anything but rough colonial fare,” actually 
“enjoy[s] the food” (96).  He is preoccupied with “that last chop” (96-97), which he hopes his 
father will leave to him.  However, the sheep meat, “the toughness of the evening‟s meal” 
(116), turns out to be hard to digest, “as his stomach gave a long low growl of discomfort.  
He settled back.  It was the last chop that had done it” (121).  Significantly, the image of “that 
last chop” frames Ludjee‟s memory of her slaughtered community: “The cool night air 
reeked with the odour of rotting flesh [. . .].  Ludjee shuddered.  Her mind filled with images 
of the skeletons of her butchered community erected and on display as if, as if . . .” (100; 
original ellipsis).  Again, Mudrooroo literalises and re-embodies a dead metaphor, as the 
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memory of butchered communities is hard to stomach, as it were; a metaphor Broome, for 
instance, employs: “Indeed, far more Aboriginal women and children were killed than 
European, although this was partly because there were so few European families on the 
frontier.  The list of massacres and slaughter could go on if one could stomach it” (Broome 
47). 
A similar contrast, with similar connotations, can be found in Kadaitcha, whereby 
Bulley Macow complains, “I bin eat migloo shit food far too long mate.  I need my own 
tucker, I need my own land!” (Kadaitcha 59).  Additionally, after Tommy criticises his white 
girlfriend Mary‟s completely burnt steaks, she tells him, “You eat too much meat that‟s only 
half-cooked.  At least my food is well done‟” (160).  The fact that Mary suggests they watch 
tennis whilst eating the steaks only highlights the connection between overcooked meat and 
English culture.  In contrast, Boonger declares to the repulsed white guests at the barbecue 
that he cooks his possum “only . . . a little bit” and professes his “love” for “bush blood” 
(210). 
In Kadaitcha, cooked meat (“post-Cook,” so to speak) re-embodies the saying 
“Cooking up a story” in relation to Australian colonial history.  The allegory rests on the 
phenomenon that, in terms of meat, Westerners are not generally keen to make a connection 
between picturesque cows in a field and the juicy steak on their dinner plate.  After all, by the 
time the animals in the fields have become chunks of meat packed in plastic on the 
supermarket shelves, we no longer think of them as sentient beings.  We deal swiftly with any 
reminders that may not have been eliminated by processing: blood dripped onto the kitchen 
bench is quickly wiped away with disinfectant, and the idea of raw, pink flesh and muscle, 
the image of a distinctive body part, dissolves during the cooking process.  And like Boonger, 
most Westerners, too, eat blood, except that most of the time we ensure it is cooked beyond 
recognition.
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  Cooking thus distorts memories, and “Cooking up a story” firmly separates 
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uncomfortable facts and events in the past from the benefits enjoyed in present.  One of the 
questions Watson‟s novel poses, certainly for his white Western readership, is this: if we 
cannot even face where our lunch comes from, how do we deal with the atrocities committed 
in the course of colonisation, as well as its prevailing injustices? 
The crucial point Watson makes is thus not so much concerned with industrialised 
meat consumption, but with the cultural mechanisms that blank out any reminder or 
suggestion of personal or societal responsibility, possibly even guilt, for “harmful practices” 
(to use Elder, Wolch and Elder‟s term) committed against others.  Kadaitcha thus directly 
addresses the process W.E.H. Stanner famously called “The Great Australian Silence” in the 
1968 Boyer Lectures.  Robert Manne explains that “[w]hat Stanner meant was that both 
scholars and citizens had, thus far, failed to integrate the story of the Aboriginal dispossession 
and its aftermath into their understanding of the course of Australian history, reducing the 
whole tragic and complex story to what one historian had called „a melancholy footnote‟. . .” 
(1).  Kadaitcha‟s narrator, accordingly, tells how “[t]he mass murders of the NMP reminded 
the rest of Australia that colonisation in the north had been a vicious and bloody process.  The 
new political order wanted to phase out the black-clad riders and relegate the great native 
wars and subsequent dispersals to the past.  New settlers wanted to get on with the business 
of prosperity” (40-1). 
Whilst “the Great Australian Silence was shattered,” as Manne points out, by 
“hundreds of books and articles on the dispossession by dozens of scholars” since the late 
1960s (2), the “structural matter” of the Great Australian Silence, which Stanner described as 
“a view from a window which has been carefully placed to exclude a whole quadrant of the 
landscape” (qtd. in Manne 1), still persists.154  Rose, commenting on Australia‟s bicentennial 
year in 1988, observes that “Australian history is not so much a set of events or social 
relations as an arena of self-definition, and that the strategy of denial is not confined to the 
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past” (Dingo 2).  Officially, this denial has taken forms such as not counting Aborigines in 
“official censuses” until 1967 (Rose, Dingo 17), whilst, in terms of writing history and the 
creation of a national myth, Rose explains: 
Aboriginal deaths are rarely counted; black deaths, like black lives, are most 
frequently acknowledged only to be consigned to the backdrop of historical 
pageantry.  While European settlers, police, and travellers shot or poisoned 
nameless and countless blacks, Aboriginal people experienced the traumatic 
loss of fathers, mothers, spouses, and children, as well as lands and 
livelihoods.  The silence with which whites have surrounded their actions, and 
their depictions of Aborigines as anonymous victims, has facilitated the 
outback myth of an empty, lonely, heartless country.  (Dingo 13)  
Broome argues that as a result of this silence, Australia has had “two frontier histories,” and 
reports that “[t]he Aboriginal resistance was relegated to a casual remark about „treacherous‟ 
Aborigines being simply one more obstacle that the gallant European pioneers overcame.  
Indeed, the Aborigines were eventually written out of frontier history, and the misdeeds of 
the Europeans whitewashed” (55). 
Accordingly, Kadaitcha was written in a climate of denial.  It addresses the failure of 
successive Australian governments to offer an official and unreserved apology to Australia‟s 
Aboriginal population, which, in recent times, was perhaps most notable in the previous 
Prime Minister John Howard‟s stance that such an apology was unnecessary, and his 
conspicuous absence when the apology was finally delivered by current Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd.  Kadaitcha‟s message, however, is not now obsolete with the delivery of the 
official apology.  The Socialist Alliance, for whom Watson was the South Brisbane candidate 
in the most recent state elections,
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 takes a cautious approach: 
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The apology given by Kevin Rudd to the Stolen Generation was an important 
and necessary symbolic step forward—if long overdue.  However, it does not 
mean that official racism is dead.  Without compensation for the Stolen 
Generations and immediate action to overcome the inequality suffered by 
indigenous Australians, the apology will become just more hollow words from 
white Australia.  (Socialist Alliance) 
Moreover, Gillian Cowlishaw and Barry Morris‟ statement, that “there is a remarkable 
silence concerning any personal involvement in Australia‟s racist past,” is still valid (269n4).  
The fact that wages of Aboriginal cattle station workers were withheld in Queensland until 
1972, for instance, shows that individuals, company representatives and government officials 
are alive today who are personally responsible.  Corporate bodies and individuals have yet to 
address their own part in that history. 
Against this cultural and historical background, Watson‟s literal and figurative use of 
meat suggests that “Cooking history” is Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the coming to terms 
with the past, Australian style.  Whilst a crucial symbolic act in Kadaitcha is Tommy‟s 
tearing down the “wall of blood” so that the heart of Biamee can be restored to the land 
(307), its key message is that reconciliation cannot be achieved without proper and full 
acknowledgement of the past.  As Watson says: 
In much the same way that Jimmy Cook and his minions invaded the land of 
the Murri tribes, I wanted to get out there into those brick houses, those living 
rooms and explode into people‟s minds.  I wanted to put a black boy into a 
white neighbourhood and point a black finger of accusation.  I wanted to say 
this is what has happened in Australia and this is who is responsible.  So be 
aware of it because somewhere down the track, answers will have to be given.  
(qtd. in Dean) 
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Thus, the bone of contention is ultimately the question of whether individuals need to share a 
communal responsibility even in the absence of personal guilt and, indeed, whether there is 
any communal responsibility at all when contemporary society, be it recent immigrants or 
descendants of early settlers, deems itself detached from historical events and processes. 
Watson has expressed his opinion in this regard very clearly: 
[C]oming to a table that is already prepared and loaded with food and drink 
and wealth and bounty, if they are going to take from the table, if they are to 
take from the tree, they need to recognize and identify the roots.  They can‟t 
totally divorce themselves from the history of the country.  If they are going 
straight across the waters and bang straight into Brisbane then they have to 
pay tribute to the entire bloodied history of Brisbane.  (“I Say This” 590-1) 
In this context, Stephen‟s reaction, his “stomach beg[inning] to churn” at the sight of the 
fresh possum blood dripping onto the cement, is striking, as well as in keeping with the 
ambivalence of his character (Kadaitcha 210-11).  Stephen is ultimately one of the most 
reconciliatory characters in the novel, and his discomfort at seeing the possum‟s blood is not, 
like his white guests‟, an act of avoidance and denial, but an uncomfortable instance of 
recognition.  The possum, after all, is indigenous to Australia, and the animal‟s blood is 
spilled at “his,”” Stephen‟s, place, where all the natives, human or animal, are only “guests”  
The legitimacy of white, European place ownership and occupancy (whether established or 
recent) is called into question, and the symbolism is further consolidated by the fact that 
Stephen rents, but does not own, “his” place.  It is significant that Stephen is the host and 
cook (or „Cook‟) of the barbecue, where he is “holding court” (197), as Watson has 
commented on the difficulty of bringing white people to the “ Treaty table” (qtd. in Dean, 
“An Interview”).  That the table would be a barbecue (a miniature version, perhaps, of the 
“Great Australian BBQ” held on Australia Day and, in any case, a popular event seen as a 
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celebration of Australian culture)
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 is fitting for a mode of writing that seeks to be political 
as well as entertaining. 
Thus, whilst the invitation to his version of the great Australian barbecue comes with 
a challenge, Watson makes his message palatable by packaging it into a paperback novel.  He 
says: 
I wanted to present a package or product that would seep into white suburbia 
and sneak into people‟s consciousness and say, this is what the fuck you‟ve 
done to my land and my people.  But I wanted to do it in a way that still gave 
people the opportunity to draw back without feeling too confronted.  I thought 
that the most effective medium would be the medium of fiction.  (“I Say This” 
589-90). 
Watson‟s novel is thus located at the intersection of leisure and survival.  Watson recuperates 
Aboriginal narrative strategies and animal practices by infusing them into the Western genre 
of the novel.  At the same time, he suggests that cultural survival and physical survival in 
view of  Aboriginal deaths in custody and low life-expectancies amongst Aboriginal people, 
physical survival is only possible when all those implicated in or benefiting from historical, 
recent and contemporary injustices are held accountable.  As Broome writes, “Equity and 
justice for all Australians, and an end to the corrupting relations of dominance and 
subordinance, can only be achieved when Australians are honest about their past” (8).  
Watson‟s silently pointing finger of accusation is thus not only a powerful challenge for 
readers to tell their story, to give their account in turn, but also a means of showing the way 
forward.  Post-apology, Kadaitcha continues to challenge complacency and points at 
outstanding questions of accountability and reparation, such as fair compensation for Stolen 
Wages, stolen children, and stolen land.  Today as much as ever, maban realism has its place 
in illuminating “country” as an other, valid way of seeing and being that needs to be 
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acknowledged and respected in a changing climate—political, cultural and environmental.  
Observing a basic courtesy of country and asking permission to set up camp—in the form of 
a treaty perhaps, rather than having to be dragged to the negotiating table—may be a good 
start.
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  That, after all, always has to be done. 
 
Conclusion 
Shoemaker comments that whilst the “Dreaming sequences” in Ghost Dreaming are 
representative of magic realism, “reminiscent of the literary metamorphoses of other authors, 
particularly Hesse, Marquez and D.M. Thomas,” he observes that “Mudrooroo‟s treatment is 
still very much his own” (Mudrooroo 74-5).  Indeed, both Mudrooroo‟s and Watson‟s 
representations of animals illustrate that maban realism is not simply magic realism with an 
Aboriginal flavour, so to speak.  In terms of its intrinsic characteristics, maban realism has 
much in common with magic realism and may therefore be productively discussed within that 
framework; yet, some of its narrative strategies and its spiritual underpinnings are 
distinctively maban realist and have not been fully addressed by critics of magic realism or 
maban realism thus far. 
Accordingly, Slemon‟s observation that magic realism‟s “separate narrative modes 
never manage to arrange themselves into any kind of hierarchy” (410) in essence still applies, 
but this goes beyond a “binary opposition between the representational code of realism and 
that, roughly, of fantasy” (409), the contrast between “magic” and “real,” or natural science 
versus spiritual concepts.  Watson and Mudrooroo add another dimension to the mode, 
whereby “body language” holds equal balance with written textual speech.  Thus, Faris‟ 
argument that “the material world is present in all its detailed and concrete variety as it is in 
realism” and that “[t]his materiality extends to word-objects as metaphors” whereby “the 
weight of their verbal reality more than equals that of their referential function” 
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(“Scheherazade‟s Children” 170-1), is relevant.  However, rather than an arbitrary, frivolous 
or carnivalesque reviving of dead metaphors, maban realism specifically employs metaphors 
which, in general parlance, have lost their original meaning, and which, more importantly, are 
connected in their origin, in some way, to animals.  These metaphors, such as Mudrooroo‟s 
“sheep” or Watson‟s “meat,” are then reliteralised; the corporeal reality of their absent 
referents, the experience of the body, is inscribed into the text.  The inextricable connection 
of language to the body is a crucial characteristic of Ghost Dreaming‟s and Kadaitcha‟s 
maban realism. 
This narrative strategy is suggestive of processes such as a traditional Aranda practice 
described by Muecke, of combining “words, bodies and acts of inscriptions—on bodies—
which mark instances of cultural reproduction.  These are the conditions under which 
traditions are reproduced, and can often take the form of mechanisms by which bodies and 
words are articulated together” (37).158  Archer-Lean‟s concept of magic realism as an 
“”incorporative”” mode thus gains a new, literal and added oxymoronic dimension, as the 
maban realist narrative is „incorporate‟ in both contradictory meanings of the term. It includes 
the body at the same time as the text is a disembodied verbal construction; the incorporeal 
and the corporeal exist in one and the same space.  Notwithstanding Muecke‟s comments that 
“[i]n the „transformation‟ from spoken word and song to written genres, from body to book; 
from Aboriginal to European ceremony; there are many things that change the whole sense of 
the events involved” and that “[i]t would be extremely difficult to establish any sort of 
continuity between traditional Aboriginal „literature‟ and work by contemporary Aboriginal 
writers” (38), maban realist “body language” can be seen as part of a wider recuperative 
strategy: when bodies, through loss of culture and loss of those whose bodies might be 
transformed, are no longer the medium for the text, the text becomes the medium for the 
body.  The incorporation of body language thus grounds Aboriginal fiction within storytelling 
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traditions, yet it also renders it a unique expression of contemporary Aboriginal culture at the 
same time. 
Furthermore, including “body language” that re-introduces the absent animal referents 
is a recognition of the historical processes and discourses that have animalised Aborigines 
and considered them “objects to be studied, observed and spoken about” (Suzanne Baker, 
“Binarisms and Duality” 86).  Animals in mainstream Western culture are conventionally 
designated to the realm of the symbolic, functional and representational, their bodies 
transformed into something altogether detached from the individual animals themselves.  
Correspondingly, as Rose writes, “Europeans most frequently construct Aborigines as 
emblems: persons are envisaged as signs which signify European-defined Aboriginality.  
Their art, their archaeological remains, their concepts of the sacred, and their physical 
presence are appropriated to fuel images of national identity” (Dingo, 2).  In a context where 
“[u]ntil comparatively recently, Aboriginal people were almost invisible or the subject of 
misinformation in the schooling system” (RCIADIC, Final Report Part F), it is significant 
that maban realism accords animals (both human and non-human) a material presence they 
are otherwise often denied.  Whilst words can be silenced, distorted, or discounted as having 
no substance, the presence of the body, after all, cannot be easily ignored. 
Whilst Mudrooroo has set the maban realist framework in terms of identifying animal 
practices as indicators for conflicting cultural, spiritual and material values, Watson has 
developed these elements more strongly in Kadaitcha.  Mudrooroo himself acknowledges 
Watson‟s effective implementation of maban realism: “I advocated a flight from natural 
scientific reality into the Dreaming, which is the field of creation for all our creative 
endeavour.  It was after this that Sam Watson‟s book was published, to some acclaim, and to 
date perhaps this is the best example of how maban reality can be used to create an original 
work” (Indigenous Literature 97).  Thus, especially Watson‟s representations of animal 
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practices such as consuming meat or hunting—a cultural oxymoron at the intersection of 
leisure and survival—illuminate cultural conflict, inherent contradictions within hegemonic 
discourses and hidden structures of oppression and denial.  They foreground what Hall calls 
“the (often uneasy) dialogue between differing cultural identities and histories,” as, she 
argues, “these hybrid texts unsettle the monologic discourses of white Australian 
historiography and narratives of nation” (111).  By blurring the distinction between human 
and animal bodies, Watson illuminates what Adams calls the “interlocking oppressions” that 
lie at the heart of “[m]etaphoric borrowing” (72) and elicits what Mudrooroo calls an 
“intuitive . . . response” (Narogin 170).  I suggest that this strategy provides for a gut 
reaction, so to speak, to the scenes of violence, which potentially heightens the reader‟s 
awareness of the parallel processes that allow the transformation of an animal practice into a 
verbal representation of human experience. 
In this way, Watson calls into question cultural ingrained or sanctioned ways of 
consumption, whether of historical narratives, the land‟s resources or Aboriginal labour and 
bodies, and highlights the need for acknowledgement and the assumption of responsibility for 
Australia‟s violent past.  He counterbalances the whitewash of history with lurid colour and 
detail, so to speak, the intensity of which serves to shine through and penetrate the veil of 
secrecy and “ignorance,” which “is the product of an historical context which treated 
Aboriginal people, either not as citizens at all, or as second class citizens” (RCIADIC, Final 
Report Part F).  Watson‟s book of wrath (Booka Roth‟s name, I suggest, is not incidental) 
conveys the anger and frustration caused by current social, political and economic 
disadvantages and by historical injustices not officially acknowledged until very recently and 
only reluctantly or controversially addressed to this day.
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  Yet, as Mudrooroo points out, 
“[a]ctivist literature is being replaced by a literature of understanding, a literature not 
committed to educating individuals as to their place in Indigenous society, but to explaining 
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Indigenous individuals to a predominantly white readership” (Indigenous Literature 16).  
This sentiment is reflected by Watson, who says: 
We can‟t attach direct blame to white people who are walking the streets of 
Australia today for what happened back in 1788 but we do expect the people 
who share in the prosperity and the wealth of the land that has been generated 
by the events of colonisation to shoulder their part of the responsibility as 
well. . . . We don‟t feel bitterness, we don‟t feel we are owed anything 
particularly by individuals but the people who dominate the capitalist 
economy and share in the wealth creating area should at least share the 
responsibility of ensuring that aboriginal people are compensated.  (qtd. in 
Dean) 
Finally, whilst maban realism shares with magic realism the blurring of human-animal 
boundaries in resistance to colonial discourse and natural science, the animality of humans 
and the simultaneous humanity and animality of Dreamings are inherently spiritual, 
determined by the oneness of humans, animals and Dreamings as “part of the web of life.”  It 
is this perceived ambivalence that “allows for the opening of the doors of perception through 
language and imagination” (Mudrooroo, Indigenous Literature 98).  As Mudrooroo says, 
“[a]n Indigenous writer simply presents a world which is different from what natural 
scientific reality once presented as the only reality.  I should say that this world, this reality, 
may be familiar as well as strange . . . . Thus the reader is led to question what he or she once 
accepted as „true‟ and „real‟” (Indigenous Literature 98).  Accordingly, maban realism draws 
its readers into other ways of being, which may lead to the recognition that we ourselves are, 
after all, strange beasts and part of a larger universe—left, however, with the deliberately 
unsettling notion that, as Tommy‟s hangman sits down to enjoy the benefits of his lifestyle 
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and eat “handsomely of fresh bacon and eggs” (Kadaitcha 312), we are all due for a good 
grilling sometime, somewhere down the track. 
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Chapter Four 
Categorically Tricky: 
Useful Pests, Cowboy Circuses, and Convergence in Green Grass, Running 
Water and Kiss of the Fur Queen 
The preceding chapters have identified some of the roles animals and animality play in 
magical realist fiction, traced the influence of Latin American magical realist animals on 
magic and maban realism from Australia, and examined maban realism as a variation of 
magical realism.  Mudrooroo‟s alternative label “maban realism” to signal a variation of 
magical realism illuminates another problem: the question of how to define magical realism 
and distinguish it from its variations and, indeed, from other literary genres.  Conversely, this 
raises the question of which particular works of fiction can be legitimately labelled magical 
realism and which cannot, especially given the sheer volume of critical discussing devoted to 
these distinctions.  The use of circensian spaces has already been identified as a marker of the 
mode, but not only was the circus itself as an introduced European entertainment form of 
little or no relevance to the maban realist novels discussed in the preceding chapter, there is 
also no reason to assume that circensian spaces are necessarily exclusive to magical realism. 
However the contemporary trickster narratives Green Grass, Running Water by 
Thomas King and Kiss of the Fur Queen by Tomson Highway certainly do make use of 
circensian spaces.  Green Grass, Running Water weaves together snapshots of the lives of 
several inhabitants and former inhabitants of the Blossom reserve in Alberta.  It features 
characters such as former academic Eli Stands Alone, whose refusal to give up his property is 
holding up a dam development on Native land; Eli‟s nephew Lionel Red Dog, who due to a 
mixture of bad luck and lack of motivation is unsure of his future; Lionel‟s sister Latisha, 
who runs the Dead Dog Café on the reserve; and Alberta, Lionel‟s girlfriend.  They all 
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converge on the Sun Dance, where they connect and reconnect with their community.
160
  The 
narrative, constantly disrupted by the trickster Coyote, is infused with elements of Native 
mythology, satirical representations of the supposed discovery of America by Columbus, and 
episodes of the history of conquest, such as the incarceration and exhibition of Natives at Fort 
Marion and the exploits of Buffalo Bill.  The story also traces the journey of four mysterious, 
very old Indians of indeterminate gender, who appear to be real-life incarnations of 
mythological characters and who may be versions of Coyote.
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  Escapees from a hospital, 
they are followed by Dr. J. Hovaugh, who tries to take them back to the institution, and Babo, 
a hospital employee.  The Indians‟ stated goal is to fix the world from a mess they have made 
(see Green Grass 136-37), and, while they are it, they fix Lionel‟s life as well as the storyline 
of some old Western movies. 
Kiss of the Fur Queen by Tomson Highway, in turn, follows the lives of the brothers 
Champion and Ooneemeetoo Okimasis from their childhood as nomadic Cree hunters in 
Manitoba, their incarceration at the Birch Lake Indian Residential School, where the boys are 
renamed Jeremiah and Gabriel respectively and suffer physical and sexual abuse from the 
priests, to their adult quest for identity and belonging, and their struggle to survive—
Champion/Jeremiah as a pianist and Ooneemeetoo/Gabriel as a ballet dancer—in a hostile 
urban environment.  Despite the brothers‟ traumatic experiences, the novel is interwoven with 
irreverent humour at the expense of Catholicism and the brothers‟ own Cree community, as 
well as the boundary-crossing presence of Weesageechak, the trickster, often represented as 
an arctic fox or as a subarctic beauty queen—the Fur Queen wearing an arctic fox cape.  First 
appearing as a beauty pageant contestant, the Fur Queen is then transformed into a guardian 
spirit. who watches over the Okimasis brothers throughout the story. 
Though both novels overtly address the processes and effects of colonisation, it is 
worth interrogating some basic assumptions about their role as fiction produced in 
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postcolonial contexts.  Arun Mukherjee criticises postcolonial approaches to literature on the 
basis of what she considers homogenising and assimilationist trends that emphasise resistance 
to and subversion of the imperialist centre.  Such approaches, she argues, start with the 
assumption “that we do nothing but search for or mourn the loss of our authentic pre-colonial 
identities or continuously resist the encroachments of the colonizers in our cultural space” 
(6).  Mukherjee stresses that “our cultural productions are created in response to our own 
needs and we have many more needs than constantly to „parody‟ the imperialists” (6).  King 
himself takes issue with the term “postcolonial” and warns against assumptions that may 
come with it.  He finds the term ethnocentric due to its focus on the arrival of Europeans in 
North America and writes that “it will not do to describe Native literature” (“Godzilla” 12).  
He argues that the “worst” problem is that “the idea of post-colonial writing effectively cuts 
us off from our traditions, traditions that were in place before colonialism ever became a 
question, traditions which have come down to us through our cultures in spite of colonization, 
and it supposes that contemporary Native writing is largely a construct of oppression” 
(“Godzilla” 11-2). 
Moreover, there is also a difference in the reception of narratives which are outside of, 
or counter to, Western realism.  As Mukherjee writes, “for those of us who never experienced 
realism as a dominant form, the „denaturalizing‟ of metafiction does not affect us in the same 
way” (6), and warns of misconstruing non-Euro-American texts as postmodern, for example, 
because of “formal similarities” between genres (5).  Correspondingly, fiction written from 
and for cultures with different understandings of what constitutes reality, such as Green 
Grass, Running Water and Kiss of the Fur Queen, may function primarily to serve that 
particular community‟s needs rather than be aimed at dismantling Western realism.  The 
representation of trickster animals within these novels, for example, may be designed to keep 
traditional beliefs alive in a contemporary medium, rather than being deliberately employed 
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to undermine Cartesian boundaries.  The latter may just be an inevitable side-effect.  
However, whilst these aims are not mutually exclusive, there is indeed a danger that “magic 
realism”—like “postcolonialism,” as King and Mukherjee argue—may in some instances 
become an imposed, homogenising and exoticising label when it is applied to any kind of 
literature that is anti-realist or outside of conventional literary realism in some way. 
Taking these issues into account, this chapter examines the fact that, in ways similar 
to those of the maban realist novels discussed, both King and Highway portray the 
discrepancy between the traditional and spiritual animal practices of First Nations hunter-
gatherers, and the pastoral and consumerist use of animals in the course of (neo-)colonial 
expansion.  Green Grass, Running Water especially illustrates the resulting exoticisation and 
commodification of First Nations peoples and their animal practices within the mythic 
structures of the Wild West narrative of conquest and its enactment in the form of Wild West 
Shows.  Accordingly, this chapter examines whether it is appropriate to place King‟s Coyote 
and Highway‟s Weesageechak into a framework of circensian spaces and thus under the 
overarching term “magic realism,” and how their tricksters relate to these frameworks by 
looking at the trickster animals‟ role in disrupting narratives of settlement, domestication and 
taxonomic ordering. 
 
Coyote Circus and Manitoba Magic 
A review of Native North American author Thomas King‟s Green Grass, Running Water, 
cited in the front matter of its paperback edition, enthusiastically proclaims King‟s “deft use 
of magical realism” (St. Paul Pioneer Press qtd. in King, Green Grass n.p.).  However, when 
King is asked whether he considers himself a magic realist, he replies with some hesitation 
that he is not sure about that label, which he does not fully understand and which to his mind 
applies primarily to South American literature.  He expresses his admiration for magic realist 
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fiction and “the idea that you can move beyond reality in a way that doesn‟t make the novel 
seem eccentric or fantastic”; an idea which he says he adapts for his own fiction (King qtd. in 
Andrews 179).  Further on, King comments on the fact that traditional Native stories are not 
determined by realism and illustrates this by citing Coyote narratives.  He then expresses his 
admiration for García Márquez‟ “The Very Old Man with Enormous Wings,” which he 
considers to have similar qualities (qtd. in Andrews 184).  Elsewhere, King remarks that the 
oral storytelling which influenced his writing provided him with the freedom to create “a 
fantastic universe in which anything can happen.”  He finds this element of oral storytelling 
comparable to magic realism or surrealism, yet does not suggest here that these terms apply 
to his novel (qtd. in Rooke 100).  King concedes, however, that “maybe I am a magic realist” 
(qtd. in Andrews 179, emphasis added). 
Certainly, King‟s Coyote displays all the characteristics shared by and inherent to the 
magical realist animals discussed so far.  Various critics of Green Grass have commented on 
Coyote‟s ability to subvert and cross boundaries (Fee and Flick 136), blur the human-animal 
divide (Flick 152; Fee and Flick 136), disrupt Western linear structure (Chester 54) and 
literary conventions (Wyile 116), undermine monologic authority (see Ridington 343) and 
biblical narratives (see Goldman 30; Flick 164; Fee and Flick 136).  Indeed, in relation to the 
latter, King comments that Green Grass‟s premise, which propelled the writing process, was 
the idea that “the real story is the Native story and the Christian story is the secondary story” 
(qtd. in Andrews 180).  At the heart of King‟s “Christian story” is of course the suggestion 
that Coyote had something to do with Mary‟s conception of Jesus Christ (Green Grass 456), 
adding a whole different dimension to the idea of Nativity, as it were, and reflecting the role 
of Coyote that John Sandlos describes as “subversive counterforce to Western colonialism” 
(109).
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  Margery Fee and Jane Flick name a number of borders crossed by Coyote, 
including disciplinary, literary, and Northern American political boundaries (136). 
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At the same time, Coyote serves to fulfil one of the functions of traditional trickster 
narratives, that is, to instruct the audience (see Moses 110; Fee and Flick 138; Sandlos 102-
3).  Fee and Flick consider the border “between white ignorance and red knowledge” to be 
the “most important” (136), and this is indeed a boundary that King‟s Coyote frequently 
crosses, asking many questions on the one hand, and knowing exactly his role in the universe, 
by dancing the Sun Dance, for example, on the other.  King comments that he employs his 
Coyote primarily as a creator of turmoil, a “sacred clown” who “could point out the fallacies 
in situations and arguments and who made sure that nothing stayed done” (qtd. in Rooke 
100).  His reference to a clown seems to further reinforce a circensian image of Coyote, 
perceived, moreover, by Eli and Lionel as a dancing “yellow dog” (Green Grass 308, 320).  
His dancing, in addition to his hilarious interjections as “sacred clown,” reflects another 
purpose of the traditional trickster, which, as Daniel David Moses informs, is “to entertain” 
(110), and Marlene Goldman points out King‟s Coyote‟s preference of “the circle and 
performance” over “the linear trajectory of Western culture” (33).  These traits certainly 
suggest that the circensian spaces of magical realist narratives are an ideal Coyote habitat, so 
to speak, but the question is whether the circus is borrowed for the purpose of a trickster tale, 
or whether the trickster is borrowed for a magical realist text. 
The same can be asked about Highway‟s novel, which also shows several elements 
that can be considered circensian, not least the fact that its very first word, “Mush!” (Fur 
Queen 3, original italics), is a command addressed to a dog called “Tiger-Tiger” by a man 
wielding a whip.  The man in question is dog-sled racer Abraham Okimasis, father of 
Champion/Jeremiah and Gabriel/Ooneemeetoo, who subsequently becomes the central 
attraction of a noisy media circus, where “a man like a white balloon” announces Abraham 
Okimasis‟ dog derby win in a “roiling rumble” (Fur Queen 6).163  In addition, Highway‟s 
Weesageechak, one of the many names of the trickster, certainly displays similar 
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characteristics to King‟s Coyote, similarly calling Western binaries and hierarchies into 
question.  As guardian spirit, the Fur Queen is an ambiguous figure, both protective and 
terrifying, and human, animal and spirit all at once.  Most strongly associated with women 
and arctic foxes, the Fur Queen appears to Champion/Jeremiah Okimasis during a near-death 
experience as a foxy Las Vegas-style singer.  She introduces herself as “Miss Maggie Sees.  
Miss Maggie-Weesageechak-Nanabush-Coyote-Raven-Glooscap-oh-you-should-hear-the-
things-they-call-me-honeypot-sees, weaver of dreams, sparker of magic, showgirl from hell” 
(Fur Queen 233-4), crossing not only human-animal, but also other interspecies boundaries, 
being able to “assume any guise he chooses” (Highway, “Note on the Trickster” n.p.).  
Cynthia Sugars sees her as a “transcultural cross-dresser,” who is neither “„Native‟ nor 
„White,‟” or who is both at the same time (74), whilst Highway makes a point of explaining 
that Weesageechak has no gender or is both male and female simultaneously (“Note on the 
Trickster” n.p.; Highway qtd. in Conlogue 216).164  This undermines patriarchal hierarchies, 
male/female binaries predominant in Western culture and Christian ideas of God as male (see 
Highway qtd. in Carlyle n.p.), and indeed, Weesageechak even appears as Jesus “on the wall 
above the piano” and winks at Jeremiah (Fur Queen 133). 
Highway further relates that the trickster is an intermediary between the human and 
the spirit world (Shackleton and Lutz 76; Conlogue 215), and a connection to God (see 
Highway qtd. in Conlogue 215), or even God her-himself (see Highway qtd. in Enright 226).  
This spiritual dimension provides comfort during the boys‟ experiences of the terrible reality 
of residential school, and during their feelings of alienation in both the city and within their 
home community of Eemanapiteepitat.  Weesageechak takes her place as an everyday 
presence in the boys‟ lives, sparking her magic in places as mundane as a shopping mall in 
the form of a “mannequin in white fox fur” (Fur Queen 117), thus suggesting a magical 
realist universe where magic is an inextricable part of everyday life.  As such, the Fur Queen 
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also fulfils the trickster‟s other functions listed by Moses, which are “to educate” and 
ultimately, though never fully achieved in the narrative, “to heal” (110). 
Accordingly, an encounter with the Fur Queen whilst being lost in a shopping mall 
unsettles Champion/Jeremiah, and prompts him to reconnect with and recall, albeit fleetingly, 
his Cree mythology and heritage, which had been violently suppressed at residential school 
(Fur Queen 117-18).  In an attempt to “disarm such occult phenomena” as the “the Cree-
whispering mannequin,” Champion/Jeremiah reminds his brother about the story of “the 
weasel‟s new fur coat.”  In the story, Weesageechak, disguised as a weasel, tries to eat and 
kill the Weetigo, an anthropophagus monster,
165
 from the inside out, and ends up expelled 
from the monster‟s body through the “bumhole,” drenched in faeces.  The story causes 
Champion/Jeremiah to laugh, “in spite of himself,” and relish the unique traits of the Cree 
language (Fur Queen 118) in what Sugars describes as “a feeling of transgression” (79). 
However, Weesageechak reveals herself to be much more complicated even in her 
role as guardian spirit, as her constant ambiguity in terms of species, culture, origin, 
mythology, gender, and so on makes Highway‟s trickster a heterotopic creature, “impossible 
to think,” to borrow Foucault‟s words once more.  As Sugars says, for example, the Okimasis 
brothers represent the trickster Weasel, at the same time as they are also Weetigo (80).  The 
Weetigo, an embodiment of greed, pervades the narrative as much as the trickster, as its 
nature as anthropophagus, the antithesis to and destroyer of culture, represents the destructive 
forces of colonisation, such as Christianity, patriarchy, and sexual abuse in residential 
schools, as well as the after-effects of colonisation, such as poverty, alcohol and drug abuse, 
the spread of HIV amongst Native Canadians, and ultimately the destruction of Native 
Canadian cultures from within, “the ways members of a culture can be induced to turn on 
their own people” (Sugars 74). 
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It is disturbing, then, that the Okimasis brothers‟ guardian spirit, the Fur Queen, 
frequently takes on the appearance of the Weetigo herself.  In this form, the Fur Queen is 
neither human nor animal, but “nonhuman” (Brightman 142).  As Robert A. Brightman 
writes, “the witiko is surrounded by associations with frozenness: the northern and eastern 
directions from which the coldest winds blow, winter, and ice” (153).166  Accordingly, the 
Fur Queen exhales “jet[s] of ice-cold vapour” (Fur Queen 11, cf. 228), and she is “so fair her 
skin look[s] chiselled out of arctic frost, her teeth pearls of ice” (10, 305).  The lips are 
represented as “streaks of blood” (10, 305), suggesting a recent cannibalistic feast.  She 
appears in this form right at the start of the narrative, when the brothers‟ father Abraham 
Okimasis wins the dog derby trophy, and then again at Abraham‟s death, whilst the priest 
places the body of Christ into the dying man‟s mouth.  The fact that the Weetigo also carries 
off Gabriel, dying of AIDS in the final scene, seems like an especially cruel joke of the 
trickster, who, like God, can be “absolutely horrifying,” as capable of “diabolic cruelty and 
evil as are human beings,” at the same time as embodying “beauty and incredible love and 
ecstasy,” as Highway explains (qtd. in Enright 226). 
However, paradoxically, the “showgirl from hell” also plays the role of victim to the 
Weetigo, when she becomes eye candy, so to speak, as a beauty contestant, and is “sized up,” 
”prodded, poked,” “felt, watched, paraded around the town,” her body exhibited “for the 
delectation of audiences from . . . far afield” (Fur Queen 7, emphasis added).  At the same 
time the prizes in “the dreaded Weetigo look-alike contest” are given out by the Fur Queen 
and her own look-alikes (7).  Not only do these resemblances make any attempt to capture the 
essence of the Fur Queen increasingly complicated and difficult, but her occasional yet 
significant resemblance to the dreaded Weetigo looks suspiciously like another trickster trick: 
after all, compared to the traditional Weetigo, who Brightman points out is typically “dirty, 
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naked, ungroomed, unornamented” (157), the Fur Queen makes an extraordinarily classy 
Weetigo indeed. 
Her fur coat is of particular importance in this respect, as Mariesis Okimasis, the 
brothers‟ mother, points out that whilst “[t]he Fur Queen will watch over you,” it is in fact 
“[t]he white fox on her cape [who] will protect [the brothers] from evil men” (Fur Queen 74, 
emphasis added).  The winking Fox on the Fur Queen‟s cape offers reassurance, protection, 
and a sense of humour in the novel‟s final moment.  However, the split in the final scene of 
the narrative between the Fur Queen‟s humanoid Weetigo or Weetigo look-alike form, and 
the arctic fox fur cape, which also represents her vulpine shape, complicates the ending that 
appears so hopeful on first reading.  The trickster thus offers both hope and warning, both 
humour and terror, but does not provide easy answers. 
The literary or legendary animal‟s association with real animals, arctic foxes, further 
reinforces the difficulty of containing Highway‟s trickster within any system of order.  
Weesageechak‟s close association with and appearance as an arctic fox reflects the nature of 
foxes, a species Martin Wallen describes as “an animal that refuses to be domesticated (121)”  
He points out that “[a]lthough some species of fox are eaten by people, and some are sold as 
pets, the fox generally resists culturation” (121).167  Furthermore, Weesageechak‟s 
ambivalent oscillation between guardian spirit and Weetigo look-alike mirrors the scientific 
labelling of foxes, which reflects deeply ingrained cultural traditions that see foxes as 
“incomplete, false,” “ambiguous” or “bad creature[s]” (Wallen 7), and her ever-changing, 
species-crossing names correspond with the difficulty of assigning a definite label to foxes 
(see Wallen 24-32).  The scientific name of arctic foxes in particular, Alopex lagopus, not 
only distinguishes them from other foxes who are designated as Vulpes and with whom they 
cannot interbreed, but it also curiously suggests that arctic foxes have “a hare‟s foot” (Wallen 
Schwalm  243 
26).  Thus, Weesageechak‟s disruption of scientific classifications combined with human-
animal-nonhuman boundary blurring and showgirl glamour appears distinctly magical realist. 
However, approaching both Fur Queen and Green Grass as magical realist texts—and 
the trickster as part of a magical realist fauna—is highly problematic.  After all, 
Weesageechak has always been there, whilst magical realism is a relatively recent arrival on 
the North American continent.  In the context of oral narrative interpretation, George L. 
Cornell warns of “literary imperialism” that re-labels traditional narratives with “convenient 
and familiar titles,” and stresses the importance of cultural context (175-6).  Indeed, both 
authors tell their stories from their own Cree or pan-Indian perspectives respectively, which 
determine the dominant mode of narration.  Fee and Flick argue that King‟s “overall strategy 
. . . subsumes European culture and history into an aboriginal framework” (136), and 
Ridington writes that “King presents a Native American perspective on the American literary 
and cultural canon” (343).  Likewise, Blanca Chester and Herb Wyile argue that Green Grass 
emphasises Native perspectives (Chester 46; Wyile 117) and creates “Native reality” (Chester 
59).  King himself points out that white readers are not his target audience.  He comments: “I 
really don‟t care about the white audience . . . . They don‟t have an understanding of the 
intricacies of Native life, and I don‟t think they‟re much interested in it, quite frankly” (qtd. 
in Weaver 57).  He explains further that, “[w]hen I do my Native material, I‟m writing 
particularly for a Native community.  That doesn‟t mean that I‟ve got a specific community 
in mind” (qtd. in Rooke 84).  More specifically, Green Grass is meant to focus on a larger 
Native community as “a kind of pan-Indian novel” (King qtd. in Gzowski 66). 
Indeed, critical attempts to class Green Grass as magical realism have been 
unconvincing thus far.  Ibis Gómez-Vega for example, discusses those events in Green Grass 
that cannot be explained from a Western point of view in terms of either “magic” or “magic 
realism,” in an analysis that attempts to separate apparently magical from supposedly realist 
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strands of the story.  The suggestion is that there is a “„real‟ story woven into the magical 
narratives,” but this approach is immediately hampered by the fact that the four Indians of the 
“„real‟ story” are both seemingly “over four hundred years old” and simultaneously look like 
women and men (Gómez-Vega 15).  Flick, too, suggests that there is a discernable realist 
narrative strand, when she refers to Alberta as “[t]he principal female character in the realist 
story” (144).  Notwithstanding the evident futility of attempting to ascertain a clear-cut 
separation between realist and magical narrative strands, worlds, or spaces, which tends to be 
impossible due to the mode‟s oxymoronic nature, the more pressing issue here is who judges 
what is “magic” to begin with.  Labelling these narratives “magic realist” may amount to the 
imposition of a Western positivist view that judges those phenomena to be “magic” or 
“impossible” that cannot be upheld by empirical observation.  However, calling either Green 
Grass or Kiss of the Fur Queen “magical realist” may not be tenable when these novels are 
considered in relation to their own cultural context, and such categorisations and labelling 
shift.  The authors themselves emphasise, after all, the contribution they make towards their 
own communities. 
This focus on community corresponds with the fact that Fur Queen, like King‟s 
novel, is determined by a Cree cultural universe, and is thus populated by those animals who 
are important to the Cree community in the narrative.  Highway‟s novel is characterised by 
what Highway describes in an interview with Heather Hodgson as “the Cree way of thinking: 
not hierarchical but communal . . . and simultaneous” (qtd. in Hodgson, original ellipsis).  
Hodgson‟s mother (identified only as “Mom”) highlights this point, which Highway, in 
response, strongly agrees with.  She says: 
Kiss of the Fur Queen is the closest thing to Cree that I‟ve ever read in 
English. You‟ve included in it the spirit world, Weesakeechak the Trickster, 
and many peoples‟ stories, all of which eventually connect at some point. You 
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also present time as we do in Cree time: as something that works in a circular 
way because the past and present inform each other. These things make the 
novel so very Cree to me.  (qtd. in Hodgson, “Survival Cree”) 
Accordingly, traits in Fur Queen that may look like magic realism to an outsider are, in fact, 
“so very Cree” instead.  Apart from the elusive trickster, polyphony and a circularity of time, 
this also includes the blurring of human-animal boundaries, interspecies communication, the 
relevance of dreams as part of everyday experience, and the everyday magic, so to speak, of 
nomadic life in the Manitoban landscape, for instance. 
Highway manages to convey the magical element of the Manitoban landscape through 
vivid descriptions of its beauty, which renders ordinary events into extraordinary experiences.  
He achieves this even without the frequent transition into myth and dreams, for instance.  
Yet, more than that, when Highway speaks of “that faith, that magic, that wonder,” he relates 
the quotidian experience of a lifestyle guided by traditional Cree beliefs.  “Magic” is 
therefore not simply a metaphor when Highway describes the “first six years of my life” as 
“magic.”  His account illustrates that an inextricable part of that magical experience, besides 
the security of growing up in a close-knit family shaped by the “love, dignity, and respect” of 
his parents, is the identification with the nomadic lifestyle of Cree hunters, and the human-
animal relationships it entails.  Highway‟s childhood was magical because he “had the 
trapline, the dog sleds, the caribou” (qtd. in Methot). 
Accordingly, Fur Queen portrays the animal practices of nomadic Cree with 
enthusiasm, such as the “trout that were the fattest in the world” (88-9), or the mushers and 
dogs who manage to withstand extraordinary conditions, “a hundred and fifty miles of 
freezing temperatures and freezing winds” for days without break (4).  This enthusiasm also 
includes native animal products, such as a “caribou-hide jacket sparkling magically” (69).  
Throughout the narrative, the primary identification of the Okimasis family is as an 
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“illustrious caribou-hunting family” (31), principally through the figure of Abraham 
Okimasis, who is frequently referred to as “hunter” and “caribou hunter,” but also as 
“fisherman” and “musher.”  These animal practices, however, involve elements that Western 
readers would consider supernatural and unreal, whereby the human-animal relationships 
depicted in Fur Queen reflect to a significant extent the interaction with, and 
conceptualisation of, animals by Rock Cree, as described by Brightman. 
Brightman makes the case that Algonquian conceptions of animals blur the boundary 
between technical, productive animal practices and religious practices.  Spiritual and practical 
concerns, including those that involve animals, are intimately linked (see Brightman 2-3).  As 
Brightman writes, hunting and religious practice are “conceptually distinct categories of 
human practice, but the animal as reactive other figures in both spheres” (3).  Accordingly, 
animals offer themselves to the hunter, when the hunter is in need, or, conversely, obstruct 
hunters by their own volition.  Hunting and trapping are thus “social interactions” with 
“reactive social others” (Brightman 2).  In Fur Queen, Champion‟s song, “Ateek, ateek, 
astum, astum, yoah, ho-ho!” (23), is a successful request to the caribou to offer themselves, 
which, furthermore, reflects what Brightman describes as “hunting medicine” (Brightman 
191).  Likewise, when Ooneemeetoo dances to Champion‟s tune, impersonating a young 
caribou, the sudden inexplicable appearance of a whole herd of caribou (see Fur Queen 41-
47) suggests that the children unwittingly performed an “operatio[n] employing imitative 
magic” (Brightman 191). 
Moreover, the caribou, traditional prey animals for Cree, continue to pervade the 
dreams of the boys throughout their lives, even when they live in the city, such as when 
Champion/Jeremiah dreams “of playing concerts to vast herds of caribou” (Fur Queen 79), or 
when Ooneemeetoo/Gabriel is so enchanted by the Royal Winnipeg Ballet dancers‟ 
performance that he imagines them as “a sea of moving antlers” (145).  The brothers‟ 
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translation of animal practices into art reflects what Highway describes as the creative 
influence of Weesageechak, whose arrival in Toronto he calls “a magical moment for the 
Native arts community” (qtd. in Hodgson, “Survival Cree”).  Significantly, Weesageechak is 
present in the city at all times, overseeing the brothers‟ inspirational moments, and guiding 
and influencing their dreams of art and caribou. 
The significance of dreams for the hunting society of the Rock Cree, and the 
occurrence of animals in their dreams, is extensively discussed by Brightman.  The 
“pawākan, or dream guardian,” whom some Cree identify as “an individual animal” 
(Brightman 170), appears to the dreamer in order to assist with hunting and trapping, decision 
making, predicting future events—sometimes even causing them—and understanding the 
past, to help with health issues, and generally to provide knowledge.  Highway explains: 
“Our spirituality comes from our dreamworld . . . We‟re very connected to everything else in 
that way. We acknowledge that the spirits of our ancestors are still with us, that they still 
walk this land, and are a very active part of our lives and our imaginations” (qtd. in Hodgson, 
“Survival Cree”).  He stresses the fact that “[o]ur dream visions affect our day-to-day lives 
and, certainly for North American Indian culture, our dream life is every bit as important as 
our physical, conscious life” (qtd. in Enright 224). 
Accordingly, the way the “showgirl” appears to Champion/Jeremiah in a dream is 
consistent with Cree beliefs, and Champion/Jeremiah‟s ignorance of who the “Cree 
chanteuse” is (Fur Queen 234) fits the typical dream patterns described by Brightman.  Her 
alternation between a human shape and her animal appearance as an arctic fox reflects the 
pawākan‟s repeated changing “between the human form and another with which the dreamer 
is familiar” in response to the dreamer‟s ignorance of the spirit guardian‟s identity.  
Furthermore, Brightman remarks that, “[i]n addition to appearing human physically, animals 
in such dreams may speak Cree, wear clothing, smoke tobacco, and live in houses” (170).  
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Thus, even Weesageechak‟s cigarette-smoking is not an instance of a realistic element 
included to ground the extraordinary in the ordinary, such as Remedios the Beauty‟s 
“flapping sheets” as she ascends into heaven (García Márquez, Solitude 221), but merely a 
detail within an overall Cree realist scene, so to speak.  Equally, Weesageechak‟s suggestion 
that she is merely a hallucination induced by alcohol grounds the phenomenon in the “real” 
as understood by Western readers and makes it plausible for them; however, the very fact that 
she herself proposes to be a drunken delusion, especially whilst drinking 
Champion/Jeremiah‟s whisky, makes a mockery out of the assertion.  Rather than an 
explanation, it is a tongue-in-cheek comment on Champion/Jeremiah‟s disbelief at seeing “a 
fox that could talk” (Fur Queen 232). 
This disbelief illustrates the degree to which Champion/Jeremiah is alienated from his 
culture.  Whilst opinions are divided as to the circumstances, the species, the kind of 
communication, or the historical period,
168
 talking animals as such, especially in those 
circumstances, would not be particularly surprising to Cree, as Brightman‟s interviewees 
indicate (see Brightman 161).
169
  Thus, it is a humorous exaggeration but not too far-fetched 
that Abraham Okimasis and Tiger-Tiger “had learned, over the seven years of Tiger-Tiger‟s 
eventful life, to communicate both with and without words.  This was fortunate because 
Tiger-Tiger‟s Cree vocabulary was limited, though he had learned to ask for „black coffee‟170 
on blizzardy Tuesday mornings” (Fur Queen 27-8).171  Similarly, the verbal battle between 
Ooneemeetoo/Gabriel‟s terrier Kiputz and a squirrel (see Fur Queen 94-5) would be entirely 
plausible to those Cree who believe that animals “[t]alk among themselves but not like 
people” (Brightman 161).  The fact that Champion/Jeremiah unquestioningly accepts some of 
the—for Westerners—extraordinary or unbelievable qualities of animals at least to some 
degree shows, however, that he is at all times, and despite the odds, the “caribou hunter‟s 
son” (Fur Queen 31, 59, 64).  As Brightman explains, “American Indian foragers ascribe to 
Schwalm  249 
their animal quarry intellectual, emotional, and spiritual characteristics paralleling in some 
respects those of human selves and persons” (2).  Correspondingly, the extraordinary abilities 
of “the remarkably intelligent Suitcase Okimasis,” his sister Chichilia‟s dog, for example, 
who “sniffed around his neck for a trace of broken vertebrae” after a fall (Fur Queen 26), are 
taken for granted by the siblings.
172
 
In contrast to Western scientific categorisations, Cree concepts of humans and 
animals cannot, as Brightman argues, “readily be arrayed as discretely bounded categories in 
sets of logically interrelated propositions” (35).  Indeed, Brightman‟s description of “Cree 
representations of the human-animal relationship” as “profoundly and perhaps necessarily 
chaotic and disordered” (3) matches Foucault‟s depiction of the heteroclite (discussed in 
Chapters One and Two).  Correspondingly, Brightman explains that “[t]he Cree human-
animal relationship is disordered both in the instability of the two categories and in the 
irreconcilable propositions about their interactions” (36), and that “[t]he human and animal 
categories are themselves continuous rather than discrete, and their interpenetration seems to 
preclude stable representations of causality or sociality in hunter-prey interactions” (3).173  
Such disorder is impossible to grasp from a Western perspective, yet, importantly, as 
Brightman proposes, it is not “a historically engendered chaos arising from the confrontation 
of the magic animals of Cree manitōkīwin with their mute and soulless counterparts in 
Western biology and scripture” (36).  Rather, he sees the origin of Cree concepts of humans 
and animals in prehistoric times, resulting from the variety of interactions between foragers 
and their prey, as well as in the belief that the earliest protoanimals possessed linguistic 
abilities and cultural attributes before humans even existed (41). 
Likewise, representations of animals, especially the trickster, in Fur Queen are not 
developed in contrast to Western concepts; rather, they were always already opposed.  This 
distinguishes them from carnivalesque inversions, which evolved as a response to social, 
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political, and ecclesiastical (usually Catholic) hierarchies on the European continent.  
Accordingly, when Kiputz thoroughly subverts what was an already subversive re-enactment 
of a Catholic mass by the Okimasis brothers, he does so not because of carnivalesque 
humour, for instance, that transfers authority from the priest to a dog.  Instead, Kiputz‟s 
agency and his non-compliance within the imposed hierarchy rest on the fact that he is “as 
Cree a dog as ever there was” (Fur Queen 94). 
Kiputz‟ Creeness is a further sign of the conceptually different understanding of what 
it means to be human or animal.  Brightman suggests that “the animal bodies men and 
women kill and eat are merely transient forms of beings whose continuing and unseen 
essence more closely approximates nihiðawīwin Cree-ness” (176), a state he describes as “the 
human state” (137).  Kiputz, in turn, brings Champion/Jeremiah‟s Creeness back to the 
surface after the boy has been coerced to suppress and forget Cree at the residential school 
and is unable to communicate with his family: 
Fortunately, before the week was out, Champion/Jeremiah experienced an 
epiphany.  At their fish camp on Mamaskatch Island one stormy evening, 
inside the tent, he tripped over Kiputz, causing him to burst out in a torrent of 
Cree expletives that shocked his mother.  From that moment, he chattered with 
such blinding speed that people could barely understand him.  (Fur Queen 67) 
Creeness thus forms an unseen connection between humans and “the animal,” whom Cree, 
Brightman proposes, understand as “different from me, and yet it is like me, as much like me 
as its ancestors were in the earliest time of the world” (36). 
Whilst this appears as disorder from a Western perspective, it is all part of a 
comprehensive, whole universe that makes sense from Cree perspectives.  Highway 
illuminates this position, “with a note of exasperation,” as Suzanne Methot observes, and 
explains: “English is so hierarchical.  In Cree, we don‟t have animate-inanimate comparisons 
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between things.  Animals have souls that are equal to ours.  Rocks have souls, trees have 
souls.  Trees are „who,‟ not „what‟” (Highway qtd. in Methot).  Animism, rather than magic 
realism, thus accounts for the living fur coats in Fur Queen, such as the “little white fox” on 
the collar of the Fur Queen‟s cape, who winks at Champion/Jeremiah (306), the “gorgeous 
pelt of arctic fox” whose “extremities remained so defiantly intact that its tail twitched” (193-
4), or the “litter of otters” on the shoulder of a “chunky matron” in front of the Okimasis 
brothers at the Winnipeg Royal Ballet performance, whose “cute little faces smiled at the 
boys, as though in recognition” (143). 
The matron‟s “steel-trap glare” (143), moreover, reconnects her fur coat with Cree fur 
hunters and trappers, who, indeed, might have been the Okimasis brothers themselves during 
one of their summer holidays with their family, as the animals‟ recognition suggests.  As 
Brightman explains, Cree believe that a trapped animal‟s “soul survives the killing to be 
reborn or regenerated” (187).  He relates, for example, how a Cree hunter killing a fox 
recognised the animal as “the same animal he had killed earlier the same winter,” and that 
“[f]reshly plucked porcupine quills were identified as „not dead yet‟” (24).  Brightman 
considers these instances “[e]vidence for persisting and very basic disparities between Cree 
and Western orientations toward animals” (24). 
 
“But I can be Very Useful”: 
Wild West Pests and Pastoralisation 
These disparities come to light further in regard to divergent concepts of the value of animals.  
As Methot writes, “Cree cosmology is at once complicated yet very simple. Everything is in 
balance, everything connects to something else, and nothing is without value.”  The question 
of value, and especially of use-value, is important here, as the Cree concept of animals, 
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described by Brightman as the “paradoxical status of the animal—that of a person who is also 
a use-value” (192), is markedly different from the Western capitalist view of “useful animals” 
as objects rather than subjects.
174
  James Serpell argues that in Western economies, a process 
of detachment is necessary for those involved in the slaughter of animals; that is, a physical 
distancing and a mechanisation of the process, which reduces the animal to “a mere cipher, a 
unit of production, abstracted out of existence in the pursuit of higher yields” (Company of 
Animals 192). 
The reason for this, Serpell suggests, is the generation of “feelings of guilt and 
remorse” on the part of the farmer (Company of Animals 187) if animals were considered “as 
subjects rather than objects; as persons rather than things” (Company of Animals 192-3).  
From a Cree point of view, no such objectification and de-valuing is necessary, but not 
because, as Serpell suggests, hunters already are detached from their prey with whom they 
never developed a social relationship and attachment over time (Company of Animals 187), 
but because the hunt is a reciprocal arrangement between hunter and prey animal.  Brightman 
explains, “the roles of human and animal are complementary, for each gives life to the other,” 
and the animal, who infinitely regenerates, “does not fear or resent the death” (Brightman 
187).  Thus, there is no moral dilemma in using the flesh and fur of an “animal person.” 
Such a difference between a view of animals as persons and of animals as production 
units is also reflected in Green Grass, where Ahab rejects Moby Jane as a “whale person” 
and is only interested in her as a useful animal.  As such, he considers her a resource for the 
production of oil and perfume, and to supply “a big market in dog food” (219).  Ahab 
explains that “[w]e only kill things that are useful or things we don‟t like” (219), a 
circumstance that alarms Coyote.  Coyote realises that he is a pest animal in a “world . . . full 
of Coyotes” (302), and as such readily replaceable like a “thing,” after he witnesses A.A. 
Gabriel‟s attitude towards women: “There are lots of Marys in the world, shouts A. A. 
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Gabriel as Thought Woman floats away.  We can always find another one, you know” (301).  
Throughout the narrative, Coyote rather anxiously tries to assert his value as an individual, 
and his usefulness as a Coyote, since the right to existence of so-called pest animals is denied 
on the basis of having no intrinsic value—even having a negative value—in a consumer 
capitalist society.  Therefore, he variously interjects: “But Coyotes are very useful” (219); 
“But I am very useful” (250); “I can be very helpful” (253), for example, and ironically 
misses the point entirely that being useful also means death when you are an animal—even a 
sacred animal, as Sandlos illustrates (see Sandlos 101). 
Sandlos‟ insightful exploration of Coyote‟s function in postcolonial narratives echoes 
these characteristics, but he goes beyond the predominant critical approach of discussing 
Coyote as a literary trickster figure only.  Sandlos sets the trickster qualities of Coyote firmly 
in the context of human-coyote relationships and, in contemporary terms, of the coyote as a 
pest animal.  He relates how Coyote has become an emblematic figure for North American 
writers (102, 108-15) and for artists relating to the North American context such as Joseph 
Beuys (166-7).  However, this relationship does not translate to settler-Coyote relationships 
outside of literature and art, where Coyote is considered a “garbage animal,” unsuitable for 
eating, and a “persistent „pest‟” in the eyes of livestock owners, as Sandlos writes (101).  
There are exceptions, such as a Canadian Wildlife Service document that admires the ability 
of coyotes not only to survive, but also to spread and multiply throughout North America and 
into urban landscapes, despite human efforts to contain and exterminate the species.  The 
document goes so far as to describe the coyote as “mocking” human attempts to dispose of 
the species (Canadian Wildlife Service qtd. in Sandlos 101).175  Sandlos convincingly argues 
for a clear correlation between coyotes, who transgress the spatial, social and other 
conceptual boundaries humans try to impose upon them, and Coyote as rule-breaking 
trickster. 
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Sandlos‟ description of “the coyote” as both biological and literary “pest animal” who 
resists domestication matches the characteristics of the magical realist animals discussed in 
preceding chapters.  As I have argued, their connection to, and reflection of, the real animals 
they represent provides these literary beasts with an agency that invigorates and animates 
magical realist narratives and resists Western concepts of order.  In relation to Coyote, 
Sandlos draws a direct parallel between settler livestock farmers and their view of coyotes as 
pests, and the relationship between Coyote and European pastoral poetry, and argues that the 
adoption of a trickster view of the world constitutes a rejection of “notions of harmony” 
projected by pastoral poetry and contrived by “pastoral/agricultural societies intent on 
homogenizing and controlling „their‟ immediate environment” (107). 
This idea is at odds with Horne‟s argument that King‟s Coyote in Green Grass is 
“aligned with settlers and their discourse” (Horne n.p.), albeit in order to satirise and critique 
settler discourse.  Horne‟s suggestion is a misconception which arises from the dialogue 
between “I” and Coyote.  For instance, “I” frequently instructs Coyote to “pay attention” 
(Green Grass 38, 107, 112, 218, 323), an utterance also directed at the reader, but it is, in 
addition, an attempt to call the chaotic trickster to order.  Whilst Coyote sometimes appears 
to be aligned with the reader,
176
 this, too, is a kind of trick.  In fact, Coyote manipulates and 
controls much of the sequence of events and storylines through his frequent interruptions and 
digressions.  The instances of his crossing over to side with the reader, so to speak, are only 
another example of Coyote‟s ambivalent role that calls definite boundaries into question.  
Besides, clear or exclusive alignment with settler discourse is ruled out by the fact that 
Coyote is also responsible for destroying the dam and the settlement at Parliament Lake, for 
example. 
Coyote‟s disruptions thus reflect the magical and maban realist subversions of Master 
texts, of authoritative control based on Cartesian subjectivity, and of pastoralism as a nation-
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building Myth of settlement.  The latter is perhaps nowhere more conspicuous than in King‟s 
representation of Alberta (the province, not the character).  His portrayal of the heavily 
farmed province is, as will be seen in the next chapter, markedly different from Robert 
Kroetsch‟s Alberta, for example, a landscape depicted as virtually reeking of cow farming.  
Also, Highway calls the province the “ranch land of Alberta” in his list of typical Canadian 
landscapes (“My Canada” 4).  Yet, if King describes the very same locale, then where, in 
Green Grass, are all those cows?  Indeed, Green Grass takes place in a landscape where the 
pastoral economy seems to have almost entirely vanished.  Whilst buffalo are, for example, 
part of the creation stories in Green Grass (38), mentioned as traditional Blackfoot food (60), 
and their almost complete extinction is hinted at when the rangers in First Woman‟s story 
“gallop off, looking for Indians and buffalo and poor people and other good things to kill” 
(76), King‟s landscape shows no trace of the introduction of European domestic cattle to 
Canada.  Cows are granted only minor entries in the novel, though not as an omnipresent, 
typical, and supposedly natural feature of the landscape, but they are an implied presence in 
the “large steak” Lionel wants to order at a hotel (66) and in Remmington‟s steak house, a 
symbol for settlement and the Wild West myth.
177
  They—and their offspring—are visible 
only as meat products. 
The pastoral—both as an ideal and as a process representative of settlement, as well 
as a primary motive for colonial conquest—is rejected here, as cows (the living, grass-eating 
variety) are relegated to the pages of the phone book, where they are listed under “artificial 
insemination” (Green Grass 195).  Paradoxically, Alberta (the person embodying the 
province) is the character looking up the entry, and both she and her mother Ada represent 
the only other “cows” in the narrative.  Thus, Alberta‟s father Amos repeatedly calls 
Alberta‟s mother a “cow” (94-5), and Alberta imagines herself in a cow‟s position when she 
ponders what artificial insemination might be like, a process she remembers as “mechanical” 
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from observing the vet using the procedure on cows in her childhood (195).  Coyote‟s 
rejection of the pastoral thus manifests itself in his replacing the artificial insemination of the 
“cow” Alberta with a more miraculous method.  Furthermore, both Ada and Alberta, as 
“cows,” represent motherly, protective and nurturing qualities, in contrast to a view of cows 
as production units, artificially reproduced for profit.  King‟s human and animal “cows” 
contrast community with capitalist economy, whereby community is the core that determines 
the narrative. 
In Fur Queen, similarly, the pastoral economy is only a minor concern, whereby the 
only cattle, apparently, are either white people at the ballet, whose “lowing” is comically 
imitated by the Okimasis brothers‟ “rumble” and polite mooing (Fur Queen 143), or the 
disneyfied, bellowing Indians at the party of Alodius Clear Sky, such as “Clarabelle Cow St. 
Pierre,” who confuse white culture with their own, and show bigotry and racism towards 
Champion/Jeremiah and, ironically, white culture (256).  Thus, Highway aligns introduced 
animals with introduced people, so to speak, and introduced culture.  Here, as in maban 
realism, for instance, the clash of animal practices is a marker for cultural difference and, 
moreover, for conflicting concepts of nature and how it is to be used or inhabited. 
Fur in particular illuminates the difference between subsistence practices and 
consumerism, revealed in the contrasting understanding of what use value means.  Highway‟s 
novel illustrates that animal products, such as goose down and fur, are necessary for survival 
for Cree trappers such as the Okimasis family, by describing the bitterly cold winters marked 
by “icy winds that blind and kill, through temperatures that freeze to brittle hardness human 
flesh exposed for fifty seconds” (Fur Queen 103).  Fur especially is “the sole winter source of 
life-sustaining income for the northern Cree” (103-4).  Highway contrasts these uses with fur 
as a luxury item, a decorative commodity to enhance the prestige of rich matrons with their 
“pearls, pink cashmere, and white fox stoles” (99), the destination for the pelts of the animals 
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trapped by Cree.  This frivolous use is juxtaposed with the “white, yellowed with age, 
polyester fur” coat of urban Natives (105), who, deprived of land and traditional lifestyle, are 
neither able to produce their own fur coats nor can they afford them as the consumerist status 
symbols they have become. 
Although traditional Cree beliefs in the “infinitely renewable bodies” of useful 
animals (Brightman 165) have, as part of the fur trade, tragically fed into a capitalist 
economy with vastly detrimental effects on various animal species,
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 capitalist concepts of 
animals, value, and usefulness are essentially in direct opposition to Creeness.  Indeed, in 
some instances, completely in contradiction to capitalist theories, Cree would deliver fewer 
pelts when they were paid more for them, because they focused on covering their needs rather 
than making profits (see Brightman 251-2).  Highway‟s use of the Weetigo to explain the 
mechanisms, or rather, the character, so to speak, of consumerism, further illustrates this 
opposition, because the greedy Weetigo‟s traits, Brightman writes, “comprise a systematic 
oppositional inversion of traits Crees understand as . . . the state of nihiðawīwin „Cree-ness‟” 
(137).  Whilst the shopping mall and its consumers are manifestations of the Weetigo, 
Champion/Jeremiah and Ooneemeetoo/Gabriel thus paradoxically not only resist the 
consumer capitalist culture it represents by being associated with Weesageechak who eats the 
Weetigo‟s insides, but they also show Weetigo tendencies themselves by the very same act, 
that is, excessive eating inside the mall‟s food court, where they join the “many people 
shovelling food in and chewing and swallowing and burping and shovelling and chewing and 
swallowing and burping, as at some apocalyptic communion” (Fur Queen 119-20).179  
Furthermore, consumerism is represented here as a kind of spiritual starvation that turns 
“mall-nourished” people (Hodgson) into “nonhuman” monsters. 
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The Greatest Dog and Pony Show on Earth: 
Consumerism, Cowboys, and Conquering Circuses 
King, too, uses the mall as the epitome of consumerist culture, especially as he chooses not 
just any mall, but the West Edmonton Mall.  It is not only “Alberta‟s most identifiable and 
controversial symbol” (Flick 151), but it has also achieved fame as the (erstwhile) “largest 
shopping center in the world” (Guinness Book of World Records qtd. in West Edmonton 
Mall, “WEM Trivia”; see also Flick 151).  However, when Charlie Looking Bear is 
“intrigued by the stunning three-bedroom condo in the West Edmonton Mall” (Green Grass 
431),
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 King does not only alert us to the mall as the “ultimate postmodern simulacrum, a 
world of commodified goods completely detached from the materials, modes of production, 
and waste that support it,” as Lousley observes.  He also constructs a connection between 
consumerism, circus entertainment, and the exoticisation of “Indians,” as the West Edmonton 
Mall is in fact known as “The Greatest Indoor Show on Earth,” as their logo reveals (West 
Edmonton Mall, “Homepage”).  This is both an explicit reference to the Calgary Stampede, 
marketed as “The Greatest Outdoor Show on Earth,” and an allusion to the circus, the origin 
of the rodeo, and the famous slogan used by Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey, “The 
Greatest Show on Earth.” 
Living inside the world‟s largest shopping mall, surrounded, as those readers familiar 
with the mall would recognise, by fun fair rides, sea lion performances and penguin, reptile 
and sea life shows (West Edmonton Mall, “More Attractions”), thus becomes a signifier, in 
King‟s novel, for inhabiting a space that is conceptualised not only in terms of excessive 
consumerism, but also in terms of circus entertainment.  The question arises as to what extent 
human inhabitants of the mall become sideshow or zoo exhibits themselves.  Moreover, the 
fact that the (actual, non-fictional) West Edmonton Mall curiously but proudly promoted 
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itself (as late as 2007) with an explicit allusion to British Imperial expansion—“It‟s true, the 
sun never sets on West Edmonton Mall!” (“More Attractions”)—reinforces the colonising, 
exoticising elements of the circensian living space portrayed in Green Grass.
181
  Whether the 
West Edmonton Mall‟s assertion was meant to be tongue-in-cheek or not, this context 
strengthens King‟s reference to the condominium in the mall as an allegory for the North 
American experience of “Indians in general,” because, as King explains, “[s]omewhere along 
the way, we ceased being people and somehow became performers in an Aboriginal minstrel 
show for White North America” (Truth about Stories 68). 
The “show” that takes place in Green Grass, however, is not quite circus and not 
quite rodeo; the circensian space in King‟s novel is most closely and explicitly aligned with a 
kind of entertainment that formed, historically, the transition between the two: the Wild West 
show.
182
  Thus, when Sergeant Cereno declares “Enough of this dog and pony show” (Green 
Grass 57), this is in fact exactly what he gets.  Significantly referred to as “Buffalo Bill 
Bursum” (44), Blossom‟s owner of Bill Bursum‟s Home Entertainment Barn epitomises the 
view of North America as an imaginary, circensian space populated by stereotypical 
“cowboys and Indians.”  His arrangement of television screens into the shape of North 
America, “The Map,” which he chooses especially for playing Westerns (293), presents a 
contemporary, cinematic version of the iconic “Wild West and Congress of Rough Riders of 
the World” show of Buffalo Bill Cody in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  His 
shows featured “classic „western‟ scenes, most of which entailed major roles for guns and 
large animals” (Grossman 2).  Along with hundreds of cheap novels and stories about his life 
(mostly imaginary rather than actual accounts),
183
 Buffalo Bill‟s show, with its displays of 
“yelling Indians” on pinto horses (“Cody, William F.”),184 significantly helped cement an 
image of the North American continent as the mythical Wild West, satirically branded as a 
pony show by King, in the North American and European imagination.
185  
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Larry McMurtry explains that “[s]omehow Cody succeeded in taking a very few 
elements of Western life—Indians, buffalo, stagecoach, and his own superbly mounted self—
and creating an illusion that successfully stood for a reality that had been almost wholly 
different” (138).  In fact, audiences accepted Cody‟s shows as an accurate re-enactment of 
history so much that one journalist, representative of many others, testified that “[i]t‟s not a 
show.  It is a resurrection, or rather an importation of the honest features of wild Western life 
and pioneer incidents to the East,” which represents “a most absorbing educational realism” 
(Pomeroy qtd. in McMurtry 138).  Likewise, the Montreal Gazette proclaimed: “The whole 
thing is real” (qtd. in McMurtry 138).186  In the simulated reality of Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West, 
Indians mounted on pinto ponies wore full feather headdresses and beaded jackets, attacked 
the pony express or stage coaches and abducted innocent white women, who were then 
rescued by dashing cowboys or a valiant cavalry.  Sam D. Gill points out that “[t]he show 
was a major influence in spreading the Plains costume and war-bonneted images that are still 
familiar” (122). 
Of course, this is not to say that horses, eagle feathers and other animals and animal 
products were and are not a significant part of Native cultural life.  King makes this clear in 
Green Grass, as, in their childhood, Eli, Norma and Camelot “would ride horses and chase 
each other across the prairies, their freedom interrupted only by the ceremonies” at the Sun 
Dance (49), and Portland Looking Bear, a Hollywood actor type-cast into stereotypical Indian 
roles, returns to the reservation to show “his son and the rest of the kids how to mount a horse 
without a saddle, how to ride bareback using just the mane and your hands, how to drop to 
the side of the horse so you couldn‟t be seen.  How to fall off” (202).  Alberta Frank teaches 
her university class about the importance of horses for survival of the southern Plains tribes 
in 1874, as the US Army “systematically went from village to village burning houses, killing 
horses, and destroying food supplies” in order to “forc[e] the southern Plains tribes onto 
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reservations. . . . Starvation and freezing conditions finally forced the tribes to surrender” 
(Green Grass 15).  Gill, moreover, points out the spiritual significance of horses in Sioux 
culture, for example, in economic, political and spiritual terms (120). 
However, a “pony show” with trick riding is all that is left visible of this culture and 
history to “Western” audiences.187  Accordingly, Buffalo Bill Bursum, watching a John 
Wayne western on The Map, sees a “spectacle of men and horses and weapons,” as the 
cavalry charges down the ridge to aid the besieged cowboys under attack from horse-
mounted Indians (Green Grass 244).  At the same time, Dr. Hovaugh, watching the same 
western on his TV, admires the “perfect symmetry of man and animal” as an Indian chief 
“spin[s] his horse around and around in the water” (246).  Part of the process by which Indian 
life, cultural practices and human-animal relationships are rendered into a commercialised 
spectacle (in the main for somebody else‟s profit) is highlighted by McMurtry‟s comment 
that the Indians in Buffalo Bill‟s shows were “much more gloriously feathered than they 
could have afforded to be back at the Red Cloud agency, or even in pre-Custer times” 
(139).
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Thus, culturally and spiritually meaningful ceremonies, objects and clothing have 
become circensian commodities, not much more than circus costumes and performances, in 
the eyes of Western spectators, regardless of whether they are actually set within an 
entertainment context or not.  This is brought to light when Alberta‟s father Amos Frank 
deals with US border guards, who confiscate his family‟s ceremonial dance outfits because 
they incorporate eagle feathers.  Finally allowed to pick up the dance outfits, Amos finds that 
they have been carelessly stuffed in “garbage bags,” damaged, and soiled by dirty boot prints.  
The patronising border official, however, appears completely oblivious of the significance of 
the ceremonial outfits or the sacredness of eagle feathers,
189
 and views Native ceremonies as 
nothing but entertainment: “„I‟ve been to a couple of powwows,‟ said the man.  „At the 
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Calgary Stampede.  Very colorful‟” (Green Grass 312-4).  The border official‟s emphasis on 
colour rather than meaning or human interactions reveals his view of Indians as pintoresque, 
so to speak, that is, as a two-dimensional and cinematic spectacle that just happens to be off-
screen sometimes. 
Accordingly, Indians, animals and animal products have become exotic, emblematic 
actors and props in the performance and production of a myth scripted by the invader culture, 
which, furthermore, still holds an astonishing currency.
190
  King comments that “the kind of 
Indian” people would “like to have” even today is “some 19th-century Native on a pinto pony 
in a teepee” (qtd. in Weaver 56), an expectation expressed by Clifford Sifton, who does not 
think that “real” Indians “drive cars, watch television, go to hockey games,” are university 
professors or “speak . . . good English” (Green Grass 156), and embodied by George 
Morningstar and his search for a “real Indian” (Green Grass 145).  It is also satirised by the 
Dead Dog Café‟s “ambience,” created by a menu of supposed dog meat and stereotypical 
Indian clothing that are nothing to do with Blackfoot cuisine or dress (Green Grass 116-7).  
These instances reflect the image created by Wild West shows and the accompanying novels 
which King calls “the literary Indian, the dying Indian, the imaginative construct” (Truth 
about Stories 34). 
King poses the question of how the myth of “the Indian” can have more currency than 
the real people, “Indians,” and argues that the imaginative construct is created and 
perpetuated by a wealth of commodities—such as brand names, sports mascots, western 
novels and movies—amongst which he specifically lists “the Calgary Stampede” and 
“Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West show” (Truth about Stories 54).  It is paradoxical, then, that 
Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West “served even to teach Native Americans how they were supposed to 
dress and act in conformance with their growing awareness of being Indians” (Gill 122).  Gill 
points out that one of the survival mechanisms for Plains Indian peoples was “to encourage 
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pan-Indian identity as much as possible and to develop traditions that were Indian in 
character.  Numerous political organizations and ceremonial practices like the powwow arose 
as a result” (123).  He argues that Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West also provided, at the same time, a 
space where “members of many cultures that had been enemies came together and found a 
common bond in their Indianness” (Gill 122).  Similarly, since its beginning, the Calgary 
Stampede has fulfilled the ambiguous role of providing a space for Native Canadians to keep 
their traditions alive whilst presenting them as part of the overall entertainment in the 
process.
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Thus, ironically, pan-Indian identity developed both as resistance to colonisation as 
well as in response to and by incorporating imposed Wild West representations.  In Fur 
Queen, this results in Champion/Jeremiah‟s confusion about the kind of event taking place 
when he walks into a pow wow: “Had he just walked into a Buffalo Bill Wild West 
extravaganza?  A John Wayne movie?  Where were the horses, the tired pioneers, the circle 
of dusty chuckwagons?” (171).  He can no longer separate stereotype and entertainment from 
meaningful cultural practice, and comments: “Disney Indians . . .  Hollywood Indians dress 
like that” (173).  In The Truth about Stories, King comments on the experience of always 
being regarded as entertainment, and writes: “But maybe being entertainment isn‟t so bad.  
Maybe it‟s what you‟re left with when the only defence you have is a good story.  Maybe 
entertainment is the story of survival” (89).  However, it does not appear as though North 
American Natives, on the whole, have had much choice in the matter of becoming 
entertainment in amongst the ponies for Western audiences.
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Accordingly, there is a sense in Green Grass whereby the Blackfoot characters simply 
cannot escape being entertainment.  For example, Lionel (“the lion,” as it happens) appears to 
be trapped in Bursum‟s Home Entertainment Barn, both through unfortunate circumstances 
and through his own indecision in regard to returning to university.  As his cousin Charlie 
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Looking Bear comments, “Lionel‟s never going to get out” (44).  Charlie himself, whose 
career as a highly paid lawyer only depends on the fact that he is a token Indian employed to 
deal with a sensitive case, is depicted as riding a battered old Pinto car instead of a pinto 
horse.  As the butt of a postmodern joke that plays on the commodification of Indian imagery, 
Charlie thus simulates the stereotypical Indian on a pinto pony as well as a stereotypical 
lawyer riding an expensive car, both of which are roles he can never quite fulfil.  Circensian 
roles, moreover, are doubly imposed upon Charlie‟s father Portland Looking Bear, who, as an 
actor, is already part of the entertainment industry.  However, since he does not look Indian 
enough for the movie directors, he is asked to wear a rubber nose to make him look more 
authentic.  Portland, in response, feels it would turn him into a clown, as clowns are “the only 
professionals he knew who wore rubber noses” (168). 
Portland‟s experience, like every other Indian character‟s experience in Green Grass, 
reflects the process at play in Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West, where, as Richard White explains, 
“[t]he show and lived historical reality constantly imitated each other” (29).  By re-enacting 
“white versions of events” in which they had actually taken part, the Native members of 
Buffalo Bill‟s troupe, “actual Indians . . . now inhabited their own representations” (White 
35).  White comments that “[t]his was the most complicated kind of mimesis.  Indians were 
imitating imitations of themselves” (35).  Karen, Eli‟s white partner, expresses the effect of 
this complicated intermingling of reality and representation in her first reaction to seeing the 
Sun Dance circle in the distance.  She says: “That‟s beautiful.  It‟s like it‟s right out of a 
movie” (Green Grass 227). 
However, it would be a mistake to think that Coyote, who lends a paw in fixing the 
world by dancing a little and singing a little (see Green Grass 450-51, 455-56), performs on 
those terms, as King adds another layer to such Wild West realism and, in turn, presents an 
Indian version of Indian imitations of white versions of events in which Indians have actually 
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taken part.  Accordingly, the show is presented entirely on Native terms, as Coyote takes 
control of the imposed Wild West circus and turns the pinto pony spectacular into the 
subversive dog and pony show Cereno is concerned about.
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  In fact, Cereno‟s comment 
comes shortly after Coyote‟s first appearance as a “yellow dog . . . sniffing at the rear tire” of 
Babo‟s Pinto (20).  The supposed dog‟s intervention animates the car, a consumer commodity 
with a Wild West name, to become a magical agent throughout the narrative.  Moreover, 
Coyote‟s dancing gives meaning to several characters‟ searches for their Indian/Blackfoot 
identity beyond imposed representations and expectations.  Cheryl Lousley comments that 
Coyote‟s part as a subversive dancer in Green Grass is a recognition of “the agency of the 
oppressed,” that is, the “agency of marginalized people, nonhuman animals and supernatural 
events/beings/places.” 
Goldman argues that King‟s focus on the circular represents a replication of “the 
structure and rhythms of the Sun Dance” rather than a postmodern manoeuvre (35).  Thus, 
the Sun Dance provides the vital underlying framework, whereas the circus arena‟s insidious 
influence on Native Americans‟ lives is mocked, the ridiculousness of its portrayal of “the 
Indian” as exotic entertainment exposed, and its frivolity is turned against itself under the 
influence of trickster humour.  At the same time as Coyote determines much of the course of 
the narrative, or causes some of its diversions and unexpected turns, the four old Indians—the 
other tricksters or trickster, or other shape of the trickster (one can never be sure)—“fix” the 
world by changing the predictable plot of the western played on TV and Bursum‟s Map.  
Thus, part of the horse act, so to speak, is simply dismissed as the cavalry mysteriously 
vanishes “[j]ust like that” (Green Grass 357), causing John Wayne‟s and Richard Widmark‟s 
characters to lose the battle to the Indians. 
Furthermore, King indicates that the other “dog,” namely Lionel Red Dog, will take 
matters into his own hands eventually (hands rather than paws here).  Accordingly, Lionel 
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shows first signs of becoming the ringmaster of the dog and pony show, rather than 
remaining the exotic lion/dancing dog, or perhaps even the “well-read dog,”194 trapped in 
Bursum‟s Home Entertainment Barn forever.  Still looking “like a goose at full gallop” on his 
way to Bursum‟s shop (Green Grass 308), Lionel is comically clueless of the fact that, on the 
day of his fortieth birthday, he is indeed closely aligned with, if not curiously the same as, 
Coyote.  In fact, his “gold blazer had turned brown” like a dog‟s coat, and he “smelled like a 
wet dog” upon his arrival at the Home Entertainment Barn (327).  Like the supposed yellow 
dog at the beginning, Lionel, too, is “making a puddle” (328), albeit (thankfully) by different 
means.  Coyote‟s sulky comment, “I‟m fine . . . . That‟s how I am” (329), echoes Lionel‟s 
earlier impression that he is not taken seriously and his equally sulky response to Norma, 
“Doing just fine” (186).  Moreover, Coyote is “also wet” like Lionel, who is “dripping water 
on the floor” of the shop, and who is worried by “the disturbing feeling that if he moved, 
things would begin to unravel” (330), just as Coyote‟s dancing unravels the order of things. 
As this scene is intertwined with a conversation about relatedness and relations, 
Lionel‟s connectedness, or relatedness, with Coyote and indeed all of creation is further 
reinforced by the Lone Ranger‟s response to Lionel‟s assertion that the four old Indians are 
“not really relations”: “Everyone‟s related, grandson” (Green Grass 330), the Lone Ranger 
replies.  After all, not only are Lionel and Coyote evidently “family” through Lionel‟s family 
name, the phrase “all my relations” or “all my relatives,” alluded to several times throughout 
the narrative, is spiritually significant in certain rituals and refers to the inter-connectedness 
of humans with the rest of the cosmos, including animals.
195
  It is through Coyote that Lionel 
will eventually gain the strength to take control, which is foreshadowed when Lionel re-
examines his life and looks in the mirror on the morning of his fortieth birthday: “It hurt his 
eyes, but mostly he did not want to look at what he had become—middle aged, overweight, 
unsuccessful.  But today he flicked out a hand like a whip and snapped the light on.  The 
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effect was startling and much worse than he imagined” (263-4).  Lionel wields the 
ringmaster‟s whip in order to turn on the light, a significant reference again to Coyote, who 
does the same later on (see 256-7), but his surprised response indicates that he is not yet 
ready to accept the responsibility.  At the end of the novel, Lionel is still undecided, and the 
reader remains unconvinced that he will ever take charge of his own life. 
However, in another comic twist, readers of Green Grass, Running Water‟s sequel, 
Truth and Bright Water, find out that Lionel does more than that, as Blossom then features 
“Lionel‟s Home Entertainment Barn,” owned by “an Indian guy who looks sort of like John 
Wayne, only not as heavy.”  As the protagonist‟s father explains dryly, “Indian guy owns this 
. . . . White guy went bankrupt a few years back and had to sell it.  Now that‟s funny. . . . Not 
many times you see that happen” (King, Truth and Bright Water 87).  Lionel‟s success 
signifies a subversion of conquest in a wider sense, whereby Indians manage to get rid of 
Buffalo Bill and the Myths he stands for, and take over the “show” entirely.  Western 
entertainment, the enactment of the taming and domestication of the Wild West, is turned 
upside-down and used to mock itself.  Thus, as Buffalo Bill (Bursum) is the one who loses 
out in the end, Native community, characters and cosmology are not marginalised at all; 
instead, it is the Western—or rather the Wild Western—world view that is pushed to the 
margin. 
 
Categorising Trickiness: 
Magical Realism or Contemporary Trickster Narrative? 
Ultimately, the apparent alternation, cross-over and borrowing between magical realism and 
trickster narrative in both Fur Queen and Green Grass does not shed light on whether these 
novels should be classed as one or the other.  Shawna Thorp argues for a “distinctive genre” 
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she calls “enactment narratives” (147), in which “the rules of operation are not those defined 
by the colonizers, but by specific Native belief systems” (149).  Fur Queen certainly matches 
Thorp‟s description of the genre.196  Discussing Ceremony by Leslie Marmon Silko and 
Nightland by Louis Owens, Thorp argues that this is a distinct category of Native writing 
characterised by a “convergence of present and mythic time” (152).  Thorp uses the term 
“myth” as a narrative “situated within a particular belief system,” the reality of which is 
reaffirmed “as lived experience” through enactment narratives (148).197  In this way, 
characters enact the myths of their specific culture to such an extent that “they merge and 
become identical” with their “mythic predecessors,” or else, they find themselves in similar 
situations (Thorp 148). 
Accordingly, the Okimasis brothers enact the myths of the “Weasel‟s new Fur Coat” 
and the “Son of Ayash,” which Sam McKegney considers “the Cree tale forming the novel‟s 
spiritual backdrop” (“From Trickster Poetics to Transgressive Politics” 93).  The latter strings 
its way through the narrative, not only as stage performance of Champion/Jeremiah‟s play, 
for example, but also in day-to-day life, as Mariesis Okimasis, in mending 
Ooneemeetoo/Gabriel‟s “ballee sleeper” and “quash[ing] a pig snort” (Fur Queen 194), 
represents an animal like those who fix Ayash‟s “damaged moccasins” (Brightman 38-9).198  
However, myth, in Fur Queen, means not only “ancient stories” that define “contemporary 
space” and “overlay present experiences” (Thorp 148).  Abraham Okimasis‟ legendary dog 
sled race win is not an ancient story, but an event still remembered by those who witnessed it.  
It becomes legendary by its transformation into a contemporary myth, which is then 
corroborated by his sons, as each son enacts the myth in his own way (see Fur Queen 213-4, 
303-6).
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Thorp points out that the choice between “scientific and culturally based 
explanations” in enactment narratives “might also suggest an alliance with magical realism” 
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(163).  She argues emphatically against such a designation, however, and maintains that the 
privileging of specific tribal perspectives “transcend[s] the conventions of that form” (163).  
By contrasting enactment narratives directly with Slemon‟s approach to magical realism, she 
proposes that enactment narratives “do legitimize one system over the other”; there is, she 
says, “no battle” between “Euro-American and Native American epistemologies” (164).  
Therefore, according to Thorp, enactment narratives make “a clean break with the genr[e] of 
magical realism” and “create a world in which the beliefs of the colonizer are invalid and 
have no effect” (162).  The Okimasis brothers‟ rejection of Catholicism in favour of Native 
spirituality in the final scene of the novel certainly suggests this.  Thorp stresses, moreover, 
the importance of “audience and reception,” as “enactment narratives displace readers who 
approach such texts from outside the tribal perspective” (164).  However, although 
Highway‟s overarching cosmology is distinctly Cree, this does not mean that other systems 
of representation, meaningful to non-Cree, do not come into play. 
Indeed, Highway borrows significantly from European systems of representation, 
such as Greek myth and classical music.  The division of the different parts of the novel in 
terms of musical tempi gives prominence to European classical music, a genre that Highway, 
a trained classical musician and composer, deliberately transforms into fiction (see 
Shackleton and Lutz 82-4).  This European influence, however, is intermingled with the 
sounds of the Manitoba landscape: 
Across the lake, a lone wolf raised its howl, the string of notes arcing in a 
seamless, infinitely slow, infinitely sad glissando, then fading into silence, 
leaving the hearts of its listeners motionless with awe.  Then two wolves 
joined the first in song.  One of Abraham‟s dogs, tethered to trees behind the 
tent, answered, then a second dog, and a third, until a chorus of weeping souls, 
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as if mourning for one irretrievably lost, filled the night air . . . .  (Fur Queen 
31) 
This is accompanied by Mariesis sighing “like the cooing of a ptarmigan” (35) and a dog 
called “Cha-La-La” (25), for example, and interjected by discordant sounds such as “the 
ticking of watches, the buzzing of incandescent lights, the hum of loudspeakers” (9), the 
“English dirge” of the cannibal-like priest (227) and “this queer new language [English] that 
sounded like the putt-putt-putt of Happy Doll Magipom‟s pathetic three-horsepower outboard 
motor” (52).  Highway thus uses humans, animals and technology as his musical instruments 
to create a piece that incorporates Native and non-Native elements, which all constitute 
significant parts of the composition overall. 
Furthermore, the “Odyssean sirens” (Fur Queen 117), or “Ulysses‟ sirens” (121), that 
provide the background music in the shopping mall indicate the inclusion of Greek 
mythology within an overarching Cree context.  Thus, Champion/Jeremiah encounters a 
“Cyclops” on his way to “a palace afloat on a nighttime sea” (105), and, like Odysseus 
pretending to be “no-one” (“mē-tis” in Greek) in order to escape the man-eating Cyclops 
Polyphemus (see Barnouw, 58), Champion/Jeremiah tries to turn himself into a nobody, as it 
were, by “will[ing] his body dead” (Fur Queen 205) and denying his Cree roots to avoid 
being consumed by the Weetigo.  More overtly, though, Champion/Jeremiah‟s play “Ulysses 
Thunderchild” is about the „Son of Ayash‟, the “„[c]losest thing the Cree have to their own 
Ulysses,” as he tells his brother (277). 
Highway also cunningly connects Greek mythology and the trickster Fox, ironically 
through cunning, “mētis” in Greek, itself: Zeus‟ first wife Mētis, a cunning shapeshifter (see 
Wallen 43-4) and mother of Athena, the patroness of Odysseus, is eaten by Zeus (see Tiles 
387), while the fox in “Greek consciousness” has mētis (Tiles 387).200  Champion/Jeremiah‟s 
reflection of Odysseus‟ pun on mē-tis, “nobody,” used to trick the Cyclops, thus alludes to his 
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transformation towards either becoming a victim of the cannibalistic monster, or embodying 
the Fox‟s cunning.  The  pun on "Métis," the First Nation incorporating European ancestry, 
moreover, ultimately enables the incorporation of the Greek cannibalistic myth and the 
cunning Fox of European traditions into Highway‟s contemporary trickster narrative.  The 
connection is strengthened further by the close association of  mētis with the knowledge 
needed for hunting and fishing (Detienne and Vernant 44-47).  Mētis, moreover, is by nature 
"multiple" and "shifting," as "[i]t bears on fluid situations which are constantly changing and 
which at every moment combine contrary features and forces that are opposed to each other" 
(Detienne and Vernant 20), which suggests an intriguing compatibility with both magical 
realism and the North American trickster. 
Accordingly, whilst the access of non-Native readers is certainly limited, they are, 
however, not excluded.  Highway comments: “I think I‟ve studied enough Western and other 
art to have achieved a level of sophistication where I write beyond the specifics of my 
aboriginal background and get to the universal human condition” (qtd. in Enright 223).  
Correspondingly, Wyile points out that Green Grass “speaks to non-Native readers as well as 
Native readers” (121).  Indeed, Louis Owens finds that hybridisation is a general feature of 
contemporary Native American novels, which privilege “the comparatively small audience” 
of Native readers (14).  This hybridisation, he argues, is a response to the circumstance that, 
“[w]hile writing for the Indian reader, the Indian novelist who desires publication must also 
write for the non-Indian” (14).  Thus, the resulting “richly hybridized dialogue” is “aimed at 
those few with privileged knowledge—the traditionally educated Indian reader—as well as 
those with claims to a privileged discourse—the Eurocentric reader” (Owens 14).  I propose 
that magical realism is part of this hybridisation process in Fur Queen and Green Grass.  As 
such, it is incorporated into the polyphony of the contemporary trickster narrative as one of 
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“many people‟s stories,” or rather, as one of many ways of telling stories, “all of which 
eventually connect” (to use the words of Hodgson‟s mother again). 
 
Convergence 
Accordingly, although the circus, an imposed, colonial form of entertainment in the shape of 
the Wild West show, is critiqued in both novels, the carnivalesque spirit of circensian spaces 
converges with the trickster in a way that appears effortless and natural, as it were.  
“Convergence,” in a biological sense, is “[t]he tendency in diverse or allied animals or plants 
to assume similar characteristics under like conditions of environment.”  These conditions 
and characteristics are captured by Larry Ellis, who describes the trickster as “[s]traddling the 
juncture of two worlds [in such a way that] he belongs to neither and yet to both, and if his 
behavior confounds us, it is because we see in him the apparent confusion that characterizes 
the marginal/liminal landscape” (56).  Both Coyote/Weesageechak and magical realist 
animals inhabit liminal landscapes, albeit of different cultural origins. 
These landscapes are literally polyphonic in Fur Queen, which resounds with the 
music of human and animal voices, and Owens, who finds Bakhtin‟s theories “ubiquitously 
useful,” observes the pertinence of the “dialogic process” to Native American narratives (6).  
Correspondingly, Carlton Smith argues that Green Grass engages the reader in a 
“collaboration” akin to Bakhtin‟s concept of “heteroglossia,” which encourages readers “to 
become members of a community engaged in telling, hearing, retelling, contradicting, and 
reweaving, rather than in simply receiving” (Smith 531).  I suggest that one of the most 
important elements shared between King‟s and Highway‟s novels and their respective readers 
of Native and non-Native backgrounds is subversive laughter, springing from both trickster 
subversions and carnivalesque elements, and although Native cultural contexts may not be 
understood by Western readers, subversive laughter as such is universal and, to a large extent 
Schwalm  273 
at least, recognisable to all.  By appropriating the carnivalesque for their purposes, King and 
Highway enable us to laugh, however painfully at times, at ourselves.  Owens finds that 
Bakhtin‟s description of laughter, which “demolishes fear and piety before an object, before a 
world, making of it an object of famliar [sic] contact and thus clearing the ground for an 
absolutely free investigation of it” (Bakhtin qtd. in Owens 226), is “a precise definition of the 
humor and method of the Native American trickster” and “a remarkably accurate description 
of a raven examining and dissecting an object of interest” (Owens 226). 
Animality is often at the heart of such subversive humour, specifically the 
transgression of human-animal boundaries, and the foregrounding of the animality of humans 
on the level of sexuality, scatology, and the body more generally.  Accordingly, the trickster 
and the carnivalesque share certain types of humour based ons overtly sexual references and 
irreverent, even blasphemous jokes otherwise unacceptable under normal circumstances, such 
as Coyote‟s impregnation of Alberta in allusion to the Virgin Birth, his comment on bestiality 
(see Green Grass 160), and the suggestion of a lesbian relationship between Changing 
Woman and Moby-Jane (see 248-9).
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  Furthermore, as Fee and Flick point out in relation to 
Green Grass, scatology is “part of Native subversive humour” (137).  Indeed, in Fur Queen, 
carnivalesque humour responds to the “very visceral, physical . . . instinctual language” of 
Cree, the “laughing language,” as Highway describes it (qtd. in Hodgson).  In Highway‟s 
novel, the scatological and irreverent instances of humour are thus recognisable, and 
recognisably subversive, to Western readers, too, albeit from a different perspective.  The 
funniness of these instances may therefore arise either from a carnivalesque or a Cree world 
view, or in some cases, from an indigenised version of the carnivalesque. 
For example, Eemanapiteepitat, at the arrival of the Okimasis brothers (Fur Queen 
186-191), represents such a liminal space where carnivalesque excesses, Cree humour and 
Creeness intermingle, and trickster and circensian animals converge.  Accordingly, 
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Eemanapiteepitat includes, for instance, inhabitants who “fight like Tasmanian devils,” 
“tricycles and bicycles . . . with four, five, twenty-one children balanced circus-like on their 
seats, backs, handlebars,” “the inhumanly tall Magimay Cutthroat,” an aircraft landing “in 
flawless Cree,” a “crowd . . . like mosquitoes,” “ants” and “bees,” and a leaking colostomy 
bag.  The small procession of the brothers, friends and family parodies a Catholic procession 
with Champion/Jeremiah leading the way.  He is imagined to wear a cassock, “one of those 
long black skirts,” accompanied by “a chorus of yowling mongrels,” and contemplating the 
lionising of a singing nun.  Moreover, carnivalesque irreverence, circensian human-animal 
boundary blurring, subversion of church hierarchies, scatological humour, the visceral 
humour of the Cree language, and postcolonial resistance to the oppressive Weetigo priests 
are united in Father Bouchard‟s “bell-like poot.”  The portrayal of the “nether-region sotto 
voce,” accompanied by Annie Moostoos‟ curse of Kookoos Cook (“you fuckin‟ goddam 
bleedin‟ caribou arsehole”), and emerging from a “club sandwich of humans” which leaves 
“the learned, elevated cleric” at the bottom of the pile (189), represents a scene that, from 
whichever cultural background it is understood, always leaves the priest as the butt of the 
joke. 
On the level of the carnivalesque, at least, the ridiculing of church authorities—such 
as the Okimasis brothers‟ enactments of Catholic rituals, which are frequently undermined by 
Creeness, the interjection of the Cree language, or animals—is also instantly recognisable to 
those familiar with carnival in other predominantly Catholic regions of the world.
202
  An 
example are the mock funerals held all over the Rhineland on the last day of the carnival and 
before repentance on Ash Wednesday, when the Nubbel, an effigy of a man, is burnt as a 
scapegoat for the sins of the past few days of revelry.  These carnival ceremonies, too, 
combine the irreverent with the scatological.  Recalling, for instance, the blessing of the 
mourners at the Nubbel’s funeral with supposed holy water, sprayed onto the congregation by 
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a toiletbrush-wielding priest, I can relate to the kind of humour depicted by the Okimasis 
brothers‟ celebration of mock Mass.  King and Highway create hybrid narrative spaces where 
stories of this kind converge, and are incorporated, shared and indigenised. 
The process at play is described by Owens, who writes: “[T]he writer is appropriating 
an essentially „other‟ language and thus entering into dialogue with the language itself.  The 
result of this exquisite balancing act is a matrix of incredible heteroglossia and linguistic 
torsions and an intensely political situation” (15).  Through the appropriation of convergent, 
formally similar elements, it becomes impossible to tell whether a phenomenon such as the 
animated Pinto is an instance of magical realism, as Goldman suggests (32), or a result of 
animism, or both.  Non-Native readers, at least, are thus put into a position of having to 
constantly question their ways of looking, their preconceptions and stereotypes, and their 
relationship to the narrative.  Interrogating the way we look at animals goes some way 
towards addressing these issues; however, because of the convergence of confusingly similar 
liminal fauna, these remain ultimately irresolvable. 
 
Conclusion 
Like magical realism, the trickster is inherently oxymoronic, and Sandlos‟ conceptualisation 
of “the Trickster-paradox” as “disharmonized harmony,” “both a pattern and an anti-pattern; 
a rigid code and an expression of imaginative possibility” (106) might just as well be a 
description of the magical realist mode.  Highway‟s and King‟s tricksters fit the description 
of the trickster by Kimberley Blaeser, who writes that she-he is “[n]ot a composite, which is 
made up of distinct and recognizable parts, but a complex, which is one unit whose makeup is 
intricate and interwoven” (Blaeser qtd. in Wyile 111).  Though Sandlos warns that Coyote‟s 
“contradictory nature and locally-colored personality resists universalizing academic 
interpretations” (102), I suggest that this in itself is approaching a definition, albeit a 
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contradictory one.  Gill ‟s comment, that “[i]t seems that the only dependable characteristic 
for the trickster is that he defies clear definition” (19), reveals a further remarkable similarity 
to magic realism as a whole, which I propose is defined by its indefinability and its inherent 
resistance to classification; at best, a definition of the mode can only be approximated. 
For example, magical realism‟s essentially oxymoronic character whereby two or 
more systems of representation hold equal balance is not necessarily absolutely unique to the 
mode.  Conversely, texts that can be regarded as “magical realism” frequently can be, and 
are, classed under a different name, such as “postmodern,” “postcolonial,” “surreal” and so 
on and vice versa, to state the most obvious and frequent choices.  The contentious issue of 
what constitutes “magic” complicates the matter even more, leaving the mode open to re-
interpretation from other cultural perspectives.  King and Highway negotiate their readers‟ 
different points of view, shaped by different cultural lenses, as well as the cross-cultural 
influences of contemporary Canada, through the convergence of trickster narrative with the 
carnivalesque, and of the trickster with magical realist animals.  At the same time, Coyote‟s 
appropriation of the circus on Native terms reminds readers that these circensian spaces are, 
to borrow Hodgson‟s expression, firmly planted “in Native soil.”  In this way, King‟s and 
Highway‟s contemporary trickster narratives create a space where stories and subversive 
laughter can be shared without trivialising the content, whilst Weesageechak remains elusive 
to capture as much as magical realist animals do. 
Moreover, due to their boundary-crossing nature and in the context of animism, these 
feral texts themselves appear to behave like tricksters and play with literary critics who 
cannot domesticate them, so to speak, under one single paradigm.  Instead, feral narratives 
seem to continue to breed even more monsters—popular and attractive ones, nonetheless.  
The impression of being mocked in the attempt of defining genres and categorising particular 
narratives, such as Green Grass and Fur Queen, arises, I propose, directly and deliberately 
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out of the material itself.
203
  Magical realism, or a version thereof, or something that looks a 
lot like it, appears at its most animated here due to its feral spirit.  Accordingly, I propose that 
“Magical Realism?” is a feasible label for Green Grass and Fur Queen with, however, an 
indispensable question mark (which looks suspiciously like a Coyote hair).  I concede that 
this term may be rejected as much as embraced, but maintain that it makes sense in the 
context of the role that animals play in the arena of international book fairs—even if only 
there.  And if such a conclusion appears ludicrous, I blame the trickster.  Coyote really is very 
useful sometimes.
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Chapter Five 
Dances with Cows: 
Domestication and Settlement in What the Crow Said, The Invention of the 
World and The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne 
So far, the analysis of material animal practices and human-animal relationships has shown 
that magical realism, borrowed from Latin America and employed in the context of British 
settlement, is inherently subversive of European Enlightenment concepts of what it means to 
be human.  The notion that humans and animals are separate beings, divided by taxonomic 
categories, is thoroughly ridiculed—through animist trickster narratives and carnivalesque 
mockery, for example.  Likewise, the supreme position of a white, male, European subject, 
the “ordering” of the natural world through Eurocentric science, and the idea of improving 
the land by pastoral settlement are questioned and exposed as ideological constructs.  
Settlement has been thoroughly unsettled by feral narratives that make use of, appropriate,  
interrogate and undermine what Belsey calls the “hierarchy of discourses of classic realism“ 
(92). 
The previous chapter featured the transgressive Native Canadian trickster, whose 
convergence with magical realist ferality exposed the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
classifying magical realist narratives with certainty.  Disruptive of pastoral settlement and 
ideals, the trickster brings not only the ordering of nature into disarray, but he also confounds 
the nature of ordering, so to speak: feral texts cannot be domesticated by applying a 
universally valid system, it appears.  Classification and domestication of narratives is also a 
concern in three Canadian novels by two authors from a European settler background:  
Robert Kroetsch‟s What the Crow Said, and Jack Hodgins‟ The Invention of the World and 
The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne.  These novels include elements familiar from Latin 
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American magical realism and prominently feature representations of animals and animality 
alongside unusual events and characters.  What the Crow Said begins with the impregnation 
of Vera Lang by a swarm of bees, who, subsequently, are blamed for the many extraordinary 
occurrences that follow.  These include the arrival of a speaking crow in the town of Big 
Indian after the birth of JG, Tiddy Lang‟s silent son; the seemingly supernatural connection 
between JG and the crow; frost and snow in summer; an almost endless game of cards; the 
appearance of Vera‟s pig-Latin speaking son, who was raised by coyotes; the Indian Joe 
Lightning‟s flight with a giant eagle and his resulting fall from the sky.  The enigmatic “War 
against the Sky” is fought by Gus Liebhaber, the printer of the local newspaper, who fires 
bees at the sky with a circus cannon, in order to win the love of Vera‟s mother Tiddy. 
Hodgins‟ The Invention of the World follows the events surrounding Donal 
Keneally‟s cult in British Columbia, founded with followers from the Irish village 
Carrigdhoun, where he grew up.  He reigns with absolute power over his colony, 
manipulating and controlling his disciples with cheap magic tricks and by instilling fear.  
Ultimately, his rule is challenged, and Keneally dies in a collapsed tunnel.  His ashes are 
finally returned to his birthplace in Ireland by Maggie Kyle, who, years after Keneally‟s 
death, runs a trailer park in the same place as the former colony.  For Maggie, the journey to 
Ireland becomes a spiritual journey that illuminates her path in life, and her sense of 
belonging and identity.  Keneally, as the embodiment of evil, however, is vanquished.  
Hodgins‟ second novel, The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne recounts the events between the 
flooding of the small town Port Annie by a tidal wave, and its destruction by a landslide.  A 
beached whale is said to have transformed into Fat Annie Fartenburg, the founder of the 
town, and an old man, Joseph Bourne, is brought back from death by a woman from a 
Peruvian freighter washed up by the tidal wave. 
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Geert Lernout points out García Márquez‟ particular influence on both authors: 
“Kroetsch and Jack Hodgins read Cien años while they were working on What the Crow Said 
and The Invention of the World respectively” (52).  Indeed, Robert Kroetsch once explained 
that what he admires about García Márquez is that “[h]e nips at the heels of realism and 
makes the old cow dance” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 132).  This image 
inadvertently connects magic realist writing with animal entertainment, agriculture and 
domestication.  This chapter explores the ways in which pastoral settlement influences 
Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ animal imagery and the classification of their respective novels as 
“magical realism.”  Both authors, I suggest, harness magical realism and domesticate ferality 
to naturalise settlement and recover enlightenment ideas of what it means to be human from 
the posthuman animality of circensian spaces. 
 
Local Flavour, Global Appeal: Canadian Mythologies and Multicultural Magic 
Robert Kroetsch‟s What the Crow Said and Jack Hodgins‟ The Invention of the World are 
considered magical realist by a number of critics.  Stephen Slemon, for example, discusses 
both The Invention of the World and What the Crow Said in an attempt to clarify the “concept 
of magic realism in a postcolonial context” (409); Stanley E. McMullin rates What the Crow 
Said as “the best example of prairie magic realism” (19); Robert Lecker associates Kroetsch‟s 
novel with “the kind of „magic realism‟ that is frequently identified with contemporary South 
American fiction” (Robert Kroetsch 97); and Robert Rawdon Wilson discusses the relevance 
of this mode usually associated with Latin American writing to the Albertan setting of What 
the Crow Said (see “On the Boundary”; “Metamorphoses”) .  J‟nan Morse Sellery states that 
Kroetsch “exploit[s] myth and magic realism” (21), and Martin Kuester calls What the Crow 
Said “Robert Kroetsch‟s flirt with magic realism” (148).  Geoff Hancock closely links 
Canadian “magic realists” such as Kroetsch and Hodgins with Latin American writers, and 
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enthusiastically compares García Márquez‟ Macondo with Hodgins‟ Vancouver Island 
(“Magic or Realism” 44).  Suzanne Baker regards both Kroetsch and Hodgins as “prime 
examples” of what she identifies as “a significant body of magic realist writing” in Canada 
(“Binarisms” 83). 
Jeffrey concedes the “evident indebtedness of The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne to 
Gabriel García Márquez” (198), and Jeanne Delbaere-Garant suggests that “[t]he obvious 
echoes of One Hundred Years of Solitude and The Autumn of the Patriarch throughout 
Hodgins‟ novel The Invention of the World probably explain why this novel was hailed as 
magic realist in the first place” (254).  She points out: 
Hodgins has never made a secret of his admiration for the Latin American 
novelists; he humorously acknowledges his debt to them by making the giant 
wave that invades Vancouver Island in The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne 
leave all sorts of Peruvian marvels behind.  These include a godlike Peruvian 
sailor thrown naked on the soaked yellow daisies of Angela Turner‟s sheets 
and the beautiful Raimey, the „walking miracle‟ who turns the little town 
upside down.  (Delbaere-Garant 254) 
The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne certainly echoes Latin American magical realist imagery 
throughout.  Images of human-animal hybridity, elements of the carnivalesque, allusions to 
the circus, and, not least, Joseph Bourne‟s travels, which take him to the Gulf of Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Brazil, suggest the Latin American influence.  Many of the human-animal 
images, however, are comparisons with animals, rather than representations of human 
animality, human-animal hybridity, although there are some descriptions of town inhabitants 
as, not like, animals.  The Chamber-Potts children, for example, “promised more 
entertainment.  And delivered.  When they walked in that front door those crazy animals of 
kids were going wild, acting like a zoo” (Resurrection 85).  Ian McCarthy is repeatedly 
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referred to as a “sea otter” (30, 139, 204), Slim Potts has a “rat‟s face” (84, 87), „Preserved 
Crabbe‟ is a “big ape of a Squatter” (120), Joseph Bourne is frequently called an “old goat” 
(7,29,30,63,95,96,100), and Mayor Weins suggests that Joseph Bourne does not “act human” 
(30).  Additionally, Raimey is „the Seabird‟ throughout: “She was the girl who came in from 
the sea, or . . . „that cormorant with the cheeky behind‟.  „A seabird is what she is, but that 
rear end of hers thinks she‟s the Queen of Sheba‟” (1).  Such images of human animality 
serve to paint Port Annie as an exotic, multicultural location, embodied in Dirty Della‟s 
“brood of kids, a United Nations of colours and faces,” which “[s]he herded . . . ahead of her, 
like a flock of noisy geese” (10). 
At the same time, the use of indigenous animals, particularly sea creatures, creates a 
distinctive sense of the local environment, as the inhabitants of the “the sea-washed town” 
(35) are compared to fish (15,58,89,90,100,127), “shrimp” (104) and crabs (the Crabbe 
brothers), for example.  Correspondingly, Fat Annie, the legendary town founder, purportedly 
half whale, half human, spectacularly embodies the boundary between land and sea.  Christie 
describes her as standing “right over there in the foyer, in her black silk funeral dress, . . . 
soaking wet and sticking to her body.  Plastered all over like this town with bits of kelp and 
weeds and seedy yellow pods and chips of bark, with broken shells in her hair” (116-7).  
Much of her appearance suggests the figure of a sea nymph, or sea goddess, as she stands 
with “strips of seaweed glitter[ing] in her hair” (118), and as she “pulled her wet dress away 
from her breasts and released tiny black silver-eyed fish that fell to the floor and thrashed 
themselves to death on the carpet” (117).  She also counts “half a dozen fish tanks” amongst 
her possessions (117). 
Moreover, Mr Manku, new Canadian citizen and Indian immigrant, combines the 
local with the exotic and multicultural in a spectacle reminiscent of SeaWorld, an aquatic 
circus, when he decides that to truly become a citizen, he must “do something that these 
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westerners liked to do,” that is, he must learn to “swim like a fish” (104).  He is the 
(ridiculed) central attraction, “the centre of everything” (135), in the local pool, as he “g[ives] 
a little wave and lower[s] his body, with the slow dignity of an elephant seal, to sit on the 
cement bottom of the pool” (79).  A “bright light” is “streaming down on him” and he 
imagines “an enormous audience, holding its breath” (135).  However, his audience are only 
the “Chamber-Potts kids, still horsing around,” who mock: “„Look at the water rise when that 
elephant sits!‟  They all screamed with laughter, and slapped at each other, and threw 
themselves around on the seats.  „Everybody out of the pool, the rug-rider‟s fleas‟ll get you‟” 
(79).  Joseph Bourne, too, adds exotic appeal in a scene that has him resembling a member of 
the motley cast of a travelling circus: 
The tidal wave of sea-gifts had left the lower town decorated with the 
underwater brilliance of a dream and filled the rainy air with the unfamiliar 
scent of a stirred-up sea, but the old man hurried away as if he thought there 
was a spell in it that he needed to escape.  His stuck-forward head bobbed like 
a camel‟s.  The skirt s of his tattered rain-soaked kimonos and robes beat in an 
uproar of colours around the tops of his high rubber boots.  His primitive cape, 
made from a sheet of plastic snitched of someone‟s backyard fence, rippled 
and flapped in the air behind him.  (Resurrection 7) 
Hodgins‟ use of local ingredients, so to speak, to create the Port Annie landscape is reflected 
in Mayor Weins‟ redecoration of the old church “with things dragged up off the beach, to 
give it a local flavour.  Driftwood and dried starfish, fishnet draped across the end wall, 
hanging with cork floats and chunks of bark.  Maybe even bring that hull [of a fishing boat] 
down out of the tree and drag it inside, fill it with dirt and plastic flowers” (Resurrection 
210). 
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Hodgins locates Resurrection recognisably in the landscape of British Columbia by 
including a backdrop of ubiquitous jays, perceived as “a plague of too much life, too much 
colour and excitement and noise” (148).  They not only serve to colour the setting, so to 
speak, but they also signify local identity: “Coloured a vibrant blue and black,” Steller‟s jays 
are “found throughout the province” and are thus intimately associated with local uniqueness 
and pride (Province of British Columbia).  In 1987, eight years after Resurrection was 
published, they became the “official” provincial bird, and, as the Province of British 
Columbia government website explains, “[t]his lively, smart and cheeky bird was voted most 
popular bird by the people of British Columbia.”  The settler culture‟s identification with 
emblematic animals, and the associated local pride, is an assertion of belonging to the land.  
As much as they are props to illustrate the setting of the narrative, Hodgins‟ jays symbolise 
the formation of a new, “colourful,” multicultural nation, where all “Indians,” whether they 
are Native, like Christie, or settlers, like Mr Manku, can be at home. 
In What the Crow Said and The Invention of the World, in turn, the magical 
dimensions are largely derived from, or grounded in, mythological narratives, such as 
Graeco-Roman, Native Canadian, or Biblical mythologies.
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  Invention of the World 
combines Irish, biblical and classical European mythologies in particular: 
Critics of the novel have noted the astonishing number of mythic and 
historical origins upon which the imagery of the text seems to be based.  These 
range through classical origins (Taurus-Europa, Lycaon, Charon), Celtic 
origins (the Táin bó Cúailnge, the war between the Fomorians and the Tuatha 
de Dannan), Christian origins (Genesis, Exodus), and historical origins (the 
Aquarian Foundation of Brother XII).  (Slemon 417)
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Animal imagery plays a prominent role in the construction of Hodgins‟ blend of mythologies.  
Keneally is a particularly striking mythical figure, who combines various “beastly” aspects.  
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Most striking is Keneally‟s association with the figure of a bulls.  Thus, he is said to be 
fathered by “a monstrous black bull” (Invention 71) with “god-qualities” (105), and behaves 
like a bull in various instances.  He “spring[s] up surprised from the mayor‟s bed, roaring like 
a bull” when he is found with the mayor‟s wife (95), and when someone insults a native 
couple, he rises “up to his feet roaring, his face the colour of blood, and his eyes bulging like 
an aroused bull” (199).  One of the townspeople reports an incident, when in a “display of the 
legendary temper . . . one of his feet pawed the floor, pawed at the carpet, and his head went 
down, shaking like there was something on the top he wanted to get rid of. . . . Then he went 
across that room again, knocking people right and left, and with his shoulder drove the table 
and your father into the corner” (203). 
Horner associates Keneally‟s apparent bull qualities as a possible allusion to 
“„Donnataurus,‟ the name of the dun-coloured, prize bull in the Táin Bó Cuailnge” of Irish 
mythology, as well as the moon of “Celtic legend” who is “a horned creature, a bull-headed 
god named Buair-ainech and like Keneally, Balor, the god of Night is born from the bull-
headed god” (10).  Furthermore, as Horner says, Keneally‟s “self-deceiving notions of his 
god-like origins and his god-given rights are closely tied to his sexual potency and prowess” 
(13).  Beryl Rowland, in her study of animal symbolism, points out the significance generally 
associated with bulls: “The bull seems to have been worshipped almost universally from 
prehistoric times both for its powerful fighting ability and for the exceptional amount of 
fertilizing power” (44).  Correspondingly, bull imagery provides the connection between 
Keneally‟s ostensible god-like qualities and his fertility, as he is supposed to have “the 
enormous scrotum of an adult bull” (Invention 73).  The merging of bull and man results in a 
“messiah monster” making “inhuman demands” (Invention 120-1).  Horner associates 
Keneally with Lucifer (12), and calls him “a manifestation of the archetype of death, darkness 
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and evil” (11).  Keneally certainly resembles, or is at least involved with, the beast of the 
apocalypse, especially at the moment of his death (see Invention 285). 
Interwoven with the representation of Keneally as an apparent human-bull hybrid and 
the embodiment of evil is his symbolic association with dogs.  Thus, he likens himself to 
Cúchulain (“Culain‟s dog”), a hero of Irish mythology, yet this connection takes on negative 
connotations.  Ned O‟Mahony and Dervit O‟Connell, two of his followers, ridicule this 
notion, for example (Invention 112).  His association with Culain‟s dog takes on a literal and 
evil meaning when Keneally fights an English bailiff, who has come to collect the rent.  
Keneally “twisted his arm until it came out of its socket, crunching like a bone bitten through 
by a dog, and came away from the body altogether” (Invention 88).  He is also known for 
“pawing” at women (Invention 209, 210).  Moreover, Rowland points out that “[i]n medieval 
times the dog was the Devil, the hound of hell” (60), and Hodgins makes use of that 
association.  Thus, while Keneally digs his tunnel, Lily, his third and last wife, hears a voice, 
saying: “Turn, hellhound, turn.  A voice like a beating drum.  Turn hellhound, turn” 
(Invention 285, original emphasis).  Black dogs, especially, as Rowland explains, “denoted 
evil, and in the Middle Ages they were frequently seen in the company of witches and agents 
of the Devil” (61).  Correspondingly, at least one of Keneally‟s two dogs is black (Invention 
272).  In addition, Horner emphasises the association of Keneally‟s dogs, who are both called 
“Thunderbird” (Invention 258), with Balor, the bull-god‟s son, “sometimes referred to as god 
of the Thunderbolt” (Horner 10).  Correspondingly, Keneally can “make the house tremble 
with the thundering sounds of his voice” (Invention 256).  Horner suggests that Keneally‟s 
dogs are “symbolic of his power and instrumental to the fear he arouses.  At his greatest 
performance Keneally appears to call up a thunderstorm which reduces even the most 
sceptical witnesses to doglike servility” (Horner 10). 
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Peter Thomas does not assign the label “magic realism” to What the Crow Said, but 
he describes the “narrative presentation of this pseudo-myth” as “matter-of-fact, busy, and 
uninflated, insisting that while the event itself is not commonplace, it takes place firmly 
within the context of common experience” (“Robert Kroetsch” 285).  He thus offers a 
description that echoes the definitions of magic realism such as that by Wendy B. Faris: 
“Very briefly defined, magical realism combines realism and the fantastic so that the 
marvelous seems to grow organically within the ordinary, blurring distinction between 
them”(Ordinary Enchantments 1).207  He connects the novel with the (de-)construction of 
myth: “[T]his novel does not imitate life as it is known through common sensory experience, 
but rather absorbs, deconstructs, and de-creates  the forms of story. It is „about‟ the 
consummation of the magical with the real” (P. Thomas, “Robert Kroetsch” 285). 
The “pseudo-myth” Thomas refers to is, in fact, composed of a multitude of 
borrowings from, and resemblances to, a variety of mythologies.  Kroetsch himself 
acknowledges his study of Greek and Blackfoot mythology, as well as the influence of the 
“Old and New Testaments” (qtd. in Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 97).  Thus, Vera‟s son, for 
example, who is labelled “a wolf in sheep‟s clothing” (What the Crow Said 146), and who, 
“especially when the moon was full, . . . would disappear for a night” (139-40), is associated 
with the myth of Lykaon.
208
  The “animal roar . . . . out of the dark earth itself” (What the 
Crow Said 112) strongly suggests the beast of the apocalypse, “coming up out of the earth” 
(Revelation 13:11).  Wilson also identifies allusions to “the Biblical story of Noah,” and 
points out that “the eponymous crow itself alluded to North American Indian mythology, 
particularly to certain creation myths, and to the bird‟s traditional symbolic function as a 
sower of discord and a representative of solitude” (“Boundary” 40).  He adds that, as a result, 
“Kroetsch‟s Alberta is undeniably fabulous and entirely marvellous” (“Boundary” 40). 
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The figure of the crow in particular lends itself to the projection of multiple, 
fragmented mythologies.  As Boria Sax shows, crows, frequently used interchangeably with 
ravens and other corvids, are seen as portents, often of an ambiguous nature, in a variety of 
cultures.  Partly, he argues, this is to do with the crows‟ diet, as “[t]he eating of carrion has 
caused crows to be closely associated with death in cultures throughout the world” (28).  
According to Sax, “attitudes towards death have always been complex and ambivalent.  It 
brings at once terror and comfort.  It can be viewed as extinction, or as the passing to another, 
perhaps more blessed, realm” (28).  He suggests that this ambivalence towards death is 
extended to crows, and she points out that “[l]egends throughout much of the world make 
them instructors for the living and guides for the deceased” (28).  In particular, the crows‟ 
“ability ... to survive on carrion” is both “feared and admired,” which makes their appearance 
a significant feature of “the myths and legends of the far north,” including those of Inuit and 
Siberians (90).  Paradoxical attitudes towards crows are also represented in the Bible, where, 
as Sax writes, “no other creature appears in such varied contexts, or with such symbolic 
ambiguity, as the crow or raven” (31). 
This “symbolic ambiguity” is reflected by Kroetsch‟s crow, who is simultaneously 
reviled and revered.  The crow appears as “an authority” of general wisdom (Crow 152), a 
prophet of doom, seemingly predicting the “abnormal deaths” of some of the lazy Schmier 
players (129), or is perceived as an omen of death as Liebhaber, trapped under the hull of his 
boat, fears that the crow has “[c]ome to peck at his unseeing eyes” (162), at the same time as 
she/he
209
 raises hope of rescue.  Kroetsch‟s crow is seen both as “friend” (147, 162) and as a 
traitor (165).  It is not clear what role the crow plays in The War Against the Sky: a go-
between who inhabits both the sky and the earth, the crow could be a divine messenger of 
fate, or sent as a kind of mediator, who speaks “on behalf of JG,” as some believe (64), for 
example.  The crow, or crows in general, could be under divine protection, from Isador 
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Heck‟s gun and nest raiding, for instance (78-9), or the crow could possibly even be a 
divinity, cursing the Schmier players and thus actually causing their “abnormal deaths.”  On 
the other hand, the crow‟s impressive command of profanities might rule out any association 
with the divine.  These unresolved ambiguities suggest a trickster figure, “independent of 
moral structure and moral interpretation” (Kroetsch in Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 100)210. 
However, none of these examples provide an answer as to what the crow “actually” 
represents.  The point here is that the crow is imbued with meaning, even though it is not 
clear which particular meaning that might be.  The crow is a carrier of meaning, or multiple 
meanings, which, in Kroetsch‟s narrative, are fragmented and alluded to, but never explicit.  
As Peter Thomas writes, Kroetsch “boldly reinstates the fabulous; stretches the tale 
deliberately beyond expectation; plunders the storyteller‟s store of archetypes and other 
narrative models—and, finally, raises fundamental questions concerning the meaning of all 
narrative meaning, the limits of the tale” (“Robert Kroetsch” 286).  The emphasis is 
deliberately on an absence of explanations and answers.  This is highlighted by Liebhaber‟s 
association with Noah (Crow 185), for example.  The message of Noah‟s raven, who “did not 
bring back news of land” (Sax 33), is, just like the crow‟s silence,211 one of absence: the 
raven returns only with the initial question, but not with an answer. 
Susan Arlene Rudy Dorscht describes this phenomenon thus: “What the Crow Said is 
a book of traces, a collection of sayings, a narrative of absence, which can be made to 
represent, metonymically, the (w)hole from which they have come.  The „story‟ can be read 
as „telling‟ that which it does not presume to know; it is simply, and enigmatically, „what the 
crow said‟” (79).  Similarly, Lecker argues that “What the Crow Said is not about what the 
crow said.  It is about our unfulfilled desire to find out what the crow said” (Robert Kroetsch 
105).  Kroetsch himself suggests that What the Crow Said centers around “the temptation of 
meaning” (qtd. in Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 15).  He comments: “Some readers were so 
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compelled to impose on it a total explanation instead of allowing the . . . game to happen; I 
was just interested in temptation again . . . . But What the Crow Said is a new version of 
temptation” (qtd. in Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 15). 
The unresolved “temptation of meaning” produced by the ambiguities traditionally 
associated with crows, from various cultural perspectives, suggests that the crow figure lends 
itself particularly well to occupying a central role in magical realist narratives.  Folklore, 
myths and legends ensure that “the most ubiquitous of birds, . . . without being in the least 
exotic . . . manage to remain mysterious” (Sax 30).  Moreover, the connection with, and 
accumulation of, multiple, multicultural meanings, make the crow a particularly suitable 
image for the Canadian context.  With the absence of a central voice, message, or narrator 
comes the creation of new and endless possibilities.  The crow is a borderline figure where 
different voices and cultures intersect.  Linda Hutcheon regards borders and margins, such as 
those depicted in What the Crow Said, as “the postmodern space par excellence, the place 
where new possibilities exist” (4).  She considers the postmodern challenge of “any notions 
of centrality in (and centralization of) culture” an “„ex-centric‟ position,” produced by the 
“paradox of underlining and undermining cultural „universals‟ (of revealing their grounding 
in the „particular‟),” and suggests that it is inherently Canadian (Hutcheon 3). 
The creation of new mythologies through the fusion of multiple myths in Invention of 
the World and What the Crow Said reflects Michael Ondaatje‟s comment that  “myth breeds 
on itself no matter what the situation or landscape” (267).  Jeanne Delbaere-Garant, with 
reference to Ondaatje, proposes that the term “mythic realism” provides a more appropriate 
model to characterise “New World” literature from “not just ... the Canadian West but . . . all 
the countries that still possess „unconsumed space,‟ where „magic‟ images are borrowed from 
the physical environment itself, instead of being projected from the characters‟ psyches,” and 
where “magic realism does . . . often display a deep connectedness between character and 
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place” (252-3).  However, the mythologies incorporated into Invention of the World and What 
the Crow Said are predominantly European, transplanted to the “New World” and a reflection 
of settler heritage.  Accordingly, these myths can only be “borrowed from the physical 
environment itself” if they are already anchored in the landscape, or ploughed into the soil, so 
to speak.  Indeed, Hutcheon comments that “Kroetsch‟s work is rooted very firmly in the 
geographical, historical, and cultural world of Alberta” (175). 
Animals, such as the crow, who project magical or mythological meanings in What 
the Crow Said, are an inextricable part of the actual prairie landscape of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan.  Accordingly, indigenous animals, such as wolves and coyotes are linked to 
the miraculous upbringing of Vera‟s son, for example, and an eagle, albeit of mythic 
proportions‟, flies off with Joe Lightning.  However, introduced animals, and industries based 
on them, play an even greater part in Kroetsch‟s Alberta.  Accordingly, bees have a 
prominent presence in What the Crow Said.  They are an important feature of the prairie 
economy, as Canada, a considerable player in the global honey production, concentrates 
seventy-five percent of its honey production in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba (see 
Agriculture and AgriFood Canada).  Vera‟s “pure love” for the bees (Crow 12) is clearly 
matched by the fact that honey production is a significant industry, as Vera purchases 
packages of bees . . . that would restock [her] 576 empty hives, at twenty-four 
different locations throughout the Municipal District of Bigknife.  All her 576 
new queens were there, each queen in a tiny cage, the cage suspended by a 
wire inside the wood and screen package.  In each package were something 
like seven thousand bees; millions and more millions of waiting bees were 
stored in the cool and the dark of the car shed: Vera Lang‟s entire fortune and 
her life‟s work too, her dedication, her passion.  (Crow 179) 
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Likewise, “[t]he bull in the sky” (Kroetsch, Crow 42) observed by Liebhaber is not only, 
presumably, Taurus of the zodiac and of Greek mythology, but it also alludes to “the 
disappearance of the buffalo” (Crow 45), as well as the prominence of cattle in the prairie 
landscape.  As Kroetsch reports, “Alberta has two cows per resident,” and Calgary, the 
largest city in the province, “is a masculine city.  It dreams of cattle and oil, of money and 
women.  Meat packers are the biggest employers here” (Alberta 173, 176).  Accordingly, the 
“bull sound, ferocious, out of the dark earth itself, the sound of the darkness itself” (Crow 
112) is also an indication of the omnipresence of cattle. 
Immediately connected with cattle ranching, cowboys and rodeos, such as the Calgary 
Stampede, are horses.  The apocalyptic horse-team of John Skandl, which is “trumpeting a 
perfection of despair” and associated with the infernal “animal roar” (Crow 112), as well as 
the “invisible horses” held by Martin Lang‟s ghost (Crow 31), for example, are also matched 
by the ubiquitous presence of working horses in the prairie landscape.  In What the Crow 
Said, this presence becomes, in fact, so overwhelming that “[t]he endlessly moving teams 
filled the valley below Tiddy‟s house with the sounds of horses and men.  The smell of horse 
shit and sweat filled the streets of the town, began to seep in through the closed windows of 
the newspaper office” (Crow 45).  Kroetsch‟s use of horses in the narrative arises out of his 
own immediate experience, as he himself grew up on an Alberta farm with “a lot of horses” 
(qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 130).  It is this first-hand experience of the pastoral 
landscape (and the domesticated animals who are part of it) that gives rise to the magical, or 
mythical, dimension.  Thus, working animals appear both as common, everyday creatures and 
as mythical beasts, and pastoral settlement is both naturalised and mythologised. 
Moreover, by appropriating Native mythological animals and blending them with 
European mythologies, Kroetsch and Hodgins create new, multicultural and indigenised 
mythologies.  In Invention of the World, Keneally‟s dogs are the most significant allusion to 
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indigenous mythology.  Both named “Thunderbird,” they signify an appropriation of 
indigenous culture by European settlers, which can be read, paradoxically, as either lending 
strength and power to Keneally‟s guard dogs through the association with the myth of 
Thunderbird, or as a reduction of a native mythological creature to the name of a pet, or 
working animal.  The dogs‟ name both suggests a degree of assumed indigenisation on the 
part of Keneally, as well as adding local flavour to Hodgins‟ novel.  Here, it is the name 
“Thunderbird” that ties settler and indigenous mythologies together, and thus connects the 
settlers to the land.  This tie is strengthened as one of Keneally‟s dogs seemingly transforms 
into Thunderbird, appearing “[l]ike a great, black, jet-propelled bird” (Invention 272). 
The polyphonic mythologies in Invention of the World and What the Crow Said 
reflect what Hutcheon calls, in a geographical and ethnic sense, “the multicultural mosaic” of 
Canada (3).  The stories and mythologies evoked by the image of the crow, for example, 
alongside the other allusions to ancient mythologies in What the Crow Said, blur and melt 
together to create new, generative narratives.  This is a reflection of Kroetsch‟s assertion that 
“I have lived in Iowa, New York, and North Carolina; I would insist that Alberta is as much a 
melting pot as any one of those states might be.  And for a number of reasons, the Alberta 
melting pot has pretty much melted” (Alberta 65).  Kroetsch explains that he “was playing 
with that sense of multitudes of voices that become one voice” in What the Crow Said, and 
agrees with Robert Wilson, who suggests to him that “the idea of a communal or collective 
voice” was “really given to you to some extent by the literary model of magic realism” 
(Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 171). 
Kroetsch comments that the result of creating a magical realist polyphony is an 
emphasis on the process of making stories, “how people talk toward a story” (qtd. in 
Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 171, emphasis omitted).  He finds myths particularly useful in 
this context because “myths are the best stories” (qtd. in Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 193).  
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Kroetsch, however, dismantles and fragments existing mythologies, and reassembles the 
pieces in a postmodern pastiche, creating new narratives particular to, and typical of, the 
prairies.  Discussing Grey Owl, the English impostor who claimed to be a Native Canadian, 
Kroetsch suggests that appropriating Native identities and stories is a way of becoming 
Canadian: “That English boy became a Canadian by going Indian.  You see, he uninvents in 
order to invent.  He does in a spectacular way what we have to do in lesser ways” (qtd in 
Hancock, Canadian Writers 142).  The crow-figure signifies this process of “uninvention,” 
the “melting pot” of the prairies and the endless possibilities of generative narratives that 
keep producing new meanings. 
McMullin takes a similar approach.  He sees magic realism as a mode particularly 
suited to what he calls the “hinterland,” regions such as British Columbia and the prairies, 
and suggests that the “Hinterland . . . is numinous and psychic rather than physical and 
psychological,” as opposed to the “Heartland,” which is “is always concerned with meaning, 
form and structure” (21).  He argues that the central concern of “magic realist books in the 
west,” in British Columbia as well as the prairies, is the question of “where is here,” resulting 
in “an equally strong need to seek for roots” (20).  These, he suggests, are to be found in the 
“oral history” of the prairies and British Columbia, which is “bound up in the mythology of 
the Haida, Kwakiutl, Salish and Tsimshian, or found in the diaries of explorers like Captain 
Vancouver” (20). In response to Hancock‟s question why he is staying in Canada, Kroetsch 
replies: “Some days I like the idea that we‟re finally telling our own story” (qtd. in Hancock, 
Canadian Writers 131).  Kroetsch‟s crow figure is thus a signifier for the process of creating 
local identities through the narration of blended mythologies. 
Hancock sees the marvellous element in magic realism as a reflection of indigenous 
mythologies and what he calls “primitive art,” and ties the processing of such art and 
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mythologies within contemporary Canadian settler writing to the process of nation-building 
and identity formation.  He writes:  
Magic realism and “primitive art” are connected. . . . Primitive art, painting, 
and magic realism all stress the importance of “painted” or “written” images.  
This enhances the memory of the shaman and his initiates.  These images are 
more than hunting “magic” to capture game.  They remind us how close we 
are to primitive thinking.  Images are totemistic or metamorphic.  They are the 
secret structures of our imagination. (Hancock, “Magic or Realism” 34) 
Reflecting these images, which originate in “primitive thinking,” as Hancock suggests, are 
part of what he calls “a voyage of self-discovery” of European settlers in British Columbia 
(“Magic or Realism” 33).  Hancock appears to suggest that it is through an appropriation of 
such supposedly “primitive” imagery that, as he says, “[w]e have to learn to recognize our 
mythology as well as our history.  Magic realism reminds us that our memory is in a state of 
crisis.  How do we preserve the past, especially when it depends upon spoken words or 
painted images?” (“Magic or Realism” 33; my emphasis).  While Hancock is enthusiastic 
about what he calls “primitive” culture, the implication here is that the European writer picks 
up from where the indigenous oral story teller, shaman or cave painter left off. 
The emphasis is on imagery, the surface appearance of cultural artefacts, rather than 
their spiritual, social or political significance within a wider cultural network.  Those 
meanings, as Hancock points out, are difficult to access by non-indigenous Canadians: “The 
native mythology of the west is hard to recover because native myths were private property, 
fiercely guarded.  It was a privilege to use song and dance, masks and images.  They had to 
be handed on with proper ritual” (“Magic or Realism” 33).  This inaccessibility is illustrated 
by Hodgins in The Invention of the World, as Julius Champney regards a totem pole in the 
park: 
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The totem . . . taller and straighter than any of the trees or shrubs that 
surrounded it, was a column of grumpy-looking Indians and bears, all resting 
their hands on the tops of their fat bellies as if feeling for a heartbeat that 
didn‟t exist.  The expected thunderbird at the top was no thunderbird at all but 
more of a seagull.  He didn‟t have the round white-ringed eyes of the 
thunderbird which would have registered something between alarm and fury, 
but rather looked upward out of human eyes, ignorant of life below, and 
clutched like the others at his own breast.”  (Invention 224). 
The totem pole becomes a meaningless image for Julius Champney, a collection of “grumpy-
looking” bears and Indians, with the wrong bird on the top, so to speak.  It is subject to 
stereotypical expectations, as well as detached from “life below”: the emphasis here lies on 
the physical image of the people and animals represented; the associated mythology is either 
distorted, or lost. 
Both in Kroetsch and Hodgins‟ texts, the absence of indigenous peoples and cultures 
is striking, but for different reasons.  “[T]he recuperation of silenced voices” (Slemon 420) 
and “the sustained dialogic engagement with the cognitive legacies of colonialist language 
and history” (Slemon 421) are not as prominent in Hodgins‟ two novels, for example, as 
Slemon asserts.  While Madmother Thomas, “a direct victim of colonialism‟s violence 
through her childhood trauma under Keneally‟s patriarchal order” does indeed become “at 
last a sustaining presence in the community,” the silenced voices of Native Canadians 
remain, largely, precisely that. 
Delbaere-Garant comments: “It seems to me that Ondaatje‟s term [mythic realism] is 
a suitable one for Second World countries from which indigenous cultures have largely 
vanished, even though they remain hauntingly present in the place itself” (253).  The sense of 
indigenous cultures as having “largely vanished” prevails in The Invention of the World 
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(though the indigenous inhabitants of Vancouver Island, such as the Kwakwaka‟wakw, the 
Coast Salish, or the Nuu-Chah-Nulth, might not agree with being described, or having their 
cultures described, as “haunting presences”).  Indeed, the idea of creating one multicultural, 
Canadian voice by incorporating Native beliefs and trickster figures into European 
mythologies, the indigenising of European settler culture, and the idea of “unconsumed 
space” gloss over the fact that European settlers were not invited, so to speak; Native land 
was not gifted to the newcomers, treaties were unjust, and Native nations did not willingly 
surrender authority over their land and affairs.  “One voice” celebrating multiculturalism and 
diversity threatens to drown out Native voices. 
Yet, Hodgins‟ invention of new mythologies does not entail a denial of history: this is 
recognised, for example, in the „wedding gift‟ of “[b]adly-treated Indians” (Invention 355) for 
Maggie and Wade.  With their new beginning, the legacy of the past is, to some degree, 
acknowledged.  A similar recognition of history lies in the account of the founding of the 
town from a small trading posts, which is described as an “uncontrolled chain of disasters” 
for the natives (Invention 93), as well as Julius Champney‟s account of a trial of “two 
Indians,” innocently hanged for the murder of a shepherd (Invention 240).  He tells a young 
man in the park: “Of course I‟m from the prairies, . . . where one incident like that is hardly 
remembered.  There were so many, and more dramatic too” (Invention 228).  Yet at the same 
time, the conversation in the park in particular conveys a sense of history as events long gone, 
with little bearing on the present, as “[t]he young man looked up at the totem, frowning.  
Perhaps he thought those grumpy faces were blaming him for something” (Invention 228).  
Images of Native Canadians, along with mythological birds and bears, become vague, albeit 
slightly unsettling, reminders of a culture of the past that no longer, or hardly still, exists.  
History and mythology, here, are stories contained within the past; tricksters and animals on a 
totem pole become nothing more than exotic images. 
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In contrast, Slemon states that in the final wedding scene, Hodgins “summons into 
presence all those figures made absent from the text by the formal system of writing itself” 
(Slemon), but while “the Queen of England” is mentioned, and “the Prime Minister of 
Canada” is rumoured to be amongst the guests (Invention 346), both of whom are, generally, 
by no means marginalised figures, Native Canadians are not present, or specifically 
mentioned in this scene.  Hancock once commented to Hodgins: “You don‟t have the 
political sense of the Latin American writers.  That you‟re trying to improve society by 
removing certain masks and revealing certain realities.  Your novels aren‟t instruments for 
social change” (Canadian Writers 63).  In response, Hodgins argued: 
We don‟t live in a climate where this is so important.  Certainly in British 
Columbia we‟re living in a situation that could be much improved, but that‟s a 
temporary thing and we can go to the polls and do something about it if we 
want.  That‟s very different from living in South America where your 
neighbour is starving or being shot for saying the wrong thing.  (Qtd. in 
Hancock, Canadian Writers 63) 
In this context it is striking that the “central victim” (Horner 16), Madmother Thomas, is, 
apparently, of European descent, at the same time as Hodgins‟ comment clashes with the 
living conditions on reservations (in the nineteen-seventies and today) and the treatment of 
native children within the now abolished British Columbian Indian residential schools 
system, for example. 
The Indian Residential Schools Survivors Society reports that, between 1863 and 
1984, “[o]ver the years, all school-aged First Nations children in this province were targeted 
for removal from their homes” to the so-called „Indian Residential Schools‟” (“B.C. 
Residential Schools”).  They describe how “[c]hildren who went to residential school 
suffered a loss of culture, identity, language, family and more. ... Clothing, food and living 
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conditions were often sub-standard and screening of school staff was minimal, leaving the 
children vulnerable to many kinds of abuse and neglect” (“B.C. Residential Schools”)  In the 
nineteen-nineties, “[t]he most prominant [sic] criminal action was taken against former Port 
Alberni Residential School supervisor, Arthur Henry Plint.  He was sentenced to 11 years in 
prison after pleading guilty to 16 counts of indecent assault” (“Residential Schools”).  Drew 
Hayden Taylor points out that the result of the Port Alberni abuses are, still, “high rates of 
alcoholism, sexual abuse (evidence has shown it is cyclical), suicide and a host of other 
equally tragic illnesses” (Taylor 111). 
This residential school was still open whilst Hodgins lived in the neighbouring town 
of Nanaimo (from 1961) and worked as a senior secondary school teacher (Jeffrey 189).  As 
for “starving neighbours,” even as late as the nineteen-nineties, Kevin D. Annett, then a 
minister at Port Alberni, ran a food bank that, according to his own information, was “feeding 
over 300 aboriginal families each month.”  The question, to put Hodgins‟ comment in 
context, is how much Vancouver Island people in the late nineteen-seventies knew, or made 
an effort to find out, about the living conditions of their neighbours on the reservations, or 
were aware about official government policy which forcibly took all British Columbian First 
Nations children to residential schools, whilst the Port Alberni crimes were perpetrated in 
secret.  Hodgins‟ comment, in any case, shows that his perspective is not so much regional 
and representative of Vancouver Island as such, but that it is a rather restricted point of view, 
shaped and framed by the living standards of European settlers. 
Kroetsch, in contrast, and as Slemon points out, is more concerned with highlighting 
postcolonial history and contemporary issues by emphasising the absence of First Nation 
Canadians from his story.  Slemon writes: “[T]he name of the town Big Indian resonates 
against the almost complete absence of native peoples from its site” (419).  The short 
comment about “the disappearance of the buffalo” (Crow 45), the presence of “buffalo 
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beans” (Crow 218) and Old Lady Lang‟s brief memory “of the nameless Cree buffalo hunter 
after whom the first settlement had been named” (Crow 195) may seem minor, but they open 
up a significant gap in the story, or history, of Big Indian.  In a paradoxical statement, 
Kroetsch illustrates the discrepancy between the settler‟s perception of the land at the time of 
their arrival and its history.  He says: 
In a few short years all the settlers arrived in a virgin and unpeopled land. ... 
[A]ll were coming into a vacuum created by the destruction of the buffalo and 
those who depended upon them, and each newcomer, instead of feeling he was 
being assimilated, felt instead that he was helping to create what Alberta was 
to become.  People alive today remember clearly the creation of Alberta not as 
history but as experience.  (Alberta 67-8) 
This experience of “creation” and the “Alberta melting pot” is reflected in the fact that the 
settlers‟ spirits haunt the land just as much as the buffalos, as the ghost of Martin Lang 
exemplifies.  Moreover, pastoral settlement “created” the state out of a supposedly empty 
land, echoing ideas such as terra nullius in Australia. 
Conversely, Joe Lightning‟s fall and preventable death in “a ton of shit and piss and 
catalogue paper” because people wore their “Sunday clothes” (Kroetsch, Crow 160) is an 
image that evokes the experience of Native Canadians, allegorically, in a nutshell, and hints 
at a social and political situation that Hodgins, apparently, considers less of a concern and “a 
temporary thing.”  An alternative point of view, which contradicts the idea of a passing 
inconvenience, is offered by Taylor, who writes, two decades after Hodgins‟ remark: “In this 
era of unsettled land claims, government cutbacks, and the continuing unacceptable levels of 
unemployment and mortality, it‟s no wonder Native people across Canada are sometimes 
viewed as, shall we say, pissed off at the world” (59).  On Port Alberni specifically, Taylor 
comments on the apology offered by the United Church of Canada: “I liken it to putting a 
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simple bandage on a gushing open wound and kissing it for good measure.  To quote a cliché, 
talk is cheap” (Taylor 111).  These unresolved issues are, as Hancock indicates, not the topic 
of Hodgins‟ novel The Invention of the World. 
Faris points out that “a postcolonial agenda does not appear in all magical realist 
fictions, because they also exist outside postcolonial environments” (Ordinary Enchantments 
28).  However, Hodgins‟ novel does exist in a “postcolonial environment,” yet his “agenda” 
is not so much a postcolonial as a moral one: 
But still a writer anywhere is political in another sense, I suppose in a moral 
sense.  A fiction writer is creating myth and societies live by myths.  The 
myths that are important to society create the way that people in it treat each 
other. . . . I feel strongly that a writer has a responsibility to be aware of the 
moral implications of what he‟s doing.  Yes, in a way you are attempting to 
change the world.  Though you cannot ask to change certain facts about the 
world, you can perhaps open up new ways of seeing it.  Or just challenge old 
ways.  Present modes of admirable behaviour.  Suggest alternatives.  (Hodgins 
qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 63-4) 
The “postcolonial environment” is, of course, portrayed in the multicultural communities of 
his fiction, both in The Invention of the World and The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne.  
Hodgins‟ focus here is on shaping the future by “a whole new breed of people like . . . 
Maggie and Wade” (Invention 352).  While Hodgins writes mythologies that reflect the 
settlers‟ cultural inheritance and perspective, they are very much in keeping with Abrams‟ 
definition, who writes: “A mythology, we can say, is a religion in which we no longer 
believe” (111, 5th ed.).  Seemingly in contradiction, Hodgins comments, in a discussion with 
Hancock: “To me myth is closer to reality than history.  While history is a collection of the 
facts, myth is the soul that surrounds those facts” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 77).  
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However, Hodgins‟ novels propose that the true mythological heroes are not the Cúchulains, 
Finn MacCools or the Thunderbirds of past beliefs, but, instead, people like Maggie Kyle and 
Joseph Bourne.
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Despite the strong sense of an island community, Hodgins‟ concern is not centred on 
Vancouver Island, but on a common humanity.  In response to Hancock‟s question whether 
his stories are an “exploration of the search that people on the edge of society engage in,” 
Hodgins declares: “But these people are not peculiar.  I‟m not aware of them as having 
special problems.  They‟re just people” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 72).  He 
concedes that “all writing has to be regional to start with.  It has to come from somewhere, it 
has to take place somewhere,” yet, he insists, “while I‟m interested in what makes people on 
this side of the water different from people in other places, I‟m much more concerned with 
finding out what makes people the same anywhere. . . .  If I can get a person in Vancouver 
Island just right on paper, he‟s not too different from someone in Montreal or New York” 
(qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 58, 52).  Hodgins‟ regionalism rests, as a result, largely 
in his descriptions of landscape, such as humpbacked whales, oyster shacks, the fishing and 
logging industry, as well as the multicultural island community, but it omits or marginalises 
significant issues affecting non-settler communities on the island in the nineteen-seventies.  
Accordingly, Hodgins‟ project is not primarily a thematising of “a kind of postcolonial 
discourse,” as Slemon suggests (420, emphasis omitted), as the postcolonial realities and 
histories are more obscured than illuminated. 
 
Domesticating Narratives: Ferality, Fables, and Figures of Speech 
Settlement in both Invention of the World and What the Crow Said is presented as a “natural” 
process, whereby Native cultures are organically integrated into the multicultural and 
polyphonic (or multilingual) present of the Canadian nation.  By appropriating magical 
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realism as a globally recognised (and successfully marketable) expression of local identities, 
both Kroetsch and Hodgins assert a particular Canadian identity, a multicultural identity 
belonging to a particular locale.  They position themselves as both belonging to a common, 
global humanity, as well as an emphatically local, and settled, culture.  However, magical 
realism is a mode that unsettles.  In order to present a narrative of settled settlement, so to 
speak, as opposed to the dislocated settler narratives of Peter Carey and Richard Flanagan, for 
example, Kroetsch and Hodgins redomesticate realism gone feral and reclaim Cartesian 
humanist ideas of what it means to be human. 
Delbaere-Garant explains her modification of the oxymoron “magic realism” to 
“mythic realism” by arguing that “the magic and the real do not have equal weight in First 
and Second World fiction in English” (261).  At the heart of this imbalance, she suggests, is 
the contrast between the magic realism of Latin America and the pragmatism of First and 
Second World fiction, as she calls it.  She writes: “Much as the Anglophone world wants to 
challenge traditional realism, it is not the Hispanic world.  The pragmatic and puritanical 
Crusoe, not the well-balanced magic realist couple Sancho/Quixote, stands at the front door 
of its house of fiction” (261).213  Delbaere-Garant‟s evoking of Crusoe is apt.  By rendering 
animals useful and establishing an agricultural base for his livelihood, Crusoe replicates what 
Armstrong calls “the economic structure of modernity,” and enacts “a form of enlightened 
humanity defined by its separation from and dominion over animality. . .” (What Animals 
Mean 31-32).  This process is indeed reflected in Kroetsch and Hodgins‟ pragmatic mythical 
realism: enlightenment humanism, called into question by magical realism‟s feral animals, is 
reasserted through the use of, and separation from, animals. 
As Gill and Anderson write: 
More than a cultural ideal . . . settled cultivation materialised a specific 
humanist ontology of human distinction from the nonhuman world, according 
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to which cultivation would not only release the land‟s potential, but signal the 
passage of a universalised human out of a “state of nature” and ultimately into 
a space of civilised accommodation with other humans and nonhumans.  
(Original emphasis) 
Accordingly, What the Crow Said emphasises the necessity of being useful within the rural, 
animal economies.  Vera Lang‟s notice in the Big Indian Signal that “men are a bunch of 
useless bastards” (Crow 14) foreshadows the Big Indian men‟s decline into animality: the 
Schmier players are at their lowest point whilst they are associated with animals and dirt, and 
especially when they inhabit “Isador Heck‟s tarpaper shack,” which “was worse than a 
pigpen” (97).  A sign of their degradation are the flies who fall into the pancake batter and 
whom Heck “flicked . . . against he greasy wall with a dirty finger” (97).  The shack is the 
site of abject (human) animality: 
The houseflies, all day, were so thick that sometimes the players had trouble 
seeing their cards.  Night was little better: at night the millers and moths 
swarmed into the two-room shack as if to put out the men‟s eyes.  The whole 
place had a sour smell. . . . Going outside was almost worse than staying in the 
shack.  Heck had nailed rotting coyote hides and dead hawks to the walls.  
Gophers and snakes abounded, right up to the doorstep.  The barn hadn‟t been 
cleaned in months and the manure was so deep that no one could enter there to 
relieve himself.  Outside the barn, the carcass of a dead horse stank to high 
heaven.  Sometimes, when the wind blew from the wrong direction, the stench 
of death spread through the shack itself; the men were barely able to continue 
the game, some days, some nights, against the impediments.  (Crow 97-8) 
However, while animals, such as pigs and flies, are associated with dirt and abjection, the 
neglect and death of animals such as horses, and the waste of rotting coyote hides, for 
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example, is, in turn, a sign of the Schmier players‟ moral debasement.  Their laziness makes 
them “worse than animals,” as the saying goes.  The animals, after all, play their expected 
parts in nature and the rural economy. 
Gus Liebhaber, in contrast, asserts his status as (white) male authority—in regard to 
language, “b-keeping” and in relation to Tiddy Lang—by wrangling with and finally gaining 
control over and restoring order to a feral landscape.  What the Crow Said uses the dichotomy 
between domesticated versus untamed, free animality to reflect magical realist mockery of  
systems of order, as Liebhaber is confronted with the arbitrary, but rigid, sequence of the 
alphabet: 
All the capital letters in his collection of wood type were set in neat rows, 
arranged alphabetically.  He couldn‟t bear that either.  In terror at the 
domestication of those free, beautiful letters—no, it was the absurdity of their 
recited order that afflicted him: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ— 
he opened a twenty-six of rye and, with immense effort, tried to disentangle 
himself from the tyranny of rote.  (Crow 69) 
Bees whose hives are managed by humans are the ideal vehicle to convey this dichotomy, as 
they are never fully domesticated, but neither are they wild.  Bees are on the border between 
nature and culture, and it is this in-betweenness that Kroetsch uses to convey an ambivalent 
attitude towards language and writing.  Rudy Dorscht writes that Kroetsch‟s texts “speak of 
their own processes of production and in so speaking question themselves” (73), and his pun 
on B and bee, humorously alluded to by Vera‟s “worn copy of Root‟s ABC and XYZ of Bee 
Culture” (Crow 130), highlights this process.  As Rudy Dorscht points out: “Vera—the name 
paradigmatically linked to „verity,‟ to truth—[is] seduced by „swarming‟ b‟s—a 
disseminating „Lang‟/language” (75).  The Bs also illustrate Kroetsch‟s tendency to link 
those “free, beautiful letters” directly to animals.  Rudy Dorscht reveals Kroetsch‟s 
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fascination with beekeeping,
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 and connects Vera‟s seduction by “b/e/es” with the act of 
writing (75).  Thus, she regards both Kroetsch and Vera as “beekeeper[s]” (Rudy Dorscht 
75), or “B-keepers.” 
Liebhaber, too, considers himself a “B-keeper,” as his role as referee in a hockey 
game illustrates.  He initially fancies himself as “some kind of arbitrator, the civilizing man.  
He liked that.  The civilizing man: at the center, and yet uninvolved.  The dispassionate man 
at the passionate core, witnessing both jealousy and desire, separate from either” (Crow 72).  
Yet when the “swarming players,” thus likened to bees, get out of control, he finds that he 
cannot remain uninvolved, as his attempt to restore order by writing down their names fails 
(72).  Like bees, the players cannot be controlled through rules and language, but only by 
physically managing their environment.  Thus, Liebhaber “walked over to a box on a post by 
the skating rink shack and turned out the lights.  He was able, that night, single-handedly, to 
assert order” (73).  The act of writing the narrative becomes a physical intervention, just as 
letters, such as the Bs, become a physical presence in the story. 
The appearance of other animal, or animated, letters in “Kroetsch‟s book on b‟s” 
(Rudy Dorscht 75) coincides with Liebhaber‟s habit of either misplacing his types, or keeping 
them in an eccentric storage system, which is, however, no more eccentric than the random 
order of the alphabet: he leaves them “on the table,” places them “on a windowsill,” takes 
them “into his living room” (Crow 54), uses them to “[print] across the linoleum,” finds them 
“in a shoebox under his bed” and keeps them “in rows on top of the tank of his toilet” (55).  
The reader finds that several of Liebhaber‟s letters have escaped, either from his eccentric 
order, or the “domesticated” alphabet, and gone astray.  Thus, the sky is “filled with vees of 
geese” (153), and horse prints “a shiny reddish U” on Leo Weller‟s forehead (85).  These are 
further symptoms of the disturbance caused by the Bs‟ seduction of Vera.  Animality, or 
ferality, adds an unpredictable element to the narrative, beyond Liebhaber‟s immediate 
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control.  The story, after all, gets out of control with the free flight of the Bs, who seduce 
Vera Lang/Language.  As the reader is told, “[p]eople, years later, blamed everything on the 
bees” (7). 
The narrative is thus generated by language and letters themselves, and it does not 
move towards the happy ending Liebhaber hopes for.  The ongoing War against the Sky 
causes a prolonged drought, which prevents him from marrying Tiddy, who declares that she 
is “going to mourn until there is a cloudburst” (Crow 144).  An author figure, Liebhaber is 
torn between the “terror” of order, such as the rigid, but random, order of the alphabet, and 
his own desire for control over the unfolding story.  Christine Jackman comments: 
“Liebhaber‟s fear of and desire for domestication [of himself and the alphabet] parallel, or are 
part of, his fear of and desire for language,” and observes that “Liebhaber seems to court the 
domestication he tries to flee.”  Thus, his initial desire to stay uninvolved changes into a 
desire for authority and control, and, in his frustration, he decides that he needs to assert 
physical control over (or domesticate) the Bs: “If it was war the sky wanted, then he would 
give it war” (Crow 179).  Lecker writes that  
the War Against the Sky . . . is fundamentally a war against the notion of 
direction from above, be it the direction issued by God, a god, the author as 
God, or any kind of systematizing, „omnipotent‟ force.  The War Against the 
Sky is a metaphor for Kroetsch‟s struggle against the inevitability of narrative 
prgresssion [sic]: if you beat the sky you beat the unseen force that has 
controlled you.  (Lecker, Robert Kroetsch 101-2) 
The result is Liebhaber‟s virtual rape of the sky and the Bs with Isador Heck‟s circus cannon 
(Crow 182), in a scene juxtaposed to the initial seduction of Vera Lang by the Bs. 
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While the Bs can be seen as “fertiliz[ing] the barren sky,” they are not just the means 
by which Liebhaber “rapes” the sky, but they themselves are violated in an act suggesting 
revenge: 
He took the bees.  He pumped them into the sky itself, rammed them into the 
sky‟s night, into the sky‟s blue breaking. . . . He knocked them high, shot them 
into the one androgynous moment of heaven and earth.  He spent the queens 
into their myriad selves; he, the first and final male, horny to die.  The 
rainmaker, burning the night with the bees‟ making.  (Crow 216) 
It is significant that Liebhaber first frees the Bs from their cages, but then uses them for his 
purposes.  Thus, at the same time as the act of creation, or the creative act of writing, liberates 
from constraints, conventions and rigid systems, it is in itself an act of control and 
management.  Liebhaber‟s action causes a downpour, which returns the Bs to being 
immobilised, passive letters: “Often, inside a huge hailstone, was a bee, frozen into perfect 
stillness, magnified by the convexity of the encasing ice” (Crow 193).  These frozen Bs, 
clearly, become part of the business of printing and writing again, as “[t]he sound of the 
hailstones, drumming on the shingle roof of the wheelhouse, on the deck of the boat, made 
him feel he was inside a typesetting machine” (197).  Liebhaber‟s intervention changes the 
course of the narrative, and promises to result in the happy ending he wished for: “A drop of 
rain hit him and he knew it would be a flood.  At last, his marriage time had come.  He had 
remembered the future correctly: there would be a flood, a joy of rain, his battle won, his ark 
floating” (185). 
Ultimately, there is “a sense in which the „natural‟ has been restored” (Rudy Dorscht 
79), as Cathy, “the normal one” (Crow 218), defines the ending of the novel.  As Rudy 
Dorscht points out, “„Crows are cawing.‟  „She‟ is normal” (79).  Although “[t]he title of 
Kroetsch‟s book on b‟s (What the Crow Said) undermines the authority both of a „master 
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storyteller‟—the narrative is what the crow said—and of the narrating voice in the text which 
does not belong to a single speaker” (Rudy Dorscht 75), Liebhaber‟s struggle to reinstate 
order is more akin to the classic realist text than to magical realism.  Belsey writes: 
The consistency and continuity of the subject provides the conceptual 
framework of classic realism . . . . classic realism recognizes the 
precariousness of the ego and offers the reader the sense of danger and 
excitement which results from that recognition.  But the movement of classic 
realist narrative towards closure ensures the reinstatement of order, sometimes 
a new order, sometimes the old restored, but always intelligible because 
familiar.  (75) 
The unresolved oppositions between author and character, between single voice and dialogic 
narrative, and the precarious state of normality at the end of the narrative, reflect the 
“precariousness of the ego,” or, in other words, a threat to the Cartesian humanist subject.  
This simultaneous acknowledgement and subversion is central to Kroetsch‟s understanding of 
deconstruction: “You take a given set of conventions and play with them in a certain way.  I 
think some of the conventions of fiction control too much our way of seeing the world.  It 
starts to get interesting when you take those conventions and both use them and work against 
them” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 133).  This creates the conditions for Liebhaber to 
be, simultaneously, an author figure, a character, and “hardly more than a mere tray of 
alphabet, awaiting the insistence of an ordering hand” (Crow 68). 
Ultimately, the Cartesian humanist subject is only temporarily disrupted, as human-
animal separation tends to be upheld, rather than radically questioned, as in the magical 
realist novels discussed in previous chapters.  Nonetheless, much of What the Crow Said 
appears to suggest a blurring of human-animal boundaries.  Apart from the speaking crow, 
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there is, for example, a plague of horseflies which causes the Big Indians to behave like 
horses: 
A few citizens of the Municipal District, unable themselves to cope with the 
flies, fastened makeshift tails to the backs of their trousers or skirts and 
learned in a matter of minutes to switch them back and forth.  Women, 
especially, took to wearing over their eyes forelocks in the manner of horses.  
One elderly gentleman figured out how to twitch his ears and the muscles of 
his thighs.  And yet, for all the precautions, the afternoon constituted a 
veritable bloodletting.   (Crow 168). 
Twitching ears and thigh muscles is within the realm of human ability, and whilst the 
mechanics of the tail-switching is unexplained, the make-shift nature of the tails identifies 
them as artificial contraptions.  They contrast with Aureliano‟s pig tail in One Hundred Years 
of Solitude in this regard, for example, with which he was born. 
More prominently in What the Crow Said, there is Vera‟s “almost human” cry, “a cry 
of joy . . . inhumanly exquisite” (11), at the beginning of the novel, as well as Vera‟s son, 
who appears to have habits and sensory perceptions of coyotes.  He communicates with “a 
short, sharp yip, a kind of bark that almost became a howl.  Squatted on his haunches, he held 
his head high, listening. . . . Vera‟s Boy howled.  From far up the valley a coyote answered” 
(190).  Furthermore, he “could . . . sense on his skin the moisture conditions, and then, with 
his blue eyes shut under his black eyebrows, announce what crop would best thrive that 
season.  He could, with a single sniff of the air, recognize the ideal seeding time while the 
local forecasters scratched in the cold soil and licked their fingers and tested the wind in 
vain” (168).  The gossipy voice of narration and the talk of the men in the pub hint at the 
possibility that he might be a werewolf (139-40; 146), but most striking is his speech that 
“was half yips and barks, half what his listeners took to be pig Latin” (135). 
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However, Vera‟s cry is called “inhuman” only while “[t]hey could not describe it,” 
and shortly after the reader is told with certainty: “They knew then . . . it was a human 
outcry” (Crow 11).  The idea that Vera‟s Boy might be a werewolf is only based on vague 
insinuations, and his ability to foretell the weather by using his finely tuned senses cannot be 
directly related to coyotes, who never use their senses to forecast “the ideal seeding time.”  
While the language he speaks is “pig Latin,” it is, of course, nothing to do with 
communication between pigs. 
The most obvious example of this is the exchange (literally) between the crow and the 
Schmier players, as the crow speaks “human,” and the Schmier players, one after the other, 
begin to caw.  In the end, “all the men” are cawing (Crow 85-7), apparently to amuse JG.  
While they caw again on the way to Cathy and Joe Lightning‟s wedding, “not so much to the 
waiting magpies, as to each other” (101), the Schmier players merely use, temporarily, crow 
sounds, which are meaningless to them.  Not “ravens” themselves, they are only “raving,” as 
the crow points out: “A bunch of raving idiots” (88). 
Conversely, the crow‟s speech is human, with human meanings.  While the crow‟s 
comments always match the circumstances, is not clear at all that the crow actually 
understands, and employs, the meaning of human language.  The crow appears to learn from 
particular situations, and mimics the appropriate sounds.  Thus, when the crow “shat in the 
middle of [Tiddy‟s] kitchen table,” Tiddy scolds the crow: “„Shame on you‟ . . . . „Shame on 
you,‟ the black crow said” (91).  Furthermore, the reader is told that “[p]eople, years later, 
insisted that it learned to talk from listening to Liebhaber piss and moan about the world” 
(64).  The crow‟s command of human language, and his/her appropriate use of it, is 
undoubtedly remarkable, and tends to contradict the idea that the crow is merely a master of 
mimicry.  However, whether the crow is capable of understanding human language or not, is 
left in doubt, as is the question whether the crow is the means by which JG communicates: 
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“Whether or not the crow was speaking what was on the silent child‟s mind, that was never 
clearly determined.  But there were those who insisted that the black crow sometimes spoke 
on behalf of JG” (64).  The crow might be nothing more than a projector for JG‟s voice. 
Like the misplaced “animal letters,” the crow‟s human speech is only part of the 
disruption caused by the free flight of the Bs: pieces of language that are displaced and 
disordered.  Yet in the end, “[t]he crows are cawing” again (Crow 218).  The concept of the 
human-animal divide is completely restored.  Thus, this final cawing of the crows, 
incomprehensible and meaningless to the human characters in the novel, reinforces the idea 
of a gap between humans and animals, and the crow‟s silence emphasises this gap further.  
The readers, like the Big Indians, are left with the nagging question “what did the crow say . . 
.?” (152).  The unfulfilled desire for some revelation, wisdom or prophecy, however, is 
nothing to do with the caw of the crow.  But that is, ultimately, all the crow naturally, and 
once normality is restored, ever says.  The crow, in the end, cannot possibly answer questions 
about human experience, such as those “on the subject of women or guns” (152). 
The crow who speaks and the men who caw can be seen as examples of Kroetsch‟s 
“postmodern paradox[es],” which Hutcheon argues express “the refusal to pick sides, the 
desire to be on both sides of any border, driving energy from the continual crossing” (162).  
However, in What the Crow Said, it is the crossing of the border between humanity and 
animality that, paradoxically, defines and reinstates it.  Hutcheon writes that “Kroetsch is the 
master of paradoxes, of opposites that do not merge dialectically, of doubles that stay double” 
(161).  Jackman, too, describes the crossing and re-crossing of boundaries: 
The topos that is Crow is one in which binaries are altered and alter each 
other. As opposing halves of an abstract objective system, they are parodied 
until they collapse under the weight of their own absurdity. However, the pairs 
are not denied; they remain as dynamic relationships. Even structure and 
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master narratives are not abolished; they also function as forces in an 
interactive field. 
In regard to his representation of animals, the underlying principle, most notable in the 
speech exchange between the crow and the Schmier players, is that of “inversion (the world 
turned upside down)” (Stallybrass and White 56).  Peter Stallybrass and Allon White explain: 
“Inversion addresses the social classification of values, distinctions and judgements which 
underpin practical reason and systematically inverts the relations of subject and object, agent 
and instrument, husband and wife, old and young, animal and human, master and slave.  
Although it re-orders the terms of a binary pair, it cannot alter the terms themselves” (56).  
They contrast this with hybridisation, which, they say “generates the possibility of shifting 
the very terms of the system itself, by erasing and interrogating the relationships which 
constitute it (58.).  In other words, the defining boundaries remain intact, do not merge and 
stay double, even though they may be redrawn elsewhere, or turned upside down. 
Kroetsch asserts elsewhere that humans and animals are “close” (qtd. in Hancock, 
Canadian Writers 143).  Vera‟s sisters, for example, “hopped like chickens themselves, 
pretending to cackle, straying their way up straw-hid wooden steps” (Crow 8).  For Rose, 
who has to take on more chores because of the men‟s laziness, it is “almost a pleasure to go 
outside and feed pigs, to walk through the chicken coop and find a few warm eggs under the 
hens, to sit milking a cow, listening to the warm milk zing into the pail” (Crow 81).  This 
kind of closeness to animals indicates the extent to which animal industries and products 
infuse everyday life, and is an affectionate portrayal of the humans who interact with animals 
on a daily basis. 
However, Kroetsch‟s comment on the closeness of humans and animals is followed 
by the remark “I look so much like a buffalo that some mornings I have an identity crisis 
myself” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 143), which derives its humour, ultimately, from 
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the otherness of animals.  The simultaneous closeness and otherness of animals lends itself to 
an allegorical use of animal imagery, and Peter Thomas comments that What the Crow Said 
constitutes “a formal shift, away . . . from character to the flatness of beast-fable” (Robert 
Kroetsch 103).  Wilson suggests that “What the Crow Said contains not specific stories but 
ways of treating stories that recall García Márquez, ways of treating stories that recall Ovid,” 
and Kroetsch replies that he “certainly use[s] Ovid” (Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 14).  
Accordingly, Peter Thomas argues that “the novel is about fable-making and the order of 
story rather than that of scientific rationalism” (Robert Kroetsch 100); Lecker calls it “a 
fabular tale of prairie life” (Robert Kroetsch 99); and Wilson declares that “Kroetsch enfables 
Alberta.” (“Boundary” 49).  Indeed, representations of animals, not only by Kroetsch but also 
by Hodgins, are emphatically figures of speech.  This calls for a more conventional reading, 
as the primary concern of a beast fable is that of decoding the allegorical message. 
Allegory relies on the co-existence and combination of two parallel, and separate 
stories, or, as M.H. Abrams puts it, on the presence of a “second, correlated order of 
signification” (Abrams 5, 7th ed.), whereby the beast fable is the “[m]ost common ..., in 
which animals talk and act like the human types they represent” (Abrams 6, 7th ed.).  In that 
scenario, animals function as screens for human concerns and meanings.  This “flatness” is 
prominent in Kroetsch‟s novel, as Peter Thomas points out, and he construes the crow, in 
connection with JG, accordingly.  He writes: “[t]he crow is the appropriate voice of corrupt 
and deathly self-love” (Robert Kroetsch 112), and thus assigns it an allegorical meaning. 
And yet, Kroetsch tends to twist the traditional relationship between the two separate 
systems of signification.  Bees, for example, are not like people, as they would be in a 
traditional beast fable, but people resemble bees in some ways, which, in turn, reflects upon 
the human characters‟ personalities via a process zoomorphism.  Peter Thomas draws 
attention to the connection between the Big Indian men, drones, and the idea of male 
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obsolescence, as Vera comments on the expendability of the drones after mating (Robert 
Kroetsch 287).  The name “Droniuk,” or Jerry Lapanne‟s “beeline[s] for Big Indian” (Crow 
105, 109), for instance, highlight this comparison, and Vera‟s remark about the drones, “[t]he 
males are useless” (58), mirrors and reinforces the often repeated assertion that “men are a 
bunch of useless bastards” (14, 19, 123, 189).  The drones thus signify male obsolescence and 
laziness, and the Big Indian men, in turn, are expendable, as they, like drones, die after 
becoming lovers and husbands of the Lang women.  Conversely, the Lang women, like queen 
bees, are apparently capable of becoming pregnant without the men.  As Peter Thomas 
writes, “[h]aving a queen bee‟s attitude towards her several suitors, their expendability for 
Vera is only a matter of time” (Robert Kroetsch 287-8). 
At the same time, Kroetsch self-consciously addresses his own process of literary 
production, and ridicules ideas of allegory and symbolism, as well as the arbitrariness of such 
significations.  Thus, Vera‟s third husband observes “a snake trying to copulate with a 
logging chain.  The tall, gangling stranger with hair the color of dust took that as an omen.  A 
sign.  He was supposed to stop building roads and get married” (Crow 176).  Wilson 
comments that “What the Crow Said seems very mythological.  And we have noted its 
resemblance to Ovid, and yet no particular thing in it is Ovidian” (qtd. in Kroetsch, Neuman 
and Wilson 113).  Kroetsch‟s use of fable is indeed unconventional, and Hutcheon writes that 
“Kroetsch is a problematizer and questioner of our cultural givens.  He does not deny their 
existence, but he challenges their authority” (Hutcheon 183).  Nonetheless, the narrative 
encourages conventional modes of reading, even if these do not yield conventional results.  
Thus, Rudy Dorscht, for example, construes Kroetsch‟s animals in the first instance as 
signifiers of abstract concepts, and remarks that the coyotes, who have raised Vera‟s Boy, are 
“trickster figures in Kroetsch‟s work” and essentially “figures for language itself” (77).  The 
(mock-) symbolic significance especially of the crow is taken (and presented) as a given.  
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Kroetsch‟s animals, unlike or not much like the magical realist animals discussed previously, 
are not agents as such, or embodied characters.  As disembodied constructs, more akin to 
conventional literary devices, they are figures of speech, verbal artefacts. 
Faris writes that “[f]or Camayd-Freixas, among the essential criteria of magical 
realism is the reader‟s simultaneous adoption of a literal and an allegorical perspective” 
(Enchantments 21).  I propose that an allegorical interpretation is not even always necessary, 
or even always particularly intended, certainly where animals are concerned.  Sometimes, as 
discussed in Chapter One, a dog is “just a dog.”  In any case, I agree with Faris, who 
proposes that “the weight of the nonallegorical thrust of realist narrative conventions works 
against a reduction of the magic in magical realism to a primarily allegorical mode” 
(Enchantments 21).  Kroetsch‟s representations of animals belong instead to “the history of 
fabulation,” which, Derrida argues, “remains an anthropomorphic taming, a moralizing 
subjection, a domestication.  Always a discourse of man, on man, indeed on the animality of 
man, but for and as man” (405). 
The separation between humanity and animality, and the use of animals as pure 
figures of speech, is more prominent in Hodgins‟ novels, due to the fact that they are based 
on and infused with Christian Science beliefs.  I agree with Carol Langhelle‟s detailed study 
of The Invention of the World, in which she demonstrates that the novel “is written from a 
Christian Science perspective” (55).  She argues that Hodgins “has, in fact, allowed the entire 
structure and meaning of the novel to be determined by his religious convictions” (56).215  
Langhelle sidesteps the issue whether “this tension” between the counterfeit and the real can 
be related to “the technique of magic realism” (7); however, she stresses that “it is important 
for the reader to understand that Hodgins‟ reality is not our reality” (6, original emphasis).  
Thus, Christian Science, founded by Mary Baker Eddy in 1879 (see Mary Baker Eddy 
Library), is based on the belief that matter does not exist, and “that this world is only illusion, 
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metaphor” (Langhelle 56).  This belief arises out of the conviction that “man was created a 
perfect spiritual being in the image of God, as recorded in the first chapter of Genesis” 
(Langhelle 7), and is thus “perfect and immortal” (Eddy qtd. in Langhelle 7).  Conversely, 
“[m]ortal material man and his belief in the reality of sickness, evil, sin, and death, are only 
illusion, falsity, counterfeit” (Langhelle 7).  Reality, roughly defined as the tangible 
experience and perception of our environment and bodies with our senses,
216
 does not exist 
according to Christian Science teaching.  The only “Reality” (capitalized by Hodgins in 
Hancock, Canadian Writers 61) is spiritual.  Accordingly, any notion of realism is 
complicated, when Hodgins represents a reality he does not believe actually exists.  Jeffrey 
points to “Hodgins‟ implicit critique of the false realism of documentary narrative,” 
represented by Becker, collector of notes, interviews and other „true to life‟ documents 
(Jeffrey 209).  Yet Becker himself provides an explanation as to the purpose of his activity.  
He writes: “Maybe all our lives that instinct is in us, trying to translate the fake material 
world we seem to experience back into pre-Eden truth” (Invention 321).  This attempt at 
translation lies at the heart of Hodgins‟ realism. 
The “fallacy of matter” is established, according to Eddy, with the second version of 
Genesis.
217
  Langhelle explains that,  
Since the second record of creation, in the teachings of Christian Science, is an 
allegory whose purpose is to depict the falsity and the effects of the belief in 
life springing from and existing in matter, it is reasonable to assume that 
Becker‟s record of the Keneally legend is similarly meant to show the falsity 
and the effects of the belief in materiality and evil.  (26) 
Thus, Hodgins‟ use of myth has to be seen as part of a larger project, which entails the 
exposal of magic as evil, and evil, in turn, as deception. Accordingly, myths and magic, both 
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in The Invention of the World and The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne, are presented as highly 
suspect. 
For example, the story of Fat Annie is told by Christie, a descendant of “the members 
of the band of natives whose longhouses and sweat baths had once stood by the edge of the 
inlet” to Bald-headed Pete, a newcomer in town (Resurrection 64).  This creation myth of 
Port Annie, the metamorphosis of Fat Annie Fartenburg from a whale with a human voice 
into a human being, is exposed as “another of [Christie‟s] unbelievable tales” (241), or 
“whatever those crazy Indians claimed” (163).  Christie‟s story, handed down from his 
grandparents, is presented not only as a part of native superstitious folklore, but also as the 
kind of tall tale locals might tell to fool newcomers, as Christie‟s drinking companion Belchy 
McFadden conspiratorially winks at him to confirm part of the story (117).  The tale, which 
describes Fat Annie as a woman of whale-like proportions, becomes even less credible when 
she turns out to be a “poor old thing,” a “dry shrivelled-up vegetable root” (245). 
Similarly, the native myth of Thunderbird collapses into the artificiality of a 
disintegrating costume.  Thunderbird is reduced to one of Port Annie‟s mayor‟s fancy dress 
outfits, with “wire-and-paper wings . . . a little battered from going in and out of doors that 
weren‟t wide enough, and the enormous beak that protruded from his forehead was bent in 
the middle, but other than that it was good as new, and colourful, a perfect costume for 
getting his picture taken for the Port Annie Crier” (43).  The costume breaks, “snapping his 
beak right in two” (45), indicating that Thunderbird has nothing more to say.  The 
Thunderbird myth, materialised as the mayor‟s costume, is rendered powerless, and exposed 
as insubstantial, false and weak. 
In her glossary to Science and Health, Eddy equates mythology and matter (somewhat 
obscurely, to the non-Christian Scientist), and defines them as “the opposite of Truth; the 
opposite of Spirit; the opposite of God; . . . that which mortal mind sees, feels, hears, tastes, 
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and smells only in belief” (Eddy 591).  Mythologies, as well as the belief in matter, are 
erroneous inventions which obscure the “Truth” from this perspective,218 and this is reflected 
in Hodgins‟ work.  He remarks, in relation to his first novel, that his interest is in “[t]he 
Reality that exists beyond this imitation reality that we are too often contented with.  The 
created rather than the invented world.  I didn‟t call my novel The Invention of the World 
because it is an arresting title.  It is a story about counterfeits” (qtd. in Hancock, CW 61-2). 
Accordingly, Lily, Keneally‟s wife, dispels some of the myths surrounding Keneally.  
She says: “They told me you‟d have a sack of turnips between your legs, but you look normal 
enough to me” (Invention 252-3).  Later, she remarks, “[v]illain, god, demon, magician, con-
man, call him what you want he was my husband,” and points out that he was “human after 
all and getting old” (Invention 264).  Richard Ryburn, one of Becker‟s interviewees, calls the 
legends around Keneally “hogwash” (Invention 195).  Dairmud Evans, another interviewee, 
similarly reports that he was “trying to reconcile this desperate whining man with the man of 
the legends.  It wouldn‟t work, I know, it never has.  When story people become flesh people 
we can‟t bear the evidence” (Invention 203). 
Such accounts suggest that, just because Keneally occasionally behaves like a bull, 
this does not mean he actually is a half-bull.  The myth and rumours consolidate his power 
over his followers, and his behaviour reinforces it.  The fear he instils in them is based at least 
in part on the stories surrounding him, supported by older, familiar legends associated with 
bull-gods and devils.  Thus, his followers see what they are preconditioned to expect, instead 
of a man putting on an act.  Lily comments: “I don‟t know who disgusted me more, him [sic] 
for being human after all, or the rest of them for letting him pretend he wasn‟t” (Invention 
264).  In contrast, the one “true” myth is that of Maggie‟s spiritual, “sacred journey” (Horner 
6), at the end of which she arrives at her role as “central healer” (Horner 16).  This role, also 
mirrored by Joseph Bourne, his wife, and Raimey in The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne, is, 
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as Langhelle points out, “one of the most important doctrines of Christian Science—„the duty 
and ability of Christians to heal the sick‟” (16). 
Magic, however, has nothing to do with this, as Becker indicates to Lily (Invention 
246).  Hodgins exposes magic as evil in his first novel, and sets up a contrast with what are 
essentially divine miracles (not magic) in his second novel, such as the healing and 
resurrection of Joseph Bourne.  Langhelle points out that “to conjure” and “to invent” are 
“both negative terms in the novel,” and contrasted with creation (17).  Accordingly, Lily 
refers to Keneally‟s “silly magic” (Invention 256).  On the other hand, there is the miraculous 
re-appearance of Joseph Bourne in Port Annie, after his apparent death.  The description 
strongly points towards the Christian Scientists‟ belief in spiritual Reality (to borrow 
Hodgins‟ capitalisation), and their disbelief in the existence of matter:  
[N]o one touched.  If it wasn‟t flesh that hung on his ancient bones they‟d 
never know; if it wasn‟t blood that pumped through those veins it was 
something else that did the job as well.  Or better, they didn‟t want to know 
for sure.  And old man come back to life was mystery enough without raising 
any other kinds of doubt.  What seemed body could be the substance of soul, 
what seemed blood-life could be the animation of pure spirit, it wouldn‟t 
matter.  And if Ian McCarthy or someone had gone up to the old man now and 
passed his hand through that body without encountering a material thing to 
stop it, no one would have been more than a little surprised.  (Resurrection 
140) 
Jeffrey comments on Hodgins‟ resistance to the label “magic realism,” and notes that 
Hodgins‟ remark: “This thing called „magic realism‟ is not magic at all. It‟s real. I don‟t write 
anything unreal or unbelievable or even improbable” (qtd. in Jeffrey 204).  However, this 
comment has to be seen in the context of miracles, rather than magic.  His use of the term 
Schwalm  321 
“magic” here acknowledges, though, that readers may not always make a distinction between 
the two.  
To use Faris‟ words, “[t]he question of belief is central here” (Ordinary Enchantments 
17).  However, Hodgins‟ narrative does not so much reflect the opposition between Western 
scientific rationality versus indigenous belief systems, “the implicit clash of cultural systems 
within the narrative” (Ordinary Enchantments 17), but a different belief system deduced 
from, and firmly rooted within, Western society.  This conundrum (for Western, non-
Christian Scientist readers) is illustrated in the discussion between Jenny and McCarthy, who 
debate the miraculous cure of Preserved Crabbe‟s club-footed brother: 
Well there had to be a sensible explanation, McCarthy said.  No doubt there 
were plenty of ways to explain it, nobody was going to treat him like a fool.  
“Everything in this world has its rational explanation.”  “Don‟t count on it,” 
Jenny said and left.  Naturally she didn‟t mean what she said.  She counted on 
an ordered universe as much as anyone in town, but she wasn‟t quite so sure as 
Ian McCarthy was that all of it could be simply understood.  There were still 
some mysteries left, thank goodness, and lots of room for new ways of looking 
at things.  (Resurrection 205) 
Faris argues that, “because belief systems differ, clearly, some readers in some cultures will 
hesitate less than others, depending on their beliefs and narrative traditions” (Ordinary 
Enchantments 17).  Leaving aside the fact that Faris applies this to inter-cultural differences, 
this is certainly true for Hodgins‟ first two novels.  For a Christian Scientist reader, hesitation, 
or confusion, is less likely.  Ironically, whilst empirical science, based on observing the 
physical world, is undermined here, the alternative explanation hinted at by Jenny‟s and 
McCarthy‟s discussion claims itself to be scientific and logical.219  One Western worldview is 
undermined by another.  Miracles fit into this (Christian) “scientific” system in a 
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straightforward manner, whereas magic does not.  As Becker proclaims: “But magic is what 
seems to defy the laws, or suspend them.  There‟s nothing magic about something that was 
there all along, though hidden, like the underground roots of frozen grass” (Invention 246). 
For “magic” that defies natural laws (that is, those considered by Mary Baker Eddy to 
be natural), Eddy uses the term “animal magnetism.”  Briefly, she equates it with mesmerism, 
hypnotism, and other kinds of healing practices which claim to be curing physical ailments 
through either mental forces or faith.
220
  Describing animal magnetism as “the criminal 
misuse of human willpower,” (106), Eddy declares that “[i]n no instance is the effect of 
animal magnetism, recently called hypnotism, other than the effect of illusion.  Any seeming 
benefit derived from it is proportional to one‟s faith in esoteric magic” (101).  The term 
“animal” here appears to be used to denote physicality rather than, specifically, non-human 
animals.  She refers to Franz Mesmer‟s theory, which is centred around the “mutual influence 
between the celestial bodies, the earth, and . . . . [a]nimal bodies” (Mesmer qtd. in Eddy 100).  
Equally, she denotes “dishonesty, sensuality, falsehood, revenge, malice” to be “animal 
propensities” (Eddy 104), that is, qualities of matter and “error.” 
It is no surprise, then, that Keneally‟s evil nature, animal qualities, seeming hybridity, 
and the kind of trickery that Eddy would call “animal magnetism” are combined.  Langhelle, 
speculating on what Keneally‟s association with wolves might mean, fleetingly comments: 
“It is interesting to note in this connection that in Christian Science, an often used synonym 
for evil is „animal magnetism‟ (30).  “[M]agic‟s solid grounding in reality” (Ordinary 
Enchantments 15) is therefore not so solid in Hodgins‟ novels. 
Delbaere-Garant‟s solution to Hodgins‟ seemingly confusing use of magical realist 
motifs, which are evidently at odds with the (Latin American) models they emulate, is to 
propose that “Jack Hodgins experiments with a variety of magic realisms,” in order to “stress 
the distinction between trickery and reality, invention and creation” (260).  Langhelle 
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comments, “[t]he conventional realism of the settings, characters and voice in his works has 
led most critics to agree that Hodgins is a realist writer, but the fantastic and allegorical 
nature of much of his fiction makes it difficult for them to define exactly what sort of realist 
he is” (55).  Accordingly, Delbaere-Garant identifies “psychic realism,” “mythic realism,” 
and “grotesque realism” in Hodgins‟ first novel, which she considers to be modifications of 
magic realism (261).  To a certain degree, this may counteract some of the confusion that 
arises when critics try to extend the term “magical realism” to The Invention of the World; 
however, this approach still assigns Hodgins‟ fiction to a mode, or mould, it was never 
intended to fit in the first place. 
Hodgins points out that any connection between magic realism and his work had 
“never occurred to [him] before,” until he read Hancock‟s description of him as a “magic 
realist” (Hancock, Canadian Writers 71). Furthermore, he continues to be vague on the 
question whether the label “magical realism” actually applies to his work, as he says that 
magical realism “may describe what I‟ve already done” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers,  
my emphasis).  Even when he speaks in terms of “this other thing that you want to label 
magic realism” (Hancock, Canadian Writers 73), his description operates within the 
parameters of Christian Science rather than magic realism.  He says: “It‟s not the realism of 
the tree.  It‟s the reality beyond the tree” (Hancock, Canadian Writers 73), indicating 
Christian Scientist thought that what appears to non-Christian Scientists as matter needs to be 
“[s]piritually interpreted” to “stand for solid and grand ideas” (Eddy 511).  Nonetheless, 
Hodgins concedes that the label “magical realist” appeals to him (Hancock, Canadian 
Writers 71), and, clearly, the motifs Hodgins employs look like magical realism (especially 
those borrowed from García Márquez), even though, ultimately, they are not. 
Jeffrey declares that “as an inclusive category for Hodgins‟ fiction, magic realism is 
inadequate and probably misleading” (198; original italics).  Accordingly, Raimey, the first 
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noteworthy, most sustained and supposedly human animal, who, significantly, attempts to 
unlock the unused church shortly after her arrival (4-5), is, after all, definitely not an animal.  
She very clearly rejects the description of her as a “seabird”: “A strange town . . . where 
everyone treated her like some kind of foreign creature, not even human” (128).  The 
opposition between humans and animals in Christian Science is absolute, as Eddy‟s 
disagreement with the theory of evolution demonstrates: “Theorizing about man‟s 
development from mushrooms to monkeys and from monkeys into men amounts to nothing 
in the right direction and very much in the wrong.  Materialism grades the human species as 
rising from matter upward” (172).  Any image of human animality is therefore a supposedly 
false perception of reality, the result of invention, not creation. 
Langhelle comes to the conclusion that the reader should probably “have some 
knowledge of the teachings of Mary Baker Eddy in order to fully appreciate The Invention of 
the World” (57), and The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne, too, has to be understood on those 
terms.  Therefore, due to Hodgins‟ very unique concept of reality, his brand of realism is 
perhaps best conceived of as “Christian Science Realism,” which, in turn, determines 
Hodgins‟ symbolic use of animals.  For Hodgins, realism is the representation of a veneer, a 
facade of a reality that is only illusion, hiding behind it the “magic” of a spiritual, divine 
dimension.  He explains: “What you and I call the ocean is to me only a metaphor.  All those 
trees for instance, are metaphors; the reality lies beyond them.  The act of writing to me is an 
attempt to shine a light on that ocean and those trees so bright that we can see right through 
them to the reality that is constant” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 62). 
Discussing the destruction of the “diabolical,” which Hodgins considers “counterfeit,” 
in The Invention of the World, Hancock comments: “This is more than a literary convention.  
It‟s something basic to your view of life,” to which Hodgins‟ replies: “Oh yes.  I‟m writing 
allegories I suppose” (Hancock, Canadian Writers 77).  His first two novels can thus both be 
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seen, above all, as allegories,
221
 in contrast to Faris‟ assertion that the “magic in magical 
realism” cannot be reduced to a “primarily allegorical mode” (Enchantments 21).  Further, 
Hodgins‟ realism is first and foremost allegorical, whereas miracles, such as the club-footed 
Crabbe brother‟s cure and Joseph Bourne‟s resurrection, are to be understood “quite literally” 
(qtd. in Hancock, CW 63). 
Non-human animals, correspondingly, symbolise spiritual meanings, consistent with 
Eddy‟s assertion that animals, like the rest of “the universe,” are merely representations of 
spiritual principles: 
Animals and mortals metaphorically present the gradation of mortal thought, 
rising in the scale of intelligence, taking form in masculine, feminine, or 
neuter gender. The fowls, which fly above the earth in the open firmament of 
heaven, correspond to aspirations soaring beyond and above corporeality to 
the understanding of the incorporeal and divine Principle, Love.  (Eddy 511) 
Langhelle relates this “„spiritual‟ interpretation of birds” to Becker‟s song “I‟d rather be a 
sparrow than a snail” in The Invention of the World, and suggest that it represents “the main 
concern of the book—spirituality versus materiality” (18).  Furthermore, she discusses the 
symbolic and religious significance of a shell-less snail, kept in a chocolate box by the young 
man Julius Champney meets in the park (Invention 237-8).  Langhelle considers this scene 
“an absurd restatement of the parable” of the Good Samaritan (21).  She also provides 
plausible interpretations for Cora Manson‟s plastic pig, connecting it with Cora‟s 
preoccupation “with the concerns of the flesh” (Langhelle 37-8), and the “various beast 
images in the novel” (Langhelle 46).  Animals, whether “magical” or “realist,” thus serve 
primarily in allegorical and symbolic functions, as well as being props to create the 
Vancouver Island setting. 
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In any case, non-human animals are clearly seen as part of the landscape and Hodgins 
is very explicit about its function in his fiction: 
“[T]he landscape is ultimately only your setting. . . . Often a story for me 
begins when I discover a place has a meaning.  Either in the lives of the people 
who live there or in the lives of people who come to it.  It can then take on 
some symbolic importance that touches everybody.  That is the only 
importance landscape has to me in my fiction.  The role it plays in human 
lives.” (Hodgins in Hancock, Canadian Writers 60). 
Hodgins use of landscape, and, by association, animals, also recalls the “anthropomorphic 
taming, [the] moralizing subjection, [the] domestication” of fabulation Derrida identifies.  His 
two-dimensional spiritual Reality reduces his animals, in their physical dimension, to the 
“flatness of the beast-fable.”  Like Fat Annie‟s “incredible translation from [speaking] whale” 
(Resurrection 66) into carnivalesque idol and inflated story, Hodgins‟ fictional animals and 
landscape are meant to be translated and defined by their usefulness to humanity. 
 
“A real cat”: Irreplaceability and Singularity 
Both Kroetsch and Hodgins thus utilize animal imagery for pragmatic purposes throughout 
their narratives, as Hodgins‟ animals, as every other part of the landscape, are abstract ideas 
per se, whilst Kroetsch employs his literally as figures of speech, constructs of metafiction 
and the postmodern.  Such representations of animals can be described by extending the 
German concept of Nutztiere to express a literary paradigm.  The term corresponds with the 
English “domestic animals” or “farmed animals,” but its connotations are farther reaching.  
Loosely translated as “useful animals,” Nutztiere, in its literal sense, connotes the idea of 
animals being “utile,” that is, “[u]seful, profitable, advantageous,” and of “utilizing,” “[t]o 
make or render useful; to convert to use.”  Closely related to this is the idea of Nützlinge, 
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denoting small useful animals, such as spiders, helpful garden insects, and earthworms; a 
concept that can usefully be applied to Kroetsch‟s bees, for example.  I will include both 
categories, Nutztiere and Nützlinge, under the term “useful animals,” and discuss, in the 
following, the idea in relation to Derrida‟s concept of “the Animal” and “l’animot.”  Further, 
I will explore the idea of literary “useful animals” within the rural context of Kroetsch and 
Hodgins‟ writing. 
The usefulness of Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ animals is inextricably linked with their 
status as representatives of their respective species, the myths, fables, anthropomorphisms 
and other human uses associated with those species, and the animals‟ replaceability in that 
regard.  A useful animal is always one of many, a representative of a particular species, or, as 
in literary contexts, for example, possibly of animality as a whole.  It needs to be replaceable 
by one of its own species, or another species of equal use value, because the need that is to be 
met by a particular use usually extends beyond the animal‟s life.222  Important here is the 
function these animals fulfil, not the animals themselves.  Any singularity of a particular 
animal as opposed to another animal of the same or a similar species (or even any other 
animal), is therefore immaterial.  Correspondingly, Kroetsch and Hodgins‟ animal imagery 
reflects literary conventions and cultural traditions and practices that reinforce the idea of „the 
Animal‟ as a commodity and literary paradigm; a figure of speech opposed to and separate 
from the idea of humanity, but also always at its service
223
. 
Derrida critiques the concept of “the Animal,” and argues: “Animal is a word that men 
have given themselves . . . . in order to corral a large number of living beings within a single 
concept” (400; original emphasis).  He calls for the need to acknowledge the differences 
between species, and writes: 
Confined within this catch-all concept, within this vast encampment of the 
animal, in this general singular, within the strict enclosure of this definite 
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article (“the Animal” and not “animals”) . . . are all the living things that man 
does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers.  And that is 
so in spite of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the dog, the 
protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the 
chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the tiger or the 
elephant from the cat, the ant from the silkworm or the hedgehog from the 
echidna.  (Derrida 402) 
Furthermore, he recognises and stresses the irreplaceability and “the unsubstitutable 
singularity” of the cat he describes to illustrate his contemplation of the term “the Animal,” 
and resists the idea that his cat stands in for the species (Derrida 378).  He insists: “No, no, 
my cat, the cat that looks at me in my bedroom or in the bathroom . . . does not appear there 
as a representative, or ambassador, carrying the immense symbolic responsibility with which 
our culture has always charged the feline race” (378).224  Neither is she a verbal construct for 
the purposes of his discussion:  
I must make it clear from the start, the cat I am talking about is a real cat, 
truly, believe me, a little cat.  It isn‟t the figure of a cat.  It doesn‟t silently 
enter the room as an allegory for all the cats on the earth, the felines that 
traverse myths and religions, literatures and fables. . . . The cat I am talking 
about does not belong to Kafka‟s vast zoopoetics, something that nevertheless 
solicits attention, endlessly and from a novel perspective.  (Derrida, 374; 
original emphasis) 
Derrida‟s cat is acknowledged first and foremost in her unique existence, rather than being 
valued, primarily, for any particular function.  Furthermore, Derrida adamantly states: 
“Nothing can ever take away from me the certainty that what we have here is an existence 
that refuses to be conceptualized” (379). 
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There is, of course, an absolute difference between a “real cat” and a cat represented 
in text.  However, the suspension of disbelief and the act of reading fiction in itself, 
especially of any kind of realist narrative, but also of fairy tales, fantasy and science fiction, 
for example, require readers to pretend that characters, settings and animals are somehow 
real, within the imaginary world of the text, from the moment the reader‟s mind enters that 
fictional space.  It is, therefore, curious that Derrida should pick Kafka‟s animals in 
particular.  Like the magical realist animals that followed Kafka‟s and were influenced by 
him, such as those I have discussed in the preceding chapters, Kafka‟s animals “refuse to be 
conceptualised” and, furthermore, rendered into abstract figures completely detached from 
the (fictionally) “real” animals.  Again, it is the realism of the narrative that counteracts this, 
as Faris has argued on a more general level.  This refusal, I propose, is an intrinsic quality of 
magical realist representations of animals.
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In contrast to Kroetsch and Hodgins‟ animal imagery, magic realist animals assert 
their physicality, their being and presence, their subjectivity and agency.  Disrupting the 
narratives as pests and nuisances, or as manifestations of the magical and marvellous, they 
contest the position of central subject, and undermine the relationship between centre and 
margin, and between subject and object, altogether.  Wilson describes the predominance of 
Cartesian thought in magical realism, and argues that “[m]agical realism involves, at the very 
least, Cartesian dualities: antinomies between natural and supernatural, explicable and 
inexplicable. . . . Magical realism can be, and indeed is, used to describe virtually any literary 
text in which binary oppositions, or antinomies, can be discovered” (“Metamorphoses” 223).  
Whilst this definition is too lose to usefully distinguish magic realism from, for instance, 
other kinds of postmodern texts, the disruption of such dualities is certainly a characteristic 
feature, indicated not least by the term “magical realism” itself. 
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Derrida coins the term “l’animot” to counter such dualities and better represent the 
heterogeneous experience and singularity of real animals.  He suggests that  
Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan and Levinas . . . . made of the animal a 
theorem, something seen and not seeing.  The experience of the seeing animal, 
of the animal that looks at them, has not been taken into account in the 
philosophical or theoretical architecture of their discourse.  In sum they have 
denied it as much as misunderstood it.  Henceforth we can do little more than 
turn around this immense disavowal whose logic traverses the whole history 
of humanity.  (Derrida 383; original italics) 
Derrida argues that the term “the Animal,” “in the singular . . . , claiming thus to designate 
every living thing that is held not to be man” homogenises a very diverse group of beings, 
and proposes „l’animot‟ to recognise their multiplicity and difference: “I would like to have 
the plural of animals heard in the singular.  There is no animal in the general singular, 
separated from man by a single indivisible limit. We have to envisage the existence of „living 
creatures‟ whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is 
simply opposed to humanity” (415).  He defines l’animot as “[n]either a species nor a gender 
nor an individual, it is an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals, and rather than a double 
clone or a portmanteau word, a sort of monstrous hybrid, a chimera” (409). 
At the same time, he insists he has “never believed in some homogeneous continuity 
between what calls itself man and what he calls the animal” (398; original italics), and 
explains that the “abyssal rupture” between humans and animot “doesn‟t describe two edges, 
a unilinear and indivisible single line having two edges, Man and Animal in general” (399).  
However, he himself then undermines his own idea of an abyssal rupture, as he asserts that its 
denial “would be an asinanity” (415; original italics), deliberately describing humans in 
animal terms, calling the boundaries of that abyss into question and creating an oxymoron.
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He contemplates this abyss, considering that “the frontier no longer forms a single indivisible 
line but more than one internally divided line,” and asks “what a limit becomes . . . . once, as 
a result, it can no longer be traced, objectified, or counted as single and indivisible. What are 
the edges of a limit that grows and multiplies by feeding on an abyss?” (Derrida 399).  Thus, 
the concept becomes “impossible to think” (Foucault, The Order of Things xv), whilst the 
“irreducible” quality of the animot counters the absolute abstraction of “the Animal” from a 
creature like Derrida‟s real cat, for example.  Animot, it appears, are “natural” inhabitants of 
heterotopias, at the very least closely related to magical realist animals, whilst useful animals 
are intimately connected to the idea of “the Animal” as described by Derrida. 
One of Maggie‟s chickens, in The Invention of the World, appears to transcend the 
status of “useful animal,” as she and Maggie briefly regard each other:  “In a moment there 
wasn‟t anyone left outside but Maggie and a half-dozen black hens that came around the 
corner of he house, pecking in the dust.  One of the hens stopped to look at her, cocked its 
head, then dismissed her as being of no consequence, and went on with its business of finding 
bugs” (39-40).  The hen appears to assume subjectivity and marginalises Maggie in that 
moment of dismissal, which Maggie finds inherently unsettling, even alarming (61).  This 
hen seems wholly detached from Maggie‟s world; she seems the center of her own world, 
independent of human concerns.  Maggie‟s hen appears to question the core of Maggie‟s 
being by looking at and dismissing her. 
“The gaze of the cat” observing Derrida is, as he argues, “the point of view of the 
absolute other” (380).  He identifies her subjectivity, as he writes: “It has its point of view 
regarding me,” suggesting an absolute opposition between him and the cat, but he also points 
out that this otherness is the “absolute alterity of the neighbor” (380, my emphasis), 
weakening the idea of absolute opposition.  Derrida suggests that the gaze of an animal 
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causes us to think about what it means to be human, by taking us to “the edge of the so-called 
human” (399), facing the animot: 
As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called 
animal offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the 
ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say the bordercrossing from which vantage 
man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the name 
that he believes he gives himself.  And in these moments of nakedness, under 
the gaze of the animal, everything can happen to me, I am like a child ready 
for the apocalypse.  (Derrida 381) 
Unlike Derrida‟s cat, however, Maggie‟s hen‟s gaze is not “bottomless.”  It is, rather, a 
reflection of Maggie‟s own needs at that point in time.  For example, the hen, as one of all 
hens generally associated with motherly love in Western culture, serves as a reminder to 
Maggie of her shortcomings, but also of her potential, as a mother.  After all, the world of 
chickens, from which the gaze is directed at Maggie, is one of mothering, indicated by one of 
the “brood hen[s]” who comes “out of her nest in the thatch to see what [is] going on in the 
world of men” (Invention 77).  Maggie‟s hen is thus no hen in particular; she is not “singular” 
or irreplaceable (unlike Allende‟s Barrabás, for instance, who is a very unique character).  
She may as well have been any hen, the brood hen, for example, or one of any other species 
associated with good mothering.  This corresponds with Keneally‟s two “Thunderbirds”: 
Keneally gets a second dog he calls “Thunderbird,” “to replace the first,” also called 
“Thunderbird,” “which had died years before” (Invention 258).  What matters are not the 
individual dogs themselves, but the inscription, the idea of a dog called “Thunderbird,” as a 
fitting accessory to the mythic figure of Keneally.  As Berger says in relation to pets, “[m]ost 
people scarcely ever meet the gaze of an animal.  The eye of the pet acts only as a coloured 
mirror” (“Animal World”1043).  The hen‟s gaze is reflective and allegorical. 
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At the same time, the hen‟s indifferent gaze is contrasted with that of “those people on 
the verandah,” who “didn‟t look at her the way that chicken had, that hen,” reminding 
Maggie of her place in, and belonging to, her community (Invention 63).  The hen‟s dismissal 
signals to Maggie (and Hodgins‟ readers) that the possibility of a wholly other, hidden 
Reality exists, of which she had up to that moment been unaware.  This is not, however, a 
reality in which animals may be “the subjects of their own experience” (Simons 21), but, 
again, a spiritual reality in which animals are merely representations of thought.  Far from 
being “soaring fowl,” the hen, close to ground and dust, represents Maggie‟s spiritual state of 
mind, as she is only at the beginning of her spiritual journey.  The hen‟s gaze becomes the 
kind of “primal scene” that Derrida emphatically rejects in connection with his companion 
cat (380).  As the hen, one amongst half a dozen other hens just like her, is substitutable; the 
scene is what Derrida calls “this deranged theatrics of the wholly other that they call animal, 
for example, a cat” (380).  The hen is, after all, a figure of speech, too. 
 
A Taste of Rodeo: The Agricultural Circus 
The figurative usefulness of Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ animals is a reflection of the rural 
background of both authors‟ fiction, where people‟s everyday work and lives are intimately 
tied to animal economies and useful animals.  Kroetsch describes a conversation with fellow 
writers at the start of their visit to rural Alberta: “But the talk was still of the beauty of hogs.  
And the question of turning hogs into poetry” (Alberta 2).  Furthermore, the everyday 
pragmatic use of animals in rural economies translates to the extraordinary, that is, popular 
culture and entertainment.  This section explores the idea that the everyday use of animals in 
rural economies forms the basis for Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ literary animal spectacles.  
Rather than the circensian spaces of Latin American magical realism, it is the agricultural 
spectacle of the rodeo that determines both authors‟ representations of animals. 
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Jeffrey calls Hodgins a “[r]ural island tale-spinner” (223) and describes Hodgins‟ 
upbringing on a stump ranch “forest-bounded, rough-cut meadows with white-faced cattle 
grazing around great blackened stumps” (187).  He writes, “[f]raming this centre we should 
imagine a strongly developed interlaced border of immediate relationships in a rural 
community; a kinship with which Hodgins still identifies” (Jeffrey 188).  Hodgins himself 
remarks that “[t]his is very much a rural society; my own roots are rural; I have never felt 
entirely comfortable in any city” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 52).  The experience of 
a strong community, centred around working the land, farming and telling stories, is also 
recognised by Kroetsch: “First of all there was the actual experience of a landscape in which 
people were farming, or coal-mining, or ranching—along the Battle River. And part of it was 
the way we survived through the oral tradition.  Women cooking and canning together, 
visiting.  Men working together, drinking together.  I grew up in what you‟d call an extended 
family” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian Writers 129-30). 
Kroetsch romanticises the experience of a family farm in What the Crow Said, at a 
time when factory farming is beginning to take over the Canadian countryside. 
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  He depicts 
the hardship endured by the Lang women, who end up doing all the men‟s work, but he also 
portrays a positive side: 
The house was in shambles; it was almost a pleasure to go outside and feed 
pigs, to walk through the chicken coop and find a few warm eggs under the 
hens, to sit milking a cow, listening to the warm milk zing into the pail.  But 
Rose managed stay just a little bit angry, putting the cows in the pasture, 
lifting the heavy pole gate, while her husband played schmier” (Crow 81). 
Moreover, his description of a meal at the Lang farm suggests homeliness, family and 
belonging: 
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Tiddy‟s daughters had seen the men coming up the valley: they had sliced 
long strips off a slab of smoked bacon.  They were frying eggs and pancakes.  
It was Rose, not Vera, who broke the honey-filled combs into a dish; it was 
Anna Marie who toasted thick slices of homemade bread in a wire rack on top 
of the stove.  Old Lady Lang was pouring coffee form the huge pot that was 
used during threshing time.  She poured the rich, steaming coffee into cups set 
in a row beside the cream pitcher; the aroma seemed to lift the frost from the 
frozen cheeks of the gasping and puffing men.  (Crow 128) 
Animal products, the rewards for the Lang women‟s hard work with animals, are at the heart 
of these positive experiences. 
Accordingly, in What the Crow Said, there is little sense of Northrop Frye‟s argument 
that “[i]n Canadian poetry there is a special pathos in dying animals and falling trees” (53).  
He writes that “the main focus of guilt in Canada seems to fall on the rape of nature.  The 
deaths of animals seems to have an extraordinary resonance in Canadian literature, as though 
the screams of all the trapped and tortured creatures who built up the Canadian fur trade were 
still echoing in our minds” (Frye 68).  Frye describes the “guilt and uneasiness” inspired by 
“the unbroken violation of nature in Canada, the economy founded on the trapping and 
mutilating of animals, the destroying of trees, the drying up of rivers and the polluting of 
lakes” (53).228  Hodgins, similarly, shows little sign of this in relation to animals.229  
Furthermore, Hancock comments on the reverse of Frye‟s argument, “the idea of Canadian 
characters being victims of their environment,” to which Hodgins replies: “It doesn‟t relate to 
anything that is part of my experience” (Hancock, Canadian Writers 58).  In response to 
Hancock‟s question whether he, as a “rural writer,” would “automatically . . . have to have 
that struggle between man and nature,” Hodgins replies: 
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No.  I‟m not conscious of a struggle between man and nature at all.  Life is 
pretty comfortable here.  At first this was one of the reasons why Canadian 
literature seemed so foreign to me.  People were always getting lost in the 
snow and freezing to death or being starved out in droughts.  All these strange 
things happening to them that never happened to anybody I ever met.  In this 
part of the world the struggle between men and the elements is not very 
dramatic.  This scenery is dramatic, but the struggle is not.  (Qtd. in Hancock, 
Canadian Writers 58) 
An explanation for the apparent discrepancies between the assessment of Canadian literature 
by critics such as Frye and Margaret Atwood, and the novels of Kroetsch and Hodgins, is 
offered by McMullin, who suggests that literary criticism from Canada‟s urban centers fails 
to take account of the regional distinctiveness of British Columbia and the prairies.  He 
argues that “Ontario‟s mythology has generally been clothed in the rhetoric of Canadian 
nationalism,” and that literary criticism, such as that by Frye and Atwood, “often takes on the 
national themes” (McMullin 15).  He comments that, “[c]onfronted by the heartland‟s 
proclivity to pass off central Canadian views as national views with no apparent concern for 
hinterland reaction, and faced with the domination of the cultural industries,” one of the 
things “the west has by necessity been forced to do” was to evolve “its own distinctive form 
of literary expression” which he takes to be magic realism (McMullin 20-1). 
Another explanation for this discrepancy lies in different conceptions of „nature‟ 
itself.  Frye states:  
Still more important is the Canadian sense of the close relation of the people to 
the land.  Everywhere we turn in Canadian literature and painting, we are 
haunted by the natural world, and even the most sophisticated Canadian artists 
can hardly keep something very primitive and archaic out of their 
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imaginations.  This sense is not that of the possession of the land, but precisely 
the absence of possession, a feeling that here is a nature that man has polluted 
and imprisoned and violated but has never really lived with.  (68) 
When Frye talks about nature, the connotations are of “wilderness” and “wild,” native 
animals.  However, in Kroetsch and Hodgins there is a sense that the settler culture‟s close 
relation to the land is intimately linked with domesticated nature and the interaction with 
domestic animals; rural communities have made a place for themselves within that “wild” 
nature by clearing and farming the land.  “Alberta,” the Alberta Centennial website 
proclaims, “was formed from the hard work of its agricultural community.”  The frontier 
experience of battling with wild nature has been largely substituted by domesticated nature, 
farming and animal economies. 
In rural economies reliant on animal products, where people are confronted with the 
daily use and death of animals, the relationship to their Nutztiere is determined by pragmatic 
concerns.  In The Invention of the World, for example, the mythical bull figure of Keneally is 
mirrored by a Hereford bull who is “butchered . . . before you had time to think” (211) and 
transformed into “frozen chunks of meat” (212).  In What the Crow Said, Liebhaber becomes 
preoccupied with breeds of dairy cows, in order to “make Tiddy rich and independent” (70).  
Kroetsch depicts the different processes and products involved in farming cattle: 
He talked of nothing but milk production versus meat production, of 
grasslands and feed lots, of diets and cream prices and the future of cheese and 
the color of milk.  Tiddy put a lot of money into purchasing breeding stock 
and remodeled her barn.  Liebhaber began to conduct experiments in artificial 
insemination in order to speed up the genetic process.  He invented gadgets for 
the collection and dissemination of the semen of widely scattered bulls.  He 
argued with Father Basil about the souls of cows.  He bought bib overalls to 
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wear over his ink-marked clothing; he bought rubber boots and began to smell 
of cow manure.  The long-range effect was simple: years later a government 
inspector informed Liebhaber that he‟d perfected the three-titted cow.  (Crow 
70) 
Thus, animals are seen primarily in relationship to their products, or as products themselves.  
Kroetsch proudly comments: “As any Albertan is likely to tell you, grass-fed beef has a 
different colour, a different flavour.  It‟s simply the best” (Alberta 14).  In an economy that 
turns animals into raw products and replaceable units, there is no room for the “pathos” and 
sentimentality Frye describes, no room for regarding domesticated animals as anything other 
than useful. 
Hodgins explains how the need for productivity infuses all aspects of life in the 
British Columbian context, where reading books is frowned upon as frivolous entertainment: 
[B]ooks are viewed with a certain amount of suspicion.  Particularly in British 
Columbia.  We‟re not very far from the frontier after all.  The job was to build 
your log cabin, shoot the bears and dig your garden.  Books are a gentlemen‟s 
frivolity.  A lady‟s pastime. . . . There‟s a suspicion of anyone who isn‟t doing 
something productive.  That includes teachers as well as writers.  The product 
can‟t be measured, therefore we can‟t be doing anything worthwhile.  (Qtd. in 
Hancock, Canadian Writers 53) 
Correspondingly, one of the most popular and famous spectacles in Canada combines 
entertainment with the idea of usefulness and productivity: the rodeo is a “practical” circus 
for cowboy (and cowgirl) skills.  Its sideshow is the agricultural exhibition, and in the biggest 
rodeo event in Canada, the Calgary Stampede, there is serious money to be made.  Kroetsch 
remarks: “If you want to see a small town or small city at its best, try to take in an annual 
event such as a sports day, or a local rodeo, or a district fair” (Alberta 63).230  
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Kroetsch describes the atmosphere of the rodeo, an intrinsic part of rural Canada‟s 
cultural landscape, in his travel book Alberta.  The scene at the Jenner Rodeo reinforces the 
notion that Kroetsch has come home, as he inhales “[t]he reassuring smell of sweat and horse 
manure and sage in the early afternoon air” (Alberta 18).  Kroetsch expresses his admiration 
for and excitement about the rodeo.  He humorously remarks that he would like to score a 
“winning goal” at ice hockey, but “[f]ailing that, I‟d like to be admired by the girls for 
staying on a bronco at a rodeo.  Failing both, I go on writing” (qtd. in Hancock, Canadian 
Writers 132).  Rodeo imagery occurs in all three novels discussed here.  For example, Tiddy 
Lang and Ebbie Else both confront bulls in What the Crow Said (9, 168-9), whilst Preserved 
Crabbe in Hodgins‟ The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne takes on a bulldozer (230), just after 
Joseph Bourne states that the squatters resisting the development are “not a bunch of bull-
headed clowns” (228).  Additionally, a turkey-buzzard attacks Joseph Bourne and holds “onto 
the white thrashing head like a bronco rider, flapping its wings to keep balance, and 
eventually rode it to rest” (Resurrection 16).  The earth itself is likened to a rodeo horse as it 
“could buck you off its back just any time it wanted to” (Resurrection 97), and the vibration 
of the mountain is “like running down the back of a bucking bronco” (Resurrection 252).  In 
Hodgins‟ first novel, a three-year-old Keneally is said to have given a particularly mean bull 
“a crack across his nose” (Invention 79), whilst the confrontation between Danny Holland 
and Madmother Thomas about Madmother Thomas‟ donkey evokes the performance of 
rodeo clowns, as the audience laughs at the humiliating spectacle.  Maggie indignantly 
observes: “You couldn‟t stand back and watch a thing like that.  Not like these others who 
acted as if it were all part of the programme, clowns for comic relief” (Invention 32).  On a 
more humorous note, Wade is compared to a bull led around by the women in his life as if he 
had “a ring in [his] nose, and the worst of it was he couldn‟t help liking it” (Invention 303). 
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Furthermore, whilst „Horseman‟, Wade‟s doppelganger, may connote all the symbolic 
meanings attributed to him,
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 his name also suggests the figure of a skilled cowboy, one of 
the icons of Northern American frontier mythology.  The rodeo provides a nostalgic return to 
that mythic past, a reliving of the frontier experience: 
Meanwhile, inside the tack, ten to fifteen waiting teams either circle at a slow 
trot or stand motionless in a thin cloud of dust, suggesting, by perfect contrast, 
the open prairie and the roundup and Indian raids.  And near the bucking 
chutes, which won‟t be used until next afternoon the cowboys sit on the 
fences, smoking and talking.  The Blackfoot and Blood and Sarcee from miles 
around note the good and bad points of a passing horse or victorious driver.  
(Kroetsch, Alberta 137)  
The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede in particular states as its mission the preservation and 
promotion of “Western heritage and values” (“Welcome”).  According to Kroetsch, urban 
Canadians especially embrace stereotypical „Cowboys and Indians‟ imagery of the rodeo:  
The Calgary Stampede is a ritual release from middle-class bondage for all the 
prospering region that is southern Alberta.  Sociologists have found that city 
folk, and the well-to-do especially, put on high-heeled boots, tall hats, tight 
denims, western shirts that cost enough to outfit a genuine cowboy—and with 
a friendly “Howdy, pardner” they begin to unbend.  Banks become stockades, 
flapjack breakfast is free at the tail end of a chuckwagon, square-dancers jostle 
in the streets of the financial district, and bars just plain bust loose.  (Alberta 
136) 
At the rodeo, a stylised re-enactment of the “struggle between man and nature,” urban and 
rural settler culture and First Nations mingle, to watch or take part in entertainment with a 
purpose. 
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The rodeo means serious business in the agricultural community.
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  Underneath the 
veneer of circus entertainment there are the ordered mechanisms of a rationalised industry: 
“Every spring, the arrival of the new crop of foals is anxiously awaited.  Each year‟s babies 
are given a letter of the alphabet as the first letter of their names[;] each letter corresponding 
with the year of birth: for example Zorro Bandit, Zinc Buckle and Zippy Delivery were all 
born in 1990” (Calgary Stampede Rodeo, “Calgary Stampede Rodeo Stock”).  Unlike the 
circus, however, the rodeo renders the ordinary into an extraordinary spectacle; spectators 
come to marvel at “traditional cowboy skills torqued up with pure vaudeville showmanship” 
(Travel Alberta website, “The Calgary Stampede”).233  In this environment, animal products 
and entertainment are inextricably linked, as Kroetsch illustrates: “I went and stood in line for 
a long time for a hamburger and a Coke; you could watch the events while you stood in line, 
so waiting wasn‟t so bad.  And you could taste rodeo in that burger” (Alberta 21). 
The rodeo clown epitomises the connection between circus entertainment and 
agricultural pragmatism.  Despite the differences (the circus presents trained animals who 
perform tricks, whilst the rodeo is supposedly an entertaining demonstration of livestock and 
horse handling skills), the rodeo closely aligns itself with the circus in some of its imagery.  
In allusion to Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey‟s famous slogan “The Greatest Show on 
Earth,” the Calgary Stampede markets itself as “The Greatest Outdoor Show on Earth.”  
Kroetsch identifies the rodeo as a form of carnival: “I think there‟s a double thing going on in 
carnival.  It‟s very much a community thing . . . it isn‟t simply a private release, it‟s a 
communal release and I‟m intrigued by all those occasions like a rodeo or a sports day on the 
prairies where everybody gets together” (qtd. in Kroetsch, Neuman and Wilson 35).  He 
contends that the rodeo, like other forms of carnival, is subversive, as “everybody gets to 
participate in that reversal of order upsetting the king.  The great example in our culture is the 
rodeo clown who often does a parody of what the cowboy is doing out there, the clown 
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risking life and limb to parody the cowboy, who is risking life and limb” (qtd. in Kroetsch, 
Neuman and Wilson 35).  However, carnival at the rodeo is controlled, commercialised and, 
certainly in the case of the Calgary Stampede, restricted to those who buy tickets; it is a 
version of the prettified carnivalesque (see Stallybrass and White 9).  Accordingly, the rodeo 
clown is not an entirely frivolous figure, but plays a serious and important role, as he distracts 
the bulls when the riders have fallen to the ground.  Kroetsch describes the matter-of-fact 
reality of an Australian rodeo clown: “He had bulls to distract, lives to save” (Alberta 21).  It 
is, in the end, this same pragmatism and rationalisation of the carnivalesque spectacle that 
renders Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ animals useful, rather than magical realist.   Their animal 
imagery, ultimately, demonstrates the domestication of García Márquez‟s “old cow.” 
 
Conclusion 
Both Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ novels can be considered manifestations of “mythic realism,” 
grounded in the landscape of rural Canada and the multiple mythologies of settlement.  Their 
mythical beasts and seemingly hybrid characters acknowledge the cultural heritage of 
European settlement, and, to varying and degrees, the mythologies of First Nations, yet both 
suggest the necessity of forging new stories to match the multicultural realities of settlement.  
In What the Crow Said, this is an endlessly generative and diverse narrative, represented by 
the crow figure, while in The Invention of the World and The Resurrection of Joseph Bourne, 
this is a universal, spiritual narrative, grounded in Christian Science. 
Furthermore, both authors‟ representations of animals are intimately tied to and arise 
from their rural Canadian background, where working animals and animal products is part of 
everyday life.  The pragmatic use of animals thus forms the basis for Kroetsch‟s and 
Hodgins‟ animal imagery, which is determined first and foremost by its function within the 
narrative.  Beside serving as ingredients for the local flavour of the landscape, they are 
Schwalm  343 
primarily figures of speech, which aligns them with Derrida‟s concept of “the Animal,” a 
homogenising term, set up in absolute opposition to the idea of “the Human.”  This contrasts 
with magical realist representations of animals, which assert the animals‟ subjectivity, 
agency, and more central presence.  Unlike Kroetsch‟s and Hodgins‟ abstract animal figures, 
magical realist animals refuse to be conceptualised, a characteristic also of Derrida‟s concept 
of l’animot.  They are singular and irreplaceable.  In contrast to this are the useful animals of 
Kroetsch and Hodgins, which represent less the animals themselves, but rather the act of 
domesticating them: they are useful in terms of their species, or as signifying “the Animal,” 
in opposition to the “Human,” in general.  This pragmatism further works against the frivolity 
of the carnivalesque: unlike the circensian spaces of magical realism, Kroetsch‟s and 
Hodgins‟ mixture of carnivalesque imagery and pragmatic use of animal figures are grounded 
in, and reflect, the agricultural spectacle of the rodeo.  An icon of popular entertainment in 
Canada, the rodeo signifies and mythologises the process of European settlement in North 
America, and the associated domestication of its nature.  Referring to the circus in some of its 
language and imagery, the rodeo‟s objective, however, is not the frivolous display of animals, 
but to represent their function, and the skills needed to manage, contain and process them, in 
an entertaining way.  Correspondingly, whilst Kroetsch and Hodgins allude to and borrow 
from Latin American writing, most notably García Márquez, their fiction represents a 
domesticated version of magical realist imagery.  When Canadian cows dance, it appears, 
there has to be a purpose.  Like the rodeo clown, everyone has, after all, a job to do. 
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Chapter Six 
Paperzoo: Life of Pi 
Yann Martel‟s Life of Pi won the Booker Prize in 2002, at a time when magical realism was 
considered by some to be “the most important trend in international contemporary fiction” 
(Faris, “Question of the Other” 101) and “en vogue not only with critics . . . but with 
publishers and the reading public as well” (Hegerfeldt 63).  Perceived by many reviewers as 
magical realism,
234
 Life of Pi incorporates themes, styles, and techniques that are 
recognisably magical realist.  Furthermore, the covers of all editions so far prominently 
display the Bengal tiger Richard Parker.  Life of Pi signifies, like no other novel before, the 
connection between animals and the commercial success of the mode. 
Although often quoted, the novel‟s conclusion that “[t]he story with animals is the 
better story” (317) has not been examined in regard to the question why animals in particular 
are so attractive to readers.
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  This chapter will discuss to what extent animals may 
contribute to magical realism‟s commercial success in general and to Martel‟s novel in 
particular, which profits, ironically, from the popularity of the very animal practices—the 
circus and the zoo—that tend to be undermined by magical realist animals.  I argue that part 
of the global success of Life of Pi rests on its mirroring and reinforcement of culturally 
ingrained, and often contradictory, human-animal relations, especially those promoted by 
commercial animal entertainment.  The novel follows the tradition and discourse of circuses 
and zoos, which, as former showcases for the exploits of imperialism, continue to represent 
the world as an exotic fantasy.  Throughout this chapter, I will make use of Graham Huggan‟s 
concept of the “postcolonial exotic,” and, although Huggan does not discuss Martel‟s novel, 
apply it to Life of Pi where relevant.  The narrative also constructs the readers‟ view of 
animals in keeping with the exoticising framework John Urry calls “the tourist gaze.”  By 
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naturalising animal practices such as zoos and circuses, Life of Pi reinforces rather than 
challenges human-animal relationships that are widely taken for granted.  In the absence of 
an oxymoronic engagement with animals, I propose that Martel‟s paper tiger functions as a 
magical realist cliché rather than a circensian beast. 
Life of Pi, which sold over four million copies worldwide and was an unprecedented 
success for Edinburgh publishing house Canongate,
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is the story of Pi Patel, a sixteen year 
old zookeeper‟s son from Pondicherry in India, whose family emigrates to Canada.  
However, the ship carrying the family and an assortment of zoo animals destined for North 
American zoos sinks in stormy weather, and after initially sharing the lifeboat with a small 
number of animals, Pi finds himself alone with a Bengal tiger named Richard Parker.   Pi‟s 
survival depends on his knowledge of animal behaviour gained whilst growing up surrounded 
by the Pondicherry zoo animals, and on training Richard Parker accordingly, like a circus 
animal, through fear and submission.  In the course of the journey, the protagonist and 
narrator, originally a vegetarian, is increasingly animalised and turns into a carnivore and 
cannibal whilst maintaining an ostensibly natural mastery over Richard Parker.  Representing 
Pi Patel as a practising Muslim, Christian and Hindu who, as an adult immigrant in Canada, 
studies zoology and theology, the narrative attempts to bridge the gap between science and 
religion and appeals to an idea of a common humanity.  Philip Armstrong points out that 
“Pi‟s sensibility . . . is that of the tourist” (What Animals Mean 179).  In this manner, 
otherness is familiarised and assimilated through a filter, or lens, of multiculturalism and 
exoticism, and diversity is reduced to a collection of lifestyle choices and spectacular 
souvenirs.
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Selling Animals 
The tiger gracing the covers of all editions of Life of Pi to date illustrates the wide appeal of 
animals as marketable and spectacular commodities.  After all, representations of animals 
feature on anything from stationery, t-shirts, and company logos to cartoons, television 
adverts, cinema screens and video games; they appear in coffee table books and children‟s 
stories, and as toys, posters, fairground rides, jelly bears and chocolate fish.  Animals 
themselves are sold as ornaments (stuffed and mounted on the wall or alive in decorative fish 
tanks, for instance) or as pets, and exhibited as spectacular, profitable commodities in 
aquariums, stage shows and, as reflected in Martel‟s narrative, in circuses and zoos.  John 
Berger‟s observation in regard to consumer items related to childhood still holds true three 
decades later: “No other source of imagery can begin to compete with that of animals” (“Why 
Zoos Disappoint” 122).  In short, animals sell, and evidently very effectively so. 
As Adrian Franklin writes, “the formation of mass markets, generalized affluence and 
mass popular culture” resulting from Fordism had “the greatest impact” on human-animal 
relationships in the twentieth century (Animals and Modern Cultures 38).  Animals were 
turned into mass market products in the process, illustrated by the rise in pet keeping, for 
instance, and the “[i]ncreased interest in animals arising from hobbies and outdoor leisure,” 
which “stimulated the demand for mass media representations of animals” (Franklin, Animals 
and Modern Cultures 39).  Moreover, the dominant visual media, in which I include zoos and 
circuses, produce for the most part images of so-called charismatic animals, usually visually 
attractive mammals, birds or reptiles, with a particular focus on the cute, the colourful, and 
the carnivorous. 
Martel‟s novel reflects this trend of using animals as glamorous commodities, as both 
the packaging and the content of Life of Pi place great emphasis on the instant visual appeal 
of exotic animals.  In an online chat with the author, one reader commented that it was 
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specifically the book‟s cover that “drew” them to the book (“amagmom” qtd. in 
WrittenVoices.com), and since “[t]he sudden appearance of a tiger is arresting in any 
environment” (Life of Pi 160), including the window of a bookshop, the visual seduction 
continues inside the novel, where Richard Parker is described in vivid colours: “The weird 
contrast between the bright, striped, living orange of his coat and the inert white of the boat‟s 
hull was incredibly compelling” (Life of Pi 160)  This virtually cinematic effect is translated 
further into a film (produced by Gil Netter and currently at the development stage [see “Ang 
Lee Circles Life of Pi Film”]), an illustrated edition of the novel with stunning images by 
Tomislav Torjanac (2007), and a rather cryptic, interactive promotional animation on the 
internet.  The animation is “designed to do for books what the pop video did for singles” 
(“Life of Pi Interactive Movie Back Online”).  However, the tiger, strangely, does not appear, 
but is only vaguely suggested by the orange and black pattern of the lifeboat tarpaulin (“The 
Life of Pi Promo”). 
Life of Pi is deliberately constructed as a colourful spectacle for the reading audience, 
whereby the Pondicherry zoo seamlessly transforms into a circus, which is presented by Pi as 
ringmaster: “Ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls, without further ado, it is my pleasure and 
honour to present to you: THE PI PATEL, INDO-CANADIAN, TRANS-PACIFIC, 
FLOATING CIRCUUUUUSSSSSSSSSSSS!” (165, original capitalisation)  The novel 
hereby presents the status of animals as globally traded commodities as an unquestioned 
given, and government regulations, “nit-picking bureaucrats” (89), and international laws to 
prevent trade in endangered species, such as CITES, are portrayed as a bothersome hindrance 
of trade between zoos and an obstacle for the “happy future” of the Patel family‟s 
“collection” in American zoos “willing to pay higher prices” (88).  At the same time, the 
lucrative side of animal trade and exhibitions is downplayed as an incidental matter.  
Sounding somewhat like a public relations spokesperson for zoos, Pi thus declares: “A zoo is 
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a cultural institution.  Like a public library, like a museum, it is at the service of popular 
education and science.  And by this token, not much of a money-making venture, for the 
Greater Good and the Greater Profit are not compatible aims, much to Father‟s chagrin” 
(78).
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  Promoted as “[a]n impassioned defence of zoos” (The New Yorker qtd. in the 
frontmatter of the 2003 Canongate paperback edition), Life of Pi appeals to contemporary 
audiences that are drawn to zoos, but also influenced by what Franklin describes as a shift 
from a “mood of entertainment and spectacle . . . to one of empathy and moral support” 
(Animals and Modern Cultures 48), as people seek reassurance that their zoo visit and 
entrance fee serves the greater good of animal welfare, conservation and education. 
Indeed, zoos place a stronger emphasis on the elimination of small cages, and on 
breeding and conservation programmes (Animals and Modern Cultures 48).  However, 
despite claims of conservation and education, the spectacle of looking at what are considered 
“wild” animals remains the prime reason visitors are attracted to the zoo, leading to what 
Franklin observes is a marked increase in “urban zoos and wildlife parks situated a short 
distance from large urban centers” (Animals and Modern Cultures 48).  After all, education 
and conservation can be achieved more effectively in other ways and do not necessitate a 
visit to the zoo, especially when one considers that the benefits for the caged animals are at 
the very least dubious.  For example, a study by Ros Clubb and Georgia Mason, partly 
funded, as the BBC reports, by “a number of British Zoos keen to learn more about how best 
to handle the animals in their care,” has shown zoos to be utterly unsuitable environments for 
wide-ranging carnivores such as tigers and lions, with polar bears the worst affected species 
(“Carnivores‟ Need for Walk”).  Clubb and Mason recommend that “the keeping of naturally 
wide-ranging carnivores should be either fundamentally improved or phased out,” keeping in 
mind, for example, that “a polar bear‟s typical enclosure size . . . is about one-millionth of its 
minimum home-range size,” a measure on which their wellbeing depends (473). 
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The zoos‟ justifications of their practices in terms of conservation and education, 
however, are designed to eliminate or alleviate any misgivings one might have against the 
confinement of animals in thoroughly artificially constructed environments, and to create a 
positive experience for zoo visitors.  The recent hype surrounding polar bear cub Knut of the 
Berlin Zoo and the appearance of related Knut merchandise illustrate that spectacle and 
marketing take priority over conservation and concerns for the individual animal.  The gap 
between the heavy promotion of animal spectacles versus comparatively moderate publicity 
for genuine conservation efforts was illustrated by Knut‟s first public appearance in 2007 
which, incongruously, drew much more media attention than the coinciding Berlin launch of 
the International Polar Year, a global initiative designed to educate the public about climate 
change and therefore also to the plight of the polar bears in their natural habitat.
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However, both zoos and circuses commonly defend the exhibition of spectacular 
animals such polar bears, tigers, lions, cheetahs, elephants, rhinoceroses, penguins, sea lions, 
apes, monkeys, zebras, giraffes, parrots and flamingos, with the argument that incarcerated 
individuals serve as so-called ambassadors for their “cousins in the wild.”240  Without such 
shows, they argue, the public would neither be adequately educated about these species and 
their habitats nor be giving money to conservation causes.  Ironically, Pi charges zoo critics 
with being fixated upon charismatic animals: “These people usually have a large, handsome 
predator in mind, a lion or a cheetah (the life of a gnu or of an aardvark is rarely exalted)” 
(Life of Pi 15).  Oddly, there is no sense of irony about Pi‟s statements in Martel‟s narrative.  
After all, it is not aardvarks and gnus who attract the crowds at zoos; neither is there an 
aardvark on the front cover of Life of Pi.  By focussing on the visual appeal of charismatic 
animals, especially the “large, handsome predator” on the cover, Martel replicates for readers 
of Life of Pi the culturally ingrained frameworks which structure the gaze of zoo visitors: his 
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book about zoo animals succeeds commercially for much the same reasons that zoos profit 
from actual animals. 
My primary framework both for looking at both actual animals in zoos and Martel‟s 
fictional zoo animals is provided by the concept of leisure, which, to borrow John Urry‟s 
description of his book The Tourist Gaze, “is about consuming goods and services which are 
in some sense unnecessary.  They are consumed because they supposedly generate 
pleasurable experiences which are different from those typically encountered in everyday 
life” (1).  Accordingly, the zoo gaze, so to speak, like the tourist gaze, “. . . is constructed in 
relationship to its opposite,” as Urry points out, and “what makes a particular tourist gaze 
depends upon what it is contrasted with; what the forms of non-tourist experience happen to 
be” (1).  Zoos, which as an urban escape are a form of tourist experience for city dwellers, 
give the illusion of closeness to wildness (if not wilderness); a relationship with wild animals 
that urban dwellers, grown increasingly distant from animals (companion animals 
excluded),
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 nostalgically lack.  Animal exhibits create the illusion of closeness while 
reinforcing distance.  The zoo visitor‟s gaze is thus as contradictory as the tourist gaze, which 
focuses on “pseudo-events” and “finds pleasure in inauthentic contrived attractions” (Urry 7).  
Simulated habitats, jungles painted on concrete walls, safari imagery and so-called lion 
encounters, for example, thus create the very fantasy that Pi ridicules as the misguided fancy 
of zoo critics: 
Well-meaning but misinformed people think animals in the wild are “happy” 
because they are “free”. . . . They imagine this wild animal roaming about the 
savannah on digestive walks after eating a prey that accepted its lot piously, or 
going for callisthenic runs to stay slim after overindulging.  They imagine this 
animal overseeing its offspring proudly and tenderly, the whole family 
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watching the setting of the sun from the limbs of trees with sighs of pleasure.  
(Life of Pi 15) 
Using “freedom” in scare quotes, Pi maintains that the animals‟ lives in their natural habitat is 
akin to “mov[ing] about a chessboard” (16), and that animals are practically freer in the 
“confined freedom of a zoo” than in the “free confinement of a jungle” (286). 
Moreover, he implicitly charges zoo critics with anthropomorphism here, a process he 
considers thoroughly unscientific and anthropocentric: “. . . we look at an animal and see a 
mirror.  The obsession with putting ourselves at the centre of everything is the bane . . . of 
zoologists.  I learned the lesson that an animal is an animal, essentially and practically 
removed from us . . .” (31).  Pi echoes Martel‟s view of the issue, who comments on the 
“real, true-to-life, totally un-anthropomorphized chimpanzee” he intends to use for a future 
novel (Martel qtd. in Sielke).  Martel stresses that chimpanzees are “similar to us, in fact 
98.4% genetically similar, which is, of course, misleading because the 1.6 percent makes all 
the difference.  So they are quite close to us in some ways and very different in others . . .” 
(qtd. in Sielke).  “Difference” is the key, reinforced and manifested throughout the narrative 
through physical barriers in the zoo and psychological boundaries on the lifeboat.  
Consequently, throughout the narrative, the human-animal boundary is maintained and 
reinforced. 
However, whilst stressing that anthropomorphising animals is “dangerous” (Life of Pi 
31) and “misinformed,” Pi concedes that it plays an important role in the success of zoos, as 
he describes the seasick orang-utan Orange Juice: “The poor dear looked so humanly sick!  It 
is a particularly funny thing to read human traits in animals, especially in apes and monkeys, 
where it is so easy.  Simians are the clearest mirrors we have in the animal world.  That is 
why they are so popular in zoos.  I laughed again” (122, original italics).  Despite his 
observation, Pi shows little empathy for the seasick orang-utan, stopping short of considering 
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that the experience may be as bad (or perhaps worse) for Orange Juice.  He indicates that 
anthropomorphism only goes as far as the image (she “looked” sick).  The animal‟s 
appearance as a strange-looking person is thus no more than a projection onto a screen, and a 
way of inventing interesting stories.  As Pi explains, “I quite deliberately dressed wild 
animals in tame costumes of my imagination.  But I never deluded myself as to the real 
nature of my playmates” (34).  His reference to pheasants with “uppity British accents” and 
baboons talking in “the menacing tones of American gangsters” (34) serves to illustrate that 
anthropomorphised animal imagery can make stories more entertaining, or “better.” 
Animals in Life of Pi thus serve primarily as narrative tools, as fictional “useful 
animals” rather than as characters within their own right.  Indeed, Martel comments: “I used 
animals simply because they served the purpose of my narrative. . . . I find animals to be very 
useful and versatile” (qtd. in Sielke).  Pi‟s humanising of Richard Parker (Life of Pi 6) is 
more a comment on Pi‟s own needs as a lonely human being in an extreme situation than on 
Richard Parker as a sentient individual.  Richard Parker is, in fact, reminiscent of the 
humanised basketball called “Wilson” in the film Cast Away (2000).  The protagonist, played 
by Tom Hanks, is shipwrecked and survives for several years with Wilson as his only 
companion.  Pi‟s encounter with a whale (Life of Pi 229) is a scene that appears to be entirely 
borrowed from Castaway, except that Tom Hanks is replaced by Pi, the makeshift life raft by 
a lifeboat, and the basketball by a tiger.  Presented in this light, anthropomorphising is the 
projection of human traits onto any “object,” be it a basketball or a tiger.  Any subjectivity of 
Richard Parker is immaterial, as the process is divorced from, and independent of, the object 
itself. 
Despite insisting that his animals “really are animals,” Martel explains that they are 
also “possibly allegorical,” and that he finds “animals useful primarily because we project a 
lot onto them” (qtd. in Sielke, my italics).  Like Pi, and like zoos, Martel knows that animals 
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who are “close to us” attract audiences perhaps naturally inclined to anthropomorphise.242  
After all, animals who are perceived to share common traits with us tend to receive the most 
attention (large carnivorous reptiles perhaps being the most notable exception), and amongst 
the birds, it is those able to speak (or “parrot”) who tend to fascinate the most.  Martel‟s 
inclusion of animals onto whom “we happily project” (qtd. in Sielke) is thus a calculated 
move, and a strategy he will employ in the allegorical novel following Life of Pi.  In order to 
speak about the Holocaust, he uses animals “to speak indirectly about something that‟s hard 
to talk about directly,” and he chooses a monkey and a donkey “because everyone likes 
monkeys and donkeys” (Martel qtd. in Sielke). 
 
Captivating Cockroaches 
If animals sell, so, too, does magical realism, and the combination of the two appears to be a 
potent formula for success.  The decades following the publication of One Hundred Years of 
Solitude in 1967, marked by the so-called Boom in Latin American magical realism and 
subsequent global success of the mode as “an international commodity” (Zamora and Faris 
2), coincide with the period characterised by “a desire for a closer relation with animals and 
nature, a concern for the animals themselves and their well being, a search for new ways of 
accommodating animals in the global economy, involving difficult choices between human 
and animal interests” (Franklin, Animals and Modern Cultures 46).  As a core feature of the 
mode, animal imagery is used to represent and market magical realism on its book covers.  A 
quick, but non-exhaustive, survey reveals that animals appear prominently on the covers of 
various editions of magical realist global bestsellers such as One Hundred Years of Solitude 
and The House of the Spirits, as well as Illywhacker; Green Grass, Running Water; Kiss of 
the Fur Queen, The Kadaitcha Sung; and, of course, Gould’s Book of Fish, a novel about 
animal representation.  Life of Pi is very much a commercial product directed towards this 
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particular market, which is not only signalled by the tiger on the cover:  Martel also employs 
imagery commonly associated with magical realism throughout the narrative.  Huggan writes 
that “magical realism, it could be argued, has itself become a commodified, increasingly 
formulaic aesthetic” (Postcolonial Exotic 71).  Correspondingly, Life of Pi‟s use of some of 
the more instantly recognisable ingredients of magical realism has caused James Wood to 
comment that “Life of Pi is proud to be a delegate for magic realism, and wears a big badge 
so that we don‟t forget it” (“Credulity”).  Martel seems to be comfortable with the label, 
although he does not directly profess to having written a magical realist text.  Responding to 
the question whether he thinks “that „magic realism‟ is a form of fiction that can only be 
written by marginalised people,” he muses on the reason why, despite being “a child of a 
white, western, middle-class family” and thus not fitting “the pattern,” he has written “a 
novel that some call magical realist” (“May Richard Parker be always at your side”).  In any 
case, placing both a circus animal and Western scientific discourse prominently in an exotic, 
Third World context could hardly be a bigger badge for magical realism.  Martel‟s focus on 
elements such as the circus and the zoo; animal-related Western sciences; exotic and 
colourful animals, food and settings; Mexico and India, and references (if only passing 
references) to colonisation and independence invariably conjure up associations with popular 
magical realist fiction.  Pi‟s declaration, “Now I will turn miracle into routine.  The amazing 
will be seen every day” (Life of Pi 148) is not only Pi marketing his lifeboat circus to an 
imaginary audience, but also Martel marketing his book and dropping a not-so-subtle hint 
about how the narrative is to be read.
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  Accordingly, Life of Pi may be perceived as the end-
product of a process that turns magical realism as a mode, and circensian animals as a 
common magical realist theme, into cliché.  Like zoo animals or the magical realist label 
itself, India especially is “an infinitely rechargeable, universally applicable market tool,” 
(Huggan, Postcolonial Exotic 66).  Thus, Martel‟s use of India, which “is currently very 
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much in fashion” (Huggan Postcolonial Exotic 59), reflects what Padmini Mongia calls 
“Indo-chic” (see Huggan, Postcolonial Exotic 59), and there are “moments,” Wood observes, 
when Martel “over-loads the book with his acquired Indian exotica” (“Credulity”). 
Huggan argues that “[o]ne need only consider the hypercommodified status of the 
„multicultural‟ or „Third World‟ writer, or of literary categories such as magical realism . . . . 
to recognise the prevalence of the word „exotic‟ as a marker of metropolitan commercial 
appeal” (Postcolonial Exotic 19).  Despite being “quick to point out . . . that his novel was not 
„exotic‟” (Harding), Martel constructs a framework that is positively orientalist.  For 
example, a portrayal of Richard Parker reflects the “descriptions of „the mysterious East‟” 
prevalent in orientalist discourses (Said xi): “The patches of white above the eyes, on the 
cheeks and around the mouth came off as finishing touches worthy of a Kathakali dancer.  
The result was a face that looked like the wings of a butterfly and bore an expression vaguely 
old and Chinese” (Life of Pi 152).  We almost expect profound wisdom to come forth 
presently from Richard Parker, in the manner of stereotypical “vaguely old and Chinese” 
characters from fairy tales, or maybe Star Wars.  However, it is Pi who appears “vaguely old 
and Chinese,” as he imparts stilted pieces of wisdom beyond his age.  After all, not many 
sixteen-year-olds would seriously consider uttering “And so it goes with God” (317), address 
adults as “my brothers” (318), or use muse loudly: “Can anyone fathom the workings of a 
drunken man‟s mind?” (313).  As Wood observes, “Pi‟s speech is . . . wildly implausible; 
Martel again seems to have forgotten that his survivor is only 16” and asks the astute question 
why, after “hundreds of days at sea,” Pi is talking “as if he were at an editorial meeting of 
Social Text” (“Credulity”). 
The tone of the narration is produced by the voice of the “Martel-like writer,” as 
Florence Stratton calls him (8).  The narrator, who “naturally” recounts the narrative in the 
first person from Pi‟s perspective (see Life of Pi xiii-xiv) is a “foreign backpacker” (Life of Pi 
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xii) like Martel, who has himself “been to India three times, each time with a backpack, 
dazzled by it all” (qtd. in WrittenVoices.com).  The author‟s assertion that “he doesn‟t like 
exoticism in fiction” (Edemariam) sits oddly with his explanation that he chose to tell the 
story from an Indian boy‟s perspective “because India is a place where all stories are 
possible” (Martel qtd. in WrittenVoices.com).  There is no reason why “all stories” could not 
be possible in, say, Canada, or anywhere else for that matter, unless a view of the exotic other 
is at play, which does not consider a reversal of the gaze.
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This one-way gaze is illustrated by Martel‟s comparison of a “homeless person in 
Montreal” who “has nothing, truly nothing” and “a homeless person in India” who “is 
materially bereft, but will most likely have some sort of Hindu thought coursing through his 
[sic] mind which will somehow give him a perspective, a way of understanding his suffering” 
(qtd. in Sielke).  After all, might a homeless person in Montreal not, for instance, have some 
sort of Christian thought coursing through their minds, such as the idea that God has a 
purpose for their suffering?
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  Conversely, it appears questionable whether homelessness 
should even lend itself all that well to transcendental musing, no more for an Indian than for a 
Canadian  The statement implies the odd assumption that Hindus somehow suffer less and do 
not experience the utter desperation that may come with homelessness.  In any case, it is not 
the assertion that Hindus may culturally and spiritually have a different outlook on life in any 
given situation that is disconcerting, but the implied assumptions that come with the 
vagueness of it.  “Some sort of Hindu thought” and “somehow” conjures up the “mysterious 
East” again in a manner that takes it for granted without any proof, other than the contrast 
with an anonymous person in Montreal, about whose beliefs we are told nothing.  Wood 
observes that if an Indian novelist were to describe a “Canadian Episcopalian” in the same 
manner of the “blazon of an outsider” that Pi applies to Hindus, it would “almost certainly 
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sound ridiculous; Westerners are too easily entranced by lovingly lacquered „Indianness‟” 
(“Credulity”). 
India in general and Pi in particular are, like Martel‟s animals, screens onto which 
exoticist fantasies are projected.  Martel is able to use Pi because “[e]veryone‟s the same, but 
they express their sameness in different ways” (Edemariam).  This idea is an expression of 
“boutique multiculturalism.”  Stanley Fish describes a “boutique multiculturalist” as someone 
who “does not take difference seriously because its marks (quaint clothing, atonal music, 
curious table manners) are for him [sic] matters of lifestyle, and as such they should not be 
allowed to overwhelm the substratum of rationality that makes us all brothers [sic] under the 
skin” (qtd. in Huggan 124-5).  A form of exoticism, boutique multiculturalism emphasises 
“spectacle and a commodified appreciation for the cultural other” (Huggan 153), epitomised 
in Life of Pi by the paper version, so to speak, of “THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH!!” 
(165, original capitalisation).  In other words, the boutique multiculturalist “shops around” 
for spectacular commodities that are familiarised through a process of exoticising, which, 
Huggan explains , “channel[s] difference into areas where it can be attractively packaged and, 
at the same time, safely contained.  What is at work here is a process, commodified of course, 
of cultural translation through which the marginalised other can be apprehended and 
described in familiar terms” (24, italics omitted). 
The gaze of the backpacker, detached from local culture to a significant degree, thus 
allows the “multicultural writer” Martel not only to invoke the settings of popular 
postcolonial, magical realist fiction in a rather clichéd fashion (“You must imagine a hot and 
humid place, bathed in sunshine and bright colours” [Life of Pi 13]), it also permits him to 
construct a commercially appealing “Third World” persona through which he speaks.  This 
persona aligns him with previous Booker Prize winners and magical realists such as Salman 
Rushdie and Arundhati Roy, and allows him to dismiss the suggestion that a hegemonic 
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discourse may be at play.  Life of Pi incorporates what Huggan calls the “emphasis on 
spectacle” (Postcolonial Exotic 153), which is an effect of the novel‟s exoticism and the 
related boutique multiculturalism.  Emphasising spectacle “occlude[s] the underlying political 
mechanisms through which more „traditional‟ racial/ethnic hierarchies are preserved” 
(Huggan, Postcolonial Exotic 153).
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  The mechanisms at work here are what Huggan calls 
“the aesthetics of decontextualisation” and “commodity fetishism,” which are “interlinked” 
and constitute “significant continuities between older forms of imperial exoticist 
representation and some of their more recent, allegedly postcolonial counterparts” 
(Postcolonial Exotic 16, italics omitted).  Said explains that magical realist “works and their 
authors and readers are specific to, and articulated in, local circumstances” (308), yet Life of 
Pi is not grounded in the local, but rather “trans-pacific, floating”—like Pi‟s circus.  It is a 
decontextualised narrative, situated between the Americas (Canada, Mexico, USA, Panama) 
and Asia (India, Japan). 
As such, the narrative is more reflective of Martel‟s own background as the child of 
Canadian diplomats who frequently moved countries,
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 and directed towards a cosmopolitan 
readership.  References to political or historical processes relevant to the various locations 
(mainly India and Canada), or even to postcoloniality as a more global phenomenon are 
fleeting or shallow, in the manner of the trivialising pun, presumably meant to be humorous, 
playing on the idea of Indians migrating to Canada, where they keep a cat called “Moccasin” 
(92).  Correspondingly, zoo animals, including the Pondicherry Zoo animals, are taken out of 
their ecological contexts and trivialised and decontextualised.  They are reduced to the 
equivalent of exotic souvenirs, reflective of the human-animal relationships up to the 1970s 
as described by Franklin: “[M]ost of the interactions were explicitly anthropocentric: animals 
were clearly there for the pleasure and entertainment of humans and read explicitly for their 
leisure use value” (Animals and Modern Cultures 44). 
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Martel‟s paperzoo thus features the “very pretty,” such as the Pondicherry Zoo zebra 
(84), or the bougainvillea creeping through a coral tree, which becomes an “aviary” for 
Indian birds (77).  The plant, native of South America, is presumably an allusion to some of 
the “masters” Martel imitates (see Martel, Interview with Mishal Husain),248 as well as an 
ornamental frame for decorative birds.  In this context of visual imagery, even the “ugly” 
hyena  (136) is attractive to a degree, because “it“ can be easily packaged in a mixture of 
exoticism and the anthropomorphising language of literary conventions.
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  As Martel 
explains, “[t]he other animals in the lifeboat[,] the zebra, the hyena and the orang-utan[,] 
arose naturally, each one a function of a human trait I wanted to embody; the hyena 
cowardliness; the orang-utan maternal instincts and the zebra exoticism” (“How I Wrote Life 
of Pi”).  As Roland Barthes argues, exoticism, which he considers a type of mythical speech, 
makes the assimilation of “the „Other‟” possible (166).  However, the hyena is ultimately too 
unfamiliar, too other, too “ugly beyond redemption” (115), to stay in the narrative for too 
long and therefore disappears soon and “practically” without a noise (150).  After all, apart 
from feeling “intense hatred for the hyena” (120), Pi counts himself “lucky” for ending up 
with a good-looking tiger, and asks himself: “What if I had ended up with a creature that 
looked silly or ugly, a tapir or an ostrich or a flock of turkeys?  That would have been a more 
trying companionship in some ways” (175).  The course of the novel is thus determined by 
aesthetic considerations, and dominated by exoticist aesthetics in particular. 
Not surprisingly then, Macondo‟s cockroaches (see García Márquez, Solitude 357-8) 
do not stand a chance in Martel‟s “ark” (209, capitalisation omitted).  Like the rat and the 
flies, they are usually forgotten by reviewers when the Tsimtsum survivors are listed (a 
human, a tiger, a hyena, a zebra, an orang-utan, flies, a rat, and cockroaches), and even 
Martel himself overlooks them completely, listing “only five survivors” when discussing the 
novel (Martel qtd. in “Ask Booker Prize Winner Yann Martel”).250  This oversight reflects the 
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fact that insects, with few notable exceptions such as butterflies, are unpopular, and 
commonly reviled as pests.  Randy Malamud cites a study by Stephen Kellert, that “found 
aversion, anxiety, fear, and loathing toward insects prevalent” (43), and a “majority” of 
people even “expressed willingness to eliminate whole classes of animals altogether, 
including mosquitoes, cockroaches, fleas, moths and spiders” (Kellert qtd. in Malamud 
43).
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  People are not attracted in great numbers to exhibitions of live insects because they 
find them “ugly,” even more so than the hyena, who, as a mammal at least, still holds a 
freakish fascination as a zoo exhibit.
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  Moreover, invertebrates cannot easily be 
anthropomorphised or taught tricks.  When insects are humanised, the contrast does not have 
a familiarising, but more likely a ludicrous effect, such as the Toronto Zoo‟s Madagascar 
hissing cockroach rock band (see Toronto Zoo, “Bugs Rock”); or else, they are marketed as 
villains and for their yuck factor, as it were, as in the Toronto Zoo‟s trading cards of 
“Grossius Yuckius (aka the Hissing Roach)” and “Assassin Bug” (Toronto Zoo, “Bugzibitz II 
Trading Cards”).  The “foreign life forms” that are the cockroaches in Life of Pi (170) are, 
after all, much too “foreign” to be assimilated, or domesticated. 
Huggan writes that exoticism “is the perfect term to describe the domesticating 
process through which commodities are taken from the margins and reabsorbed into 
mainstream culture” (Postcolonial Exotic 22), and when that process is accompanied by 
oversimplification and mass production of complex narratives, the outcome is art turned into 
cliché.
253
  Life of Pi illustrates just those processes of simplification and commodification, 
which make the issues presented palatable to the mainstream reader and thus facilitate 
absorption of a mode considered marginal.  The end-product is a rather laboured, hackneyed 
writing towards a magical realist formula.  Unlike Phoebe Kate Foster, who argues that “[i]n 
the best tradition of all good literature, [Life of Pi] „shows,‟ but never „tells,‟”  I suggest that 
the novel displays several instances of “telling“ what the reader is supposed to see without, in 
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some instances, actually showing.  Accordingly, Pi indicates that his journey across the sea is 
to be read in an oxymoronic fashion, as “opposites often take place at the same moment” 
(216).  As the prime example, “the worst pair of opposites,” Pi cites “boredom and terror” 
(217), yet his explanation that “even these two opposites do not remain distinct” (217), a 
reasonably accurate definition of an oxymoron, does not make up for the fact that the items 
he lists—such as changing weather conditions, food and water supplies alternating between 
scarcity and abundance—are juxtapositions of events that just happen to occur at the same 
time, and as such are unlike oxymorons and very “possible to think,”254 especially in the case 
of boredom and terror, which are not even opposites.
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Similarly, the narrative mimics the oxymoronic, impossible structure of well-known 
anti-linear magical realist fiction, characterised by what Said calls the “dense interwoven 
strands of a history that mocks linear narrative” (276).  Chapter 97, which contains “[the 
story” (Life of Pi 291), is an example of Martel‟s borrowing from magical realism..  As his 
chapter 97 is supposed to contain chapters 1-94, it resembles Borges‟ “Chinese 
Encyclopedia,” for example, in which categories of animals defy Western taxonomies by 
containing each other as well as everything on the outside (see Foucault, Order xv).  
However, Martel‟s manoeuvre only superficially disrupts the linear narrative.  His stated 
intention is, in fact, to uphold linearity and simplicity: “. . . most of my stories are quite 
linear. . . . So, I would say that in terms of narrative, my stories are simple and classical” 
(Martel qtd. in Sielke).  Martel wants his stories to be “uncomplicated” and “not convoluted,” 
whilst “creating a more complex picture” (Martel qtd. in Sielke). 
The elimination of oxymoronic structure has strong implications both for the 
perception of the text as magical realist and for the representation of animals.  Accordingly, 
Life of Pi‟s magical realist “chic“ is only superficial, and essentially different from the 
magical realist fiction discussed in preceding chapters.  In spite of the emphasis on Richard 
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Parker, who becomes a circus animal, there is no circensian dynamic at play here.  There is 
no balance between fundamentally different systems of representation.  For example, any 
blurring of human-animal boundaries, a typical trait of magical realism, is temporary and 
superficial in Life of Pi.  Martel comments that “the animals might embody certain traits. We 
think of tigers as being ferocious, etc.  But to my mind, it was the other way around: the 
humans embodied certain animal traits” (qtd. in WrittenVoices.com).  However, despite the 
increasing „animalisation‟ of Pi during his journey on the lifeboat (see Life of Pi 225, 239), 
the idea of a human-animal divide is ultimately upheld.  Moreover, everything is plausible 
and can ultimately be explained by Western science and logic.  As Pi states, “I applied my 
reason at every moment” (298).  Accordingly, even the carnivorous algae island is plausible, 
as Pi demonstrates.  Although it may operate “by some chemical process unknown” (282), 
this does not mean the “island is botanically impossible,” as Mr Okamoto maintains (294).  
Pi‟s arguments to the sceptical Mr Okamoto and Mr Chiba are quite logical, and he invokes 
the Enlightenment by pointing out that scientific consensus once “dismissed Copernicus and 
Darwin” (294). 
Pi asserts also, however, that to “be excessively reasonable” is to “risk throwing out 
the universe with the bathwater” (Life of Pi 298), and mirrors Martel‟s conviction that “there 
are limits to what you can do with a calculator or a hammer.  You must make a leap of faith 
to get the full flavour of life” (qtd. in Renton).  Yet this “leap of faith” is not in contradiction 
to rationality in Life of Pi.  Amazement does not require the impossible, and as Martel points 
out, animals, for example, can “fill [him] with wonder” (qtd. in Sielke).  This is reflected in 
Pi‟s observation of albatrosses, who “were something supernatural and incomprehensible” 
(Life of Pi 230).  They are, nonetheless, still “only” albatrosses, and not, for instance, 
supernatural spirits of albatrosses, or circensian hybrids impossibly crossed with another 
species.  Likewise, the dorado‟s changing colours seem like a miracle, and yet Pi finds out 
Schwalm  363 
that there is a scientific explanation “later” (185).  The Pondicherry Zoo‟s zebra especially, 
admired by Mr Kumar, the angular, atheist biology teacher (see 25-6), and Mr Kumar, the 
“Muslim mystic” (61), embodies the idea that science and religion are not mutually 
exclusive, as each Mr Kumar appreciates the zebra from his own perspective.  Thus, the 
Muslim calls the zebra “a wondrous creature,” to which the biology teacher replies with the 
Linnaean label (84).  The religious Mr Kumar‟s response, “Allahu akbar” (84), reconciles 
science and religion, reinforces the idea that natural order is as Allah intended it, and thus 
opens up the possibility that scientific explanations may be discovered “later”  Martel, in fact, 
states: “Science and religion don‟t have to collide—I see them as complementary, rather than 
contradictory.  Science can be a gateway to the greater mystery” (qtd. in Renton). 
Armstrong, citing Marian Scholtmeijer, argues that science in Life of Pi represents a 
reduction of animals to “a system of behaviours to be isolated, manipulated, and tabulated“ 
(What Animals Mean 216).  They effectively become “Cartesian beast-machine[s]” through 
Pi‟s knowledge of zoology and behavioural science, as the lives of Richard Parker, trained 
like a circus animal, and the other Pondicherry Zoo animals are governed by flight distances 
and stimulus responses (Armstrong, What Animals Mean 216-17 ).  Science thus attempts to 
reduce animals to something that can be logically and fully explained, and the behaviour of 
which
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 can be fully controlled.  This reduction is consistent with Martel‟s simplification 
process, because without the oxymoronic dynamics inherent in magical realism, Life of Pi 
eliminates the various challenges posed by animals, who are both like us and unlike us.  The 
“animal other” in a zoo enclosure, possibly more than anyone, is subject to a gaze that, as 
Urry writes, “enables people to take possession of objects and environments, often at a 
distance” and which “facilitates the world of the „other‟ to be controlled from afar, combining 
detachment and mastery” (147).  However, through their oxymoronic quality—from our 
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human animal point of view at least—non-human animals always, and ultimately, elude us 
conceptually; we can approach, but never capture them. 
However, it could be argued that Life of Pi‟s animals differ little from magical realist 
fauna, as its animals, in turn, are just as exoticised, decontextualised and commodified.  One 
of the German editions of House of the Spirits illustrates this well, as its cover shows Isabel 
Allende with a sulphur-crested cockatoo on her shoulder.
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  Readers will not necessarily 
recognise, or even particularly care, that this is not a South American parrot representing 
Chile (the setting of the narrative), but a native of Australia.  The bird, commodified as pet, 
marks a generic exotic, the “warm and humid place” of Life of Pi, and thus is part of the 
“semiotic system” Huggan calls “the postcolonial exotic” (see Postcolonial Exotic xvi).  Like 
“most of the familiar semiotic markers of Orientalism,” which Huggan identifies in Rushdie‟s 
work, and which appears to “pande[r] to a wonder-seeking Western readership” (Postcolonial 
Exotic 72), the cockatoo repesents a familiar marker of exoticism more generally: whether an 
exotic animal comes from “the Orient,” from Africa, or some other sunny place, is immaterial 
for the consuming public (as long as the place is “warm”).  Magical realism can thus be 
considered the contemporary continuation of imperial armchair-travel literature, and the 
reader a virtual tourist.  Hans Magnus Enzensberger points out that the goal of tourists is to 
experience “adventure,” the “elemental,” and “the untouched” (126).  They seek the  
“inaccessible,” but in a “comfortable” and “accessible” way (Enzensberger 127).  The zoo 
epitomises such an opportunity to experience “wildness” and exotic settings in comfort.  
Likewise, to experience Martel‟s paperzoo or magical realism‟s postcolonial settings, one 
does not even need to leave the house. 
Ironically, even in the controlled environment of the zoo, it is often precisely this 
“irreducibility” that attracts people to observing animals.  Much of the fascination for the zoo 
visitor lies in gazing at an untameable animal, or an animal who despite having been tamed or 
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subdued remains ultimately unpredictable, potentially dangerous, and intent on escaping our 
control.  Bars, deep moats filled with water, or walk-through cages for the visitors are the 
visual markers of this wildness,
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 an impression that intensifies the more tightly controlled 
and confined an animal is.  It is this tension that drives readers of Life of Pi to keep turning 
the pages.  Signage, however, teaches zoo visitors “how, when and where to „gaze,‟” to 
borrow Urry‟s words (10),259 and serves not only as marker of an absent, far-away and 
possibly lost habitat for the urban tourist, but also as an ordering device that frames the 
animal in terms of Western science and as an object of observation.  The animal pacing, 
climbing, capering, or sitting behind the information board becomes a signifier for nature, an 
endangered habitat, or an exotic elsewhere, but also a symbol of Western physical and 
conceptual conquest of the elusive animal.  Thus, in Life of Pi, it is the scientific labels, 
zoological and behaviourist explanations that frame “wondrous creatures” firmly within 
scientific order, and reduce them to domesticated, useful animals. 
Indeed, as Armstrong points out, the Pondicherry Zoo animals are “(contentedly) 
imprisoned” (What Animals Mean 181).  Overall, animals in Life of Pi are compliant with the 
imposed order, as illustrated in Pi‟s account of animals in what he considers a good zoo, 
where “[e]verything in an enclosure [is] just right” (Life of Pi 40).  In contrast, several 
editions of House of the Spirits and One Hundred Years of Solitude, as well as at least two 
editions of Illywhacker, show birds who are either not caged at all, who are on the verge of 
flying away, or who have just left their cage.  The cover of the Spiegel-Verlag 2006 German 
edition of House of the Spirits (Das Geisterhaus) especially captures the essence of magical 
realist oxymoron: although the image foregrounds a parrot locked in a golden cage, the gaze 
is focussed on the shadows projected onto the back wall and in the center of the image, 
showing an open cage and the escaping bird.  Similarly, on the cover of the 2004 Harper 
Perennial edition of One Hundred Years of Solitude, the artwork of Cathleen Toelke, 
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depicting a sleeping person, is brought to life by a single, small, stray insect crawling into the 
bottom corner.  Like real animals, and unlike the Pondicherry Zoo animals, magical realist 
fauna does not comply. 
Elusiveness and non-compliance are thus another reason magical realist cockroaches, 
for example, are not wanted on the voyage.  Circensian, feral animals essentially embody 
themselves; their „irreducibility‟ injects them with an agency that precludes conformity with 
human interests and denies human authority.  Accordingly, parrots are foulmouthed and ants 
tear the house down.  As feral animals, they challenge Western order in physical, 
geographical, and metaphorical senses, as García Márquez‟s cockroaches and ants or 
Allende‟s maggots show.  They assert themselves as significant agents, undermine human 
mastery and question hierarchical ideas about Homo sapiens as the pinnacle of evolution.  
Besides, cockroaches of the Macondo kind in particular are a “species . . . definitely resistant 
to any and all methods of extermination” (García Márquez, Solitude 357), which is why 
Martel‟s cockroaches need to fly to their deaths of their own volition (see Life of Pi 170).  
Indeed, as the most resilient amongst the survivors, there is no reason why cockroaches 
would abandon the lifeboat, which potentially holds plenty of food, after only five days.  Yet 
their resilience is partly the problem (for Martel), because the insects‟ presence on the boat 
undermines the tiger‟s position as the top of the food chain, which Pi manages, effectively, to 
wrest from him by establishing himself as “the alpha male” (Life of Pi 43) through the 
application of (human) reason and ingenuity.  Both Pi and the tiger would become breakfast 
for flies and cockroaches if they died; the insects‟ presence on the boat threatens to provide 
an anticlimax in a narrative about human ascendancy.  Martel thus constructs his central 
animal character in accordance with circus acts, where “[i]t is this compliant animal,” 
submissive to the alpha male, “that will be the star of the show” (45).  In keeping with 
magical realist chic, he installs Richard Parker as the “major lifeboat pes[t]” (168), who can 
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ultimately be conquered through circus training.  Since the same cannot be said for 
cockroaches, Martel avoids the challenge they represent by throwing them overboard with the 
stroke of a pen, so to speak. 
Like the complicated cockroaches, irony, too, goes overboard in the simplification 
process.  This is where Life of Pi differs significantly from the postcolonial fiction Huggan 
terms “postcolonial exotic” because unlike these narratives, Martel‟s novel does not display 
“an ironic relation to Orientalism, emphasising the ideological shortfall of self-serving 
Orientalist myths” (Huggan, Postcolonial Exotic 72).  Equally, Life of Pi has no such ironic 
distancing towards exoticism more generally, of which Orientalism can be seen as a 
subcategory.  As Huggan points out, “the postcolonial exotic is both a form of commodity 
fetishism and a revelation of the process by which „exotic‟ commodities are produced, 
exchanged, consumed; it is both a mode of consumption and an analysis of consumption” 
(Postcolonial Exotic 264, original italics), and this is where “The Greatest Show on Earth” in 
Life of Pi differs from “The Best Pet Shop in the World” in Illywhacker, for example.  There 
is no self-reflexive irony that “constructs the metropolitan reader as a voyeuristic consumer,” 
no “parody of the reader-as-consumer” (Huggan, Postcolonial Exotic 72).  The implausible 
speech of sixteen-year-old Pi; his authority as an animal behaviour expert, who does not 
know, despite specialising in sloths with “an algae” in their fur (Life of Pi 4), that the singular 
of “algae“ is “alga“;260 Pi‟s indignation at the offer of a leather boot because he “consider[s] 
cows sacred” (252), when much is made of the fact that he fishes with pieces of his own 
leather shoe (see 178); and the supposedly indistinct opposites that are neither opposites nor 
indistinct, do not suggest subversive irony despite their incongruity, but weaknesses in a 
deeply conservative narrative.  The novel does not have a “deconstructive project,” as 
Stratton argues (5).  Unlike the circensian spaces of magical realism, which expose the 
contradictory discourses and power structures at play, and where, to employ Huggan‟s theory 
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again, “exoticism is effectively repoliticised, redeployed both to unsettle metropolitan 
expectations of cultural otherness and to effect a grounded critique of differential relations of 
power” (Postcolonial Exotic ix-x, original italics), Life of Pi reinforces imperialist discourse 
and mainstream animal practices, such as the zoo or the circus.  Rather than the “postcolonial 
exotic,” Life of Pi exemplifies a “colonial exotic,” epitomised by the Pondicherry Zoo. 
 
Arresting Animals 
Malamud points out the imperial legacy of the zoo, which continues to define how animals 
are represented:  “The zoo‟s forte is its construction of zoogoers as paramount, masters of all 
they survey, and zoo animals as subalterns” (58).  The emphasis upon zoos as repositories of 
charismatic, or emblematic, animals originates in the imperialist tradition of collecting 
animals who symbolised the colonies from which they were taken.  James R. Ryan illustrates 
the role of big cats in nineteenth century photography. He discusses a picture of Lord Curzon, 
who, standing “at the head of the slumped tiger, clutching his gun,” assumes “the 
conventional stance of the victorious huntsman and landowner” (Picturing Empire, 103).  
Ryan points out that Curzon‟s “confident pose symbolized British authority over India at the 
moment when Britain‟s Empire was at its zenith” (Picturing Empire 103).  Zoos, like 
circuses, were once the showcases of empire, “an endorsement of modern colonial power” 
(Berger, “Why Zoos Disappoint” 122), presenting to European audiences animals who 
signified the exotic places which had been colonised, and who simultaneously symbolised the 
subjugated natives of those places, alongside whom they were sometimes exhibited.
261
  
Moreover, they represented the domination of nature, which, according to Harriet Ritvo, was 
most powerfully expressed by “the sight of large carnivores in cages” (Ritvo“The Order of 
Nature” 47), and which continues as a colonisation and domestication of nature today. 
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Martel places himself firmly within this imperial tradition.  He says that he “wanted 
an Indian animal,” and therefore his choice of a tiger “now seems . . . natural” (qtd. in 
WrittenVoices.com) and “obvious” (“How I Wrote Life of Pi”).  Readers readily recognise 
the colonial symbolism, widespread in adventure narratives, or zoo and circus imagery, and 
therefore Martel does not need to explain; his choice does indeed go without saying in this 
conventional context.  The connection between Life of Pi and the tiger as emblem for India as 
imperial colony, moreover, is clearly established by the UK and US covers of the illustrated 
editions of Life of Pi.  It is not coincidental, but entirely fitting and consistent with the 
narrative‟s imperial legacy that the cover painting was inspired by a Victorian etching, 
originally intended as the image on the UK edition (see Torjanac).  Urry points out the 
importance placed on the visual sense “within the long history of Western societies” (146), 
and whilst an emphasis of zoo marketing is now conservation, the imperial tourist gaze of zoo 
visitors and “its organising power of vision” has not fundamentally changed.  As Malamud 
writes, “[t]he zoo‟s exercise of control and oppression, and insistence on the distant, 
subjugated subject as other, sustain an imperial hegemony” (58).  Pi, accordingly, stresses 
that Richard Parker is “royalty“: “What a stunning creature.  Such a noble mien.  How apt 
that in full it is a Royal Bengal tiger” (175, original italics).  The tiger‟s noble status enhances 
Pi‟s own position as the “super-alpha trainer” (44), because above the king (of beasts), after 
all, is the emperor. 
Malamud describes the parallel between zoo and colonial discourse: “The zoo is the 
analogue, in popular culture, to the colonialist text in literary culture.  Such a text 
appropriates and packages the „native‟ experience, simultaneously contextualizing and 
distorting that experience with the inherent biases of the imperial culture” (58).  Martel not 
only illustrates the analogous relationship between zoo and text, but links the two by 
transforming the zoo into text and the text into zoo.  Life of Pi thus translates, to apply 
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Huggan„s theory, “power-politics into spectacle,” and thereby exhibits the “exoticist rhetoric 
of fetishised otherness and sympathetic identification” that “conceals the inequality of the 
power relations” (Postcolonial Exotic 14, italics omitted).  In a narrative lauded as “a 
formidable argument for the retention of zoos” (F. H. King), the exotic spectacle of zoo and 
lifeboat circus serves to trivialise, hide and naturalise the power-relations involved in these 
animal practices both through specious arguments and through the creation of mythical 
discourse as described by Barthes. 
Martel propagates his conventional view of zoos through setting his protagonist and 
himself up as a rational, unbiased authorities on the topic, and by contrasting Pi‟s opinions to 
the “nonsense” circulated by “[w]ell-meaning but misinformed people” (Life of Pi 15).  Like 
no other author discussed in this thesis, Martel stresses, and is frequently asked about, his 
research into the topics his novel deals with: “I read a history of zoos, some books on zoo 
biology, on animal psychology.  And I visited zoos.  I interviewed someone at the Toronto 
Zoo as well as the director of the Trivandrum Zoo in India” (qtd. in Sielke).262  He projects 
this role as researcher by creating a protagonist with a zoology degree, frequently citing “the 
literature,” implying expert publications (see Life of Pi 19, 29, 85, 163, 265), and producing a 
semblance of a scientific text by citing “Beebe (1926),” “Bullock (1968),” “Tirler (1966),” 
(4) and “Hediger (1950)” (44), complete with publication dates in brackets in the manner of a 
professional scientific journal article. 
Many readers and reviewers accept Martel and Pi, who largely reflects the author‟s 
views,
263
 as authorities on zoo animal welfare and behaviour, and their arguments apparently 
even manage to convince some people who were previously critical of zoos.  Martel, after all, 
is a convert himself, so to speak.  He explains:  
A zoo is not an ideal place for an animal—of course the best place for a chimp 
is the wilds of Tanzania—but a good zoo is a decent, acceptable place.  
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Animals are far more flexible than we realize.  If they weren‟t, they wouldn‟t 
have survived.  But my opinion about zoos came after research.  Initially I had 
the opinion that most people have, that they are jails.  (Martel qtd. in 
WrittenVoices.com, capitalisation omitted). 
Thus, readers comment in an online interview with Martel that his “research on the zoos was 
good.  After reading your book, I started thinking that zoos are not such bad places,”  that his 
book made them “look at zoos in a new light,”  and one person  writes: “I have to admit that 
you certainly changed my mind on the whole zoo thing. My husband is delighted that he can 
now take our son to one without feeling my wrath” (Written Voices.com). 
The arguments put forward in Life of Pi to support Martel‟s opinion, that it is “better 
to have a good zoo—note the adjective—than not” (Martel, “A Giraffe in a Cage is Worth 
Two on the Box”), are not only unconvincing but also specious.264  Thus, Pi‟s portrayal of 
zoo animals as bothersome hotel “guests” jokingly suggests that the reason the animals 
“never leave their rooms,” except to “saunter to their balconies, so to speak,” is out of an 
inflated sense of entitlement and grandeur, treating zookeepers like servants who have to put 
up with their “guests‟” eccentricities (Life of Pi 13).  Elsewhere, Pi maintains:  
One might even argue that if an animal could choose with intelligence, it 
would opt for living in a zoo, since the major difference between a zoo and the 
wild is the absence of parasites and enemies and the abundance of food in the 
first, and their respective abundance and scarcity in the second.  Think about it 
yourself.  Would you rather be put up at the Ritz with free room service and 
unlimited access to a doctor or be homeless without a soul to care for you?  
(Life of Pi 18) 
The image of the “zoo hotel” that Pi conjures up sounds as though zoo animals really live the 
life of luxury that only very privileged humans ever experience.  The comparison trivialises 
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and clouds the fact that, unlike real hotel guests, zoo animals have not checked in for a 
holiday, are not free to leave at any time, are unable to chose their own company, are 
sometimes completely isolated from others of their own species, almost always isolated from 
other species with whom they would interact in nature, and, in any case, will usually not be 
returned to their natural habitat.  The argument is also false in presupposing that humans 
would “intelligently” choose to stay at the Ritz, or conversely, be unintelligent not to make 
that choice; after all, being locked up in the same hotel for all of their lives is hardly a 
lifestyle choice most people would actually make.  No matter how nice the hotel, most people 
would eventually get bored and long for a change of scenery and freedom of movement, a 
desire a globetrotter like Martel, for instance, can surely appreciate.
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Pi further reinforces the idea of the “zoo hotel” by giving examples of animals who 
had every chance to leave, but evidently, or so Pi suggests, chose not to escape “simply 
because they had no reason to” (Life of Pi 41).  Once again, Pi cites “the literature,” which 
provides “legions of examples of animals that could escape but did not, or did and returned” 
(19).  His argument is once again framed by a view of animals as slaves to stimulus 
responses.  Thus, Pi maintains that “animals don‟t escape to somewhere, but from 
something”; that they run away from either bad enclosures, slightly miscalculated elements of 
the enclosure, skirmishes amongst the animals themselves or disturbances, but that animals 
who are “perfectly adapted to their enclosures” will “seek to escape” out of “madness” (41, 
original italics).  His most convincing example appears to be a “herd of roe-deer,” who, 
“[f]rightened by visitors, . . . bolted for the nearby forest, which had its own herd of wild roe-
deer and could support more.  Nonetheless, the zoo roe-deer quickly returned to their corral” 
(19).  Such examples are designed to prove the validity of the hotel comparison, because 
animals—except for the supposedly mad ones—are seen here as voting with their feet, so to 
speak. 
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Indeed, Pi insists that a good zoo can create “the essence” of the animals‟ natural 
habitats (40, original italics), which meets all of their needs and, moreover, provides comfort, 
shown by their choice to stay when they could escape.
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  This argument is implicitly and 
supposedly proven by way of a logical fallacy, as well as by omitting a few important factors.  
Pi‟s exclamation, “A plague upon bad zoos with bad enclosures!” (40) is one that everyone 
can essentially agree with.  The logical fallacy lies in the assumption that if there are “bad 
zoos” that have “bad enclosures,” then there must also be “good zoos” that have “good 
enclosures.”  The latter statement cannot, or has not yet been, put to the test, because if it 
were true that animals would rather be captive in a good zoo than free in the surrounding 
environment, then zoos like the Berlin, Toronto, San Diego and Singapore Zoo, listed by Pi 
as exemplary (see 40), could simply open their enclosures, and the animals would stay. 
However, zoo animals are surrounded by an alien environment, such as the commonly 
urban setting, or an adverse climate and habitat.  Therefore, instances of animals staying in or 
returning to their enclosures does not in any way prove the argument for the zoo hotel.  Pi 
explains that “[a]nimals that escape go from the known into the unknown—and if there is one 
thing an animal hates above all else, it is the unknown” (41).  He gives the impression that the 
“unknown” is largely the lack of routine and of the carefully, scientifically constructed 
essence of their habitat; the fact that lack of food and terrifying traffic, or simply the 
terrifying unknown for an animal reared in the zoo, might drive an animal back into their 
enclosure is not mentioned. 
Additionally, the argument that zoo enclosures and cages serve as “protection” (39) 
for the animals from predators and hostile humans, for example, is not convincing either, as 
other methods are available.
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  In contrast to zoos, the endangered rhinos of Matobo National 
Park in Zimbabwe, for instance, are heavily guarded and surrounded by a fence that spans a 
vast area.
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  Due to this, sightings of rhinos cannot be guaranteed, but that is the point: the 
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enclosure is primarily designed for the animals‟ interest, and tourists who manage to see them 
count themselves lucky.  Tourists do pay an entrance fee, but they cannot ask for it back if 
they do not see any rhinos, or any of the many other animal species in the game park that they 
would like to see.  The market principle of supply and demand does not apply in that sense; 
you pay for what you may not get, which makes national parks fundamentally different from 
zoos that are dependent on the supply and demand mechanism.  I agree with Malamud, who 
goes so far as to argue that an institution governed by those principles cannot ever be 
adequate: “[E]ven in the hands of the most enlightened emperors of commerce, consumer 
culture cannot beneficially mediate people‟s relationship with animals, and nature can 
prosper only to the extent that it can be divorced—rescued—from consumerist forces” (98).  
After all, the priority of consumer culture lies not with the question of “what it would take to 
make the animals happy” (see Masson and McCarthy 146), but with the question of what 
makes producer or provider and consumers happy.
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In any case, Pi‟s examples are highly selective and omit cases of the “many well-fed, 
well-treated captive animals [who] regularly try to escape over and over again” (Masson and 
McCarthy 144-5), but while oversight of obvious and valid counterarguments could be seen 
as the flaw of a youthful protagonist, Martel‟s own suggestion that animals would not have 
survived if they were not flexible enough to be accommodated by zoos also fails to 
acknowledge that all sorts of animal species, human animals included, survive and produce 
offspring even in the most desperate of circumstances, such as wars, famines, and droughts in 
the case of humanity, for example.  Pi‟s assertion, and a well-propagated argument by zoos, 
that “the best sign” to indicate a good zoo is reproduction (Life of Pi 40), is thus only a 
limited measure of how “good” a zoo is.  The well-publicised birth and subsequent rejection 
by his mother of polar-bear Knut in the Berlin Zoo is a fitting example, as the zoo 
environment cannot possibly be ideal.  The measure should not be life itself, but rather 
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quality of life, and, as Malamud argues (48-9), or Mason and Chubb‟s study demonstrates, 
this is severely impaired in a zoo environment. 
By not considering alternatives or by omitting important factors, Pi thus manoeuvres 
the novel‟s readers, largely already disposed to agreeing with him in a desire to justify 
common animal practices, towards acceptance of his arguments by providing false or 
contrived choices, such as the fallacious choice between the Ritz and homelessness, as the 
question really only allows one answer because of its narrow options.  After all, would an 
animal not rather choose freedom with an abundance of food, or sufficient food at least, over 
captivity with an abundance of food, for example?  Pi‟s contrived portrayal of zoos as the 
only alternative to extinction—which is ultimately the reason Martel endorses zoos270—makes 
it hard to disagree with his narrowly focused point of view.  Moreover, his pretended 
acquiescence adds an element of emotional manipulation, designed to make “zoo detractors” 
(41) feel guilty of not preventing species extinction: “But I don‟t insist.  I don‟t mean to 
defend zoos.  Close them all down if you want (and let us hope that what wildlife remains can 
survive in what is left of the natural world).  I know zoos are no longer in people‟s good 
graces” (Life of Pi 19). 
Martel himself concedes that the majority of zoos are far from being the Ritz for 
animals (see Martel, “A Giraffe in a Cage is Worth Two on the Box”).  Arguments revealing 
animal suffering in zoos, however, carry little weight in Life of Pi, as suffering, to whatever 
degree, is not considered an outcome of the institution as such, but of the failure to correctly 
apply known science, “the art and science of zookeeping” (39), which, Pi maintains, will 
result in an “emotionally stable, stress-free wild animal that not only stays put, but is healthy, 
lives a very long time, eats without fuss, behaves and socializes in natural ways and—the best 
sign—reproduces” (40).  Life of Pi reflects Malamud‟s observation that “[t]hose who promote 
zoos refute (or anticipate and defuse) indications that animals may not like their cages and 
Schwalm  376 
may suffer in them” (Malamud 145).  Indeed, Pi‟s “zoo hotel” argument reflects the attitude 
shown by the San Diego Zoo, which goes even further than to claim that zoo inhabitants like 
their cages: one of their billboards shows a monkey by the side of an untarred jungle-road, 
holding a hitchhiker‟s sign to the San Diego Zoo.  The caption proclaims: “NEW MONKEY 
TRAILS.  WHERE EVERY MONKEY WOULD LOVE TO LIVE” (M&C Saatchi, “Monkey 
Trails,” my italics, original capitalisation).271 
Armstrong argues: 
Of course, the merest knowledge of either zoos or zoology is sufficient to 
discredit Pi‟s claims, which cannot account (among other things) for the 
pathologically repetitive behaviour of many confined animals, the needs of 
migratory species whose territories are defined not by boundaries but by vastly 
extensive paths of travel, the distress produced by inappropriate climatic 
conditions, or the other incalculable effects of removing organisms from the 
network of relationships that comprise their native habitats.  (What Animals 
Mean 178) 
Yet, Pi‟s response would be that any zoos that do not meet these needs by recreating the 
essence of the animals‟ habitats would simply need to improve.  As Martel suggests, “[b]etter 
to work at making zoos better” than not have them at all (“A Giraffe in a Cage is Worth Two 
on the Box”).  Pi‟s argument, however, is based on an impossible ideal, which is used to 
justify the institution of the zoo per se.  Readers are reassured that their spectatorship actually 
amounts to doing something good for animals, and once the idea that the institution as such is 
“good” is accepted, it justifies the practice regardless of whether the particular zoos 
subsequently visited actually meet the ideal.  The matter of improvement becomes incidental, 
an issue for experts to worry about. 
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What zoo visitors therefore see is the ideal of the zoo, not the reality, as mythical 
discourse sets them up to disregard cages, zoochotic behaviour, and the inadequacy of the zoo 
“habitat.”  As Malamud writes, “[t]hey see what they want to see, rather than the thing itself” 
(134).  The imperial legacy of the zoo, which turns animals into subalterns, the exoticist 
commodification of wild animals, the conservationist discourse of the recent decades, and the 
benign image of the zoo as the “last ark” (the only possible “ark“) for endangered species, are 
examples of mythical speech, which together form a kind of zoo Mythology, uncritically 
accepted by the spectators.  Malamud argues that “[t]hey cannot help it: the hegemony of 
cultural conditioning cannot be eschewed when one looks into a cage” (134).  Indeed, the zoo 
as cultural institution functions as a mirror to society which reflects and reinforces common 
beliefs, attitudes and practices in the context of human-animal relations.  The cultural 
conditioning is achieved by mythical speech, which, according to Barthes, depoliticises by 
“giving an historical intention a natural justification” (155): myth “transforms history into 
nature” (140). 
Accordingly, Pi presents the zoo, a cultural institution, as a natural entity, whereby the 
word “natural” becomes a mantra to reinforce the idea.  He points out, for example, that “[i]n 
zoos, as in nature, the best times to visit are sunrise and sunset” (Life of Pi 15, my italics); 
that his father, as a “good zookeeper,” was “a natural” (40), and that Mr Kumar, looking as 
the Pondicherry Zoo animals and “read[ing] the labels and descriptive notices in their 
entirety,” is really looking at “nature as a whole” as “an exceptionally fine illustration of 
science” (25-6).  The zoo itself appears like a natural setting, as Pi not only 
“underemphasizes the presence of cages and barriers” (Armstrong, What Animals Mean 177), 
but practically renders them invisible.  Thus, in the “huge zoo, spread over numberless 
acres,” Pi describes the “surprises” of “[s]uddenly” seeing giraffes, “the elephant that was 
there all along, so big you didn‟t notice it,” the hippopotami in the pond, the “great troupe of 
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monkeys” and “strange birds,” all apparently in amongst the “young couples” and the “men 
sleeping” on the benches (12-3).  The Pondicherry Zoo sounds more like an African 
wilderness, or a vast game park (the presence of courting couples on park benches 
notwithstanding), than a zoological garden, where every animal is so clearly signposted that 
there is little room for surprises.  Only the “two mighty Indian rhinoceros” are behind a “low 
wall” in a “shallow pit” (13, my italics), an enclosure that seems to be dwarfed by the animals 
and hardly the equivalent of a cage at all. 
Malamud comments that “[t]rendy replications of habitats mislead zoo spectators to 
believe that wild animals can be at home in alien compounds” (107).  Indeed, when Pi does 
mention cages, such as the “cat house,” it is ostensibly a “house,” and not really a cage (33), 
as the name would have us believe.  Malamud argues that “[i]t seems paradoxical at best, 
deceptively hypocritical at worst, for the zoo—fundamentally a place of confinement—to 
promote the idea of cagelessness for its captive animals and to dupe spectators thereby into 
believing they are watching real animal life” (109).  Similarly, Barthes proposes that readers 
“consume myth innocently,” by seeing a “factual system,” such as Pi‟s scientific explanation 
as to why animals are comfortable in their enclosures, instead of a “system of values” 
(Barthes 142), such as the idea of human mastery over nature, or exoticist discourse. 
The representation of the Pondicherry Zoo does indeed appear to be deeply deceptive.  
As a zoo operating in India between 1954 and 1977, it appears, implausibly, to conform to 
the contemporary ideal of “immersion exhibits,” which emerged in the nineteen-eighties, as 
Dhun Karkaria and Hema Karkaria‟s overview of Indian zoo-design through the ages, 
“Zoorassic Park: A Brief History of Zoo Interpretation,” shows.  Pi‟s concept of good 
zookeeping is mirrored in their description of contemporary design, as Karkaria and Karkaria 
write that “[t]oday, the zoo director sees his job as that of a conservationist.”  They suggest 
that immersion exhibits “may be an answer to this dilemma” between conservation and the 
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visitors, who “think the zoo owes them spectacular entertainment.”  Moreover, they describe 
what Pi, in his words, explains as the recreation of essences: 
The enclosure is landscaped with the use of both real and artificial material 
giving an extremely real impression of the animals‟ habitat.  Skills, materials, 
techniques and processes employed for the creation of natural history museum 
kind of dioramas are used with such finesse, coupled with the removal and 
concealment of all man-made elements that you never feel for a moment that 
you are in a zoo!  This is extremely important as the first goal of interpretation 
is to present a given animal in relation to its habitat.  (Karkaria and Karkaria) 
However, given its historical placement, the Pondicherry Zoo is more likely an example of 
the “Hagenbeck approach,” described by Karkaria and Karkaria: “The animals were still 
captive but their captivity was well hidden by judicious placement of various moats, plants 
and rocks as well as carefully laid out paths to ensure that nothing interfered with the look of 
the exhibit.  All artificial structures were kept out of sight of the visitor.”  Martel‟s apparent 
conflation of time in the space of the Pondicherry Zoo is not a magical realist subversion of 
linear history, but another example of conjuring up an ideal that contemporary readers are 
inclined to agree with. 
Moreover, it seems extraordinary that Pi does not report what must have been signs of 
zoochosis, caused by extreme confinement, after “spen[ding] hours observing” Richard 
Parker for 227 days at sea (Life of Pi 191).  Instead, Pi reports: 
He didn‟t have much of a routine beyond eating, drinking and sleeping, but 
there were times when he stirred from his lethargy and rambled about his 
territory, making noises and being cranky.  Thankfully, every time, the sun 
and the sea quickly tired him and he returned to beneath the tarpaulin, to lying 
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on his side again, or flat on his stomach, his head on top of his crossed front 
legs.  (191) 
There is no swaying, chewing, or pacing, for instance.  Arguably, learning about the 
symptoms of zoochotic behaviour would have been a valuable lesson for readers concerned 
about zoo animal welfare, but like the educational institutions that zoos present themselves to 
be, Martel‟s paperzoo, itself presenting an image of being “at the service of popular education 
and science,” does not inform about zoochosis.  As Armstrong comments, such 
“considerations are ignored because Martel is less concerned with the fate of animals than 
with advancing a particular view of the human condition, which is—despite the novel‟s 
glossy postmodern style—fundamentally that of humanist modernity” (What Animals Mean ). 
That is not to say there is no concern for animals; after all, the narrative may be read 
as an environmental metaphor, whereby humans and animals rely on each other for survival 
(see Armstrong, What Animals Mean 177).  It is, however, a question of emphasis and 
priority, as Martel‟s animals do not, first and foremost, represent their own individual being, 
but, despite the individual names and characters of Orange Juice and Richard Parker, they are 
“specimens,” representatives of their species, the justification Martel provides for the 
incarceration of zoo animals in the first place.  Life of Pi is motivated by an anthropocentric 
desire for closeness to wild animals and for supposed education.  Martel illustrates both by 
his “favourite pastime in the zoo,” which is, apparently, “to look the animals in the eye” 
(Alanyali, my translation)
272, and his comment: “I do believe that it‟s good that we have zoos 
because if we don‟t, children will never see animals in the flesh. An animal becoming extinct 
will have no more impact on them than a TV show that‟s been discontinued.  Children won‟t 
really feel for an animal the way they would if giraffes were being pushed to extinction and 
they had seen giraffes” (qtd. in Sielke).  For the animals themselves, it makes no difference 
whether they are seen by children or not, except that captivity in a zoo is more likely to be 
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detrimental than beneficial,
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 a fact glossed over by discourse designed to manipulate the 
way children and their families feel about zoos. 
Ultimately, there is nothing particularly unusual or unexpected in Pi‟s speech.  
Despite his glossing over cages and fences, readers are well aware that they would be part of 
the zoo.  As Barthes writes, “it is natural and goes without saying” (156, italics omitted).  
Cages and fences do not need to be hidden, or conversely, they do not need to be mentioned, 
because “[m]yth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a 
confession: it is an inflexion” (Barthes 140).  Like circuses, zoos actually exhibit their cages, 
enclosures, moats, fences, and glass houses, after all,
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 and not without a measure of pride, 
as the San Diego Zoo‟s example shows.  However, their presence is embedded in the 
language of “environmental enrichment,”  Pi‟s recreation of “essences,” and comparisons 
with “bad zoos” and now outdated, historical practices, for instance.275  As Barthes writes, 
“[m]yth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it 
purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification” (156). 
Accordingly, instead of seeing the confinement of tigers, who are naturally wide-
ranging animals, on the small area of a “moated island” (33), the readers of Life of Pi 
perceive the view out of the “cat house” cages, which suggests nature and freedom of 
movement: “Through the cage exits we could see the vegetation of the surrounding island, 
flooded with sunlight.  The cages were empty—save one” (33).  As Steve Baker explains, 
“what [myth] distorts and inflects is the historical and the cultural, so that they appear entirely 
natural.  But what is most useful here is the idea that nothing is actually hidden, it‟s just that 
the culture typically deflects our attention from these things, and makes them seem unworthy 
of analysis” (8, original emphasis).  Zoo visitors know, of course, that the zoo is  a place of 
confinement; it is common sense, after all, as Barthes points out: “Sometimes—rarely—the 
Other is revealed as irreducible: not because of a sudden scruple, but because common sense 
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rebels” (166, original italics).  For fleeting moments, they are aware that the “animal other” is 
behind bars (or other, cosmetic equivalents), but then dismiss the fact and look through the 
bars, not at them, instead. 
Moreover, Malamud argues that “[i]nstitutional, cultural, and historical aspects of zoo 
practices conspire to screen or marginalise zoo animals‟ pain, making it easier to ignore.  
Those who inflict this pain are adept at rationalizing, trivializing, or denying its existence” 
(179).  In a similar fashion, Pi naturalises the circus, in the first instance by closely 
associating it with the zoo, which, by the time he begins to talk about the circus (see Life of 
Pi 43), he has already established as an appropriate environment for animals.  He extends his 
argument about flight distances and “territory” to the circus (43) and provides, once again, 
expert opinion, a quotation by Heini Hediger, whom he calls “. . . a wise animal man.  Mr. 
Hediger was for many years a zoo director . . . . He was a man well versed in the ways of 
animals” (44).  Most readers will find it difficult to even consider disagreeing with the weight 
of authority portrayed here, which is used to link the zoo so seamlessly with the circus and to 
support the practice of keeping animals for entertainment.  Both zoo and circus are indeed 
closely related and share imperial origins and legacy; both operate along the same ideological 
paradigms of human superiority, colonisation of nature, and commodification and 
exoticisation of animals; and both practices exist primarily to provide animal entertainment, 
regardless of the main justifications provided, such as conservation and education.
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What Pi‟s speech largely omits is the fact that circuses differ markedly from zoos by 
engaging in practices which would be considered unacceptable in a zoo environment, such as 
confinement in extremely small cages and trailers, training with whips and bullhooks, and 
frequent transport.  He does admit that his aggressive intimidation and training of Richard 
Parker “was not good zookeeping . . .  but psychological bullying” (211), yet this bullying, in 
the context of the extreme situation he finds himself in, the necessity for survival, and the fact 
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that his strategy worked to ensure the survival of both himself and Richard Parker, seems 
excusable.  The circus as an animal practice is justified per se nonetheless, through 
behaviourist arguments based on Hediger‟s quotation, which are thus presented as “naturally” 
and universally valid, and the suggestion that animals, such as lions, actually want to be 
dominated by circus trainers and benefit from that relationship by being looked after and 
cared for in circuses.  Accordingly, this time, instead of letting animals vote with their feet, as 
it were, he lets the circus lions speak for themselves to seemingly prove the validity of his 
argument: 
They are in the presence of a strongly dominant male, a super-alpha male, and 
they must submit to his dominance rituals.  So they open their jaws wide, they 
sit up, they jump through paper-covered hoops, they crawl through tubes, they 
walk backwards, they roll over.  “He‟s a queer one,” they think dimly.  “Never 
seen a top lion like him.  But he runs a good pride.  The larder‟s always full 
and—let‟s be honest, mates—his antics keep us busy.  Napping all the time 
does get a bit boring.  At least we‟re not riding bicycles like the brown bears 
or catching flying plates like the chimps.”  (43). 
The trainer‟s dominance, Pi argues, is in the animals‟ best interest, especially where the 
“omega animal,” “the one with the lowest social standing in the pride” is concerned (44). 
In this fashion, Pi exploits readers‟ inclination to side with the underdog, so to speak, 
by explaining “a fact commonly known in the trade,” which is that the most “inferior” 
animal‟s “close relationship” with the trainer “will also mean protection from the other 
members of the pride” (44-5).  Once again, going to the circus apparently amounts to doing a 
good deed for the “[s]ocially inferior animals,” who, in some ways, are also more human, as 
they “are the ones that make the most strenuous, resourceful efforts to get to know their 
keepers.  They prove to be the ones most faithful to them, most in need of their company, 
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least likely to challenge them or be difficult” (45).  Such domination, Pi explains, makes all 
of the animals feel “[s]atisfied,” as this “make[s] clear to [the animal] where it stands, the 
very thing it wants to know” (44, my italics).  Life of Pi presents the circus as a place that 
meets the animals‟ supposed need of hierarchical order, submission and protection; a 
relationship that seems, once again, entirely natural.  As Pi points out, the “nature of the 
circus trainer‟s ascendancy” is “a question of brain over brawn” (44).  The novel reclaims 
“the values of scientific modernity,” since humans are presented as “innately different from 
and superior to animals because they possess a greater capacity for rational inventiveness,” 
for example, as Armstrong argues (What Animals Mean 178).  Martel thus demonstrates, 
throughout Life of Pi, his view of the natural order: “We are reasonable animals. That‟s what 
makes us more powerful than other animals” (qtd. in Sielke).  Ultimately, Pi‟s conquest of the 
tiger in his “floating circus” is the central image that sums up the paradigm determining 
human-animal relationships in Life of Pi: the theme of the novel, as Pi says, is “mastery in the 
making” (Life of Pi 211). 
 
Conclusion 
Life of Pi is Martel‟s perceptive assembly of the kinds of elements that “make a story work” 
(see Martel, Interview with Mishal Husain) and which, ultimately, sell successfully.  The 
emphasis on charismatic, colourful and exotic animals appeals both visually and in terms of 
literary and historical traditions.  However, by emulating yet simplifying the complexity of 
magical realism, Life of Pi illustrates how art, animals, and animal art are turned into a 
commodified, exoticised and clichéd spectacle that veils, rather than uncovers, the hegemonic 
discourses at play, as considerations for target markets appear to dominate the creative 
process.  In consequence, Life of Pi‟s project of human ascendancy, invoking the spirit of the 
Enlightenment and grounded firmly within Cartesian paradigms of Western science, is 
Schwalm  385 
actually a reversal of the process underlying postcolonial magical realism, which is, typically, 
“mastery in the unmaking.”  The product, a kind of faux magical realism, is attractive 
nonetheless because it can be consumed with ease; it is palatable to the general public, whose 
animal practices are largely endorsed in essence, if not necessarily in detail. 
The animal story, accordingly, is “the better story” because Life of Pi operates on the 
same level as animal entertainment: the idea that “close encounters” with wild animals can be 
controlled and provided on demand, that humans can be masters over ferocious animals, and 
that these animals can supposedly be tamed,
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 is attractive, especially when it is coupled 
with the notion that this is for the animal‟s own good, as the lingering popularity of circuses 
and zoos demonstrates.  One of the achievements of Life of Pi is the attempt to make explicit 
the discrepancy between reading animals as “real” animals, in and for themselves, as 
embodied, living beings, versus reading them as symbolic projections, as figures of speech.  
However, Martel does not ultimately succeed in representing a sense of “real” animal 
characters, keeping them trapped within a field of vision constructed by zoo mythology.  
Therefore, if magical realism has freed animals from Cartesianism, the rigidity of Linnaean 
taxonomic orderings, and the hegemonic structures of imperialism, Martel has put them back 
into the cages.  In the context of magical realism, to which Life of Pi aspires, the story with 
elusive, feral, pest animals who escape control, cross boundaries, assert their subaltern 
“animal voice” and challenge authority, is a much “better story” still. 
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Conclusion 
Animal Writing 
Beyond our various cultural and social constructions of nature, Arturo Escobar writes, is “the 
existence of a biophysical reality . . . with structures and processes of its own . . .” (“After 
Nature” 1-2).  By this, he does not mean to promote an essentialised ideal of nature, but he 
argues for the necessity to acknowledge the reality of “an independent order of nature, 
including a biological body,” at the same time as “the constructedness of nature,” its histories 
and “political implications,” need to be interrogated (“After Nature” 3).  In this way, he 
suggests, one may be able to theorise “the manifold forms in which [nature] is culturally 
constructed and socially produced, while fully acknowledging the biophysical basis of its 
constitution,” and highlight “the interwoven character of the discursive, material, social, and 
cultural dimensions of the human-environment relation” (“After Nature” 2). 
In a similar vein, beyond the constructedness of animality, and the many figurative 
uses we make of animals, is the “biophysical reality” of their embodied lives, the experience 
of what Jonathan Balcombe calls their “conscious, sensory encounters with the world” (8), as 
well as the material realities of our uses of and encounters with them.  Just as our experience 
of nature is historically, geographically, politically, economically and socially contingent and 
culturally mediated, as Escobar‟s paper “After Nature” shows, we cannot separate our 
constructed views of animals from what animals might mean to themselves, or even (fully) 
know how they experience their lives and encounter the world.  Being like us and unlike us, 
they are familiar and elusive at the same time. 
In relation to scientific enquiry, Escobar finds Katherine Hayles‟ suggestion helpful: 
“we need to acknowledge that we are always positioned observers and that our observations 
always take place in continuous interaction with the world and ourselves” (“After Nature” 
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15).  This view is also pertinent for my analysis of representations of animals in magical 
realist fiction, but equally, the position and subjectivity of the “observed,” as it were, needs to 
be recognised: animals do not care what humans think about them; they do not care what I 
write about them here.  What matters to animals themselves undoubtedly, however, is how 
we interact with and treat them. 
Our conceptions of animals, as expressed in literary production, for instance, 
simultaneously reflect and influence our treatment of them.  Moreover, representations of 
animals often illustrate more about humans than about animals.  This notion is not new: John 
Berger wrote in 1971 that “animals have always been central to the process by which men 
[sic] form an image of themselves” (“Animal World” 1042).  Accordingly, examining the 
material animal practices, human-animal relationships and “biophysical realities” of each 
novel‟s respective context has uncovered a variety of issues related to human identities and 
relationships in postcolonial environments, which are, nonetheless, inextricably intertwined 
with the way nonhuman animals are regarded, treated and experienced. 
The fictions of Watson, Mudrooroo, King and Highway assert an indigenous identity 
through the recuperation and rejuvenation of traditional beliefs and narrative modes fused 
with the Western realist novel, whilst the settlement narratives of Carey, Flanagan, Kroetsch 
and Hodgins, as well as Martel‟s globalised and virtually dislocated novel, seek to construct 
identities distinct from the culture of the imperial British motherland.  García Márquez and 
Allende, in turn, set up a hybrid Latin American identity that acknowledges historical 
European influences alongside those of other cultures, but rejects its hegemonic status, in 
conjunction with US-driven neocolonialism, both culturally and economically.  What all of 
these novels have in common is the recognition of nonhuman subjectivity and agency, and, to 
varying degrees and with the exception of Hodgins‟ novels, of a kinship with nonhuman 
animals.  In Martel, Hodgins and, partially, Kroetsch‟s respective narratives, that recognition 
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leads to an attempted retrieval of Cartesian humanist values and human mastery over nature.  
However, even their reclamation of human ascendancy, in appropriating a mode of writing 
that so emphatically deconstructs it, recognises that the influence of the Cartesian humanist 
subject is waning. 
Magical realism‟s popularity in the latter decades of the twentieth century and at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century coincides with a more widely emerging, global 
environmental awareness, growing environmental movements, and activist calls to changes in 
our modes of consumption.  Though often still in an all-too-limited fashion, these calls are 
increasingly, finally, even surprisingly, supported by governments and corporate bodies after 
years of resistance.  “Greenwash” is a very recent entry in our dictionaries, but its existence 
attests, at least, to the growing appeal of environmentalist ideas to consumers.  The 
realisation that we are but one species amongst many, inextricably interconnected even with 
seemingly insignificant life forms, has become pertinent to our survival.  Magical realist 
representations of that interconnection—whether they make use of the Darwinian notion of 
being “netted together”; the idea of a “web of life” and “Oneness” with other species, as 
expressed by Kakkib li‟Dthia Warrawee‟a; or the Native North American concept of “All my 
Relatives,” for example—strike a chord with readers in the West. 
Animality is not only a significant feature of magical realist content, but also a quality 
that determines form and style.  As a feral narrative mode, magical realism‟s unsettling 
representations of animals, animality and human-animal relationships are, however, in 
contrast to the more conventional forms of the classic realist text.  As Catherine Belsey 
writes:  “The experience of reading a realist text is ultimately reassuring . . . because the 
world evoked in the fiction, its patterns of cause and effect, of social relationships and moral 
values, largely confirm the patterns of the world we seem to know” (51).  Classic realist texts 
hide their modes of production as much as their modes of consumption (see Belsey 126-28), 
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whereas magical realism deconstructs, dislocates and defamiliarises.  It is a mode of writing 
that openly addresses its production (cf. Belsey 91-2), and which ironises its consumption 
through the style Graham Huggan calls “the postcolonial exotic.”  Beyond the postcolonial 
context, magical realism suggests the potential of challenging us, as consumers of these texts, 
to question our modes of consumption in other spheres of life, a challenge that has become 
ever more relevant in the context of climate change: Do we consume in different ways, but 
with continued familiarity and reassurance (that is, do we, for example, visit a “good zoo” 
instead of a “bad zoo”?  Do we only drink milk from cows fed or bred to be less flatulent?), 
or do we find other ways of being that may be more radically transformative of our lives, life-
styles, and understandings of ourselves? 
Rethinking our relationships with animals has become a necessary measure in a 
consumer capitalist system, in which a view of animals as production units, as commodities 
at our disposal, contributes significantly to greenhouse gas emissions, for example.  
Moreover, increasing consumer awareness of, and resistance to, the cruelty inherent in 
factory farming systems, for instance, sheds light on a shifting sense of how we would like to 
be, how we would like to see ourselves, as humans in this world.  Western consumers are 
slowly but steadily beginning to rethink their role as “masters” of nature.  The main question 
is not “Are we changing?” but “Are we changing—fast and radically—enough?”  As the 
choice between familiarity and dislocation or transformation applies to other modes of 
consumption, magical realism‟s circensian spaces reflect the dilemmas of a wider cultural 
context in overlapping, intertwining and blurring our contradictory, ambiguous and 
conflicting relationships to, and views of, nature in general and animals in particular.  As 
such, magical realism offers the possibility for innovative modes of reading that acknowledge 
the subjectivity of nonhuman others. 
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Such recognition of nonhuman others is an act of empathy, of imagining what and 
how the other feels, and of acknowledging that they do feel to begin with.  This act of 
empathy transcends the lonely logic of the Cartesian “I,” who only accepts his or her own 
existence as proven beyond doubt (God as the creator of “I” aside) and as centrally important 
to the surrounding universe.  Magical realism‟s carnivalesque tendency to focus on 
communities rather than individual protagonists is in itself a move beyond the boundaries of 
the Cartesian subject, and a recognition that others not only also exist, but that they are in 
some way or degree “like me” and as significant as “I” at least in relation to their own 
experience. 
The magical realist novels discussed here tend to create communities that not only 
extend beyond the text to incorporate the reader, but that are also characterised by the 
interconnectedness of human and nonhuman worlds.  This extension of community to 
incorporate the nonhuman suggests that the distinction between human and nonhuman 
animals may be dissolved altogether, and thus moves these narratives, along with the reader, 
into the realm of the posthuman.  In the end, postcolonial magical realism conveys, to varying 
degrees, the idea that we ourselves, in our human animality, are also already the posthuman 
other, and that the all-surveying, central human subject has never “really” existed to begin 
with, except as the Myth and fantasy of those for whom disregard of nonhuman others is an 
expedient measure in the maintenance of power.  Writing, and reading, with empathy for 
nonhuman others means to recognise that we, too—authors, readers and critics—are all 
literally and literary animals. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Amongst the many such critical attempts proposing definitions are, for instance, 
Michael Scheffel‟s Magischer Realismus (1990); Maggie Ann Bowers‟ Magic(al) Realism 
(2004), which seeks to explain differences between “magic,” “magical,” and “marvellous” 
realism whilst also using “magic(al)” realism as an overarching term; and Takolander‟s 
Catching Butterflies (2007), the most recent study devoted to defining the label.  The 
collection of essays entitled Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community (1995) and edited 
by Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy Faris is, to date, still the most prominent collection of 
resources on magical realism, which offers various historical and more contemporary 
attempts to classify, position or contextualise this mode of writing.  Faris‟ Ordinary 
Enchantments: Magical Realism and the Remystification of Narrative (2004) is also a 
notable, more recent contribution. 
2
 I make no distinction between “magic realism” and “magical realism.”  An argument 
for a difference in emphasis between “magical realism” and “magic realism” may well be 
made, of course, on the basis of an apparent juxtaposition of two nouns (“magic” and 
“realism”) versus using an adjective (“magic” or “magical”) as a qualifier for the noun 
“realism.”  The semantic difference is, however, either immaterial or negligible for the 
purposes of this study. 
3
 Cf. Takolander (13), where she almost suggests as much, but then devotes the rest of 
her study to the classification of a distinct genre. 
4
 By “structural theme” I mean a narrative structure that is reflective of the story‟s 
content.  An example is Illywhacker, in which the ending is a return to the beginning, as in a 
circle, reflecting the geometry of a circus ring. 
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5
 This is emphasised by the fact that, in amongst the abundance of non-human animals 
depicted in magical realist narratives, talking animals are comparatively few and far in 
between.  A notable exception is the donkey narrator of Ardour by English author Lily Prior, 
for example, but even there the donkey is unable to communicate with the human characters 
in the narrative.  In the texts discussed in this thesis, instances of talking animals are either 
grounded in or borrowed from animist spiritual belief systems, rather than “arbitrarily 
constructed,” with Robert Kroetsch‟s What the Crow Said representing a more complicated 
and ambiguous case. 
6
 Nonhuman animals add another dimension to Faris‟ definition of the “irreducible 
element” in so far as their irreducibility comes as a revelation in the Western context, where 
the prevailing conception of animals is strongly influenced by Cartesian humanist beliefs, 
which dictate that animals are indeed reducible.  Appropriating and applying Faris‟ 
definition, I suggest that the irreducibility of animals is revealed to readers of magical realism 
because “we cannot explain [them] according to the laws of the universe, as they have been 
formulated in Western empirically based discourse, that is, according to „logic, familiar 
knowledge, or received belief‟” (Ordinary Enchantments 7).  Just as “the reader [therefore] 
has difficulty marshaling evidence to settle questions about the status of events and characters 
in such fictions” (Faris, Ordinary Enchantments 7), readers cannot settle questions about the 
status of animal characters, or indeed of animality itself. 
7
 Carnival does not simply invert hierarchies into their opposite; it is also a levelling 
force that turns everyone, regardless of class, into a carnival participant.  This is illustrated, 
for instance, by carnival-related proverbs commonly used in Cologne, a city that prides itself 
on the everyday presence of carnival in its culture: Jede Jeck es anders thus translates to 
“Everyone is different,” or “other,” as it were (with “Jeck” meaning “crazy carnival 
participant” specifically, but also used to denote “everyone” in general); while Jeck loss Jeck 
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elans translates (loosely) to “Live and let live.”  These are carnivalesque expressions of 
equality and tolerance for difference (however much or little these may actually be applied in 
day-to-day life).  For an illustration of the historical connection between carnival as an 
egalitarian political force (in spirit and theory, at least, if not always in practice, as the 
longstanding exclusion of women, for example, shows [see Schmidt 51]) and the democratic 
movement in Germany, see, for instance, Klaus Schmidt. 
8
 I capitalise “Myth” and “Mythology” throughout this thesis when denoting the 
construction of Mythical discourse in the Barthesian sense, discussed especially in Chapter 
Two, and to distinguish the concept from the traditional stories and beliefs (“myths” and 
“mythologies”) pertaining to particular cultures. 
9
 The use of the problematic term “white” will be discussed in the following chapters.  
Inevitably, I also speak as a German, an international reader from a globalised audience, and 
as a migrant to Aotearoa New Zealand. 
10
 In its contemporary form, the circus, moreover, creates an illusion of human-animal 
partnerships that is diametrically opposed to the material reality of the animals‟ experience 
(see Schwalm, “No Circus without Animals”). 
11
 Note my distinction between maban reality and maban realism as a representation 
of maban reality in Chapter Four. 
12
 The term “pest” is a negative label for species that are considered destructive, 
noxious, and invasive.  The labelling is contentious and contingent upon varying human 
interests, or upon particular interpretations of ecological balance and the needs of other 
species.  The term “pest” is an expression of a particular human-animal relationship, often 
accompanied by “pest control.”  I will retain these labels, not to endorse the inherent value-
judgment, but to denote this particular view of an animal or animal species, where 
appropriate. 
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13
 The “unmaking of mastery” is a reversal of Life of Pi‟s protagonist‟s description of 
his lifeboat circus as “mastery in the making” (211). 
14
 La casa de los espíritus has been translated into over twenty-five languages (“La 
casa de los espíritus”). 
15
 Secondary texts and electronic sources frequently omit the accents of Spanish 
spelling.  I will reproduce anglicised spelling in quotations without comment henceforth. 
16
 By “West,” I mean industrialised nations which have their cultural roots in 
European epistemologies, with industrial animal economies that are traditionally based on 
pastoralism and animal domestication, and that are characterised, in the present day, by 
consumer capitalist commodification of mass-produced animals, animal products and animal 
representations.  By „Western reader‟ I mean those (including myself) who identify as 
European or as being of European descent or origin, and whose perception of animals and 
experience of reality has been shaped and influenced by European epistemologies. 
17
 In contrast to the term “companion animal,” the term “pet” normally denotes a 
relationship of ownership, dependent property or commodity, and unequal power relations.  I 
will therefore use the term “pet” wherever this meaning is relevant.  Indeed, Peter Carey‟s 
Illywhacker in particular requires “pet” to be understood on those terms, as I will discuss in 
Chapter Two. 
18
 See the introduction for a discussion of Takolander‟s and Pinet‟s respective 
approaches.  Nicole C. Matos, discussing animal imagery in García Márquez‟ Of Love and 
Other Demons, points out the disruptive force animals represent in relation to colonialism and 
argues: “The image of a rabid dog encroaching on a cherished human space and wreaking 
havoc without regard to race or other social constructions introduces a subtle threat to 
colonial culture that animals, wild or domesticated, often embody in the novel” (46).  Her 
short but perceptive article considers animals in relation to Julia Kristeva‟s concept of “the 
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abject,” and Matos keenly observes a connection between animals and African slaves, and the 
animals‟ occupancy of a “strange liminal space” (46).  Moreover, she evokes an idea of “the 
animal inside” one of the main characters (Matos 48), yet the brevity of the article does not 
make room to explain what she means by that, if anything, beyond the general idea of a 
paradoxically abject experience that disrupts “the marketplace of „civilized‟ culture” (Matos 
47), and neither are the other observations explored in depth. 
19
 Jones is referring to Faris (“Scheherazade‟s Children” 171). 
20
 J.M. Coetzee observes this phenomenon in relation to his novel Disgrace, which 
features dogs very prominently.  He comments: “Most reviewers have more or less ignored 
their [the dogs‟] presence . . . . In this respect they—naturally—mirror the way in which 
animals are treated in the world we live in, namely as unimportant existences of which we 
need take notice only when their lives cross ours” (qtd. in Engström, “Animals, Humans, 
Cruelty and Literature”). 
21
 Because of Descartes‟ influential position, I use the term “Cartesian” here and 
elsewhere not only to refer to Descartes‟ philosophies directly, but also more loosely to 
denote theoretical and material practices based on the assumption of a human subject-animal 
object split. 
22
 I will retain the term “New World” to denote the European explorer‟s perspective 
of the Americas.  I note, however, that these continents were far from new to their indigenous 
populations. 
23
 This is emphasised even more strongly in the English translation, where Barrabás is 
initially attributed with the reflexive pronoun “which,” which soon turns into “who.”  In both 
The House of the Spirits and One Hundred Years of Solitude, the reflexive pronoun “who” is 
occasionally used for animals instead of “which,” but there is no consistency in their usage.  
However, this inadvertently influences the conceptualisation of animals, and suggests that the 
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division between humans and animals, at least grammatically, is more pronounced in English 
than in some other European-based languages, such as Spanish.  
24
 Conversely, it could be argued that Barrabás‟ preference for marmalade is an 
expression of pleasure as an adaptive behaviour.  This, however, would also compromise the 
idea of a Cartesian machine, as humans experience pleasure, too, of course.  For a discussion 
of the animals‟ ability to experience pleasure, see Balcombe‟s Pleasurable Kingdom. 
25
 I prefer, however, the term “ferality” over “ferity” as the latter term, in its original 
meaning, carries negative connotations that may or may not play a role in particular magical 
realist employments of the concept.  “Ferality,” moreover, foregrounds fera, the referent, and 
gives it more prominence over those cultural attributes that are more closely associated with 
“ferity.” 
26
 See Leal (119-22); Allende (“Questions and Answers”); Flanagan (qtd. in 
Kornegay); Flanagan (qtd. in Hugo); Carey (qtd. in Meyer 80). 
27
 Das Ungeziefer is both grammatically and conceptually a neutral term in German, 
therefore “it” rather than “he” is appropriate here.  “Monstrous,” “uncanny,” “scandalously 
inappropriate” and “too enormous to comprehend” are all connotations of Kafka‟s term 
ungeheuer, the connotations of which cannot be completely captured by English translations.  
“Vermin” is the closest translation of Ungeziefer, a singular, amorphous term used to denote 
a plurality of small “pest animals” such as cockroaches, flies and maggots, as well as insects 
in general, spiders, and rodents, for example.  The designation of the term to a particular 
animal or species depends on the definer‟s momentary or general perception of them as 
repellent, annoying, dirty, useless and possibly damage-causing. 
28
 Following Bakhtin‟s description, I suggest that carnival cannot be readily 
understood through theoretical study alone.  It needs to be experienced with all the senses 
(“lived”) from in amongst a carnival crowd in order to grasp its spirit. 
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29
 Elizabeth Knox‟ The Vintner’s Luck or Lily Prior‟s Ardour also feature prominent 
angels—human-bird hybrids—for instance. 
30
 See Nigel Rothfels‟ Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo.  See also 
Roslyn Poignant, who documents the removal of two groups of Aborigines from Australia by 
an agent for P.T. Barnum, and their subsequent exhibition in Europe. 
31
 Indeed, such fake legendary creatures are still part of the repertoire of circuses, as 
the Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey circus‟ 1985 exhibition of a “living unicorn” 
illustrates (Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey, “The Living Unicorn!”). 
32
 For a more detailed study of the way human-animal relationships are represented in 
the circus, see Tanja Schwalm‟s “„No circus without animals‟?: Animal Acts and Ideology in 
the Virtual Circus.” 
33
 Since completing earlier drafts of this chapter I have become aware of Julian 
Cowley‟s comments on Ishmael Reed‟s work.  Cowley also refers to Foucault‟s The Order of 
Things and the historical shift from the circular to a tabular arrangement of animals, and 
relates this to Reed‟s use of circus aesthetics, in the context of Reed‟s deconstruction of the 
novel as a “Western genre” (1239).  However, Cowley limits his analysis to Reed‟s work, and 
does not connect it to magical realism.  Nor does he, beyond Foucault‟s argument, 
specifically address literary representations of animals.  Furthermore, Cowley points out that 
“Reed embraces the circus, not the museum” (1240).  This is different from circensian 
spaces, which encompass both. 
34
 I will frequently return to this phrase in the following chapters, as it captures the 
essential nature of heterotopias and heterotopic creatures. 
35
 This oxymoronic relationship between these two types of heterotopias is 
particularly striking in the Australian context discussed in the next chapter. 
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36
 An example of Western scientific methods applied in a local context was illustrated 
by the Australian television series The Alice (2004-2005).  The programme is characterised 
by strong magical realist components, and includes the portrayal of a doctor (“Matt 
Marione”) and a nurse (“Jess Daily”) who negotiate their position in outback communities 
between offering Western medicine where it is needed and standing back to leave room for 
Aboriginal healing methods, especially where Western medicine proves ineffective, or less 
effective. 
37
 Calling developing countries “Third World” is contentious, as is, in fact, 
“developing countries,” since both terms imply value judgments, as critiqued by Escobar.  I 
use “Third World” here to reflect the particular view of former colonies shaped by the 
“Discourse of Development” that Escobar describes. 
38
 Allende, for instance, writes: “In 1975, half of Latin America‟s citizens lived under 
some kind of repressive government, most of which were backed by the United States, which 
has a shameful record of overthrowing legally elected governments and of supporting 
tyrannies that would never be tolerated in its own territory” (My Invented Country 158). 
39
 By “we,” here and elsewhere, I mean Western readers. 
40
 Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy describe the case of Alex, whose 
command of human language went beyond simple mimicking towards actual understanding 
of simple expressions (see 34-5).  For more information on Alex‟s abilities, see The Alex 
Foundation website. 
41
 His view of the land as devoid of human habitation corresponds with the idea of 
Australia as terra nullius, discussed in Chapter Three. 
42
 Here, Allende reflects Bentham‟s view of a direct correlation between the treatment 
of slaves and “the inferior races of animals.”  He suggested in 1789 that, whilst the “French 
have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should 
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be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor,” it might be recognized “one day 
. . . that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, 
are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate” (Bentham 
qtd. in Regan and Singer 130). 
43
 Significantly, in One Hundred Years of Solitude, the result of “love,” another 
counter-Cartesian concept, is a human-animal hybrid, the pig-tailed Aureliano, who is “the 
only Buendía to have been conceived” with that emotion (García Márquez qtd. in Mendoza 
75). 
44
 All page numbers for Gould’s Book of Fish refer to the 2002 paperback version. 
45
 Huggan‟s description here points to Rushdie‟s fiction in particular; however, it is 
part of a discussion of the postcolonial exotic as a wider phenomenon of postcolonial 
literature and clearly applicable to Illywhacker and Gould’s Book of Fish. 
46
 The Australian Museum Fish Site offers an excellent overview of these species with 
colour photographs.  (At the time of access, no information about the Striped Cowfish was 
available.)  FishBase also offers information and images; alternatively, see Bernhard 
Grzimek et al. 
47
 Harvey M. Feinberg and Joseph B. Sodolow trace the origin of the phrase, which 
“passed from Aristotle to Pliny to Erasmus” and eventually became popularized in the 
variation above.  They contend that the original Greek proverb cited by Aristotle referred 
“specifically to strange hybrid animals” (Feinberg and Sodolow 261). 
48
 Philo and Wilbert observe the perception of “wilder-lands . . . as repositories of 
wild creatures available for sports such as hunting and shooting” (12). 
49
 The narrator may be referring to Sid Hammet, but the statement “I shall be you” 
(Gould’s Book 445) strongly suggests that the reader is directly addressed. 
50
 As Broome writes, 
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Phrenologists claimed that he shape of the head and its bumps represented the 
shape and size of the brain within, and the different personality traits of the 
person.  By reading these signs a person‟s, or a race‟s characteristics and 
abilities could be revealed.  Practitioners of this “science” told colonial 
audiences that Aboriginal skulls revealed deficiencies in the so-called moral 
and intellectual organs of the brain, and excesses in those areas allegedly 
controlling the passions, aggression and the observational instinct.  (94) 
51
 Indeed, Ritvo describes the application of phrenology to nonhuman animals and its 
inherent confusion and implausibility (see Animal Estate 36-7). 
52
 See M. Cherif Bassiouni.  See also the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). 
53
 Cliff Lobe suggests the connection between Illywhacker and Foucault‟s comparison 
of Bentham‟s Panopticon with the menagerie of Versailles (24). 
54
 Similiarly, Huggan notes that “[m]otifs of entrapment . . . abound in Carey‟s 
fiction” and especially in Illywhacker, although he focuses “particularly” on “spider webs” 
which, he suggests, make the reader “complicit with the narrator‟s lies and self-deceptions” 
(Peter Carey 17).  The spider, who entraps the reader, is the opposite figure to a nonhuman 
animal trapped in a cage by humans.  Herbert‟s suggestion that he might be both a spider and 
a prisoner (Illywhacker 567) illustrates the oxymoronic effect of the circensian space, and 
shows that, in the case of a settler Australian like Herbert, the idea of the victimhood of a 
convict past is not straightforward or innocent. 
55
 Penny Olsen informs that Halley‟s images of the Sulphur-crested Cockatoo, the 
Major Mitchell Cockatoo and the Regent Parrot “reflect the keeping of parrots as 
companions, which was common from quite soon after settlement” (76). 
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56
 Huggan distinguishes hybrid monsters from “the monster as mutant,” and whilst he 
considers the former to be positive symbols, he argues that, within a range of functions, the 
latter serve as “evil portents” (Carey 69).  I agree that they may serve a range of functions, 
but I do not distinguish between two contrasting types—one with positive, one with negative 
connotations.  Instead, I propose that mutating, transforming or metamorphosing all serve to 
resist and dismantle Enlightenment science and the human-animal divide, and therefore all 
offer the possibility of “a different future,” whatever other functions they may have (positive 
or negative).  Furthermore, whilst Huggan notes that Carey‟s hybrids transgress a multitude 
of boundaries, including human-animal and machine-animal boundaries, he does not address 
how animality in particular might be important in what he regards as a celebration of 
hybridity in the works of Carey and Rushdie (see Huggan, Carey 73, 81). 
57
 See Moyal 68-70. 
58
 For an example of the pun on Barron Field‟s name by one of his contemporaries, 
see G. A Wilkes (n.p.). 
59
 Other references to bower-birds include Illywhacker (535, 569, 604, 623). 
60
 See Gill and Anderson, who discuss the representation of “a stewardship role for 
pastoralism that further naturalises the presence of cattle and which strengthens the 
naturalness and the morality of the pastoral landscape.” 
61
 The term “useful animals” will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five. 
62
 This sentence is used verbatim in a publication by David Michalk, employed as 
Leader of Weeds Research and Director of the Orange Agricultural Institute by the New 
South Wales Department of Primary Industries (see Michalk 3).  Compare, in addition, 
Michalk‟s remark that the “successful dominance of world markets by Australian livestock 
products is a tribute to the ingenuity and resilience of the men and women that pioneered 
these industries” (2) with Meat and Livestock Australia‟s comment: “This success is tribute 
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to the ingenuity and resilience of the men and women that run this industry” (“Paddock to 
Plate”).  The fact that these comments are closely echoed by Meat and Livestock Australia 
certainly indicates that animal industries and government agencies are united in promoting a 
view of animal farming as a national endeavour, in the course of which they represent a 
history that glosses over Aboriginal suffering, dispossession and exploitation resulting from 
pastoral settlement. 
63
 One current Meat and Livestock Australia campaign poster states: “A week of 
lamb.  Any less is unAustralian” (“A Week of Lamb”).  
64
 Representing a linkage between vegetarianism and “unpatriotic behaviour” is 
revealed as more calculated and serious than the humorous tone of the commercials would 
suggest.  The impact of such views, after all, is felt and experienced by vegetarians and 
vegans to be real and not uncommon, as a study from New Zealand, a country with a (post-) 
colonial history equally dominated by pastoral settlement and animal industries, shows.  As 
Annie Potts and Mandala White report, respondents to a survey about ethical consumption in 
New Zealand recounted being made to feel unpatriotic because they chose not to eat meat 
(see 80-2).  Kekovich‟s polarising references to social activists are no less grounded in real 
prejudice, as they serve to confirm the kinds of banal stereotypes commonly held by those 
who feel threatened by alternative propositions.  In my experience from New Zealand, for 
instance, the odd member of the public will accuse animal advocates manning information 
stalls as being “unemployed hippies” or tell them to “get a job,” which is especially ironic 
when aimed at fellow volunteers who work several jobs or who are highly-respected and 
educated members of the community in reputable full-time positions.  Meat and Livestock 
Australia thus provide their target audience with the kinds of stereotypes they supposedly feel 
comfortable with, at the same time as such polarising comments are designed to reinforce the 
practice of eating animals as mainstream and “normal.” 
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65
 For further references to butchers, see, for example, Illywhacker (165, 170, 230, 
397, 403, 409, 433, 460). 
66
 Meat and Livestock Australia report: 
From the handful of stock that arrived with the First Fleet in 1788 Australia 
now has a cattle herd of over 26.5 million head and a sheep flock of over 
121.6 million head.  Today beef remains one of Australia‟s largest rural 
exports, worth around $2.4 billion each year.  Overall exports of meat and 
livestock earn around $3.5 billion—making a significant contribution to the 
nation‟s economy.  Add to this the income generated from sales of meat within 
Australia and the many jobs created to support it and you have an industry 
worth well over $6 billion.  (“Paddock to Plate”) 
67
 See also Morton and Smith, who comment on land clearing by pastoralists and 
agriculturalists, and remark that “the eradication of feral species, and the correlative 
preservation of endangered ones, could be seen as „an unusually attractive decoy‟ that 
distracts attention from more fundamental issues of land management in Australia” (167).  
Moreover, Gill and Anderson point out that cattle are “thought to transform nature” by 
breaking up the soil and fertilising it, a process considered a positive contribution to the 
supposed improvement of the land and thus represented as “treading lightly relative to the 
interventions of rabbits.  While cattle are theoretically at least subject to pastoralists‟ control, 
rabbits are not so readily managed.” 
68
 See Landström (208-11) for an account of the construction of exotic species as 
“alien invaders.” 
69
 See, for example, Meat and Livestock Australia‟s posters of the 2008 campaign, 
which feature Kekovich with a group of children standing behind him, waving lamb chops as 
though they were Australian flags.  Given that the campaign relies on stereotypes, the 
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absence of any children who could be construed as having Aboriginal ancestry is striking (“A 
Week of Lamb.  Any Less is UnAustralian”). 
70
 A similar euphemism is “opening up” the land, as in Michalk‟s document, where he 
writes: “Sheep production started in earnest when the hinterland of Australia was opened up 
by the early explorers which allowed „squatters‟ to move flocks from the narrow coastal plain 
near Sydney to the vast grassy woodlands and open grasslands in western New South Wales” 
(4). 
71
 The original German phrase is “auf schwankendem Pferd,” which may simply 
denote the horse‟s natural movement, but it may also suggest that the horse is staggering, and 
that all is not well with the horse, either. 
72
 The original phrase is “. . . da dies so ist, legt der Galeriebesucher das Gesicht auf 
die Brüstung und, im Schlußmarsch wie in einem schweren Traum versinkend, weint er, ohne 
es zu wissen.”  The term schwer, describing the dream, has multiple meanings and can denote 
heaviness, seriousness and difficulty.  The ending of the piece, “ohne es zu wissen,” is 
ambiguous; the reader is left wondering what it is that the spectator does not know, whether it 
is the reality of the equestrian‟s misery, or whether they do not know that this misery is not 
real. 
73
 “Der Gegensatz von wirklichem Elend und blendendem äußeren Schein des Zirkus . 
. . .”  “Vordergründig geht es um Elend und Schein der Zirkuswelt.  Das ist ein Thema, das 
die erzählende Dichtung des Expressionismus lebhaft interessierte.” 
74
 Rudd‟s apology and the subsequent speech display the kind of empathy and 
acknowledgment that the Australian novels discussed in this and the next chapter identified 
as lacking in Australia‟s historical writing, public discourse, government policies and public 
discourse.  What real and practical changes will follow to address the social inequalities 
created through racist policies of successive Australian governments, and, conversely, to 
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what extent the right-wing school of thought Flanagan mentions will resist this recent 
development and remain influential, are questions that remain to be answered.  Flanagan—
like Carey—stresses that whilst the apology is “a fundamental and necessary step towards 
Australians coming together to address their national ills,” it “will not alter the condition of 
Aboriginal people.  The hurt won‟t end, nor the misery and inequality that sees indigenous 
Australians with a life expectancy 17 years less than non-indigenous Australians” (“An 
Invitation”).  The apology, he contends, needs to be followed up with concrete action, such as 
“once more looking at the matters of a treaty, land rights, and compensation to the survivors 
of assimilation” (”An Invitation”; cf. Carey, Interview with Stephen Sackur).  However, all of 
the Australian novels discussed in this thesis (in Chapters Two and Three) comment on 
Australian policy and society before the apparent watershed in Australian history marked by 
Rudd‟s speech, and my analysis engages with the context in which these novels were written. 
75
 Further references with an immediate juxtaposition between animals and writing 
include the “fourth gallery” of the pet shop, where spiders live alongside “old yellowing 
newspapers” (Illywhacker 524), Leah‟s letters which “fill with the sweet fecund odours of the 
little pet shop” where she visits Emma and where “[s]he was as happy . . . as in a letter” 
(473), Leah‟s “crabbed handwriting” (299) and the “little square of newspaper she had tucked 
away in her feathers” of her emu suit (233), or her father‟s letters marked by a “rare black 
one-shilling Kookaburra” stamp (299).  Animals are associated with print publications, as 
smuggling and selling “the last-recorded golden-shouldered parrot” is meant to finance the 
publication of Malley’s Urn (622), Phoebe‟s poetry magazine, available for sale in the pet 
shop (see 541).  Charles, moreover, fears that Time magazine will do a story about bird 
smuggling (see 587), and Herbert and Leah discuss his “write-up” of their variety act 
involving Leah‟s emu dance and snakes (304). 
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76
 Carey connects animals metaphorically with money: “My pocket contained a damp 
bird‟s nest of crumpled currency from which drifted the unmistakable odours of Ballarat 
Bitter” (Illywhacker 360). 
77
 Whilst the gesture of kicking the jellyfish may appear gratuitous and brutal, there is 
no suggestion that he kicks the jellyfish roughly.  I propose that the gesture is an act of 
kindness, based on Jack‟s character described elsewhere, to save the stranded creature from 
death on the beach, whereby Jack‟s use of his foot is a way of avoiding injury to his hands 
from the creature. 
78
 Jonathan Balcombe observes that such “dubious assumptions lean heavily on 
prejudice and convenience” (185).  Balcombe cites evidence not only for the perception of 
pain in fish, but he also argues that “[t]here are some good reasons to suspect that fish feel 
pleasure” (189).  See Balcombe (185-191) for further discussion. 
79
 See, for instance, Flanagan, “Paradise Lost—with Napalm”; Flanagan, “The Rape 
of Tasmania.” 
80
 “Numminer” is the term “Twopenny Sal” uses to describe the British, while she 
uses “Palawa” for her own people. 
81
 The author currently known as Mudrooroo has frequently changed his name.  He 
has called himself Colin Johnson, S.A. Jivaka, Mudrooroo Nyoongah, Mudrooroo Narogin 
and, currently, Mudrooroo (see M. Clark,  58).  For the sake of consistency I will refer to him 
as Mudrooroo in text, but provide either “Mudrooroo” or “Narogin” in parenthetical 
references as appropriate, in accordance with the current entry for the respective work on the 
National Library of Australia website (http://www.nla.gov.au), especially since in the case of 
Master of the Ghost Dreaming the name on the cover is not identical with the name listed in 
the copyright section or with the National Library of Australia listing provided in the front 
matter, which labels him “Mudrooroo Nyoongah.” 
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82
 Mudooroo explains the Dreaming as “indicat[ing] a psychic state in which or 
during which contact is made with the ancestral spirits, or the Law, or that special period of 
the beginning now past which is still heavily pervasive in the present” (Us Mob 41).  
Mussolini Harvey, a Yanyuwa man from the Gulf of Carpentaria, moreover, explains the 
nature of Dreaming spirits:  “The Dreamings are our ancestors, no matter if they are fish, 
birds, men, women, animals, wind or rain” (qtd. in Rose, Nourishing Terrains 27).  Dreaming 
also denotes a spiritual connection to all things natural, and the belief that human beings are 
part of and at one with every other part of creation.  For further explanation and an excellent 
overview of the Dreaming, see Rose (Nourishing Terrains 26-28). 
83
 The distinction between “black” and “white” people is contentious, as they suggest 
the idea of “race,” a term that denotes biological determinism and rigid classifications that 
cannot be scientifically upheld.  As Gillian Cowlishaw and Barry Morris write: “Race is not a 
self-evident and natural category, but a historically grounded social construction, dynamic 
and shifting.  Discourse and imagery construct a generic Other, an Other who is often 
perceived as hostile” (3).  However, the terms “black” and “white” are commonly used by 
both “black” and “white” authors referred to in this chapter.  As Cowlishaw and Morris point 
out, “while race may matter little as a biological fact, it does matter as a major organising 
principle, as a source of imaginative energy and as a secret focus of social identity” (4-5).  
Thus, the terms “black” and “white” are used in this sense in Ghost Dreaming (see, for 
example, 34, 74, 79 and 32, 52, 77-78, 142 respectively), as well as throughout Kadaitcha.  
Significantly, the categories “black” and “white” are inherently unstable in Watson‟s novel, 
at the same time as they reflect a powerful binary that affects the lives (and deaths) of the 
characters.  Accordingly, I will retain the terms “black” and “white” for the purposes of this 
discussion and elsewhere in this thesis where appropriate, not to suggest biologically 
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determined categories or perpetuate racist discourse, but to reflect the dubious binary 
produced by social ordering. 
84
 The meaning of Aboriginal Law is explained by Mussolini Harvey in Nourishing 
Terrains: 
The Dreamings made our Law or narnu-Yuwa.  This Law is the way we live, 
our rules.  This Law is our ceremonies, our songs, our stories; all of these 
things came from the Dreaming.  One thing that I can tell you though is that 
our Law is not like European Law which is always changing—new 
government, new laws; but our Law cannot change, we did not make it.  The 
Law was made by the Dreamings many, many years ago and given to our 
ancestors and they gave it to us. [. . .] All things in our country have Law, they 
have ceremony and song, and they have people who are related to them . . . .”  
(qtd. in Rose 27, original ellipsis) 
85
 While using the term “Aboriginal” or “Aborigines” in a generalised sense, it is 
important to acknowledge the diversity of Aboriginal societies and customs.  As David 
Unaipon writes: “Of course, it will be readily understood that the Aboriginal language and 
customs vary a great deal according to the nature of the country the tribes are living in, 
although there is a great common understanding running through us all.  Our legends and 
traditions are all the same tales, or myths, told slightly differently, with local colouring, etc.” 
(7)  See also Broome (15).  Cf. Foley, who discusses the label as both disempowering and 
empowering.  I retain the generalised term, however, since the novels discussed here focus on 
groups or communities composed of members with diverse backgrounds, who share a 
common identity connected to the land and the Dreaming. 
86
 See Belsey‟s comments on the classic realist text, which she associates with the 
“consistency and continuity of the subject” (75).  See also Belsey (67-83). 
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87
 I use “Law” with a capital letter to denote Aboriginal Law, as opposed to “the law,” 
the rules of Western legal systems. 
88
 The spelling of “Aboriginal” varies in the sources I quote.  I use the capitalised 
version, in accordance with Jackie Huggins‟ argument that spelling “Aboriginal” with a 
lower case “a” is disrespectful, as this sets it apart from the adjectives for other nations and 
ethnicities, which are capitalised.  This may, of course, not be an author‟s, or editor‟s, 
intention, yet the often simply accepted practice of not capitalising “Aboriginal” should not 
be passed over without question.  See Anita Heiss (204). 
89
 Similarly, Kate Hall comments: 
Existing critical approaches to magical realism are inadequate because they 
fail to move beyond the politics of polarity encapsulated in the oxymoronic 
reading of the term, and because such approaches reduce the complexities of 
the magical realist text until it becomes simply a hybrid of realism and its 
„Other‟, which is characterised stylistically as the fantastic, or ontologically as 
the supernatural.  (117) 
90
 Mudrooroo seems to assume here that his readers are exclusively Westerners 
operating within a cultural universe determined by Cartesian scientific thinking, which does 
not allow for the possibility of realities other than those scientifically, or rationally, 
knowable.  Whilst his comment appears to underestimate the potential of and for an 
Aboriginal readership, it serves to emphasise that maban realism operates outside of the 
frameworks of Western epistemologies, not only in regard to ideas about genres and 
representations of reality, but also, significantly, in relation to animals.  However, the vast 
majority of Mudrooroo‟s readers are indeed non-Aboriginal.  Gary Foley asserts that non-
Aborigines “constituted the 98% of the readers of [Mudrooroo‟s] work.” 
91
 See Franklin, Animal Nation (167-69); Rose, Nourishing Terrains (6-15). 
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92
 Whilst the serpent is described as “it” in this passage, Island, as an animal or 
animal-like creature, is masculine elsewhere.  It appears that the pronoun “he” refers 
primarily to Jangamuttuk in this passage, but I contend that there is a deliberate ambiguity 
and boundary-blurring with Fada and Island here. 
93
 Correspondingly, AlexisWright describes the role of the land in her maban realist 
novel Plains of Promise: "The land is, I suppose, one of or even the central character.  Most 
of the images and ideas relate to the land being alive and having important meaning, which is 
tied to the ancient roots of our continent" (qtd. in Vernay 121). 
94
 Indeed, Watson considers Uluru to be “the centre of every single dreaming path in 
the world” (Davies and Watson 196). 
95
 The anthology Mongrel Signatures: Reflections on the Work of Mudrooroo, edited 
by Annalisa Oboe, also provides discussions by several commentators about the controversy. 
96
 Colin Johnson‟s alias “Mudrooroo” is, after all, the word for “paperbark” in the 
language of the Bibbulmun, to whom he specifically claimed to be related (see M. Clark, 
Likely Story 31, 16, 43, 58). 
97
 However, the charge of imposture on the grounds of personal gain is complicated 
by the fact that, whilst Mudrooroo ultimately did derive personal gain, recognition and a 
career on the basis of his public identity, at the time he “entered into his Aboriginality,” as he 
currently describes it (“The Global Nomad”), assuming an Aboriginal identity was a 
“passport to discrimination,” as Foley points out (Foley), rather than to “money and 
accolades from the white Australian public and other ignorant Aborigines,” as van den Berg 
puts it  (“Intellectual Property Rights”). 
98
 See also Maureen Clark (Likely Story 185, 244). 
99
 Mudrooroo states in full: “So just see me as a mongrel and forget any other labels” 
(“The Global Nomad”). 
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100
 See, for example Shoemaker (“Curse” 20).  Maureen Clark discusses the question 
throughout Mudrooroo: A Likely Story. 
101
 Eggington suggested that Mudrooroo‟s works be destroyed.  See Shoemaker 
(“Curse” 4) and Pybus (38). 
102
 See Maureen Clark (“Crafty Impostor” 109), Shoemaker (“Curse” 4), or Cassandra 
Pybus, who writes: “[H]is connection to Aboriginal Australia has been intense and his writing 
has been profoundly important to Aboriginal Australia . . .” (37). 
103
 Watson‟s statement was made pre-1996.  In any case, it reflects his view of 
Mudrooroo at the time of writing Kadaitcha. 
104
 As in Ghost Dreaming and Kadaitcha, country is essential to Wright‟s maban 
realism: “I try to situate my fiction in my traditional land space and because the meaning of 
country is extremely important to me” (qtd. in Vernay 120). 
105
 See Hall‟s comments on the “epistemological dilemma” of Western critics, who 
may see “the use of the term „Maban Reality‟ . . . as a claim for an authentic essentialised 
Aboriginal reality in opposition to . . . „natural scientific reality,‟” and thus fall into the trap 
of applying a framework of “Manichean dualities—culture/nature, rational/irrational, 
technology, superstition” (119). 
106
 His use of “our” is of course highly contentious here and elsewhere. 
107
 In the same vein, neither am I suggesting that maban realism is “inauthentic,” an 
argument Maria Takolander pursues in relation to magical realism in general, and 
Mudrooroo‟s version of it in particular (158-165). 
108
 Cf. Watson‟s and Davies‟ comments on real events and life experiences, and 
poetic licence (190-91). 
109
 Watson, too, comments that “[a]t the present time, black writers are writing for a 
white readership . . .” (qtd. in Dean). 
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110
 A study focussed on maban realist animals from an Aboriginal perspective—or 
indeed any other point of view—has, to my knowledge, not been done yet.  Clark discusses 
some aspects of Dreaming animals, such as the cat as introduced species, in Mudrooroo‟s 
fiction; however, she considers them primarily as symbolic for human conditions (see M. 
Clark, Likely Story 186-7, 197-99) 
111
 Both novels have also been successful in France and Holland, for example 
(Mudrooroo, Indigenous Literature 200). 
112
 This is also reflected in Wright‟s Plains of Promise, which is named for the 
farming potential European settlers saw in the Aboriginal country of the Gulf of Carpentaria 
(see Vernay 121). 
113
 See Archer-Lean (246), Suzanne Baker (“Binarisms and Dualities” 87; "Magic 
Realism" 57),, Hall (117). 
114
 Cf. Franklin, who writes: “The colonisation of Australia involved the meeting of 
one culture that defined itself as absolutely different from animals with another that defined 
itself as indistinguishable from animals” (Animal Nation 48).  By “indistinguishable” 
Franklin refers to totemic relationships.  It is not to imply, of course, that Aboriginal people 
cannot tell the difference between humans and other animals. 
115
 For other descriptions of the island‟s Aborigines as a “flock” of sheep, see Ghost 
Dreaming (126, 133). 
116
 See Ghost Dreaming (50, 53, 59, 64-65, 67, 132). 
117
 Critics of Kadaitcha have largely focused on negative imagery in Watson‟s novel 
and neglected its humour, created by the blurring of boundaries and ambivalence.  
Ambivalent figures such as Jack Finlay and Stephen, the English lecturer, for example, are 
treated with a form of affectionate but thorough ridicule. 
118
 See Kadaitcha (52, 185, 205, 206, 238). 
Schwalm  413 
                                                                                                                                                        
119
 For instance, Boonger and Jarroo, Tommy‟s friends, sit in a restaurant “wolfing 
down fish and chips” (Kadaitcha 178), and both triumphantly declare their and Stephen‟s 
darts victory: “We skunked them migloo like they was dogs!” (185).  Tommy shakes himself 
“like a dog” (237), and Ningi says to Tommy: “[W]e waste our time like puppies at a bitch‟s 
tit” (228).  The image of dogs is also used as a disparaging label and an insult.  Booka calls 
Tommy a “fuckin‟ dog” (52), women are branded as “bitches” (16, 21, 171, for example), 
and there is also Stephen‟s “bitchy humour” (168).  Tommy accuses Ningi of having “let 
[Koobara] die like a mongrel camp dog” 228).  Tea-Pot/Bunda‟s father calls his son a “dingo 
dropping” and accuses him of killing him “like a dog” (125). 
120
 See also Kadaitcha (262-3) for an instance of Tommy and Purnung reassuring each 
other in both spiritual and more human terms. 
121
 See also Serpell‟s “Anthropomorphism and Anthropomorphic Selection—Beyond 
the „Cute Response‟” for a discussion of anthropomorphism as an adaptive feature in the 
relationship between companion animals and the people who live with them. 
122
 I am assuming that by “those older forms of representation” Griffiths means 
transcriptions of Aboriginal oral narrative that reduce those texts to children‟s stories or 
fables and not the original representations in oral form themselves. 
123
 Archer-Lean points to the same strategy in Mudrooroo‟s The Kwinkwan, the sequel 
to Ghost Dreaming (265-6). 
124
 For other representations of Tommy as hunter, see also Kadaitcha (131, 193, 294). 
125
 See, for instance, Kadaitcha (25, 99, 166, 192, 193, 236). 
126
 As Griffiths argues: 
Strategies of recuperation and texts which insist on the importance of re-
installing the „story‟ of the indigenous cultures are, therefore, as many 
Australian Aboriginal spokespeople have insisted, crucial to their resistance.  
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Such recuperations may be the literal recuperation of the texts of pre-colonial 
cultures, the narratives of the dreaming or the body of pre-colonial oratures . . . 
."  (“Myth of Authenticity” 239) 
127
 Tommy comments that mullets make “a good feed” (Kadaitcha 77), and he is 
clearly trained to look for “telltale flashes of fish scales” in the water (273). 
128
 “A recent report put malnutrition among Aboriginal children on a par with some of 
the world's poorest countries, such as Sudan and Sierra Leone” (BBC News, “Aborigines 
Fight for Their Money Back”).  See also Tatz (“Genocide in Australia”). 
129
 Susan Lever contemplates Watson‟s use of the death penalty, as “no-one has been 
executed in Australia for nearly thirty years” (104).  She suggests that “[a]n acceptance of the 
novel‟s authenticity as an account of contemporary Aboriginal attitudes and experience 
depends on how the reader responds to these genre clues,” as “the realist depictions of the 
operations of courtrooms or of Aboriginal pub life in modern Brisbane seem to invite trust,” 
and wonders whether “the death penalty [is] one of the elements imported from American 
movies, and merely an accepted part of the genre” (104).  See also Griffiths‟ comment on the 
matter (“Representing Difference” 482n17).  However, against the background of the 
disproportionate number of Aboriginal deaths in custody, the death sentences in Kadaitcha 
allude to the fact that dying in custody is a reality for too many Aborigines (see the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody reports), as well as to the wider context of 
significantly lower life-expectancy amongst Aboriginal communities compared to the overall 
Australian population (see Australian Bureau of Statistics ix-x).  Watson thus literalises the 
metaphor of "passing a death sentence" upon Australia‟s Aboriginal population here. 
130
 For example, the RCIADIC states in its final report: “Although the discriminatory 
legislation which embodied attitudes of racial superiority have been repealed, those attitudes 
are still embedded in practice and in administration” (Final Report, Part F). 
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131
 Hall suggests the term “polychronotopic” in relation to the “juxtaposition of 
multiple time/space configurations within the [magical realist] narrative.”  The text is thus 
“not only polyphonic (multi-voiced), but also „polychronotopic‟” (Hall 115). 
132
 Notwithstanding the fact that his novel is fiction, Watson comments that 
“[e]verything that is in that book happened actually within the precincts of Brisbane” (“I Say 
This” 593), and describes his approach thus: “So what I did was I took the entire history of 
white settlement and compressed it into living memory, and I thought that was fairly 
effective” (“I Say This" 590-1).  His strategy reflects the very real “sense of urgency” felt by 
Aboriginal people, who “have shorter lives than white people”: “Our memories are dimming 
and we are losing songs, stories, language. . . . That sense of urgency is portrayed by the 
central character Tommy who does have a mission to perform and time is running out” (qtd. 
in Dean). 
133
 See also Dingle, who describes the process of dispossession in the wake of sheep 
farming: “Physical dispossession was somewhat more gradual. . . . It began around Sydney in 
1788 but relatively few groups were affected until pastoral methods of fine wool production 
were developed from the 1820s.  Sheep then rapidly colonized the eastern side of the 
continent; they and their capitalist owners took exclusive possession of the land” (56). 
134
 The institutionalised practice of forced Aboriginal labour operated in conjunction 
with the systematic removal of children from their families, known as the Stolen Generation 
(see Kidd 9), which is detailed in the "Bringing Them Home" report (1997). 
135
 Rose points out, however, that “VRD Aborigines, and cattle station Aborigines 
throughout the north, were largely isolated from Europeans who might wish to ameliorate the 
conditions of their lives” (Dingo 18). 
136
 See also Jonathan Richard‟s paper on the impact of the Native Police on race 
relations in Queensland.  He argues: “It is important to look at the history of relations 
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between indigenous people and police in Queensland because so many contemporary issues 
and problems can be traced back to the events and policies of the nineteenth century” 
(Richard, “Moreton Telegraph Station”). 
137
 See Colin Tatz, who discusses the controversy surrounding the use of the term 
"genocide" in the Australian context.  He points out that “[i]n the current climate of heat in 
Aboriginal affairs . . . very few people use the word. Almost all historians of the Aboriginal 
experience—black and white—avoid it.  They write about pacifying, killing, cleansing, 
excluding, exterminating, starving, poisoning, shooting, beheading, sterilising, exiling, 
removing—but avoid genocide.” 
138
 As Pro Rodeo Online proudly states: “Rodeo embodies the frontier spirit as 
manifested through the aggressive and exploitative conquest of the West, and deals with . . . 
the reordering of nature according to the dictates of this ethos.  It supports the value of 
subjugating nature, and reenacts the „taming‟ process whereby the wild is brought under 
control” (original ellipsis). 
139
 Even without breaches of welfare codes, rodeo animals invariably suffer.  From a 
position between the chutes and the holding pens at the Methven Rodeo 2006, for example, I 
observed young calves separated from their mothers and crammed into pens for long periods 
of time in which they could barely move.  Larger animals got stuck and twisted in the chutes; 
one was dragged out of this position by the tail.  Moreover, animals were intimidated (legally 
and illegally) by cowboys and handlers with sticks, kicks, cattle prods and loud noise.  
Animals, marked with old scars, displayed numerous new injuries at the end of the event, and 
rodeo participants/staff revealingly allowed me to film only “as long you‟re not SPCA.”  As 
for Australian rodeos, I have been shown undercover footage that gives evidence of several 
abuses during one particular event, including a young calf‟s legs being broken. 
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140
 However, the horses‟ bucking seems to have more to do with the flankstrap, as 
suggested by Ralph Clark himself and by my own observations at various New Zealand 
rodeos, where horses continued to buck after the cowboys were thrown and until the flank 
straps were removed. 
141
 Keith Thomas, commenting on early modern England, points out: "The ideal of 
human ascendancy . . . had implications for men's relations to each other, no less than for 
their treatment of the natural world.  Some men were seen as useful beasts, to be curbed, 
domesticated and kept docile; others were vermin and predators, to be eliminated" (46-47).  
He also suggests that pastoralism—the management of herds and domestication of animals—
and authoritarian rule over people perceived as animals "reinforced each other. . . . 
Domestication thus became the archetypal pattern for other kinds of social subordination.  
The model was a paternal one, with the ruler a good shepherd . . . . Loyal, docile animals 
obeying a considerate master were an example to all employees." (46).  Correspondingly, 
depicting Aborigines as animals was also a matter of convenience in justifying the abuse of 
Aboriginal labour. 
142
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “meat” as “[t]he flesh of animals used for 
food.” 
143
 This term is borrowed from Philo and Wilbert (10-11). 
144
 However, the sexualisation of “meat” in Kadaitcha does not always necessarily 
presuppose victimhood, as in Jelda‟s and Tommy‟s case at least (see 94, 288). 
145
 See also the description of Surfer‟s Paradise, where “[g]ambling, cheap flesh and 
illicit drugs [are] the common currencies and trading went on twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week,” a sign of “human degradation” (283). 
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146
 And he, too, alongside the other high society "butchers," so to speak, who are 
entertained at Booka‟s house, is ultimately "made meat of" and dismembered in revenge by 
Tommy, who tears his head off (see Kadaitcha 245). 
147
 The idea that Watson represents women in a degrading fashion seems to stem at 
least in part from a confusion between the author‟s position and the attitude of his 
protagonist.  Thus, Griffiths argues that the “numerous presentations of Jelled [sic] and other 
young Aboriginal women as sexually promiscuous” are “open to this kind of charge,” and 
states that “Watson‟s „defence‟ that they too are „warriors,‟ free of the sexual hang-ups of 
their white sisters, is a dubious one”(“Representing Difference” 481).  Griffiths does not 
provide a source for “Watson‟s "defence”; most likely, this refers to an assertion made by 
Tommy: "Black women had an alarming frankness about life and love.  They were totally 
different from their fucked up white sisters" (Kadaitcha 184).  However, Tommy‟s opinions 
cannot be equated with Watson‟s.  Griffiths seems to miss the fact that Tommy is a flawed 
hero, as Ningi points out: “„You have so many gifts, my boy,‟ Ningi said sadly.  „But you 
also have an abundance of stupidity and that can be very dangerous‟” (250). 
148
 In the context of Watson‟s hunting trope, one could say that the derogatory label 
“gin” is turned around into an empowering concept, as “gin traps” snap back to wound their 
oppressors, though the fact that women are “instrumental” in this way is still a contentious 
issue. 
149
 This is reinforced by the fact that “Gubba,” Tommy‟s surname, is not only “a 
common Aboriginal word for a white person” and “a colloquial abbreviation of the word 
„government,‟” but that it also means “peeping tom” (Gelder and Jacobs 110, 111). 
150
 By Mitläufer, I mean to denote someone who, despite having knowledge of 
injustices, allows them to occur or continue by either remaining passive about them or by 
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quietly enjoying the benefits of such acts, without being directly involved in committing 
them. 
151
 See for example Gideon Eshel and Pamela A. Martin for a study of the effects of 
meat production on the environment. 
152
 Meat and Livestock Australia (“Paddock to Plate”). 
153
 A recent campaign by Voiceless and Animals Australia, which involved adverts 
designed to look like recipes from a cookbook, illustrates just how controversial it is to bring 
the connection, the hidden processing of animals into meat, into the limelight.  The adverts, 
with titles such as “Lame and Pained Pork Pie” and “Traumatised Suckling Piglet with 
Severed Tail,” highlighted the suffering of factory farmed animals and were to be placed in 
mainstream Australian magazines.  However, all but two publications refused to print them 
(see Voiceless; “Disturbing Pork Ads Mess with Industry”). 
154
 With the official apology offered to the Stolen Generation by current Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd in 2008, these issues are beginning to be addressed.  The apology marks 
an important turning point in Australian politics and, perhaps, culture, and history changes as 
I write in 2009, such as the very recent declaration by Rudd's government that the previous 
Australian opposition to the UN Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous People be 
overturned and the declaration be endorsed.  The denial about Australia's past, however, is 
very recent and deeply ingrained, and Kadaitcha's message remains pertinent, as I argue here. 
155
 These took place on 21 March 2009. 
156
 One backpacker‟s website comments: “To carry out a top BarBie is indeed to 
become Australian” (Stoned Crow). 
157
 “We have found in Brisbane that white Australians will not walk unassisted to the 
Treaty table, we have to drag and force them to acknowledge us as equals” (Watson qtd. in 
Dean). 
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158
 Muecke is talking about human bodies only here, but the blurred distinction 
between human and non-human animal bodies is intrinsic to Mudrooroo‟s and Watson's 
maban realism, as humans and animals are “one” and of the same origins within the 
Dreaming. 
159
 “The most troubling aspect of the apology was the fact that Mr Rudd rejected the 
need for compensation to the Stolen Generations and instead proposed that closing the gap on 
Indigenous disadvantage was an appropriate substitute" (ANTaR).  Other concerns include 
the continuation of the so-called Northern Territory Intervention, instituted under the 
previous government and upheld by the Rudd government without adequate consultation of 
the communities affected (see, for instance, Socialist Alliance). 
160
 In this chapter, I follow Gerald Vizenor, King and others in using the capitalised 
version of “Native” to mean natives of the Americas and, given the subject matter at hand, 
specifically those of the North American continent.‟‟‟‟ 
161
 My use of the term “Indian” in this chapter reflects both the stereotype created by 
the frontier Myth of the Wild West and King‟s usage of the term, which plays on a “pan-
Indian” experience of colonisation as much as on the stereotype “Indians” are expected to 
conform to.  Gerald Vizenor rightly criticises the term: 
The name “Indian” is a convenient one, to be sure, but it is an invented term 
that does not come from any Native language, and it does not describe or 
contain any aspect of traditional Native experience or literature.  Indian, the 
noun, is a simulation of racialism, an undesirable separation of race in the 
political and cultural interests of discovery and colonial settlement of new 
nations; the noun does not reveal the experiences of diverse Native 
communities.  The name is unbidden, and the Native heirs must bear an 
unnatural burden to be so christened in their own land.  (47) 
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162
 Cynthia Sugars also comments on the trickster‟s deconstruction of colonialist 
binaries in Native literature in general (see 87n7). 
163
 Note the allusion to the circus announcements “Roll up, roll up” and “Are you 
ready to rumble?” 
164
 Coyote in Green Grass appears to be male, according to Robinson Crusoe (see 
Green Grass 258), so I will use “he” for King‟s trickster, but “she” when Weesageechak 
appears as the Fur Queen and “she-he” for the trickster in general.  I prefer the slash to the 
hyphen (as in “she/he” or “s/he”) because it is a connecting symbol more than a dividing 
device. 
165
 Robert A. Brightman describes the Weetigo of Cree narratives and beliefs: 
The most salient trait of the windigo is clearly anthropophagy, which contrasts 
with human zoophagy.  The term „cannibalism‟ is imprecise, since Crees 
emphasize that the witiko, although formerly human, no longer is so.  The 
very fact of eating or desiring to eat human flesh results in the loss of human 
identity, paradoxically resulting in a diet that is thereafter not technically 
cannibalistic.  (140). 
166
 Brightman‟s study of Rock Cree human-animal relationships is appropriate here: 
Brightman focuses primarily on the Rock Cree communities “in and around . . . Granville 
Lake and Pukatawagan” (xii), but he also explicitly includes Brochet, Highway‟s home 
community (xv).  Variations are possible due to the “fluidity and mobility of Cree society” 
(5-6), and it is not my intention to efface potential differences between the stories and beliefs 
of specific communities and those Highway may identify with.  However, Brightman‟s study 
of human-animal relationships is detailed and extensive—he acknowledges his limitations 
and his desire for a “Missinippi Cree” to “write a better book” (xi)—and I use Brightman‟s 
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account where the beliefs and practices he describes are reflected, at least to a significant 
degree, in Fur Queen. 
167
 Indeed, the arctic fox is “one of the few species [of fox] that humans consider 
edible” (Wallen 143). 
168
 It should be noted here that even though some Cree suggest that animals may have 
spoken in the past and hold the belief that “animals talked and behaved” like human beings at 
the beginning of the world, this past is “both continuous with and detached from the present” 
(Brightman 37-8). 
169
 Brightman points out here and elsewhere, however, that, outside of dreams, bears 
tend to have special status: “It is said that bears, for example, understand spoken Cree, a 
competence not conventionally generalized to other animals” (32). 
170
 Since Highway conceived his novel in Cree and translated as he wrote (Hodgson), 
I wonder whether “black coffee” might be a Cree pun that alludes to barking, or else, whether 
the English phrase “black coffee” might sound somewhat like barking to the ears of a Cree 
speaker; a point I can only surmise, but which a Cree speaker might clarify. 
171
 Indeed, animals are reported to speak Cree as part of the shaking lodge (Brightman 
173-6). 
172
 However, now that dogs are being trained to sniff out cancer cells in human 
bodies, this ability may not appear so “magical” anymore even to scientifically-minded 
Westerners. 
173
 Brightman points out, however, that “[i]n conventional waking experience, 
animals are usually seen as mute, noncultural, and unreactive socially with human beings.  
There is a Cree commonsense view that these visible differences separate animals from 
humans as qualitatively distinct life forms, whatever their similarities” (Brightman 161).  
Nonetheless, this commonsense view is not readily comparable to the distinctions made from 
Schwalm  423 
                                                                                                                                                        
Western scientific perspectives, as Brightman‟s many descriptions of Cree human-animal 
encounters show. 
174
 Rather than employing common terms such as “domestic animals” or “farmed 
animals,” I prefer the German concept of Nutztiere, “useful animals,” here.  The term and its 
application to fiction, and its distinction from the more common labels for farmed animals, 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
175
 I refer to Coyote with a capital “C” to denote the archetypal trickster figure, and 
“coyotes” in the plural and lower case when I mean the species.  “The coyote” here is taken 
from Sandlos and the Canadian Wildlife Service document he cites, reflecting the convention 
of referring to the many individuals belonging to a species by an emblematic singular term, 
but also signalling the ambivalence of “the animal” Sandlos discusses, who belongs to both 
the trickster stories and the biological realm. 
176
 See, for example, the scene in which “I” appears to be talking to Coyote, but is in 
fact directly addressing the reader: “„Okay,‟ says Coyote.  „Tell me a story.‟  „Okay,‟ I says.  
„You remember Old Woman?  You remember that big hole and Young Man Walking On 
Water?  You remember any of this at all?‟  „Sure,‟ says Coyote.  „I remember all of it.‟  „I 
wasn‟t talking to you,‟ I says.  „Who else is here?‟ says Coyote” (Green Grass 432). 
177
 See Flick for information on Fredric Remington, “the most famous artist of the Old 
West,” and for a comment on the stereotyping of Indians at Remmington‟s burlesque theatre 
(157). 
178
 Brightman discusses this extensively.  However, Brightman also points out that 
“[c]ontrary to Cree theology, moose, caribou, and beaver are not infinitely regenerated or 
reborn, or, at least, they proved not to be under the regime of intensified harvesting that 
followed the expansion of the inland posts” (300-1). 
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179
 Brightman relates how humans can display Weetigo tendencies: “Witikos are 
imagined as existing in a state of chronic ravenousness, evocative of the famine tragedies said 
to induce the condition.  One man said that persons who greedily ate acceptable food in great 
quantities were thought likely to be incipient witikos” (141). 
180
 The advert for the condominium in the mall is seemingly a minor detail, yet King 
repeatedly draws our attention to it (cf. Green Grass 413). 
181
 This slogan now no longer appears on their webpage. 
182
 In fact, James Bailey of the Barnum and Bailey circus worked for Buffalo Bill 
Cody as manager of the Wild West shows (see McMurtry 9).  Lewis Eldon Atherton writes 
further that “[w]ith the passing of the Wild West Shows, the American public turned its 
attention to rodeos” (77), and indeed, the founder of the Calgary Stampede, Guy Weadick, 
intended to “make Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West extravaganza look like a side show” (The 
Calgary Stampede, “The Calgary Stampede Story”). 
183
 See John Shelton Lawrence and Robert Jewett (50). 
184
 The Encyclopaedia Britannica describes the Wild West as “a spectacular featuring 
fancy shooting, a buffalo hunt, capture of the Deadwood (S.D.) stagecoach, a Pony Express 
ride, hard-riding cowboys, and yelling Indians” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Cody, William 
F.”) 
185
 Larry McMurtry stresses the importance of the Wild West in shaping American 
identity: “The Wild West, as it evolved under his [Bill Cody‟s] leadership, was always, 
however crudely, a pageant of American life—and particularly that part of it that had 
involved the settling of the American West” (115-6).  He also highlights the significance of 
patriotic elements in the performance: “He noticed that cowboys were always competing with 
one another in roping contests or bronco-riding contests.  Cody quickly concluded that if 
these ranch competitions could be organized, people might pay to see them.  If such 
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competitions could be linked to some patriotic theme or occasion, then lots of people might 
pay to see them” (115, original italics).  For the reception of the Wild West show in various 
European countries, see John Burke (185-200). 
186
 For an analysis of the currency of the frontier myth depicting hostile savages 
conquered by noble white men as propagated by Buffalo Bill Cody, and its both contrasting 
and complementary role in relation to nineteenth century historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner‟s myth of a peaceful settlement of the North American continent, see Richard White 
and Patricia Nelson Limerick respectively. 
187
 The ambiguity of the term “Western” is inevitable here and throughout this 
chapter. 
188
 Gill asserts that “[t]he famous Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West Show . . . exploited Native 
Americans as curiosities for audiences throughout the United States, Canada, and Europe.  
Even Sitting Bull traveled with the show in 1885” (122).  Ironically, the fact that Sitting Bull 
was part of the show is generally used as legitimisation for its project, and many sources 
stress that Buffalo Bill was a friend of Indians.  This sweeping generalisation aside, it also 
erases Buffalo Bill‟s role as an Indian Scout, and his bragging about the scalping of Chief 
Yellow Hair, as people want to see him as a flawless hero, not as the ambiguous human being 
he appears to have been. 
189
 “Native American ritual acts and ritual dress often involve the extensive use of 
feathers.  Among many people, nothing is more potent and meaningful than feathers.  
Feathers can scarcely be symbolic apart from images of motion, flight, air, and the sky.  The 
types of birds from which feathers can be collected and the habits and character of those birds 
provide an endless potential for religious symbols” (Gill 58). 
190
 Greg Dickinson, Brian L. Ott and Eric Aoki highlight the continued importance of 
the myth created and perpetuated by Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West: “The continuing desire for the 
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BBM‟s [Buffalo Bill Museum‟s] version of history is dramatically illustrated by public 
response to the West as America exhibit at the National Museum of American Art in 1991.”  
They describe the critical response to the exhibition, which “consistently highlighted the 
ideological biases of Western Art,” as “vitriolic,” and argue that, “[a]lthough the exhibit 
indicates that alternative visions of the West are representable, the resistance to this different 
vision of the West demonstrates the continuing importance of the traditional Western 
narrative to US American culture” (103-4). 
191
 Reg Crowshoe tells of the impossibility of passing knowledge, ceremonies and 
other cultural aspects on to the younger generation before the founder of the Calgary 
Stampede Guy Weadick invited “the First Nations, the Piikani, Kainai, Siksika, T‟suu Tina, 
and the Stoneys,” because the people were not allowed to leave the reservations without 
permits, Native languages and songs were forbidden, and First Nations tribes were coerced 
into giving up their nomadic life, living in teepees and travelling by horseback, in favour of 
farming.  Indeed, whilst Weadick invited them to “come in your teepees,” the government 
tried to intervene and wanted them to show off their successes as farmers.  However, seeing 
the opportunity to gather again and pass on their cultural knowledge to their children, 
Crowshoe recounts how the tribes came with teepees and Pow-Wow drums regardless.  
Crowshoe also points out that Calgary was an important meeting and ceremonial ground long 
before the city ever existed, and participating in the Calgary Stampede was in fact a return “to 
their old camping grounds” (Crowshoe, “Doctor Elder Reg Crowshoe Reflects”). 
192
 King writes about Sitting Bull “who, nine years after the Battle of the Little 
Bighorn, was touring with Buffalo Bill‟s Wild West Show at a salary of $50 a week, plus a 
$150 signing bonus” and mentions “about thirty Indians who had been involved in the 1890 
Wounded Knee Massacre.”  He points out that, “[s]een as malcontents, they were given the 
choice of touring with Buffalo Bill or going to jail.  An easy choice, if you ask me” (Truth 
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about Stories 87).  Burke asserts that Sitting Bull joined the Wild West because he “had a 
large family and needed the money” (157). 
193
 In some ways, King follows in the footsteps of some of the Native members of 
Buffalo Bill‟s troupe who, during the show‟s tour of Europe, managed to turn the circus and 
the exoticising gaze around after a visit to the Vatican, where they “laughed all the way back 
to the campsite” at the “idea of the Swiss Guard pretending to be warriors” (Burke 195).  
They also managed to have the last word when Buffalo Bill‟s press agent John Burke 
delivered a speech in Barcelona: “He gestured dramatically toward the nearby statue of 
Columbus and declaimed, „There stands our advance agent, four hundred years ahead of us‟.  
„Damn bad day for us,‟ one of the Indians remarked in cultivated tones, „when he discovered 
America‟” (Burke 192, original italics). 
194
 “Red Dog” may be a pun on “Read Dog,” since Lionel is a “Dog” who went to 
university after all, and an allusion to “clever animals” circus tricks such as the famous 
Clever Hans horse who was believed to be able to count. 
195
 For the significance of the phrase in, for example, contemporary pan-Indian 
religion, see Jordan Paper (643-4); for the Lakota specifically see Marsha Bol (102). 
196
 Thorp would not consider Green Grass an enactment narrative, because, by her 
definition, enactment narratives are “evocations not of a pan-Indian reality, but that of the 
specific cultures they portray” (165). 
197
 Gill‟s comment about Native creation stories is also appropriate here to distinguish 
“myth” from M. H. Abrams‟ definition of mythology as “a religion in which we no longer 
believe” (Abrams 111, 5th ed.).  Gill writes:  
It is common to refer to such stories as mythology or, more exactly, as 
creation or cosmogonic mythology.  The distinctive marker of these stories, 
being set „in the beginning,‟ is not a historical reckoning.  It is rather a way to 
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designate events as beyond question and doubt, beyond precedent.  Nor does 
mythology mean false or scientifically false, yet believed by the primitive or 
unsophisticated.  (10) 
198
 For a more detailed reading of the Okimasis brothers‟ enactment of the Ayash 
myth, particularly in relation to the Weetigo as sexual predator and embodiment of 
Christianity, see McKegney‟s “From Trickster Poetics to TransgressivePolitics” and 
“Claiming Native Narrative Control: Tomson Highway on Residential Schooling.” 
199
 Abraham Okimasis‟ win is also, in a sense, a mythical transformation of 
Highway‟s own father‟s dog race victory.  Joe Highway won the dog race at the Les Pas 
Trapper‟s Festival in 1951 (Moss; “Race Winners”). 
200
 See also Wallen (43-4). 
201
 For an account of the vulgar, shocking and sexual elements of Coyote stories, see 
Dell H. Hymes. 
202
 For other symbolic meanings of the Okimasis brothers‟ enactments of Catholic 
rituals, see Sugars. 
203
 “Hee-hee-hee-hee-hee-hee-hee-hee” (Coyote qtd. in Green Grass 451). 
204
 “„See,‟ says Coyote.  „See.  I can be helpful‟” (Green Grass 422). 
205
 Thomas (Robert Kroetsch 108, 112),  Lecker (105, 98), and Wilson ("Boundary 
40) list a number of allusions to Graeco-Roman myths in What the Crow Said.  
206
 See Jan Horner for an in-depth discussion of Hodgins' conflation of Irish and 
Biblical myths. 
207
 See also Lois Parkinson Zamora and Faris (2), Angel Flores (114), or Scott 
Simpkins (150). 
208
 See Robin Hard and Herbert J. Rose for the myth of Lykaon (538-40). 
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209
 The gender of the crow, too, is ambiguous, as Rudy Dorscht points out (76-7), and 
the Schmier players “couldn‟t agree on the sex of the crow” (What the Crow Said 11).  
210
 J'nan Morse Sellery also considers the crow an “animal trickster” (21).  
211
 If, indeed, it is actually the crow on the hull.  Liebhaber is certain that it is the 
crow, but he never sees her/him, to verify his belief. 
212
 See Carol Langhelle‟s discussion of “Maggie‟s „triumph‟ over Keneally” and the 
role of Maggie and Wade‟s final “show of love” in connection with Christian Science beliefs 
(51). 
213
 I disagree with Delbaere-Garant‟s generalisation here, though, as this statement 
does not apply to Peter Carey‟s and Richard Flanagan‟s magic realist novels, for example. 
214
 See also Kroetsch, Crow Journals (69). 
215
 Jeffrey, too, notes that “beginning in the early 1960s,” Hodgins‟ “sense of the real” 
shows “the impact of reading Mary Baker Eddy” (209).  He also points out, in a biographical 
note on Hodgins, that “the family are conscientious adherents to Christian Science” (189).  
216
 “Reality seems at least somewhat contingent upon what we can touch, taste, hear, 
feel, and see with our ordinary eyes” (Jeffrey 207).  
217
 Eddy writes: “No one can reasonably doubt that the purpose of this allegory—this 
second account in Genesis—is to depict the falsity of error and the effects of error.  
Subsequent Bible revelation is coordinate with the Science of creation recorded in the first 
chapter of Genesis” (537).  All citations from Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures 
were accessed on the Spirituality.com website.  For convenience, I have given the page 
numbers of the print version, provided on the website, in the text. 
218
 “Heathen mythology and Jewish theology have perpetuated the fallacy that 
intelligence, soul, and life can be in matter; and idolatry and ritualism are the outcome of all 
man-made beliefs” (Eddy 466). 
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219
 “Divine logic and revelation coincide. If we believe otherwise, we may be sure that 
either our logic is at fault or that we have misinterpreted revelation. Good never causes evil, 
nor creates aught that can cause evil” (Eddy 93). 
220
 For Eddy, the premise is wrong from the outset, as no ailing physical body exists 
to begin with.  See Eddy‟s chapter in Science and Health devoted to the subject, entitled 
“Animal Magnetism Unmasked.” 
221
 See also Langhelle‟s discussion of The Invention of the World as an allegorical 
narrative, and the relationship between Maggie‟s and Keneally‟s respective stories, in the 
context of Christian Science (13-15). 
222
 I use "it" advisedly here. 
223
John Berger considers the objectification of animals to be the result of 
industrialisation, whereby “[a]nimals required for food are processed like manufactured 
commodities.”  He discusses the “physical marginalisation” of animals, who „disappear‟ into 
feedlots, or into the privacy and isolation of the family home.  Berger parallels this with the 
animals‟ “cultural marginalisation.”  He writes: “The animals of the mind, instead of being 
dispersed, have been co-opted into other categories so that the category animal has lost its 
central importance.  Mostly they have been co-opted into the family and into the spectacle.”  
Berger cites picture books, Disney characters and animal photography as examples.  As a 
result, he says, “animals are always the observed.  The fact that they can observe us has lost 
all significance” (Berger, “Vanishing Animals” 664-5).  See also Philip Armstrong‟s 
discussion of the connection between industrial farming practices and visual representations 
of farmed animals, who signify, in the end, primarily the products made from them: they are 
“always already meat” (Armstrong, “Farming Images” 121). 
224
 This cat here is of course a companion animal and not a useful animal (unlike cats 
who, for example, are primarily kept to catch mice).  A companion animal is usually 
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considered irreplaceable.  Conceptualised as pets, however, animals tend to be commodified 
and therefore often replaceable.  (Keneally‟s two „Thunderbirds‟ are an example of this.)  
This, however, is determined by their relationship to humans.  There is no intrinsic, biological 
reason why a cow, for instance, should be a useful animal, and why a cat should be a pet or 
animal companion.  Cats can be eaten, and cows can be companions. 
225
 It is a fitting oxymoron that magical realist animals can be conceptualised as those 
kinds of representations of animals that refuse to be conceptualised. 
226
 See also Derrida‟s use of “asinine” (398), and the translator‟s footnote no. 22 on 
the same page, concerning his translation of Derrida‟s original “bête” and “bêtise.” 
227
 See Kendall Thu, who describes a “shift from pasture-based and open-lot 
production to total animal confinement, beginning in the early 1970s” (16). 
228
 Margaret Atwood also writes, "the animal as victim is a persistent image in 
Canadian literature . . ." (79). 
229
 He does, however, address the environmental problems associated with logging, 
such the mudslide in the final chapter of Joseph Bourne. 
230
 British Columbia also has a strong rodeo culture.  See The British Columbia 
Rodeo Association. 
231
 Horner comments on Horseman‟s “supernatural” appearance (6) .  She also 
associates him with the Tuatha De Danann and Irish “peasant belief . . . that supernatural 
horsemen rode between the mountains” (Horner 13), and with the riders of the apocalypse 
(Horner 14).  See also Langhelle (20).  See Delbaere-Garant, who considers Horseman a 
manifestation of psychic realism (254), and her comment on Kroetsch‟s and Slemon‟s 
interpretations of Horseman (255). 
232
 At the 2006 Calgary Stampede, there is $1.6 million in prize money to be made 
(Calgary Stampede Rodeo, “Calgary Stampede Rodeo Action”).  See also the origins of the 
Schwalm  432 
                                                                                                                                                        
Stampede: “With origins as an 1886 Agricultural Fair to the world-famous attraction that it is 
today” (Calgary Exhibition and Stampede, “About Stampede: History”). 
233
 The American Humane Association, however, “contends that rodeos are not an 
accurate or harmless portrayal of ranching skills; rather, they display and encourage an 
insensitivity to the acceptance of brutal treatment of animals in the name of sport.”  
234
 See, for instance, Fiachra Gibbons. 
235
 All page numbers for Life of Pi refer to the Canongate paperback edition (2003). 
236
 See Douglas Johnstone. 
237
 Cf. Armstrong (What Animals Mean 179). 
238
 Contrary to Pi‟s assertion, zoos and related entertainment forms are not only 
businesses, but also in some cases distinctive brand names.  The San Diego Zoo, for example, 
which Pi highlights as a particularly good zoo (Life of Pi 40), appeals to potential corporate 
sponsors as “one of the most powerful and impactful [sic] brands in Southern California (San 
Diego Zoo, "Partnership Marketing”).  Their advert succinctly states: “Nothing draws 
customers like a good cause.  That‟s what cause marketing can do for you.  Companies can 
see strong sales when linking their products to saving endangered species and their habitats” 
(“Partnership Marketing).  Apart from generating income to pay not only for the animals‟ 
food and shelter but also the zookeepers, general staff, the board of directors, public relations 
officers, suppliers and, where applicable, shareholders, the benefits of being associated with 
zoos especially for companies with dubious environmental records is evident in such 
partnerships as the Auckland Zoo‟s exhibit, which used to be known as the “McDonald‟s 
Rainforest” (see McSpotlight), until the sponsor changed. 
239
 Unlike the Paris launch of the International Polar Year, which was well attended 
by reporters, only a handful of media outlets appeared at the Berlin launch, which competed 
with a veritable media circus at the Berlin Zoo.  (Information supplied by Bettina Kaiser, 
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Chair of APECS [Association of Polar Early Career Scientists] Germany, and Education 
Coordinator of the New Zealand Youth Steering Committee of the International Polar Year). 
240
 Knut is such an “ambassador.”  See “Respect Habitats. Knut.”  Also cf. Malamud 
(44) and Schwalm (96). 
241
 See Berger (“Vanishing Animals” 664). 
242
 This is especially relevant when neoteny comes into play and elicits, more or less 
strongly, an instinctive attraction.  This is illustrated by the common promotion of newborn 
animals by zoos, for example. 
243
 It also strongly suggests that Martel looked up theories or discussions related to 
magical realism and decided to address the broad consensus of what defines magical realism; 
otherwise, it is uncanny how this formula of sorts for magical realism, repeated and discussed 
by critics in many variations, is so explicitly addressed. 
244
 As Huggan, referring to Root, writes: “. . . the objects of [exoticism‟s] gaze are not 
supposed to look back (Postcolonial Exotic 14). 
245
 Almost every third person (32%) in Montreal was a religious worshipper in 2001, 
including Buddhists, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians and Hindus (Todd). 
246
 A similar mechanism is at work in the "cultural sharing" between Maasai and the 
San Diego Zoo (see San Diego Zoo, “Maasai Culture Share Program”; M&C Saatchi, ““San 
Diego Zoo‟s Wild Animal Park—Journey into Africa: Masai”).  The term “share” really 
clouds the fact that zoos have a history of exhibiting  peoples from countries deemed exotic 
by the West.  It seems that in this context the idea of “culture share” can really only be 
considered genuine if a contingent of US Americans will follow up by going to a Kenyan 
zoo, in order to demonstrate, say, scrap-booking, quilting, and burger-flipping, to tell stories 
of mass produced turkeys and pet dog fashion, and to allow Saatchi and Saatchi to produce a 
glossy advert making fun of ballroom and line dancing. 
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247
 See Edemariam. 
248
 Martel comments on his process of becoming a writer: “You must have masters to 
imitate first before you become a writer yourself” (Interview with Mishal Husain). 
249
 Since the hyena is primarily a “function,” as Martel explains, “it” seems 
appropriate. 
250
 See also Martel (“How I Wrote Life of Pi”; Interview with Mishal Husain). 
251
 See also Amanda Onion, who writes about the difficulty of drawing attention and 
funding to insect conservation, because “[b]ig and pretty animals get all the glory.” 
252
 Seeing hyenas in their natural habitat is quite a different experience, which makes 
Pi‟s preoccupation with the hyena‟s perceived lack of beauty seem rather trivial. 
253
 I am borrowing and reversing the argument of Turner and Ash here, who write, in 
relation to Balinese art and tourist kitsch: “Many aspects of Balinese culture and art are so 
bewilderingly complex and alien to western modes that they do not lend themselves readily to 
the process of over-simplification and mass production that converts indigenous art forms 
into tourist kitsch” (qtd. in Huggan, Postcolonial Exotic 7-8). 
254
 I am referring back to Foucault‟s phrase “impossible to think,” of course. 
255
 Indeed, boredom can be a form of terror itself, as torture methods such as sensory 
deprivation and prolonged solitary confinement, or even the behaviour of zoochotic animals 
demonstrate.  If Pi, however, amused himself by being bored, that would be an oxymoron. 
256
 Under such circumstances, an animal can hardly be considered a “who.” 
257
 Allende, Isabel. Das Geisterhaus. Suhrkamp, 2004. 
258
 That is, aside from being safeguards that prevent visitors from becoming dinner for 
carnivores. 
259
 Urry is referring to MacCannell‟s discussion of the signage provided to frame 
tourist attractions. 
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260
 Pi (and/or possibly Martel) makes this mistake two more times: “I wondered 
whether this algae would ever cease to amaze me with its botanical strangeness” (Life of Pi 
278); “A fish-eating algae that produces fresh water?” (Life of Pi 294). 
261
 For a detailed discussion of the exhibition in zoos of people deemed exotic, for 
example, Rothfels‟ Savages and Beasts. 
262
 See also Martel (“How I Wrote Life of Pi”; “Exclusive Interview—Life of Yann 
Martel”; “Conversation”; Iris Alanyali; Luke Harding. 
263
 Carsten Würmann, who interviewed Martel in the Berlin Zoo, paraphrases the 
author as saying that the “defence of zoos” in the novel was “undoubtedly exaggerated” (“Im 
Roman habe er das Plädoyer für den Zoo sicherlich übertrieben.”) (“Der mit den Tieren 
schreibt,” my translation).  However, Pi reflects, in essence, the opinion Martel puts forward 
in regard to zoos.  See, for example, Martel's “A Giraffe in a Cage is worth two on the Box.” 
264
 For an extensive argument critical of zoos, see Malamud‟s Reading Zoos. 
265
 In fact, zoos are better compared to old-fashioned mental asylums than to hotels 
(see Malamud 115-6). 
266
 Pi reflects an observation made by Masson and McCarthy: “I]t has been argued 
that if all an animal‟s needs are met, it will not care whether it is free or not” (144). 
267
 In any case, despite having cages and enclosures, Trivandrum Zoo, for example, 
where Martel did much of his research, is evidently unable to stop people from harassing the 
animals by “frequently lob[bing] things at the animals to wake them up” (Harding). 
268
 The Whovi Game Park in Matobo covers a fenced area of around 105 km² 
(approximately 25,946 acres) (Rachlow and Berger 102).  In comparison, the San Diego 
Zoo‟s Wild Animal Park has “[o]ver half of the Park‟s 1,800 acres [approximately 7.3 km²] . 
. . set aside as protected native species habitat” (San Diego Zoo, “About the Zoological 
Society”). 
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269
 Masson and McCarthy comment on the difficulty of determining whether “good 
zoos” exists:  
Can there be a good zoo?  Since animal behaviour is so often flexible, it seems 
that this ought to be possible, but then most animals are not held captive by 
people who are asking what it would take to make the animal happy.  They ask 
what it would take to make the animal docile, or to make a good exhibit, or to 
breed.  We do not study the art of making zoo animals content, thrilled or 
joyous.  (146) 
Arguably, “enrichment” experiments study just that; however, since the outcome is never 
compared with wild populations provided with the same tasks and opportunities, it is difficult 
to prove that the so-called enrichment sufficiently meets the animals‟ needs, as Masson and 
McCarthy point out in the context of animal acts (see 143-4), which are often represented as 
better for the animals‟ welfare than regular zoo captivity. 
270
 See Martel (“A Giraffe in a Cage is Worth Two on the Box”). 
271
 This is the point where Pi and Martel differ, as Martel insists the best place for 
animals is their natural habitat. 
272
 “Martels Lieblingsbeschäftigung im Zoo ist, den Tieren in die Augen zu sehen.” 
273
 Zoos, arguably, teach children not to respect animals, but to see them as 
commodities at our disposal (cf. Malamud 43-4).  In any case, the experience of seeing wild 
animals compares in no way to the experience of seeing them “in the flesh” in the zoo or 
circus. 
274
 Cf. Schwalm (91). 
275
 Malamud comments that the argument that “[z]oos are better now than ever” veils 
the many shortcoming of contemporary zoos (46-49). 
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276
 For the ideological underpinnings of and justifications for circuses, see Schwalm, 
“No Circus without Animals?” 
277
 “Taming” is really a euphemism when it means subjugation by intimidation, 
instead of teaching animals to overcome their fear of humans by demonstrating that there is 
nothing to fear.  Pi employs the euphemism; another instance of mythical speech (see Life of 
Pi 164, 165, 181). 
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